Caput 104 Chapter 104 Quod opera magorum non sunt solum ex impressione caelestium corporum That the works of magicians result not only from the influence of heavenly bodies Fuerunt autem quidam dicentes quod huiusmodi opera nobis mirabilia quae per artes magicas fiunt, non ab aliquibus spiritualibus substantiis fiunt, sed ex virtute caelestium corporum. Cuius signum videtur quod ab exercentibus huiusmodi opera stellarum certus situs consideratur. Adhibentur etiam quaedam herbarum et aliarum corporalium rerum auxilia, quasi ad praeparandam inferiorem materiam ad suscipiendam influentiam virtutis caelestis. Some there were who averred that such works as seem wonderful to us, being wrought by the magic art, are done not by certain spiritual substances, but by the power of the heavenly bodies. This would seem to be indicated by the fact that those who practice works of this kind observe the position of the stars, and are assisted by the employment of certain herbs and other corporeal things, for the purpose, as it were, of preparing matter of lower degree to receive the influence of the celestial power. Hoc autem expresse apparentibus adversatur. Cum enim non sit possibile ex aliquibus corporeis principiis intellectum causari, ut supra probatum est, impossibile est quod effectus qui sunt proprii intellectualis naturae, ex virtute caelestis corporis causentur. In huiusmodi autem operationibus magorum apparent quaedam quae sunt propria rationalis naturae opera: redduntur enim responsa de furtis sublatis, et de aliis huiusmodi, quod non posset fieri nisi per intellectum. Non est igitur verum omnes huiusmodi effectus ex sola virtute caelestium corporum causari. But this is in contradiction with what is apparent. For as it is impossible that an intellect be formed from corporeal principles, as we proved above, it is impossible for effects that are caused exclusively by the intellectual nature to be produced by the power of a heavenly body. Now in these works of magicians, things appear that are exclusively the work of a rational nature—for instance, answers are given about stolen goods and the like—and this could not be done except by an intelligence. Therefore, it is not true that all such effects are caused by the mere power of a heavenly body. Praeterea. Ipsa loquela proprius actus est rationalis naturae. Apparent autem aliqui colloquentes hominibus in praedictis operationibus, et ratiocinantes de diversis. Non est igitur possibile quod huiusmodi fiant sola virtute caelestium corporum. Further. Speech is an act proper to the rational nature. Now in these works people appear to men and speak to them on various matters. Therefore, such things cannot be done by the mere power of heavenly bodies. Si quis autem dicat quod huiusmodi apparentiae non sunt secundum sensum exteriorem, sed secundum imaginationem tantum: hoc quidem, primo, non videtur verum. Non enim alicui apparent formae imaginatae quasi res verae, nisi fiat alienatio ab exterioribus sensibus: quia non potest esse quod similitudinibus intendatur tanquam rebus, nisi ligato naturali iudicatorio sensus. Huiusmodi autem collocutiones et apparitiones fiunt ad homines qui utuntur libere sensibus exterioribus. Non est igitur possibile quod huiusmodi visa vel audita sint secundum imaginationem tantum. If, however, someone say that these apparitions are present not to the sensorial organ, but only to the imagination, this is, in the first place, apparently untrue. For imaginary forms do not seem real to anyone unless his external senses be suspended, since it is not possible for a person to look on a likeness as a reality unless the natural judgements of the senses are tied. Now these conversations and apparitions are addressed to those who have free use of their external senses. Therefore, these apparitions and speeches cannot be imaginary. Deinde, ex quibuscumque formis imaginatis non potest alicui provenire intellectualis cognitio ultra facultatem naturalem vel acquisitam sui intellectus: quod etiam in somniis patet, in quibus, etsi sit aliqua praesignatio futurorum, non tamen quicumque videns somnia, eorum significata intelligit. Per huiusmodi autem visa vel audita quae apparent in operibus magorum, plerumque advenit alicui intellectualis cognitio aliquorum quae sui intellectus facultatem excedunt: sicut revelatio occultorum thesaurorum, manifestatio futurorum, et quandoque etiam de aliquibus documentis scientiae alicuius vera respondentur. Oportet ergo quod vel illi apparentes et colloquentes non videantur secundum imaginationem tantum: vel saltem quod hoc fiat virtute alicuius intellectus superioris, quod homo per huiusmodi imaginationes in cognitionem talium adducatur; et non fiat hoc virtute solum caelestium corporum. Besides, no imaginary forms can lead a person to intellectual knowledge beyond the natural or acquired faculty of his intellect. This is evident in dreams, since even if they contain some indication of the future, it is not every dreamer that understands the meaning of his dreams. Now, in these apparitions and speeches that occur in the works of magicians, it frequently happens that a person obtains knowledge of things surpassing the faculty of his intelligence, such as the discovery of hidden treasure, the manifestation of the future, and sometimes even true answers are given in matters of science. Either, therefore, these apparitions or speeches are not purely imaginary, or at least it is the work of some higher intelligence, and not only of a heavenly body, that a person obtain the aforesaid knowledge through these imaginings. Adhuc. Quod virtute caelestium corporum fit, est effectus naturalis: nam formae naturales sunt quae in inferioribus causantur ex virtute caelestium corporum. Quod igitur nulli rei potest esse naturale, non potest fieri virtute caelestium corporum. Quaedam autem talia fieri dicuntur per operationes praedictas: sicut quod ad praesentiam alicuius quaecumque sera ei pandatur, quod aliquis invisibilis reddatur, et multa huiusmodi narrantur. Non est igitur possibile hoc fieri virtute caelestium corporum. Again. That which is done by the power of heavenly bodies is a natural effect, since they are natural forms that are caused in this lower world by the powers of heavenly bodies. Hence that which cannot be natural to anything cannot be caused by the power of the heavenly bodies. And yet some such things are stated to be caused by the aforesaid works: for instance, it is averred that at the mere presence of a certain person all doors are unlocked, that a certain man become invisible, and many like occurrences are related. Therefore, this cannot be done by the power of heavenly bodies. Amplius. Cuicumque virtute caelestium corporum confertur quod posterius est, confertur et ei quod prius est. Moveri autem ex se consequitur ad habere animam: animatorum enim proprium est quod moveant seipsa. Impossibile est igitur fieri virtute caelestium corporum quod aliquod inanimatum per se moveatur. Fieri autem hoc per magicas artes dicitur, quod aliqua statua per se moveatur, aut vocem emittat. Non est ergo possibile quod effectus magicarum artium fiat virtute caelesti. Further. The reception of that which follows through the power of heavenly bodies implies the reception of what precedes. Now movement, of its very nature, is the result of having a soul, since it is proper to animate things to move themselves. Therefore, it is impossible for an inanimate being to be moved by itself through the power of a heavenly body. Yet it is stated that by the magic art an image is made to move of itself, or to speak. Therefore, it is not possible for the effects of the magic art to be caused by a celestial power. Si autem dicatur quod statua illa sortitur aliquod principium vitae virtute caelestium corporum, hoc est impossibile. Principium enim vitae in omnibus viventibus est forma substantialis: vivere enim est esse viventibus, ut philosophus dicit, in II de anima. Impossibile est autem quod aliquid recipiat aliquam formam substantialem de novo nisi amittat formam quam prius habuit: generatio enim unius est corruptio alterius. In fabricatione autem alicuius statuae non abiicitur aliqua forma substantialis, sed fit transmutatio solum secundum figuram, quae est accidens: manet enim forma cupri, vel alicuius huiusmodi. Non est igitur possibile quod huiusmodi statuae sortiantur aliquod principium vitae. And if it be said that the image in question is endowed with some vital principle by the power of the heavenly bodies, this is impossible. For the principle of life in all living things is the substantial form, because in living things to be is to live, as the Philosopher says. Now, it is impossible for anything to receive anew a substantial form unless it lose the form which it had previously, since the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. But in the making of an image no substantial form is discarded, and there is only a change of shape, which is an accident, since the form of copper or something of the kind remains. Therefore, the image in question cannot possibly be endowed with the vital principle. Adhuc. Si aliquid per principium vitae moveatur, necesse est quod habeat sensum: movens enim est sensus vel intellectus. Intellectus autem in generabilibus et corruptibilibus non est sine sensu. Sensus autem non potest esse ubi non est tactus: nec tactus sine organo medie temperato. Talis autem temperies non invenitur in lapide vel cera vel metallo, ex quo fit statua. Non est igitur possibile quod huiusmodi statuae moveantur per principium vitae. Further. If anything is moved by a principle of life it necessarily has sensation, for the principle of movement is sensation or understanding. But understanding is not found without sensation in things that come to be and pass away. Now there cannot be sensation where there is not the sense of touch; nor the sense of touch without an organ of mean temperature. Such a temperature, however, is not found in the stone or wax or metal out of which the statue is made. It is not possible, therefore, that statues of this sort should be moved by a principle of life. Amplius. Viventia perfecta non solum generantur virtute caelesti, sed etiam ex semine: homo enim generat hominem et sol. Quae vero ex sola virtute caelesti sine semine generantur, sunt animalia generata ex putrefactione, quae inter alia ignobiliora sunt. Si igitur per virtutem caelestem solam huiusmodi statuae sortiuntur principium vitae, per quod moveant seipsa, oportet ea esse ignobilissima inter animalia. Quod tamen esset falsum, si per principium vitae intrinsecum operarentur: nam in earum actibus apparent nobiles operationes, cum respondeant de occultis. Non est igitur possibile quod operentur vel moveantur per principium vitae. Besides. Perfect living things are generated not only by a celestial power, but also from seed, for man and the sun generate man. Those which are generated by a celestial power alone without seed are animals formed by putrefaction; these belong to a lower grade than the others. Accordingly, if these images be endowed with the vital principle by a celestial power alone, so as to move themselves, it follows that they belong to the lowest grade of animals. And yet this would be false if they worked by an intrinsic principle of life, since among their operations some are of a high degree, for they give answers about hidden things. Therefore, it is not possible that their operations and movements proceed from a principle of life. Item. Effectum naturalem virtute caelestium corporum productum contingit inveniri absque artis operatione: etsi enim aliquo artificio aliquis operetur ad generationem ranarum, vel aliquorum huiusmodi, contingit tamen generari ranas absque omni artificio. Si ergo virtute caelestium corporum huiusmodi statuae, quae per artem nigromanticam fiunt, sortiantur principium vitae, erit invenire generationem talium absque huiusmodi arte. Hoc autem non invenitur. Manifestum est igitur quod huiusmodi statuae non habent principium vitae, neque moventur virtute caelestis corporis. Again. We find sometimes a natural effect produced by the power of heavenly bodies without the operation of art: thus, although one may produce frogs or something of the kind by means of some artifice, frogs do happen to be produced without any artifice. Consequently, if these images that are made by necromancy are endowed with the vital principle by the power of heavenly bodies, it will be possible for them to be formed without the operation of art. But this is not the case. Therefore, it is evident that such images have not the principle of life, nor are they moved by the power of heavenly bodies. Per haec autem excluditur positio Hermetis, qui sic dixit, ut Augustinus refert, VIII de civitate Dei: Deus sicut effector est deorum caelestium, ita homo fictor est deorum qui in templis sunt, humana proximitate contenti: statuas dico animatas, sensu et spiritu plenas, tantaque facientes et talia; statuas futurorum praescias; easdem de somniis et multis aliis rebus praedicentes; imbecillitates hominibus facientes, eosque curantes; tristitiam laetitiamque dantes pro meritis. Hereby we refute the opinion of Hermes who, according to Augustine, expressed himself thus: As God is the cause of the heavenly gods, so man fashions the gods that reside in temples, being satisfied to live near men. I refer to those animal images, endowed with sense and spirit, that do great and wonderful things, images gifted with knowledge of the future, and who foretell by dreams and many other things; who afflict men with ailments and heal them, who bring sorrow and joy to them according to their merits. Haec etiam positio auctoritate divina destruitur. Dicitur enim in Psalmo: simulacra gentium argentum et aurum, opera manuum hominum. Os habent et non loquentur: neque enim est spiritus in ore ipsorum. This opinion is also refuted by divine authority. For it is said in the Psalm: The idols of the nations are silver and gold, the work of men’s hands. They have mouths, but they speak not, they have eyes, but they see not, they have ears, but they hear not, nor is there any breath in their mouths (Ps 135[134]:15–17). Non videtur autem omnino negandum quin in praedictis ex virtute caelestium corporum aliquid virtutis esse possit: ad illos tamen solos effectus quos virtute caelestium corporum aliqua inferiora corpora producere possunt. Yet seemingly we must not absolutely deny the possibility of some kind of efficacy being in these things through the power of the heavenly bodies, but only for such effects as certain lower bodies are able to cause by the power of the heavenly bodies. Caput 105 Chapter 105 Unde magorum operationes efficaciam habeant Whence the works of magicians derive their efficacy Investigandum autem relinquitur unde artes magicae efficaciam habeant. Quod quidem facile perpendi potest si modus operationis earum attendatur. It remains for us to inquire whence the magic arts derive their efficacy: a question that will present no difficulty if we consider their mode of operation. In suis enim operationibus utuntur vocibus quibusdam significativis ad determinatos effectus producendos. Vox autem, inquantum est significativa, non habet virtutem nisi ex aliquo intellectu: vel ex intellectu proferentis; vel ex intellectu eius ad quem profertur. Ex proferentis quidem intellectu, sicut si aliquis intellectus sit tantae virtutis quod sua conceptione res possit causare, quam quidem conceptionem vocis officio producendis effectibus quodammodo praesentat. Ex intellectu autem eius ad quem sermo dirigitur, sicut cum per significationem vocis in intellectu receptam, audiens inducitur ad aliquid faciendum. Non autem potest dici quod voces illae significativae a magis prolatae efficaciam habeant ex intellectu proferentis. Cum enim virtus essentiam consequatur, virtutis diversitas essentialium principiorum diversitatem ostendit. Intellectus autem communiter hominum huius dispositionis invenitur quod eius cognitio ex rebus causatur, magis quam sua conceptione res causare possit. Si igitur sint aliqui homines qui verbis conceptionem sui intellectus exprimentibus res possint transmutare propria virtute, erunt alterius speciei, et dicentur aequivoce homines. For in the practice of their art they make use of certain significative words, in order to produce certain definite effects. Now, words, insofar as they signify something, have no power except as derived from some intellect, either that of the speaker or of the person to whom they are spoken. They are from the intellect of the speaker when an intellect is of such great power that it can cause things by its mere thought, the voice serving to convey, as it were, this thought to the things that are to be produced. They are from the intellect of the person to whom the words are addressed when the hearer is induced to do some particular thing through his intellect receiving the signification of those words. Now, it cannot be said that these significative words uttered by magicians derive efficacy from the intellect of the speaker. For, since power follows essence, diversity of power indicates diversity of essential principles. Moreover, man’s intellect is invariably of such a disposition that its knowledge is caused by things, rather than that it is able by its mere thought to cause things. Consequently, if there be any men that are able of their own power to transform things by words expressive of their thoughts, they will belong to another species, and it would be an equivocation to call them men. Amplius. Virtus faciendi non acquiritur per disciplinam, sed solum cognitio aliquid faciendi. Per disciplinam autem aliqui acquirunt quod huiusmodi operationes magicas efficiant. Non igitur est in eis ad huiusmodi effectus producendos virtus aliqua, sed cognitio sola. Further. By learning we acquire not the power to do a thing, but the knowledge of how to do it. Yet some, by learning, are rendered able to perform these magic works. Therefore, they must have not only knowledge but also the power to produce these effects. Si quis autem dicat quod huiusmodi homines sua nativitate, ex virtute stellarum, sortiuntur prae ceteris virtutem praedictam, ita quod, quantumcumque alii instruantur, qui hoc ex nativitate non habent, efficaces in huiusmodi operibus esse non possunt: primo quidem dicendum est quod corpora caelestia super intellectum imprimere non possunt, ut supra ostensum est. Non igitur ex virtute stellarum sortiri potest intellectus alicuius hanc virtutem quod repraesentatio suae conceptionis per vocem sit alicuius effectiva. If someone say that these men are born with the aforesaid power by the influence of the stars, while others are excluded from it, so that, however much the others who are born without this power may be instructed, they cannot succeed in performing these works; we reply first that, as shown above, heavenly bodies cannot make an impression on the intellect. Therefore, through the influence of the stars, a man’s intellect cannot receive a power whereby the vocal expression of its thoughts is productive of something. Si autem dicatur quod etiam imaginatio aliquid in prolatione vocum significativarum operatur, super quam possunt corpora caelestia imprimere, cum eius operatio sit per organum corporale: hoc non potest esse quantum ad omnes effectus qui per huiusmodi artes fiunt. Ostensum est enim quod non possunt omnes huiusmodi effectus virtute stellarum produci. Ergo neque ex virtute stellarum aliquis sortiri potest hanc virtutem ut eosdem effectus producat. And if it be said that the imagination produces an effect in the utterance of significative words, and that heavenly bodies can work on the imagination since its operation is performed by a bodily organ, this does not apply to all the results produced by this art. For we have shown that these effects cannot all be produced by the power of the stars. Neither, therefore, can anyone receive the power to produce those effects by the power of the stars. Relinquitur igitur quod effectus huiusmodi compleantur per aliquem intellectum ad quem sermo proferentis huiusmodi voces dirigitur. Huius autem signum est: nam huiusmodi significativae voces quibus magi utuntur, invocationes sunt, supplicationes, adiurationes, aut etiam imperia, quasi ad alterum colloquentis. Consequently, it follows that these effects are accomplished by an intellect to whom the discourse of the person uttering these words is addressed. We have an indication of this in the fact that the significative words employed by the magician are invocations, supplications, adjurations, or even commands as though he were addressing another. Item. In observationibus huius artis utuntur quibusdam characteribus et figuris determinatis. Figura autem nullius actionis principium est neque passionis: alias, mathematica corpora essent activa et passiva. Non ergo potest per figuras determinatas disponi materia ad aliquem effectum naturalem suscipiendum. Non ergo utuntur magi figuris aliquibus quasi dispositionibus. Relinquitur ergo quod utantur eis solum quasi signis: non enim est aliquid tertium dare. Signis autem non utimur nisi ad alios intelligentes. Habent igitur magicae artes efficaciam ab alio intelligente, ad quem sermo magi dirigitur. Again. Certain characters and definite figures are employed in the observances of this art. Now a figure cannot be the principle of either action or passion; otherwise, mathematical bodies would be active and passive. Therefore, matter cannot be disposed by definite figures to receive a certain natural effect. Therefore, magicians do not employ figures as dispositions. It remains, then, that they employ them only as signs, for there is no third solution. But we make signs only to other intelligent beings. Therefore, the magic arts derive their efficacy from another intelligent being, to whom the magician’s words are addressed. Si quis autem dicat quod figurae aliquae appropriantur aliquibus caelestium corporum; et ita corpora inferiora determinantur per aliquas figuras ad aliquorum caelestium corporum impressiones suscipiendas: videtur non rationabiliter dici. Non enim ordinatur aliquod patiens ad suscipiendam impressionem agentis nisi per hoc quod est in potentia. Illa ergo tantum determinant ipsum ad specialem impressionem suscipiendum, per quae in potentia fit quodammodo. Per figuras autem non disponitur materia ut sit in potentia ad aliquam formam: quia figura abstrahit, secundum suam rationem, ab omni materia et forma sensibili, cum sit quoddam mathematicum. Non ergo per figuras vel characteres determinatur aliquod corpus ad suscipiendam aliquam influentiam caelestis corporis. And if someone say that certain figures are appropriate to certain heavenly bodies, and so the lower bodies are determined by certain figures to receive the impressions of certain heavenly bodies, this seems to be an unreasonable statement. For the patient is not directed to receive the impression of the agent except through being in potency. Hence those things alone that cause it to be somehow in potency determine it to receive a particular impression. Now figures do not cause matter to be in potency to any particular form, because a figure, as such, abstracts from all matter and sensible forms, since it is something mathematical. Therefore, a body is not determined by figures or characters to receive the influence of a heavenly body. Praeterea. Figurae aliquae appropriantur corporibus caelestibus ut effectus ipsorum: nam figurae inferiorum corporum causantur a corporibus caelestibus. Praedictae autem artes non utuntur characteribus aut figuris quasi effectibus caelestium corporum, sed sunt effectus hominis operantis per artem. Appropriatio igitur figurarum ad aliqua caelestia corpora nihil ad propositum facere videtur. Besides. Certain figures are appropriate to heavenly bodies as their effects, for the figures of the lower bodies are caused by heavenly bodies. Now, the aforesaid arts do not use characters or figures as produced by heavenly bodies; in fact, they are produced by man in the practice of the art. Therefore, the appropriateness of figures to certain heavenly bodies has nothing to do with the question. Item. Per figuras non disponitur aliqualiter materia naturalis ad formam, ut ostensum est. Corpora igitur in quibus sunt impressae huiusmodi figurae, sunt eiusdem habilitatis ad recipiendam influentiam caelestem cum aliis corporibus eiusdem speciei. Quod autem aliquid agat in unum eorum quae sunt aequaliter disposita, propter aliquid sibi appropriatum ibi inventum, et non in aliud, non est operantis per necessitatem naturae, sed per electionem. Patet ergo quod huiusmodi artes figuris utentes ad effectus aliquos producendos, non habent efficaciam ab aliquo agente per naturam, sed ab aliqua intellectuali substantia per intellectum agente. Further. As we have shown, matter is in no way disposed to form by means of figures. Hence the bodies on which these figures are impressed are as capable of receiving the influence of heavenly bodies as other bodies of the same species. Now, that a thing acts on one rather than another of several equally disposed, by reason of something appropriate to be found in it, is a mark of its operating not by natural necessity, but by choice. Hence it is clear that these arts which employ figures in order to produce certain effects derive their efficacy not from something that acts by nature, but from some intellectual substance that acts by intelligence. Hoc etiam demonstrat et ipsum nomen quod talibus figuris imponunt, characteres eos dicentes. Character enim signum est. In quo datur intelligi quod figuris huiusmodi non utuntur nisi ut signis exhibitis alicui intellectuali naturae. This is also proved by the very name of character, which they apply to these figures: for a character is a sign. Whereby we are given to understand that they employ these figures merely as signs shown to some intellectual nature. Quia vero figurae in artificialibus sunt quasi formae specificae, potest aliquis dicere quod nihil prohibet quin constitutionem figurae, quae dat speciem imagini, consequatur aliqua virtus ex influentia caelesti, non secundum quod figura est, sed secundum quod causat speciem artificiati, quod adipiscitur virtutem ex stellis. Sed de litteris quibus inscribitur aliquid in imagine, et aliis characteribus, nihil aliud potest dici quam quod signa sunt. Unde non habent ordinem nisi ad aliquem intellectum. Quod etiam ostenditur per sacrificia, prostrationes, et alia huiusmodi quibus utuntur, quae non possunt esse nisi signa reverentiae exhibitae alicui intellectuali naturae. Since, however, in the products of art figures are like specific forms, someone might say that there is no reason why, through the influence of a heavenly body, some power should not shape the figure that gives an image its species; not indeed as a figure, but as specifying the product of art, which acquires this power from the stars. But as to the letters that form an inscription on an image, and other characters, nothing else can be said of them but that they are signs: hence they are directed to an intelligence only. This is also proved by the sacrifices, prostrations, and other similar practices, which can be nothing else than signs of reverence shown to an intellectual nature. Caput 106 Chapter 106 Quod substantia intellectualis quae praestat efficaciam magicis operibus, non est bona secundum virtutem That the intellectual substance which gives efficacy to the practices of magic is not good according to virtue Est autem ulterius inquirendum quae sit haec intellectualis natura, cuius virtute tales operationes fiunt. We must furthermore inquire what is this intellectual nature by whose power these works are done. Et primo quidem apparet quod non sit bona et laudabilis. Praestare enim patrocinium aliquibus quae sunt contraria virtuti, non est alicuius intellectus bene dispositi. Hoc autem fit in huiusmodi artibus: fiunt enim plerumque ad adulteria, furta, homicidia, et alia huiusmodi maleficia procuranda; unde utentes his artibus malefici vocantur. Non est ergo bene disposita secundum virtutem intellectualis natura cuius auxilio huiusmodi artes innituntur. And in the first place it is plain that it is not good and praiseworthy, for it is the mark of an ill-disposed mind to countenance things contrary to virtue. Now this is done in these arts: for they are often employed in order to further adultery, theft, murder and like malefices; therefore, those who practice these arts are called ‘malefics.’ Therefore, the intellectual nature on whose assistance these arts depend is not well disposed according to virtue. Item. Non est intellectus bene dispositi secundum virtutem familiarem esse et patrocinium exhibere sceleratis, et non quibuslibet optimis viris. Huiusmodi autem artibus utuntur plerumque homines scelerati. Non igitur intellectualis natura cuius auxilio hae artes efficaciam habent, est bene disposita secundum virtutem. Again. It is not the mark of a mind well disposed according to virtue to befriend and assist men of evil life, rather than every upright man. Now those who practice these arts are often men of evil life. Therefore, the intellectual nature from whose assistance these arts derive their efficacy is not well disposed according to virtue. Adhuc. Intellectus bene dispositi est reducere homines in ea quae sunt hominum propria bona, quae sunt bona rationis. Abducere igitur ab istis, pertrahendo ad aliqua minima bona, est intellectus indecenter dispositi. Per huiusmodi autem artes non adipiscuntur homines aliquem profectum in bonis rationis, quae sunt scientiae et virtutes: sed in quibusdam minimis, sicut in inventione furtorum et deprehensione latronum, et his similibus. Non igitur substantiae intellectivae quarum auxilio hae artes utuntur, sunt bene dispositae secundum virtutem. Further. It is the mark of a well disposed mind to guide men towards those goods that are proper to man, namely the goods of reason. Consequently, to lead men away from these, and to draw men to goods of the least worth, shows a mind of evil disposition. Now by these arts men progress not in the goods of reason, which are science and virtue, but in goods of least account, such as the discovery of stolen goods, the capture of thieves, and so forth. Therefore, the intellectual substances whose assistance these arts employ are not well disposed according to virtue.