Caput 112 Chapter 112 Quod creaturae rationales gubernantur propter seipsas, aliae vero in ordine ad eas That rational creatures are governed for their own sake, and other creatures as directed to them Primum igitur, ipsa conditio intellectualis naturae, secundum quam est domina sui actus, providentiae curam requirit qua sibi propter se provideatur: aliorum vero conditio, quae non habent dominium sui actus, hoc indicat, quod eis non propter ipsa cura impendatur, sed velut ad alia ordinatis. Quod enim ab altero tantum agitur, rationem instrumenti habet: quod vero per se agit, habet rationem principalis agentis. Instrumentum autem non quaeritur propter seipsum, sed ut eo principale agens utatur. Unde oportet quod omnis operationis diligentia quae circa instrumenta adhibetur, ad principale agens referatur sicut ad finem: quod autem circa principale agens vel ab ipso vel ab alio adhibetur, inquantum est principale agens, propter ipsum est. Disponuntur igitur a Deo intellectuales creaturae quasi propter se procuratae, creaturae vero aliae quasi ad rationales creaturas ordinatae. In the first place then, the very condition of the rational creature, in that it has dominion over its actions, requires that the care of providence should be bestowed on it for its own sake. But the condition of other things that do not have dominion over their actions shows that they are cared for not for their own sake, but as being directed to other things. For that which acts only when moved by another is like an instrument; but that which acts by itself is like a principal agent. Now an instrument is required not for its own sake, but that the principal agent may use it. Hence whatever is done for the care of the instruments must be referred to the principal agent as its end, but any such action directed to the principal agent as such, either by the agent itself or by another, is for the sake of the same principal agent. Accordingly, intellectual creatures are ruled by God as though he cared for them for their own sake, while other creatures are ruled as being directed to rational creatures. Adhuc. Quod dominium sui actus habet, liberum est in agendo, liber enim est qui sui causa est: quod autem quadam necessitate ab alio agitur ad operandum, servituti subiectum est. Omnis igitur alia creatura naturaliter servituti subiecta est: sola intellectualis natura libera est. In quolibet autem regimine, liberis providetur propter seipsos: servis autem ut sint in usum liberorum. Sic igitur per divinam providentiam intellectualibus creaturis providetur propter se, ceteris autem creaturis propter ipsas. Again. That which has dominion over its own act is free in its action, because he is free who is cause of himself: whereas that which by some kind of necessity is moved by another to act is subject to slavery. Therefore, every other creature is naturally under slavery; the intellectual nature alone is free. Now, in every government provision is made for the free for their own sake, but for slaves that they may be useful to the free. Accordingly, divine providence makes provision for the intellectual creature for its own sake, but for other creatures for the sake of the intellectual creature. Amplius. Quandocumque sunt aliqua ordinata ad finem aliquem, si qua inter illa ad finem pertingere non possunt per seipsa, oportet ea ordinari ad illa quae finem consequuntur, quae propter se ordinantur in finem: sicut finis exercitus est victoria, quam milites consequuntur per proprium actum pugnando, qui soli propter se in exercitu quaeruntur; omnes autem alii, ad alia officia deputati, puta ad custodiendum equos, ad parandum arma, propter milites in exercitu quaeruntur. Constat autem ex praemissis finem ultimum universi Deum esse, quem sola intellectualis natura consequitur in seipso, eum scilicet cognoscendo et amando, ut ex dictis patet. Sola igitur intellectualis natura est propter se quaesita in universo, alia autem omnia propter ipsam. Moreover. Whenever certain things are directed to a certain end, if any of them are unable of themselves to attain to the end, they must be directed to those that attain to the end, which are directed to the end for their own sake. Thus the end of the army is victory, which the soldiers obtain by their own action in fighting, and they alone in the army are required for their own sake; but all others to whom other duties are assigned (such as the care of horses and the preparing of arms) are requisite for the sake of the soldiers of the army. Now, it is clear from what has been said that God is the last end of the universe, whom the intellectual nature alone obtains in himself, namely, by knowing and loving him, as was proved above. Therefore, the intellectual nature alone is requisite for its own sake in the universe, and all others for its sake. Item. In quolibet toto partes principales propter se exiguntur ad constitutionem totius: aliae vero ad conservationem, vel ad aliquam meliorationem earum. Inter omnes autem partes universi, nobiliores sunt intellectuales creaturae: quia magis ad similitudinem divinam accedunt. Naturae ergo intellectuales sunt propter se a divina providentia procuratae, alia vero omnia propter ipsas. Further. In every whole, the principal parts are requisite on their own account for the completion of the whole, while others are required for the preservation or betterment of the former. Now, of all the parts of the universe, intellectual creatures hold the highest place, because they approach nearest to the divine likeness. Therefore, divine providence provides for the intellectual nature for its own sake, and for all others for its sake. Praeterea. Manifestum est partes omnes ordinari ad perfectionem totius: non enim est totum propter partes, sed partes propter totum sunt. Naturae autem intellectuales maiorem habent affinitatem ad totum quam aliae naturae: nam unaquaeque intellectualis substantia est quodammodo omnia, inquantum totius entis comprehensiva est suo intellectu: quaelibet autem alia substantia particularem solam entis participationem habet. Convenienter igitur alia propter substantias intellectuales providentur a Deo. Besides. It is clear that all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole, since the whole is not on account of the parts, but the parts on account of the whole. Now, intellectual natures are more akin to the whole than other natures, because the intellectual substance is all things in a sense, inasmuch as by its intellect it is able to comprehend all things; but every other substance has only a particular participation of being. Consequently, God cares for other things for the sake of intellectual substances. Adhuc. Sicut agitur unumquodque cursu naturae, ita natum est agi. Sic autem videmus res cursu naturae currere quod substantia intellectualis omnibus aliis utitur propter se: vel ad intellectus perfectionem, quia in eis veritatem speculatur; vel ad suae virtutis executionem et scientiae explicationem, ad modum quo artifex explicat artis suae conceptionem in materia corporali; vel etiam ad corporis sustentationem, quod est unitum animae intellectuali, sicut in hominibus patet. Manifestum est ergo quod propter substantias intellectuales omnia divinitus providentur. Besides. Whatever happens to a thing in the course of nature happens to it naturally. Now, we see that in the course of nature the intellectual substance uses all others for its own sake: either for the perfection of the intellect, which sees the truth in them as in a mirror; or for the execution of its power and development of its knowledge, in the same way as a craftsman develops the conception of his art in corporeal matter; or again to sustain the body that is united to an intellectual soul, as is the case in man. It is clear, therefore, that God cares for all things for the sake of intellectual substances. Amplius. Quod aliquis propter se quaerit, semper illud quaerit: quod enim per se est, semper est; quod vero aliquis propter aliud quaerit, non oportet quod semper illud quaerat, sed secundum quod competit ei propter quod quaeritur. Esse autem rerum ex divina voluntate profluxit, ut ex superioribus est manifestum. Quae igitur semper sunt in entibus, sunt propter se a Deo volita: quae autem non semper, non propter se, sed propter aliud. Substantiae autem intellectuales maxime accedunt ad hoc quod sint semper, quia sunt incorruptibiles. Sunt etiam immutabiles, nisi solum secundum electionem. Ergo substantiae intellectuales gubernantur quasi propter se, aliae vero propter ipsas. Moreover. If a man seek something for its own sake, he seeks it always, because what is of itself is always: whereas if he seek a thing on account of something else, he does not of necessity seek it always, but only in reference to that for the sake of which he seeks it. Now, as we proved above, things derive their being from the divine will. Therefore, whatever is always is willed by God for its own sake; and what is not always is willed by God not for its own sake, but for another’s. Now, intellectual substances approach nearest to being always, since they are incorruptible. Moreover, they are unchangeable, except in their choice. Therefore, intellectual substances are governed for their own sake, as it were, and others for the sake of intellectual substances. Non est autem ei quod praemissis rationibus est ostensum contrarium, quod omnes partes universi ad perfectionem totius ordinantur: sic enim ad perfectionem totius omnes partes ordinantur, inquantum una deservit alteri. Sicut in corpore humano apparet quod pulmo in hoc est de perfectione corporis, quod deservit cordi: unde non est contrarium pulmonem esse propter cor, et propter totum animal. Et similiter non est contrarium alias naturas esse propter intellectuales, et propter perfectionem universi: si enim deessent ea quae requirit substantiae intellectualis perfectio, non esset universum completum. The fact that all the parts of the universe are directed to the perfection of the whole is not in contradiction with the foregoing conclusion, since all the parts are directed to the perfection of the whole, insofar as one part serves another. Thus in the human body it is clear that the lungs belong to the body’s perfection, in that they serve the heart: hence there is no contradiction in the lungs being for the sake of the heart and for the sake of the whole animal. In like manner, that other natures are on account of the intellectual is not contrary to their being for the perfection of the universe: for without the things required for the perfection of the intellectual substance, the universe would not be complete. Similiter etiam praedictis non obviat quod individua sunt propter proprias species. Per hoc enim quod ad suas species ordinantur, ordinem habent ulterius ad intellectualem naturam. Non enim aliquod corruptibilium ordinatur ad hominem propter unum individuum hominis tantum, sed propter totam humanam speciem. Toti autem humanae speciei non posset aliquod corruptibilium deservire nisi secundum suam speciem totam. Ordo igitur quo corruptibilia ordinantur ad hominem, requirit quod individua ordinentur ad speciem. Nor again does the fact that individuals are for the sake of the species militate against what has been said. Through being directed to their species, they are directed also to the intellectual nature. For a corruptible thing is directed to man not on account of only one individual man, but on account of the whole human species. Yet a corruptible thing could not serve the whole human species, except as regards its own entire species. Hence the order whereby corruptible things are directed to man requires that individuals be directed to the species. Per hoc autem quod dicimus substantias intellectuales propter se a divina providentia ordinari, non intelligimus quod ipsa ulterius non referantur in Deum et ad perfectionem universi. Sic igitur propter se procurari dicuntur et alia propter ipsa, quia bona quae per divinam providentiam sortiuntur, non eis sunt data propter alterius utilitatem; quae vero aliis dantur, in eorum usum ex divina ordinatione cedunt. When we assert that intellectual substances are directed by divine providence for their own sake, we do not mean that they are not also referred to God and for the perfection of the universe. Accordingly, they are said to be provided for on their own account, and others on account of them, because the goods bestowed on them by divine providence are not given them for another’s profit. But those bestowed on others are in the divine plan intended for the use of intellectual substances. Hinc est quod dicitur Deut. 4:19: ne videas solem et lunam et cetera astra, et errore deceptus, adores ea quae creavit dominus Deus tuus in ministerium cunctis gentibus quae sub caelo sunt. Et in Psalmo dicitur: omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius; oves et boves universas, insuper et pecora campi. Et Sap. 12:18 dicitur: tu autem, dominator virtutis, cum tranquillitate iudicas, et cum magna reverentia disponis nos. Hence it is said: Beware, lest you lift up your eyes to heaven, and when you see the sun and the moon and the other stars, you be drawn away and worship them and serve them, things which the Lord your God has allotted to all the peoples under the whole heaven (Deut 4:19); and: You have put all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen, and also the beasts of the field (Ps 8:6–7); and: You who are sovereign in strength do judge with mildness, and with great forbearance you do govern us (Wis 12:18). Per haec autem excluditur error ponentium homini esse peccatum si animalia bruta occidat. Ex divina enim providentia naturali ordine in usum hominis ordinantur. Unde absque iniuria eis utitur homo, vel occidendo, vel quolibet alio modo. Propter quod et dominus dixit ad Noe, Gen. 9:3: sicut olera virentia dedi vobis omnem carnem. Hereby is refuted the error of those who said it is sinful for a man to kill dumb animals: for by divine providence they are intended for man’s use in the natural order. Hence it is no wrong for man to make use of them, either by killing or in any other way whatever. For this reason the Lord said to Noah: As I gave you the green plants, I have delivered all flesh to you (Gen 9:3). Si qua vero in sacra Scriptura inveniantur prohibentia aliquid crudelitatis in animalia bruta committi, sicut de ave cum pullis non occidenda: hoc fit vel ad removendum hominis animum a crudelitate in homines exercenda, ne aliquis, exercendo crudelia circa bruta, ex hoc procedat ad homines; vel quia in temporale damnum hominis provenit animalibus illata laesio, sive inferentis sive alterius; vel propter aliquam significationem, sicut apostolus exponit illud de non alligando ore bovis triturantis. And if any passages of Sacred Scripture seem to forbid us to be cruel to dumb animals—for instance, to kill a bird with its young (Deut 22:6)—this is either to remove man’s thoughts from being cruel to other men, and lest through being cruel to animals one become cruel to human beings; or because injury to an animal leads to the temporal hurt of man, either of the doer of the deed, or of another; or on account of some signification: thus the Apostle expounds (1 Cor 9:9) the prohibition against muzzling an ox when it treads out the grain (Deut 25:4). Caput 113 Chapter 113 Quod rationalis creatura dirigitur a Deo ad suos actus non solum secundum ordinem ad speciem, sed etiam secundum quod congruit individuo That the rational creature is directed to its action by God not only in its relation to the species, but also in its relation to the individual Ex hoc autem apparet quod sola rationalis creatura dirigitur a Deo ad suos actus non solum secundum congruentiam speciei, sed etiam secundum congruentiam individui. Omnis enim res propter suam operationem esse videtur: operatio enim est ultima perfectio rei. Sic igitur unumquodque a Deo ad suum actum ordinatur secundum quod divinae providentiae substat. Creatura autem rationalis divinae providentiae substat sicut secundum se gubernata et provisa, non solum propter speciem, ut aliae corruptibiles creaturae: quia individuum quod gubernatur solum propter speciem, non gubernatur propter seipsum; creatura autem rationalis propter seipsam gubernatur, ut ex dictis manifestum est. Sic igitur solae rationales creaturae directionem a Deo ad suos actus accipiunt non solum propter speciem, sed secundum individuum. Hence it is clear that the rational creature alone is directed to its actions by God with due regard not only to the species, but also to the individual. For it seems that everything is on account of its operation, since operation is the ultimate perfection of a thing. Therefore, each thing is directed to its action by God according as it stands under divine providence. Now, the rational creature stands under divine providence as being governed and cared for on its own account, and not on account of the species only like other corruptible creatures. For the individual that is governed only for the sake of the species is not governed for its own sake, but the rational creature is governed for its own sake, as we have made clear. Accordingly, rational creatures alone are directed by God to their actions for the sake not only of the species, but also of the individual. Adhuc. Quaecumque directionem habent in suis actibus solum secundum quod pertinent ad speciem, non est in ipsis agere vel non agere: quae enim consequuntur speciem, sunt communia et naturalia omnibus individuis sub specie contentis; naturalia autem non sunt in nobis. Si igitur homo haberet directionem in suis actionibus solum secundum congruentiam speciei, non esset in ipso agere vel non agere, sed oporteret quod sequeretur inclinationem naturalem toti speciei communem, ut contingit in omnibus irrationalibus creaturis. Manifestum est igitur quod rationalis creaturae actus directionem habet non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individuum. Besides. Things that are directed in their actions only so far as these refer to the species have not the power to act or not to act, since whatever results from the species is common and natural to all the individuals contained in the species, and we have no choice about natural things. Hence if man were directed in his actions in reference only to the demands of the species, he would not have the power to act, or not to act, and he would have to follow the natural inclination common to the whole species, as is the case with all irrational creatures. It is therefore clear that rational creatures are directed in their actions with regard not only to the species, but also to the individual. Amplius. Sicut supra ostensum est, divina providentia ad omnia singularia se extendit, etiam minima. Quibuscumque igitur sunt aliquae actiones praeter inclinationem speciei, oportet quod per divinam providentiam regulentur in suis actibus praeter directionem quae pertinet ad speciem. Sed in rationali creatura apparent multae actiones ad quas non sufficit inclinatio speciei: cuius signum est quod non similes sunt in omnibus, sed variae in diversis. Oportet igitur quod rationalis creatura dirigatur a Deo ad suos actus non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individuum. Moreover. As we proved above, divine providence extends to every single thing, even the least. Therefore, whatever things have actions outside the inclination of nature must in such actions receive from divine providence a direction besides that which regards the species. Now, many actions are apparent in the rational creature for which the inclination of the species is not sufficient. A sign of this is that they are not the same in all, but differ in different subjects. Therefore, the rational creature must be directed to its actions by God with reference not only to the species, but also to the individual. Item. Deus unicuique naturae providet secundum ipsius capacitatem: tales enim singulas creaturas condidit quales aptas esse cognovit ut per suam gubernationem pervenirent ad finem. Sola autem creatura rationalis est capax directionis qua dirigitur ad suos actus non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individuum: habet enim intellectum et rationem, unde percipere possit quomodo diversimode sit aliquid bonum vel malum secundum quod congruit diversis individuis, temporibus et locis. Sola igitur creatura rationalis dirigitur a Deo ad suos actus non solum secundum speciem, sed etiam secundum individuum. Again. God provides for every nature according to its capacity, for he made each creature such that he knew it to be adapted to obtain its end through being governed by him. Now, the rational creature alone is capable of being directed to its actions in respect not only of the species but also of the individual, because it has intellect and reason, so as to be able to perceive the different ways in which a certain thing is good or evil in relation to various persons, times, and places. Therefore, the rational creature alone is directed by God to its actions in respect not only of the species, but also of the individual. Praeterea. Creatura rationalis sic providentiae divinae subiacet quod non solum ea gubernatur, sed etiam rationem providentiae utcumque cognoscere potest: unde sibi competit etiam aliis providentiam et gubernationem exhibere. Quod non contingit in ceteris creaturis, quae solum providentiam participant inquantum providentiae subduntur. Per hoc autem quod aliquis facultatem providendi habet, potest etiam suos actus dirigere et gubernare. Participat igitur rationalis creatura divinam providentiam non solum secundum gubernari, sed etiam secundum gubernare: gubernat enim se in suis actibus propriis, et etiam alia. Omnis autem inferior providentia divinae providentiae subditur quasi supremae. Gubernatio igitur actuum rationalis creaturae inquantum sunt actus personales, ad divinam providentiam pertinet. Besides. The rational creature is subject to divine providence in such a way that not only is it governed thereby, but is able to know something of the nature of providence, so that it is capable of providence and government in respect of others. This is not the case with other creatures, for they only participate in providence by being subject to it. Now, a man can also direct and govern his own actions through being capable of providence. Therefore, the rational creature participates in divine providence not only in being governed, but also in governing: for it governs itself in its own actions, and other things too. Now, every lower providence is subject to divine providence as supreme. Therefore, the government of a rational creature’s acts, as personal acts, belongs to divine providence. Item. Actus personales rationalis creaturae sunt proprie actus qui sunt ab anima rationali. Anima autem rationalis non solum secundum speciem est perpetuitatis capax, sicut aliae creaturae, sed etiam secundum individuum. Actus ergo rationalis creaturae a divina providentia diriguntur non solum ea ratione qua ad speciem pertinent, sed etiam inquantum sunt personales actus. Again. The personal acts of a rational creature are properly those that proceed from the rational soul. Now, the rational soul is capable of perpetuity not only in respect of the species, like other creatures, but also in respect of the individual. Therefore, the actions of a rational creature are directed by divine providence not only in the point of their belonging to the species, but also inasmuch as they are personal. Hinc est quod, licet divinae providentiae omnia subdantur, tamen in Scripturis sacris specialiter ei hominum cura attribuitur: secundum illud Psalmi 8:5: quid est homo quod memor es eius? Et I Cor. 9:9: nunquid Deo cura est de bobus? Quae quidem ideo dicuntur, quia de humanis actibus Deus curam habet non solum prout ad speciem pertinent, sed etiam secundum quod sunt actus personales. Hence it is that, though all things are subject to divine providence, yet Sacred Scripture ascribes the care of men to it in a special manner; according to the Psalm: What is man that thou art mindful of him? (Ps 8:4[5]); and: Is it for oxen that God is concerned? (1 Cor 9:9). These things are said because God watches over man’s actions not only as belonging to the species, but also as personal acts. Lex divina The divine law Caput 114 Chapter 114 Quod divinitus hominibus leges dantur That laws are given by God to man Ex hoc autem apparet quod necessarium fuit homini divinitus legem dari. Sicut enim actus irrationalium creaturarum diriguntur a Deo ea ratione qua ad speciem pertinent, ita actus hominum diriguntur a Deo secundum quod ad individuum pertinent, ut ostensum est. Sed actus creaturarum irrationalium, prout ad speciem pertinent, diriguntur a Deo quadam naturali inclinatione, quae naturam speciei consequitur. Ergo, supra hoc, dandum est aliquid hominibus quo in suis personalibus actibus dirigantur. Et hoc dicimus legem. It is evident from this that it was necessary for man to receive laws from God. For, as we have shown, just as the acts of irrational creatures are directed by God, inasmuch as they belong to the species, so are man’s actions directed by God, inasmuch as they belong to the individual. Now, insofar as they are actions belonging to the species, actions of irrational creatures are directed by God by a certain natural inclination, which is consequent to the specific nature. Therefore, in addition to this, something must be given to man whereby he is directed in his personal actions. And this is what we call law. Adhuc. Rationalis creatura, ut dictum est, sic divinae providentiae subditur quod etiam similitudinem quandam divinae providentiae participat, inquantum se in suis actibus et alia gubernare potest. Id autem quo aliquorum actus gubernantur, dicitur lex. Conveniens igitur fuit hominibus a Deo legem dari. Again. The rational creature, as stated above, is subject to divine providence in such a way as to participate in a certain likeness of divine providence, inasmuch as it is able to govern itself in its own actions, and other things also. Now, that by which the actions of people are governed is a law. Therefore, it was reasonable that a law should be given to man by God. Item. Cum lex nihil aliud sit quam quaedam ratio et regula operandi, illis solum convenit dari legem qui sui operis rationem cognoscunt. Hoc autem convenit solum rationali creaturae. Soli igitur rationali creaturae fuit conveniens dari legem. Besides. Since a law is nothing else than a reason and rule of action, it is reasonable that to those alone a law be given who know the reason of their action. Now, this applies only to the rational creature. Therefore, it was fitting that a law should be given to the rational creature alone. Praeterea. Illis danda est lex in quibus est agere et non agere. Hoc autem convenit soli rationali creaturae. Sola igitur rationalis creatura est susceptiva legis. Further. A law should be given to those in whom is the power to act or not to act. But this belongs to the rational creature alone. Therefore, only the rational creature is adapted to receive a law. Amplius. Cum lex nihil aliud sit quam ratio operis; cuiuslibet autem operis ratio a fine sumitur: ab eo unusquisque legis capax suscipit legem a quo ad finem perducitur; sicut inferior artifex ab architectore, et miles a duce exercitus. Sed creatura rationalis finem suum ultimum in Deo et a Deo consequitur, ut ex superioribus patet. Fuit igitur conveniens a Deo legem hominibus dari. Moreover. Since a law is nothing else than a reason of action, and the reason for everyone’s action is his end, everyone who is capable of receiving a law must receive the law from the one who guides him to his end, even as the inferior craftsman is guided by the master-craftsman, and the soldier by the commander-in-chief. Now, the rational creature obtains his last end in God and from God, as we have already shown. Therefore, it was reasonable that a law should be given to men by God. Hinc est quod dicitur Ierem. 31:33: dabo legem meam in visceribus eorum et Oseae 8:12: scribam eis multiplices leges meas. Hence it is said: I will put my law within them, and I will write it upon their hearts (Jer 31:33), and: I shall write to him my manifold laws (Hos 8:12). Caput 115 Chapter 115 Quod lex divina principaliter hominem ordinat in Deum That the divine law directs man chiefly to God Ex hoc autem sumi potest ad quid lex divinitus data principaliter tendat. From this we may gather what is the principal intention of the divine law.