Hinc est quod dicitur Rom. 12:1: rationabile obsequium vestrum; et I Thess. 4:3: haec est voluntas Dei, sanctificatio vestra. Hence it is said: Your reasonable service (Rom 12:1); and: This is the will of God, your sanctification (1 Thess 4:3). Per haec autem excluditur quorundam error dicentium illa solum esse peccata, quibus proximus aut offenditur aut scandalizatur. Hereby we refute the error of those who assert that there is no sin unless our neighbor be injured or scandalized. Caput 122 Chapter 122 Qua ratione fornicatio simplex secundum legem divinam sit peccatum: et quod matrimonium sit naturale How simple fornication is a sin according to the divine law, and that matrimony is natural Ex hoc autem apparet vanam esse rationem quorundam dicentium fornicationem simplicem non esse peccatum. Dicunt enim: sit aliqua mulier a viro soluta, quae sub nullius potestate, ut patris vel alicuius alterius, existat. Si quis ad eam accedat ea volente, non facit illi iniuriam: quia sibi placet, et sui corporis habet potestatem. Alteri non facit iniuriam: quia sub nullius potestate ponitur esse. Non videtur igitur esse peccatum. Hence it is clear how futile is the reasoning of those who say that simple fornication is no sin. For they say: ‘Take, for instance, a woman who is not bound by the marriage tie, or under any authority, paternal or otherwise. If a man have intercourse with her with her consent, he does her no wrong, since she pleases herself, and has the disposal of her own body. He does not wrong a third party, because, in the supposition, she is under no one’s authority. Therefore, there is no sin.’ Non videtur autem esse responsio sufficiens si quis dicat quod facit iniuriam Deo. Non enim Deus a nobis offenditur nisi ex eo quod contra nostrum bonum agimus ut dictum est. Hoc autem non apparet esse contra hominis bonum. Unde ex hoc non videtur Deo aliqua iniuria fieri. Nor, seemingly, is it enough to reply that he does a wrong to God, because we do not wrong God unless we wrong our own good, as stated above. But this would not seem to be contrary to man’s good. Consequently, no wrong seems to be done to God thereby. Similiter etiam non videtur sufficiens responsio quod per hoc fiat iniuria proximo, qui scandalizatur. Contingit enim de aliquo quod secundum se non est peccatum, aliquem scandalizari: et sic fit peccatum per accidens. Nunc autem non agimus an fornicatio simplex sit peccatum per accidens, sed per se. Likewise, it would not seem to meet the case if one reply that the man wrongs his neighbor by scandalizing him. For one may be scandalized at something that is not a sin in itself, so that it becomes a sin accidentally. But the point at issue is whether simple fornication be a sin, not accidentally, but in itself. Oportet igitur ex superioribus solutionem quaerere. Dictum est enim quod Deus uniuscuiusque curam habet secundum id quod est ei bonum. Est autem bonum uniuscuiusque quod finem suum consequatur: malum autem eius est quod a debito fine divertat. Sicut autem in toto, ita et in partibus hoc considerari oportet: ut scilicet unaquaeque pars hominis, et quilibet actus eius, finem debitum sortiatur. Semen autem, etsi sit superfluum quantum ad individui conservationem, est tamen necessarium quantum ad propagationem speciei. Alia vero superflua, ut egestio, urina, sudor, et similia, ad nihil necessaria sunt: unde ad bonum hominis pertinet solum quod emittantur. Non hoc autem solum quaeritur in semine, sed ut emittatur ad generationis utilitatem, ad quam coitus ordinatur. Frustra autem esset hominis generatio nisi et debita nutritio sequeretur: quia generatum non permaneret, debita nutritione subtracta. Sic igitur ordinata esse seminis debet emissio ut sequi possit et generatio conveniens, et geniti educatio. Accordingly, we must seek the solution from what has been said above. For it has been stated that God cares for everything in respect of what is good for it. Now, it is good for everything that it obtain its end, and its evil is that it turn from its end. This applies to the parts as well as to the whole, so that man’s every part, even as his every act, should attain to its due end. Now, though the seed be superfluous for the preservation of the individual, it is necessary for the propagation of the species. Other superfluities such as excretions, urine, sweat and the like are not necessary for anything, and so it is only their discharge that is good for man. Seed, however, has another end in view, since it is emitted for the purpose of generation, which is the object of intercourse. Moreover, generation would be in vain if due nourishment were not to follow, because the offspring would not survive if deprived of its due nourishment. Hence the emission of seed should be ordered in such a way that suitable generation and education of the offspring may follow. Ex quo patet quod contra bonum hominis est omnis emissio seminis tali modo quod generatio sequi non possit. Et si ex proposito hoc agatur, oportet esse peccatum. Dico autem modum ex quo generatio sequi non potest secundum se: sicut omnis emissio seminis sine naturali coniunctione maris et feminae; propter quod huiusmodi peccata contra naturam dicuntur. Si autem per accidens generatio ex emissione seminis sequi non possit, non propter hoc est contra naturam, nec peccatum: sicut si contingat mulierem sterilem esse. It is therefore clearly contrary to man’s good that the seed be emitted in such a way that generation cannot ensue: if this be done deliberately it must be a sin. I mean if it be done in a way that is directly opposed to generation, such as every emission of seed without the natural union of male and female. Hence sins of this kind are said to be against nature. If, however, it be accidental that generation cannot ensue, it is not on this account contrary to nature or sinful (for instance, if the woman be sterile). Similiter etiam oportet contra bonum hominis esse si semen taliter emittatur quod generatio sequi possit, sed conveniens educatio impediatur. Est enim considerandum quod in animalibus in quibus sola femina sufficit ad prolis educationem, mas et femina post coitum nullo tempore commanent, sicut patet in canibus. Quaecumque vero animalia sunt in quibus femina non sufficit ad educationem prolis, mas et femina simul post coitum commanent quousque necessarium est ad prolis educationem et instructionem: sicut patet in quibusdam avibus, quarum pulli non statim postquam nati sunt possunt sibi cibum quaerere. Cum enim avis non nutriat lacte pullos, quod in promptu est, velut a natura praeparatum, sicut in quadrupedibus accidit, sed oportet quod cibum aliunde pullis quaerat, et praeter hoc, incubando eos foveat: non sufficeret ad hoc sola femella. Unde ex divina providentia est naturaliter inditum mari in talibus animalibus, ut commaneat femellae ad educationem fetus. Manifestum est autem quod in specie humana femina minime sufficeret sola ad prolis educationem: cum necessitas humanae vitae multa requirat quae per unum solum parari non possunt. Est igitur conveniens secundum naturam humanam ut homo post coitum mulieri commaneat, et non statim abscedat, indifferenter ad quamcumque accedens, sicut apud fornicantes accidit. In like manner, it must be contrary to man’s good if, though seed be emitted so that generation can ensue, the proper upbringing of the offspring is hindered. For it must be observed that in those animals in which the female alone suffices for the rearing of the offspring—dogs, for instance—the male and female do not remain together after intercourse. On the other hand, in all cases in which the female does not suffice to rear the offspring, the male and female remain together after intercourse as long as may be necessary for the rearing and development of the young. We have an instance of this in certain birds, whose young are unable to seek food as soon as they are hatched. For, since the bird does not feed its young on milk—which, as in the case of quadrupeds, is ready at hand through being prepared by nature—and needs to go in search of food for them, and besides this fosters them by incubation, the female alone would not suffice for all this. Therefore, divine providence has given the male of such animals the natural instinct to remain with the female for the rearing of the offspring. Now it is clear that in the human species the female is far from sufficing alone for the rearing of the children, since the needs of human life require many things that one person alone cannot provide. It is therefore in keeping with human nature that the man remain with the woman after intercourse, and not leave her at once, indifferent as to what happens, as do fornicators. Non autem huic rationi obstat quod aliqua mulier suis divitiis potens est ut sola nutriat fetum. Quia rectitudo naturalis in humanis actibus non est secundum ea quae per accidens contingunt in uno individuo, sed secundum ea quae totam speciem consequuntur. Nor is this argument weakened because some woman has sufficient means to rear her offspring by herself. Because natural rectitude in human acts depends not on what is accidentally in one individual, but on that which is proper to the whole species. Rursus considerandum est quod in specie humana proles non indiget solum nutritione quantum ad corpus, ut in aliis animalibus; sed etiam instructione quantum ad animam. Nam alia animalia naturaliter habent suas prudentias, quibus sibi providere possunt: homo autem ratione vivit, quam per longi temporis experimentum ad prudentiam pervenire oportet; unde necesse est ut filii a parentibus, quasi iam expertis, instruantur. Nec huius instructionis sunt capaces mox geniti, sed post longum tempus, et praecipue cum ad annos discretionis perveniunt. Ad hanc etiam instructionem longum tempus requiritur. Et tunc etiam, propter impetus passionum, quibus corrumpitur aestimatio prudentiae, indigent non solum instructione, sed etiam repressione. Ad haec autem mulier sola non sufficit, sed magis in hoc requiritur opus maris, in quo est et ratio perfectior ad instruendum, et virtus potentior ad castigandum. Oportet igitur in specie humana non per parvum tempus insistere promotioni prolis, sicut in avibus, sed per magnum spatium vitae. Unde, cum necessarium sit marem feminae commanere in omnibus animalibus quousque opus patris necessarium est proli, naturale est homini quod non ad modicum tempus, sed diuturnam societatem habeat vir ad determinatam mulierem. Hanc autem societatem matrimonium vocamus. Est igitur matrimonium homini naturale et fornicarius coitus, qui est praeter matrimonium, est contra hominis bonum. Et propter hoc oportet ipsum esse peccatum. Again, we must observe that, in the human species, the offspring needs not only nourishment for its body, as with other animals, but also instruction for its soul. For other animals have their natural forethought which enables them to provide for themselves, but man lives by reason, which can attain to forethought only after long experience. Thus children need to be instructed by their parents, who are experienced. Moreover, children are not capable of this instruction as soon as they are born, but only after a long time, and especially when they reach the age of discretion. Besides, this instruction requires a long time. And even then, on account of the assaults of the passions whereby the judgment of prudence is perverted, they need not only instruction but correction. Now a woman is insufficient for these things—in fact, there is more need for a man for such things, for his reason is more perfect for instruction, and his arm is stronger for punishment. Consequently, a short space of time, such as suffices for birds, is not sufficient for the education of the offspring in the human species, and a great part of life is required for the purpose. Thus as in all animals the male must remain with the female as long as the father is needed by the offspring, it is natural in the human race that the man should have not a short-lived but a lasting fellowship with a definite woman: this fellowship is called matrimony. Therefore, matrimony is natural to man, and the intercourse of fornication, which is apart from matrimony, is contrary to man’s good. For this reason it must be a sin. Nec tamen oportet reputari leve peccatum esse si quis seminis emissionem procuret praeter debitum generationis et educationis finem, propter hoc quod aut leve aut nullum peccatum est si quis aliqua sui corporis parte utatur ad alium usum quam ad eum ad quem est ordinata secundum naturam, ut si quis, verbi gratia, manibus ambulet, aut pedibus aliquid operetur manibus operandum: quia per huiusmodi inordinatos usus bonum hominis non multum impeditur; inordinata vero seminis emissio repugnat bono naturae, quod est conservatio speciei. Unde post peccatum homicidii, quo natura humana iam in actu existens destruitur, huiusmodi genus peccati videtur secundum locum tenere, quo impeditur generatio humanae naturae. Moreover, the emission of seed without the requisite intention of procreation and education must not be thought a slight sin because it is a small sin, or none at all, to use some part of one’s body for some other purpose than that for which nature intended it: for instance, if one walk on one’s hands, or use one’s feet to do what the hands should do. For by such actions man’s good is not prejudiced very much; but the inordinate discharge of semen is perversive of a natural good, which is the preservation of the species. Therefore, after the sin of murder, whereby human nature is deprived of actual existence, this kind of sin, whereby the generation of human nature is hindered, seems to hold the second place. Haec autem quae praemissa sunt, divina auctoritate firmantur. Quod enim emissio seminis ex qua proles sequi non potest, sit illicita, patet. Dicitur enim Levit. 18:22 cum masculo non commisceberis coitu femineo; et: 23 cum omni pecore non coibis. Et I Cor. 6:10: neque molles, neque masculorum concubitores, regnum Dei non possidebunt. The foregoing conclusions are confirmed by divine authority. That the discharge of semen in such a way that no offspring can ensue is unlawful is clear from the words of Lev 18:22–23: You shall not lie with a male as with a woman, and: You shall not lie with any beast; and of 1 Cor 6:9–10: Neither the effeminate nor sodomites . . . shall possess the kingdom of God. Quod etiam fornicatio, et omnis coitus praeter propriam uxorem, sit illicitus patet. Dicitur enim Deut. 23:17: non erit meretrix de filiabus Israel, nec scortator de filiis Israel. Et Tobiae 4:13: attende tibi ab omni fornicatione, et praeter uxorem tuam, non patiaris crimen scire. Et I Cor. 6:18: fugite fornicationem. Again, that fornication (and all intercourse with other than one’s own wife) is unlawful is evident from the words of Deuternomy 23:17: There shall be no prostitute of the daughters of Israel; neither shall there be a whoremonger of the sons of Israel. And: Take heed to keep yourself from all fornication, and beside your wife never endure to know a crime (Tob 4:13). And: Fly fornication (1 Cor 6:18). Per haec autem excluditur error dicentium in emissione seminis non esse maius peccatum quam in aliarum superfluitatum emissione; et dicentium fornicationem non esse peccatum. Hereby we exclude the error of those who denied that there was a greater sin in the emission of seed than in the discharge of other superfluities, and of those who said that fornication is no sin. Caput 123 Chapter 123 Quod matrimonium debet esse indivisibile That matrimony should be indissoluble Si quis autem recte consideret, praedicta ratio non solum ad hoc perducere videtur ut societas maris et feminae in humana natura, quam matrimonium appellamus, sit diuturna, sed etiam quod sit per totam vitam. If one consider the matter rightly, it will be seen that the foregoing arguments not only show that the fellowship of male and female in human nature, which we call matrimony, should be lasting, but also that it should endure throughout life. Possessiones enim ad conservationem naturalis vitae ordinantur: et quia naturalis vita, quae conservari non potest in patre perpetuo, quasi quadam successione, secundum speciei similitudinem, conservatur in filio, secundum naturam est conveniens ut in his quae sunt patris, succedat et filius. Naturale est igitur ut sollicitudo patris ad filium maneat usque ad finem vitae suae. Si igitur sollicitudo patris de filio causat etiam in avibus commanentiam maris et feminae, ordo naturalis requirit quod usque ad finem vitae in humana specie pater et mater simul commaneant. For possessions are directed to the preservation of the natural life; and, since the natural life, which cannot be preserved in the person of an undying father, is preserved by a kind of succession in the person of the son, it is naturally befitting that the son succeed in things belonging to the father. Therefore, it is natural that the father’s care for his son should endure to the end of his life. If, then, the father’s care for his son causes, even among birds, the continued fellowship of male and female, the natural order demands that in the human species father and mother should remain together to the end of life. Videtur etiam aequitati repugnare si praedicta societas dissolvatur. Femina enim indiget mare non solum propter generationem, sicut in aliis animalibus, sed etiam propter gubernationem: quia mas est et ratione perfectior, et virtute fortior. Mulier vero ad viri societatem assumitur propter necessitatem generationis. Cessante igitur fecunditate mulieris et decore, impeditur ne ab alio assumatur. Si quis igitur, mulierem assumens tempore iuventutis, quo et decor et fecunditas ei adsunt, eam dimittere possit postquam aetate provecta fuerit, damnum inferet mulieri, contra naturalem aequitatem. It would seem also contrary to equity for the aforesaid fellowship to be dissolved. For the female requires the male not only for procreation, as in other animals, but also for governance, because the male excels both in intelligence and in strength. Now, the woman is taken into partnership with the man for the purpose of procreation. Consequently, when the woman ceases to be fruitful and fair, this is an obstacle against her being taken by another man. Hence, if a man, after taking a wife in her youth while she is yet fair and fruitful, can put her away when she has aged, he does her an injury, contrary to natural equity. Item. Manifeste apparet inconveniens esse si mulier virum dimittere possit: cum mulier naturaliter viro subiecta sit tanquam gubernatori; non est autem in potestate eius qui alteri subiicitur, ut ab eius regimine discedat. Contra naturalem igitur ordinem esset si mulier virum deserere posset. Si ergo vir deserere posset mulierem, non esset aequa societas viri ad mulierem, sed servitus quaedam ex parte mulieris. Again. It is clearly unfitting that the woman be allowed to put away the man, since she is naturally subject to the man’s authority, and one who is subject to another is not free to withdraw himself from his authority. Hence it would be contrary to the natural order if a wife could leave her husband. Consequently, if the husband could leave his wife, there would not be just fellowship between husband and wife, but a kind of slavery on the part of the latter. Praeterea. Hominibus naturalis quaedam sollicitudo inest de certitudine prolis: quod propter hoc necessarium est, quia filius diuturna patris gubernatione indiget. Quaecumque igitur certitudinem prolis impediunt, sunt contra naturalem instinctum humanae speciei. Si autem vir posset mulierem dimittere, vel mulier virum, et alteri copulari, impediretur certitudo prolis, dum mulier a primo cognita, postmodum a secundo cognosceretur. Est igitur contra naturalem instinctum speciei humanae quod mulier a viro separetur. Sic igitur non solum diuturnam, sed etiam individuam oportet esse in humana specie maris et feminae coniunctionem. Also. There is in man a certain natural anxiety to be assured of his offspring: this is necessary because the child needs the father’s authority for a long time. Hence whatever prevents him from being assured of his children is contrary to the natural instinct of the human species. Now, if the husband may put away his wife, or the wife leave her husband, and take another man, thus being copulated first to one, and afterwards to another, the certainty of offspring would be hindered. Therefore, it is contrary to the natural instinct of the human species that husband and wife be separated. In consequence, the union of male and female in the human race must be not only long lasting, but indissoluble. Amplius. Amicitia, quanto maior, tanto est firmior et diuturnior. Inter virum autem et uxorem maxima amicitia esse videtur: adunantur enim non solum in actu carnalis copulae, quae etiam inter bestias quandam suavem societatem facit, sed etiam ad totius domesticae conversationis consortium; unde, in signum huius, homo propter uxorem etiam patrem et matrem dimittit, ut dicitur Gen. 2:24. Conveniens igitur est quod matrimonium sit omnino indissolubile. Moreover. The greater the friendship, the more stable and lasting is it. Now, there seems to be the greatest friendship between husband and wife: for they are made one not only in the act of carnal intercourse, which even among dumb animals causes an agreeable fellowship, but also as partners in the whole intercourse of daily life. As a sign of this, man must leave father and mother for his wife’s sake (Gen 2:24). Therefore, it is right that matrimony should be altogether indissoluble. Ulterius autem considerandum est quod inter naturales actus sola generatio ad bonum commune ordinatur: nam comestio, et aliarum superfluitatum emissio, ad individuum pertinent; generatio vero ad conservationem speciei. Unde, cum lex instituatur ad bonum commune, ea quae pertinent ad generationem, prae aliis oportet legibus ordinari et divinis et humanis. Leges autem positae oportet quod ex naturali instinctu procedant, si humanae sunt: sicut etiam in scientiis demonstrativis omnis humana inventio ex principiis naturaliter cognitis initium sumit. Si autem divinae sunt, non solum instinctum naturae explicant, sed etiam defectum naturalis instinctus supplent: sicut ea quae divinitus revelantur, superant naturalis rationis capacitatem. Cum igitur instinctus naturalis sit in specie humana ad hoc quod coniunctio maris et feminae sit individua, et quod sit una unius, oportuit hoc lege humana ordinatum esse. Lex autem divina supernaturalem quandam rationem apponit ex significatione inseparabilis coniunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae, quae est una unius. Sic igitur inordinationes circa actum generationis non solum instinctui naturali repugnant, sed etiam leges divinas et humanas transgrediuntur. Unde circa hoc magis ex inordinatione peccatur quam circa sumptionem cibi, aut alterius huiusmodi. It must also be observed that among natural acts generation alone is directed to the common good, since eating and the discharge of other superfluities regard the individual, but procreation regards the preservation of the species. Hence, as the law is made for the common good, whatever regards procreation should be regulated before other things by laws both divine and human. Now positive laws should be based on natural instinct, if they are human, even as all human discoveries must be founded on principles naturally known in demonstrative sciences. And if they be divine, not only do they express the instinct of nature, but they also supply the defect of natural instinct: even as the things that God reveals are beyond the grasp of natural reason. Since, then, the natural instinct of the human species is that the union of male and female be indissoluble, and that one man be united to one woman, this had to be ordered by human law. Moreover, the divine law adds a kind of supernatural reason taken from the representation of the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church, which is union of one with one. Therefore, inordinateness in the act of generation not only is contrary to the natural instinct, but it also transgresses laws both divine and human. Hence, this kind of disorder is more sinful than that which may occur in taking food, or in similar things. Quia vero necesse est ad id quod est optimum in homine, alia omnia ordinari, coniunctio maris et feminae non solum sic ordinata est legibus secundum quod ad prolem generandam pertinet, ut est in aliis animalibus, sed etiam secundum quod convenit ad bonos mores, quos ratio recta disponit vel quantum ad hominem secundum se, vel secundum quod homo est pars domesticae familiae, aut civilis societatis. Ad quos quidem bonos mores pertinet individua coniunctio maris et feminae. Sic enim erit fidelior amor unius ad alterum, dum cognoscunt se indivisibiliter coniunctos. Erit etiam utrique sollicitior cura in rebus domesticis, dum se perpetuo commansuros in earundem rerum possessione existimant. Subtrahuntur etiam ex hoc discordiarum origines, quas oporteret accidere, si vir uxorem dimitteret, inter eum et propinquos uxoris: et fit firmior inter affines dilectio. Tolluntur etiam adulteriorum occasiones, quae darentur si vir uxorem dimittere posset, aut e converso: per hoc enim daretur via facilior sollicitandi matrimonia aliena. And since in man all other things should be subordinate to what is best in him, the union of male and female is ordered by law not only in the point of its relation to the procreation of children, as in other animals, but also in its relation to good morals, which right reason regulates both as regards man in himself, and considered as a member either of a private family, or of the civil community. Now, the indissolubility of the union of male and female belongs to good morals. For their mutual love will be the more constant if they know that they are indissolubly united. They will also be more carefully provident in the conduct of the household when they realize that they are always to remain together in possession of the same things. Again, this precludes the origin of quarrels which must arise between the husband and his wife’s relatives, if he were to put his wife away: and those who are connected through affinity have a greater regard for one another. Moreover, it removes the occasions of adultery which would occur were the husband free to put away his wife, or vice versa: for this would encourage the seeking of further marriage. Hinc est quod dicitur Matth. 5:32, et 19:6, et I Cor. 7:10: ego autem dico vobis, uxorem a viro non discedere. Hence it is said: But I say to you that the wife should depart not from her husband (Matt 5:31; Matt 19:6; 1 Cor 7:10). Per hoc autem excluditur consuetudo dimittentium uxores. Quod tamen in veteri lege permissum fuit Iudaeis propter eorum duritiam: quia scilicet proni erant ad occisionem uxorum. Permissum ergo fuit minus malum, ad excludendum maius malum. Hereby we condemn the custom of putting a wife away. Nevertheless, this was permitted to the Jews in the old law for their hardness of heart (Matt 19:8); namely, because they were prone to wife-murder. Hence the lesser evil was allowed, in order to avoid the greater. Caput 124 Chapter 124 Quod matrimonium debeat esse unius ad unam That matrimony should be the union of one man with one woman Considerandum etiam videtur quod innatum est mentibus omnium animalium quae coitu utuntur, quod consortium in compari non compatiuntur: unde propter coitum pugnae in animalibus existunt. Et quidem quantum ad omnia animalia est una communis ratio, quia quodlibet animal desiderat libere frui voluptate coitus, sicut et voluptate cibi: quae quidem libertas impeditur per hoc quod ad unam plures accedunt, aut e converso; sicut et in libertate fruendi cibo impeditur aliquod animal si cibum quem ipsum sumere cupit, aliud animal usurpet. Et ideo similiter propter cibum et propter coitum animalia pugnant. In hominibus autem est ratio specialis: quia, ut dictum est, homo naturaliter desiderat certus esse de prole; quae quidem certitudo omnino tolleretur si plures essent unius. Ex naturali igitur instinctu procedit quod sit una unius. It is also to be observed, that it seems like all animals that are used to copulate have a natural instinct to resist another’s intercourse with their consort: hence animals fight on account of intercourse. And there is one common reason for this as regards all animals, because every animal desires to indulge at will in the pleasure of intercourse, even as in the pleasure of eating. This freedom ceases if many males have access to one female, or vice versa, just as an animal is deprived of the free enjoyment of its food if another animal usurps the food it desires to consume. Hence animals fight both for food and for intercourse. But with regard to men there is a special reason, because, as already stated, man naturally desires to be assured of his offspring, and this assurance would be altogether nullified in the case of promiscuous intercourse. Therefore, the union of one man with one woman comes from a natural instinct. Sed in hoc differentia consideranda est. Quantum enim ad hoc quod una femina a pluribus maribus non cognoscatur, utraque praedictarum rationum concurrit. Sed quantum ad hoc quod unus mas plures feminas non cognoscat, non facit ratio secunda: non enim certitudo prolis impeditur si unus mas plures feminas cognoscat. Facit autem contra hoc ratio prima: nam sicut libertas utendi femina ad libitum a mare tollitur si femina habeat alium, ita et eadem libertas a femina tollitur si mas habeat plures. Et ideo, quia certitudo prolis est principale bonum quod ex matrimonio quaeritur, nulla lex aut consuetudo humana permisit quod una esset plurium uxor. Fuit etiam hoc inconveniens reputatum apud antiquos Romanos, de quibus refert maximus Valerius quod credebant nec propter sterilitatem coniugalem fidem debere dissolvi. A difference, however, is to be noted here. For as regards one woman not being united to several men, both the foregoing arguments avail. But as regards one man not being joined to several women, the second argument is of no use, since the certainty of having offspring is not removed if one man be joined to several women. The first argument, however, avails against this: for just as freedom of access to the woman is denied if she have another man, so too the same freedom is denied the woman if the man have several women. Hence, as certainty of having offspring is the chief good sought from marriage, no human law or custom has permitted polyandry. This was considered to be wrong even among the ancient Romans, of whom Maximus Valerius relates that they deemed that not even on account of sterility should the marriage bond be severed. Item. In omni animalis specie in qua patri inest aliqua sollicitudo de prole, unus mas non habet nisi unam feminam, sicut patet in omnibus avibus quae simul nutriunt pullos: non enim sufficeret unus mas auxilium praestare in educatione prolis pluribus feminis. In animalibus autem in quibus maribus nulla est sollicitudo de prole, indifferenter mas habet plures feminas, et femina plures mares: sicut in canibus, gallinis, et huiusmodi. Cum autem masculo inter omnia animalia maior sit cura de prole in specie humana, manifestum est quod naturale est homini quod unus mas unam feminam habeat, et e converso. Again. In every animal species where the father has a certain care for his offspring, the one male has but one female (as may be seen in birds, where both unite in feeding their young); for one male would not suffice to rear the progeny of several females. On the other hand, where the male animal has not the care of the offspring, we indifferently find the union of one male with several females, or of one female with several males: such is the case with dogs, hens, and so forth. Since, then, of all animals the male of the human species is preeminent in the care of his offspring, it is clearly natural to man that one man should have one wife, and vice versa. Adhuc. Amicitia in quadam aequalitate consistit. Si igitur mulieri non licet habere plures viros, quia hoc est contra certitudinem prolis; liceret autem viro habere plures uxores: non esset liberalis amicitia uxoris ad virum, sed quasi servilis. Et haec etiam ratio experimento comprobatur: quia apud viros habentes plures uxores, uxores quasi ancillariter habentur. Besides. Equality is a condition of friendship. Hence if a woman may not have several husbands (because this removes the certainty of offspring), if it were lawful for a man to have several wives, the friendship of a wife for her husband would not be freely bestowed but servile, as it were. And this argument is confirmed by experience, since where men have several wives, the wives are treated as servants. Praeterea. Amicitia intensa non habetur ad multos: ut patet per philosophum in VIII Ethicorum. Si igitur uxor habet unum virum tantum, vir autem habet plures uxores, non erit aequalis amicitia ex utraque parte. Non igitur erit amicitia liberalis, sed quodammodo servilis. Further. In perfect friendship it is impossible to be friends with many, according to the Philosopher. Hence if the wife has but one husband, while the husband has several wives, the friendship will not be equal on either side: consequently, it will be not a freely bestowed friendship, but a servile one, as it were. Amplius. Sicut dictum est, matrimonium in hominibus oportet ordinari secundum quod competit ad bonos mores. Est autem contra bonos mores quod unus habeat plures uxores: quia ex hoc sequitur discordia in domestica familia, ut experimento patet. Non est igitur conveniens quod unus homo habeat plures uxores. Moreover. As we have already stated, matrimony among men should be so ordered as to be consistent with good morals. Now it is contrary to good morals that one man have several wives, for this leads to discord in the family, as shown by experience. Therefore, it is not right for one man to have several wives.