Amplius. Amicitia, quanto maior, tanto est firmior et diuturnior. Inter virum autem et uxorem maxima amicitia esse videtur: adunantur enim non solum in actu carnalis copulae, quae etiam inter bestias quandam suavem societatem facit, sed etiam ad totius domesticae conversationis consortium; unde, in signum huius, homo propter uxorem etiam patrem et matrem dimittit, ut dicitur Gen. 2:24. Conveniens igitur est quod matrimonium sit omnino indissolubile. Moreover. The greater the friendship, the more stable and lasting is it. Now, there seems to be the greatest friendship between husband and wife: for they are made one not only in the act of carnal intercourse, which even among dumb animals causes an agreeable fellowship, but also as partners in the whole intercourse of daily life. As a sign of this, man must leave father and mother for his wife’s sake (Gen 2:24). Therefore, it is right that matrimony should be altogether indissoluble. Ulterius autem considerandum est quod inter naturales actus sola generatio ad bonum commune ordinatur: nam comestio, et aliarum superfluitatum emissio, ad individuum pertinent; generatio vero ad conservationem speciei. Unde, cum lex instituatur ad bonum commune, ea quae pertinent ad generationem, prae aliis oportet legibus ordinari et divinis et humanis. Leges autem positae oportet quod ex naturali instinctu procedant, si humanae sunt: sicut etiam in scientiis demonstrativis omnis humana inventio ex principiis naturaliter cognitis initium sumit. Si autem divinae sunt, non solum instinctum naturae explicant, sed etiam defectum naturalis instinctus supplent: sicut ea quae divinitus revelantur, superant naturalis rationis capacitatem. Cum igitur instinctus naturalis sit in specie humana ad hoc quod coniunctio maris et feminae sit individua, et quod sit una unius, oportuit hoc lege humana ordinatum esse. Lex autem divina supernaturalem quandam rationem apponit ex significatione inseparabilis coniunctionis Christi et Ecclesiae, quae est una unius. Sic igitur inordinationes circa actum generationis non solum instinctui naturali repugnant, sed etiam leges divinas et humanas transgrediuntur. Unde circa hoc magis ex inordinatione peccatur quam circa sumptionem cibi, aut alterius huiusmodi. It must also be observed that among natural acts generation alone is directed to the common good, since eating and the discharge of other superfluities regard the individual, but procreation regards the preservation of the species. Hence, as the law is made for the common good, whatever regards procreation should be regulated before other things by laws both divine and human. Now positive laws should be based on natural instinct, if they are human, even as all human discoveries must be founded on principles naturally known in demonstrative sciences. And if they be divine, not only do they express the instinct of nature, but they also supply the defect of natural instinct: even as the things that God reveals are beyond the grasp of natural reason. Since, then, the natural instinct of the human species is that the union of male and female be indissoluble, and that one man be united to one woman, this had to be ordered by human law. Moreover, the divine law adds a kind of supernatural reason taken from the representation of the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church, which is union of one with one. Therefore, inordinateness in the act of generation not only is contrary to the natural instinct, but it also transgresses laws both divine and human. Hence, this kind of disorder is more sinful than that which may occur in taking food, or in similar things. Quia vero necesse est ad id quod est optimum in homine, alia omnia ordinari, coniunctio maris et feminae non solum sic ordinata est legibus secundum quod ad prolem generandam pertinet, ut est in aliis animalibus, sed etiam secundum quod convenit ad bonos mores, quos ratio recta disponit vel quantum ad hominem secundum se, vel secundum quod homo est pars domesticae familiae, aut civilis societatis. Ad quos quidem bonos mores pertinet individua coniunctio maris et feminae. Sic enim erit fidelior amor unius ad alterum, dum cognoscunt se indivisibiliter coniunctos. Erit etiam utrique sollicitior cura in rebus domesticis, dum se perpetuo commansuros in earundem rerum possessione existimant. Subtrahuntur etiam ex hoc discordiarum origines, quas oporteret accidere, si vir uxorem dimitteret, inter eum et propinquos uxoris: et fit firmior inter affines dilectio. Tolluntur etiam adulteriorum occasiones, quae darentur si vir uxorem dimittere posset, aut e converso: per hoc enim daretur via facilior sollicitandi matrimonia aliena. And since in man all other things should be subordinate to what is best in him, the union of male and female is ordered by law not only in the point of its relation to the procreation of children, as in other animals, but also in its relation to good morals, which right reason regulates both as regards man in himself, and considered as a member either of a private family, or of the civil community. Now, the indissolubility of the union of male and female belongs to good morals. For their mutual love will be the more constant if they know that they are indissolubly united. They will also be more carefully provident in the conduct of the household when they realize that they are always to remain together in possession of the same things. Again, this precludes the origin of quarrels which must arise between the husband and his wife’s relatives, if he were to put his wife away: and those who are connected through affinity have a greater regard for one another. Moreover, it removes the occasions of adultery which would occur were the husband free to put away his wife, or vice versa: for this would encourage the seeking of further marriage. Hinc est quod dicitur Matth. 5:32, et 19:6, et I Cor. 7:10: ego autem dico vobis, uxorem a viro non discedere. Hence it is said: But I say to you that the wife should depart not from her husband (Matt 5:31; Matt 19:6; 1 Cor 7:10). Per hoc autem excluditur consuetudo dimittentium uxores. Quod tamen in veteri lege permissum fuit Iudaeis propter eorum duritiam: quia scilicet proni erant ad occisionem uxorum. Permissum ergo fuit minus malum, ad excludendum maius malum. Hereby we condemn the custom of putting a wife away. Nevertheless, this was permitted to the Jews in the old law for their hardness of heart (Matt 19:8); namely, because they were prone to wife-murder. Hence the lesser evil was allowed, in order to avoid the greater. Caput 124 Chapter 124 Quod matrimonium debeat esse unius ad unam That matrimony should be the union of one man with one woman Considerandum etiam videtur quod innatum est mentibus omnium animalium quae coitu utuntur, quod consortium in compari non compatiuntur: unde propter coitum pugnae in animalibus existunt. Et quidem quantum ad omnia animalia est una communis ratio, quia quodlibet animal desiderat libere frui voluptate coitus, sicut et voluptate cibi: quae quidem libertas impeditur per hoc quod ad unam plures accedunt, aut e converso; sicut et in libertate fruendi cibo impeditur aliquod animal si cibum quem ipsum sumere cupit, aliud animal usurpet. Et ideo similiter propter cibum et propter coitum animalia pugnant. In hominibus autem est ratio specialis: quia, ut dictum est, homo naturaliter desiderat certus esse de prole; quae quidem certitudo omnino tolleretur si plures essent unius. Ex naturali igitur instinctu procedit quod sit una unius. It is also to be observed, that it seems like all animals that are used to copulate have a natural instinct to resist another’s intercourse with their consort: hence animals fight on account of intercourse. And there is one common reason for this as regards all animals, because every animal desires to indulge at will in the pleasure of intercourse, even as in the pleasure of eating. This freedom ceases if many males have access to one female, or vice versa, just as an animal is deprived of the free enjoyment of its food if another animal usurps the food it desires to consume. Hence animals fight both for food and for intercourse. But with regard to men there is a special reason, because, as already stated, man naturally desires to be assured of his offspring, and this assurance would be altogether nullified in the case of promiscuous intercourse. Therefore, the union of one man with one woman comes from a natural instinct. Sed in hoc differentia consideranda est. Quantum enim ad hoc quod una femina a pluribus maribus non cognoscatur, utraque praedictarum rationum concurrit. Sed quantum ad hoc quod unus mas plures feminas non cognoscat, non facit ratio secunda: non enim certitudo prolis impeditur si unus mas plures feminas cognoscat. Facit autem contra hoc ratio prima: nam sicut libertas utendi femina ad libitum a mare tollitur si femina habeat alium, ita et eadem libertas a femina tollitur si mas habeat plures. Et ideo, quia certitudo prolis est principale bonum quod ex matrimonio quaeritur, nulla lex aut consuetudo humana permisit quod una esset plurium uxor. Fuit etiam hoc inconveniens reputatum apud antiquos Romanos, de quibus refert maximus Valerius quod credebant nec propter sterilitatem coniugalem fidem debere dissolvi. A difference, however, is to be noted here. For as regards one woman not being united to several men, both the foregoing arguments avail. But as regards one man not being joined to several women, the second argument is of no use, since the certainty of having offspring is not removed if one man be joined to several women. The first argument, however, avails against this: for just as freedom of access to the woman is denied if she have another man, so too the same freedom is denied the woman if the man have several women. Hence, as certainty of having offspring is the chief good sought from marriage, no human law or custom has permitted polyandry. This was considered to be wrong even among the ancient Romans, of whom Maximus Valerius relates that they deemed that not even on account of sterility should the marriage bond be severed. Item. In omni animalis specie in qua patri inest aliqua sollicitudo de prole, unus mas non habet nisi unam feminam, sicut patet in omnibus avibus quae simul nutriunt pullos: non enim sufficeret unus mas auxilium praestare in educatione prolis pluribus feminis. In animalibus autem in quibus maribus nulla est sollicitudo de prole, indifferenter mas habet plures feminas, et femina plures mares: sicut in canibus, gallinis, et huiusmodi. Cum autem masculo inter omnia animalia maior sit cura de prole in specie humana, manifestum est quod naturale est homini quod unus mas unam feminam habeat, et e converso. Again. In every animal species where the father has a certain care for his offspring, the one male has but one female (as may be seen in birds, where both unite in feeding their young); for one male would not suffice to rear the progeny of several females. On the other hand, where the male animal has not the care of the offspring, we indifferently find the union of one male with several females, or of one female with several males: such is the case with dogs, hens, and so forth. Since, then, of all animals the male of the human species is preeminent in the care of his offspring, it is clearly natural to man that one man should have one wife, and vice versa. Adhuc. Amicitia in quadam aequalitate consistit. Si igitur mulieri non licet habere plures viros, quia hoc est contra certitudinem prolis; liceret autem viro habere plures uxores: non esset liberalis amicitia uxoris ad virum, sed quasi servilis. Et haec etiam ratio experimento comprobatur: quia apud viros habentes plures uxores, uxores quasi ancillariter habentur. Besides. Equality is a condition of friendship. Hence if a woman may not have several husbands (because this removes the certainty of offspring), if it were lawful for a man to have several wives, the friendship of a wife for her husband would not be freely bestowed but servile, as it were. And this argument is confirmed by experience, since where men have several wives, the wives are treated as servants. Praeterea. Amicitia intensa non habetur ad multos: ut patet per philosophum in VIII Ethicorum. Si igitur uxor habet unum virum tantum, vir autem habet plures uxores, non erit aequalis amicitia ex utraque parte. Non igitur erit amicitia liberalis, sed quodammodo servilis. Further. In perfect friendship it is impossible to be friends with many, according to the Philosopher. Hence if the wife has but one husband, while the husband has several wives, the friendship will not be equal on either side: consequently, it will be not a freely bestowed friendship, but a servile one, as it were. Amplius. Sicut dictum est, matrimonium in hominibus oportet ordinari secundum quod competit ad bonos mores. Est autem contra bonos mores quod unus habeat plures uxores: quia ex hoc sequitur discordia in domestica familia, ut experimento patet. Non est igitur conveniens quod unus homo habeat plures uxores. Moreover. As we have already stated, matrimony among men should be so ordered as to be consistent with good morals. Now it is contrary to good morals that one man have several wives, for this leads to discord in the family, as shown by experience. Therefore, it is not right for one man to have several wives. Hinc est quod dicitur Gen. 2:24: erunt duo in carne una. Hence it is said: They shall be two in one flesh (Gen 2:24). Per hoc autem excluditur consuetudo habentium plures uxores; et opinio Platonis qui posuit uxores debere esse communes. Quem in nova lege secutus est Nicolaus, unus ex septem diaconibus. Hereby polygamy stands condemned, as also the opinion of Plato, who said that wives should be possessed in common, which opinion was adopted by Nicolas (one of the seven deacons) in the New Law. Caput 125 Chapter 125 Quod matrimonium non debet fieri inter propinquos That marriage should not be contracted between relatives Propter huiusmodi etiam causas rationabiles ordinatum est legibus quod certae personae a matrimonio excludantur, quae sunt secundum originem coniunctae. For these reasonable motives, the laws have decreed that certain persons belonging to a common stock should be debarred from marriage. Nam cum in matrimonio sit diversarum personarum coniunctio, illae personae quae se debent reputare quasi unum propter eandem originem, convenienter a matrimonio excluduntur, ut, dum se per hoc unum esse recognoscunt, ferventius se diligant. For, as marriage is the union of different persons, those who should consider themselves as one through having a common ancestor are rightly debarred from marriage, so that they may have a greater regard for each other by realizing that they are one through marriage. Item. Cum ea quae inter virum et uxorem aguntur, quandam naturalem verecundiam habeant, ab his mutuo agendis illas personas prohiberi oportuit quibus, propter coniunctionem sanguinis, reverentia debetur. Quae quidem ratio videtur in veteri lege inducta per hoc quod dicitur: turpitudinem sororis tuae non discooperias, et similiter de aliis. Again. Since in the relations between husband and wife there is a certain natural shame, relations should be forbidden between those who through being united in blood should revere each other. This motive seems to be indicated in the law, where it is said: You shall not uncover the shame of your sister (Lev 18:9), and so on with others. Praeterea. Ad corruptionem bonorum morum pertinet quod homines sint nimis dediti voluptatibus coitus: quia, cum haec voluptas maxime mentem absorbeat, impediretur ratio ab his quae recte agenda essent. Sequeretur autem nimius voluptatis usus si liceret homini per coitum coniungi illis personis quibus commorandi habet necessitatem, sicut sororibus et aliis propinquis: quia talibus occasio coitus subtrahi non posset. Conveniens igitur fuit bonis moribus ut talis coniunctio legibus inhiberetur. Further. That men be too much given to the pleasure of intercourse is corruptive of good morals; for, since this pleasure absorbs the mind more than any other, the reason would be hindered in things pertaining to rectitude. Now there would result an abuse of pleasure if man were allowed to be united in intercourse with those in whose society he must live, such as sisters and other relatives, for it would be impossible to remove the occasion of intercourse with such persons. Therefore, it was in keeping with good morals that the laws should forbid such unions. Adhuc. Delectatio coitus maxime corrumpit existimationem prudentiae. Multiplicatio igitur talis delectationis repugnat bonos mores. Talis autem delectatio augetur per amorem personarum quae coniunguntur. Esset igitur contrarium bonis moribus propinquis coniungi: quia in eis adiungeretur amor qui est ex communione originis et connutritione, amori concupiscentiae; et, multiplicato amore, necesse esset animam magis delectationibus subdi. Moreover. The pleasure of intercourse corrupts entirely the judgment of prudence. Therefore, frequency of that pleasure is contrary to good morals. Now, this pleasure is increased by the mutual love of those who are thus united. Hence it would be contrary to good morals for relatives to marry, for then there would be in them the love arising from community of blood and nourishment in addition to the love of desire. In consequence, the soul would be all the more a slave to pleasures through a multiplicity of loves. Amplius. In societate humana hoc est maxime necessarium ut sit amicitia inter multos. Multiplicatur autem amicitia inter homines dum personae extraneae per matrimonia colligantur. Conveniens igitur fuit legibus ordinari quod matrimonia contraherentur cum extraneis personis, et non cum propinquis. Besides. It is most necessary in human society that friendship be among many. Now friendships among men are multiplied if marriage be contracted between persons of different stock. Therefore, it was becoming for the laws to direct that marriage be contracted with those of different stock, and not between relatives. Adhuc. Inconveniens est ut illis personis aliquis socialiter iungatur quibus naturaliter debet esse subiectus. Naturale autem est quod aliquis parentibus sit subiectus. Ergo inconveniens esset quod cum parentibus aliquis matrimonium contraheret: cum in matrimonio sit quaedam coniunctio socialis. Also. It is unsuitable that a person be united socially with those to whom he should naturally be subject. Now, it is natural for a man to be subject to his parents. Therefore, it is unfitting for one to marry one’s parent, since marriage is a social union. Hinc est quod dicitur Levit. 18:6: omnis homo ad proximam sanguinis sui non accedat. Hence it is said: None of you shall approach any one near of kin to him (Lev 18:6). Per haec autem excluditur consuetudo eorum qui propinquis suis se carnaliter commiscent. By this stands condemned the custom of those who contract bonds of the flesh with persons of their kindred. Sciendum est autem quod, sicut naturalis inclinatio est ad ea quae sunt ut in pluribus, ita et lex posita est secundum id quod in pluribus accidit. Non est praedictis rationibus contrarium si in aliquo aliter possit accidere: non enim propter bonum unius debet praetermitti bonum multorum, cum bonum multitudinis semper sit divinius quam bonum unius. Ne tamen defectus qui in aliquo uno posset accidere, omnino absque medela remaneat, residet apud legislatores, et eis similes, auctoritas dispensandi in eo quod communiter est statutum, secundum quod est necessarium in aliquo casu particulari. Et si quidem lex sit humana, per homines similem potestatem habentes dispensari potest. Si autem lex sit divinitus posita, auctoritate divina dispensatio fieri potest: sicut in veteri lege ex dispensatione indultum videtur uxores plures habere et concubinas, et uxoris repudium. We must observe, however, that just as the natural inclination is to what occurs most frequently, so too is the law made to fit the majority of cases. The foregoing arguments are not invalidated by any possible exceptions, for the good of many should not be foregone for the sake of the good of one, since the common good is ever more god-like than the good of one. Lest, however, a defect that may occur in a single instance be altogether irremediable, lawgivers and the like have the power to dispense in the statutes that are made for the generality, according to the requirements of a particular case. If the law be made by man, those who have the same power can dispense therein. But if the law be of God, dispensation can be granted by divine authority, just as in the old law polygamy, concubinage, and divorce appear as allowed by dispensation. Caput 126 Chapter 126 Quod non omnis carnalis commixtio est peccatum That not all carnal intercourse is sinful Sicut autem contra rationem est ut aliquis carnali coniunctione utatur contra id quod convenit proli generandae et educandae, ita etiam secundum rationem est quod aliquis carnali coniunctione utatur secundum quod congruit ad generationem et educationem prolis. Lege autem divina haec solum prohibita sunt quae rationi adversantur, ut ex supra dictis patet. Inconveniens est igitur dicere quod omnis carnalis coniunctio sit peccatum. Just as it is contrary to reason to indulge in carnal intercourse so as to frustrate the begetting and rearing of children, so is it in keeping with reason to make use of it in a manner consistent with procreation and upbringing. Now, the divine law forbids only those things that are contrary to reason, as we have shown above. Therefore, it is unreasonable to say that all carnal intercourse is sinful. Adhuc. Cum membra corporis sint quaedam animae instrumenta, cuiuslibet membri finis est usus eius: sicut et cuiuslibet alterius instrumenti. Quorundam autem membrorum corporis usus est carnalis commixtio. Carnalis igitur commixtio est finis quorundam membrorum corporis. Illud autem quod est finis aliquarum naturalium rerum, non potest esse secundum se malum: quia ea quae naturaliter sunt, ex divina providentia ordinantur ad finem, ut ex supra dictis patet. Impossibile est igitur quod carnalis commixtio sit secundum se mala. Again. Since the members of the body are instruments of the soul, the end of each member, as of any other instrument, is its use. Now, the use of certain members of the body is carnal intercourse. Therefore, carnal intercourse is the end of certain members of the body. But that which is the end of any natural thing cannot be evil in itself, since that which is according to nature is directed to an end by divine providence, as stated above. Therefore, carnal intercourse cannot possibly be evil in itself. Amplius. Naturales inclinationes insunt rebus a Deo, qui cuncta movet. Impossibile est igitur quod naturalis inclinatio alicuius speciei sit ad id quod est secundum se malum. Sed omnibus animalibus perfectis inest naturalis inclinatio ad coniunctionem carnalem. Impossibile est igitur quod carnalis commixtio sit secundum se mala. Further. Natural inclinations are implanted in things by God, who moves all things. Therefore, the natural inclination of a species cannot be to that which is evil in itself. Now, in all perfect animals there is a natural inclination to carnal intercourse. Therefore, carnal intercourse cannot be evil in itself. Item. Illud sine quo non potest esse aliquid quod est bonum et optimum, non est secundum se malum. Sed perpetuitas speciei non conservatur in animalibus nisi per generationem, quae est ex commixtione carnali. Impossibile est igitur quod commixtio carnalis sit secundum se mala. Moreover. That which is a necessary condition for something good—and very good—is not evil in itself. But the preservation of the animal species cannot be enduring except by means of generation by carnal intercourse. Therefore, carnal intercourse cannot be evil in itself. Hinc est quod dicitur I Cor. 7:28: mulier non peccat si nubat. Hence it is said: A woman sins not if she marries (1 Cor 7:28). Per hoc autem excluditur error quorundam dicentium omnem carnalem coniunctionem esse illicitam: unde totaliter matrimonium et nuptias damnant. Quorum quidam hoc ideo dicunt quia credunt corporalia non a bono, sed a malo principio esse. Hereby we refute the error of those who say that all carnal intercourse is unlawful, and thus utterly condemn matrimony and nuptials. Some of them are led to this assertion because they believe that bodies were made not by a good but by an evil principle. Caput 127 Chapter 127