Caput 158 Chapter 158 Qualiter homo a peccato liberatur How man is freed from sin Quia vero homo non potest ad unum oppositorum redire nisi recedat ab alio, ad hoc quod homo auxilio gratiae ad statum rectitudinis redeat, necessarium est quod a peccato, per quod a rectitudine declinaverat, recedat. Et quia homo in ultimum finem dirigitur et ab eo avertitur praecipue per voluntatem, non solum necessarium est quod homo exteriori actu a peccato recedat, peccare desinens, sed etiam quod recedat voluntate, ad hoc quod per gratiam a peccato resurgat. Voluntate autem homo a peccato recedit dum et de praeterito poenitet, et futurum vitare proponit. Necessarium est igitur quod homo a peccato resurgens et de peccato praeterito poeniteat, et futura vitare proponat. Si enim non proponeret desistere a peccato, non esset peccatum secundum se contrarium voluntati. Si vero vellet desistere a peccato, non tamen doleret de peccato praeterito, non esset illud idem peccatum quod fecit, contrarium voluntati. Est autem contrarius motus quo ab aliquo receditur, motui quo ad illud pervenitur: sicut dealbatio contraria est denigrationi. Unde oportet quod per contraria voluntas recedat a peccato his per quae in peccatum inclinata fuit. Fuit autem inclinata in peccatum per appetitum et delectationem circa res inferiores. Oportet igitur quod a peccato recedat per aliqua poenalia, quibus affligatur propter hoc quod peccavit: sicut enim per delectationem tracta fuit voluntas ad consensum peccati, sic per poenas confirmatur in abominatione peccati. But because man cannot return to one of two opposites unless he go away from the other, in order by the aid of grace to return to the state of righteousness, he must withdraw from sin whereby he had abandoned the path of rectitude. And since it is chiefly by his will that man is directed to his ultimate end and turned away from it, it is necessary that he not only withdraw from sin in his external actions by ceasing to sin, but also that he withdraw by his will, in order to rise from sin by grace. Now man withdraws from sin by his will in repenting of the past sin, and purposing to avoid it for the future. Therefore, in order to rise from sin man must both repent of past sins and purpose to avoid future sins. For if he did not propose to sin no more, sin would not, in itself, be contrary to his will. And if he were willing to sin no more without repenting of his past sin, the sin itself that he committed would not be contrary to his will. Now, the movement of recession from a thing is contrary to the movement of approach, as whitening is contrary to blackening. Hence in withdrawing from sin, the will must take the contrary road to that which led it into sin. Now, it was led into sin by the desire and pleasure of things beneath it. Therefore, it needs to turn away from sin by certain punishments, whereby it suffers for having sinned: for even as the will was drawn by pleasure to consent to sin, so by punishment it is confirmed in the detestation of sin. Item. Videmus quod etiam bruta animalia a maximis voluptatibus retrahuntur per dolores verberum. Oportet autem eum qui a peccato resurgit, non solum detestari peccatum praeteritum, sed etiam vitare futurum. Est igitur conveniens ut affligatur pro peccato, ut sic magis confirmetur in proposito vitandi peccata. Again. Fear of the whip deters even dumb animals from their greatest delights. Now the man who arises from sin must not only detest his past sin, but also avoid future sin. It is therefore right that he should be punished for his sin so that he may be the more strengthened in his purpose to avoid sin. Praeterea. Ea quae cum labore et poena acquirimus, magis amamus, et diligentius conservamus: unde illi qui per proprium laborem acquirunt pecunias, minus eas expendunt quam qui sine labore accipiunt, vel a parentibus, vel quocumque alio modo. Sed homini resurgenti a peccato hoc maxime necessarium est ut statum gratiae et Dei amorem diligenter conservet, quem negligenter peccando amisit. Est ergo conveniens ut laborem et poenam sustineat pro peccatis commissis. Besides. The things we acquire with toil and pain are dearer to us, and we are more careful about keeping them. Thus men who have enriched themselves by their own labors spend less than those who have received their riches from their parents or in any other way without labor. Now for the man who arises from sin it is most necessary that he be most careful to keep in the state of grace, which he carelessly lost by sinning. Therefore, it is fitting that he suffer labor and pain for the sins he committed. Adhuc. Ordo iustitiae hoc requirit ut peccato poena reddatur. Ex hoc autem quod ordo servatur in rebus, sapientia Dei gubernantis apparet. Pertinet igitur ad manifestationem divinae bonitatis et Dei gloriam quod pro peccato poena reddatur. Sed peccator peccando contra ordinem divinitus institutum facit, leges Dei praetergrediendo. Est igitur conveniens ut hoc recompenset in seipso puniendo quod prius peccaverat: sic enim totaliter extra inordinationem constituetur. Further. The order of justice demands that punishment be awarded for sin. Now, the wisdom of God’s government appears in the maintenance of order among things. Therefore, it belongs to the manifestation of God’s goodness and glory that punishment be the reward of sin. But the sinner by sinning acts against the divinely established order, for he transgresses the laws of God. Therefore, it is right that he make compensation by punishing in himself that which had previously sinned, for thus he will be wholly freed of his disorder. Per hoc ergo patet quod, postquam homo per gratiam remissionem peccati consecutus est, et ad statum gratiae reductus, remanet obligatus, ex Dei iustitia, ad aliquam poenam pro peccato commisso. Quam quidem poenam si propria voluntate a se exegerit, per hoc Deo satisfacere dicitur: inquantum cum labore et poena ordinem divinitus institutum consequitur, pro peccato se puniendo, quem peccando transgressus fuerat propriam voluntatem sequendo. Si autem a se hanc poenam non exigat, cum ea quae divinae providentiae subiacent, inordinata remanere non possint, haec poena infligetur ei a Deo. Nec talis poena satisfactoria dicetur, cum non fuerit ex electione patientis: sed dicetur purgatoria, quia, alio puniente, quasi purgabitur, dum quicquid inordinatum fuit in eo, ad debitum ordinem reducetur. Hinc est quod apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. 11:31 si nosmetipsos diiudicaremus, non utique iudicaremur: cum autem iudicamur, a domino corripimur, ut non cum hoc mundo damnemur. It is clear, then, that after man has by grace obtained the forgiveness of sin, and been restored to the state of grace, he remains, by virtue of God‘s justice, bound to suffer punishment for the sin he has committed. And if he, of his own accord, take this punishment on himself, he is said thereby to satisfy God, inasmuch as with labor and pain he follows the divinely established order by punishing himself for his sin, which same order by sinning he of his own accord had abandoned. On the other hand, if he fails to take this punishment on himself, since the things subject to divine providence cannot remain in disorder, this punishment will be inflicted on him by God. Nor will this punishment come under the name of satisfaction, since it will not be of the sufferer‘s choice, but it will be described as purgatorial, because he will be purged, as it were, by another punishing him, and whatever was disorderly in him will be brought back to the right order. Hence the Apostle says: If we judged ourselves truly, we should not be judged. But when we are judged by the Lord, we are chastened so that we may not be condemned along with the world (1 Cor 11:31–32). Considerandum tamen quod, cum mens a peccato avertitur, tam vehemens potest esse peccati displicentia, et inhaesio mentis ad Deum, quod non remanebit obligatio ad aliquam poenam. Nam, ut ex praedictis colligi potest, poena quam quis patitur post peccati remissionem, ad hoc necessaria est ut mens firmius bono inhaereat, homine per poenas castigato, poenae enim medicinae quaedam sunt; et ut etiam ordo iustitiae servetur, dum qui peccavit, sustinet poenam. Dilectio autem ad Deum sufficit mentem hominis firmare in bono, praecipue si vehemens fuerit: displicentia autem culpae praeteritae, cum fuerit intensa, magnum affert dolorem. Unde per vehementiam dilectionis Dei, et odii peccati praeteriti, excluditur necessitas satisfactoriae vel purgatoriae poenae: et, si non sit tanta vehementia quod totaliter poenam excludat, tamen, quanto vehementius fuerit, tanto minus de poena sufficiet. We must observe, however, that when the mind turns away from sin, it is possible for its detestation of sin to be so strong, and for it to cling so closely to God, that there remains no obligation to punishment. For, as may be gathered from what has been said, the punishment that one suffers after sin has been forgiven is necessary in order that the mind may adhere to good more firmly, through being chastised by punishment (for punishment is a kind of medicine). Also, so that the order of justice may be maintained by the sinner being punished. Now, the love of God suffices to strengthen man’s mind in good, especially if it be vehement, and when the intense detestation of past sin causes great sorrow. Consequently, great love of God and great hatred of past sin remove the need of punishment, whether satisfactory or purgatorial. Even if the vehemence be not so great as to exclude all punishment, yet the greater the vehemence, the less punishment will be required. Quae autem per amicos facimus, per nos ipsos facere videmur: quia amicitia ex duobus facit unum per affectum, et praecipue dilectio caritatis. Et ideo, sicut per seipsum, ita et per alium potest aliquis satisfacere Deo: praecipue cum necessitas fuerit. Nam et poenam quam amicus propter ipsum patitur, reputat aliquis ac si ipse pateretur: et sic poena ei non deest, dum patienti amico compatitur; et tanto amplius, quanto ipse est ei causa patiendi. Et iterum affectio caritatis in eo qui pro amico patitur, facit magis satisfactionem Deo acceptam quam si pro se pateretur: hoc enim est promptae caritatis, illud autem est necessitatis. Ex quo accipitur quod unus pro alio satisfacere potest, dum uterque in caritate fuerit. Hinc est quod apostolus dicit, Galat. 6:2: alter alterius onera portate, et sic adimplebitis legem Christi. Now, what we do by our friends, we seems to do by ourselves, because friendship, especially the love of charity, binds two persons together as one. Therefore, as a man can satisfy God by himself, so can he by another, especially when there is urgent need for it. For a man looks upon the punishment which his friend suffers for his sake as though he suffered it himself; and so he is not without punishment, seeing that he suffers with his suffering friend, and he suffers all the more, according as he is the cause of his friend‘s suffering. Again, the love of charity in him who suffers for his friend makes the satisfaction more acceptable to God than if he suffered for himself; the former comes of the eagerness of charity, but the latter comes of necessity. Hence we infer that one man may satisfy for another, so long as both remain in charity. Hence the Apostle says: Bear one another’s burdens, and so fulfil the law of Christ (Gal 6:2). Caput 159 Chapter 159 Quod rationabiliter homini imputatur si ad Deum non convertatur, quamvis hoc sine gratia non possit That although man cannot be converted to God without God’s grace, yet it is reasonably imputed to him if he be not converted Cum autem, sicut ex praemissis habetur, in finem ultimum aliquis dirigi non possit nisi auxilio divinae gratiae; sine qua etiam nullus potest habere ea quae sunt necessaria ad tendendum in ultimum finem, sicut est fides, spes, dilectio, et perseverantia: potest alicui videri quod non sit homini imputandum si praedictis careat; praecipue cum auxilium divinae gratiae mereri non possit, nec ad Deum converti nisi Deus eum convertat; nulli enim imputatur quod ab alio dependet. Quod si hoc concedatur, plura inconvenientia consequi manifestum est. Sequetur enim quod ille qui fidem non habet, nec spem, nec dilectionem Dei, nec perseverantiam in bono, non sit poena dignus: cum expresse dicatur, Ioann. 3:36: qui incredulus est filio, non videbit vitam, sed ira Dei manet super eum. Et cum nullus ad beatitudinis finem sine praemissis perveniat, sequetur ulterius quod aliqui homines sint qui nec beatitudinem consequantur, nec poenam patiantur a Deo. Cuius contrarium ostenditur ex eo quod dicitur Matth. 25, quod omnibus in divino iudicio existentibus dicetur, venite, possidete paratum vobis regnum; vel, discedite in ignem aeternum. Since man cannot be directed to his last end without the aid of divine grace, as we have shown in the preceding chapters; and seeing that without it man can have none of the things required that he may tend to his last end, such as faith, hope, love, and perseverance; someone might think that man is not to be blamed if he lack the things in question. This is especially because man cannot merit the assistance of divine grace, nor be converted to God unless God convert him, since no one is blamed for what depends on another. But, if this be granted, it is clear that several absurdities follow. For it would follow that a man without faith, or hope, or love of God, or perseverance in good, is not deserving of punishment; but it is said expressly: He who does not believe in the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God rests upon him (John 3:36). And since no man obtains beatitude without these things, it would also follow that there are some who neither obtain beatitude from God, nor suffer punishment from him. But the contrary is proved from the words of Matthew 25:34–41, where we are told that to all who are present at God‘s judgment it will be said: Come, O blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you; or: Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire. Ad huius dubitationis solutionem considerandum est quod, licet aliquis per motum liberi arbitrii divinam gratiam nec promereri nec advocari possit, potest tamen seipsum impedire ne eam recipiat: dicitur enim de quibusdam, Iob 21:14, dixerunt Deo: recede a nobis, scientiam viarum tuarum nolumus; et Iob 24:13, ipsi fuerunt rebelles lumini. Et cum hoc sit in potestate liberi arbitrii, impedire divinae gratiae receptionem vel non impedire, non immerito in culpam imputatur ei qui impedimentum praestat gratiae receptioni. Deus enim, quantum in se est, paratus est omnibus gratiam dare, vult enim omnes homines salvos fieri, et ad cognitionem veritatis venire, ut dicitur I ad Tim. 2:4: sed illi soli gratia privantur qui in seipsis gratiae impedimentum praestant; sicut, sole mundum illuminante, in culpam imputatur ei qui oculos claudit, si ex hoc aliquod malum sequatur, licet videre non possit nisi lumine solis praeveniatur. In order to clear away this doubt, we must take note that, though a man is unable to merit or acquire the divine grace by the movement of his freewill, nevertheless he can hinder himself from receiving it. For it is said of some: They say to God: ‘Depart from us; we do not desire the knowledge of thy ways’ (Job 21:14); and: They rebelled against the light (Job 24:13). And since it is in the power of the free-will to hinder or not to hinder the reception of divine grace, he who places an obstacle in the way of his receiving grace is deservedly to be blamed. Because God, for his own part, is prepared to give grace to all, for he desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim 2:4). But those alone are deprived of grace who place in themselves an obstacle to grace: thus he who shuts his eyes while the sun is shining is to be blamed if an accident occurs, although he is unable to see unless the sun‘s light enable him to do so. Caput 160 Chapter 160 Quod homo in peccato existens sine gratia peccatum vitare non potest That a man who is in sin cannot avoid sin without grace Quod autem dictum est, in potestate liberi arbitrii esse ne impedimentum gratiae praestet, competit his in quibus naturalis potentia integra fuerit. Si autem per inordinationem praecedentem declinaverit ad malum, non erit omnino in potestate eius nullum impedimentum gratiae praestare. Etsi enim, ad aliquod momentum, ab aliquo peccati actu particulari possit abstinere propria potestate: si tamen diu sibi relinquitur, in peccatum cadet, per quod gratiae impedimentum praestatur. The statement that it is in the power of the free-will to offer no obstacle to grace applies to those in whom the natural power retains its integrity. If, however, through some previous disorder, it has turned aside to evil ways, it will not be wholly in its power to place no obstacles to grace. For though man, by his own power, is able to refrain at a certain moment from a particular sinful act. Yet if he be left to himself for long, he will fall into sin, whereby an obstacle to grace is set up. Cum enim mens hominis a statu rectitudinis declinaverit, manifestum est quod recessit ab ordine debiti finis. Illud igitur quod deberet esse in affectu praecipuum, tanquam ultimus finis, efficitur minus dilectum illo ad quod mens inordinate conversa est sicut in ultimum finem. Quandocumque igitur occurrerit aliquid conveniens inordinato fini, repugnans autem fini debito, eligetur, nisi reducatur ad debitum ordinem, ut finem debitum omnibus praeferat, quod est gratiae effectus. Dum autem eligitur aliquid quod repugnat ultimo fini, impedimentum praestat gratiae, quae dirigit in finem. Unde manifestum est quod, post peccatum, non potest homo abstinere ab omni peccato, antequam per gratiam ad debitum ordinem reducatur. For when the human mind has turned aside from the path of rectitude, it is clear that it has abandoned the direction to its due end. Consequently, that which should stand first in its affections as its last end becomes less loved than the thing to which the mind has inordinately turned as though it were its last end. Hence whenever something presents itself that is suitable for an inordinate end, and incompatible with the right end, it will be chosen, unless the mind be brought into right order, so that it places its last end before all. And this is the effect of grace. But as long as a thing is chosen that is incompatible with the last end, an obstacle is opposed to grace which directs us to our end. Hence it is evident that man cannot refrain from all sin after having sinned, before being restored to the right order by grace. Praeterea. Cum mens inclinata fuerit ad aliquid, non se iam habet aequaliter ad utrumque oppositorum, sed magis ad illud ad quod est inclinata. Illud autem ad quod mens magis se habet, eligit, nisi per rationis discussionem ab eo quadam sollicitudine abducatur: unde et in repentinis signum interioris habitus praecipue accipi potest. Non est autem possibile mentem hominis continue in ea vigilantia esse ut per rationem discutiat quicquid debet velle vel agere. Unde consequitur quod mens aliquando eligat id ad quod est inclinata, inclinatione manente. Et ita, si inclinata fuerit in peccatum, non stabit diu quin peccet, impedimentum gratiae praestans, nisi ad statum rectitudinis reducatur. Again. Once the mind is inclined to something, it is no longer equally disposed towards either of two opposites, but is more disposed to that one to which it is inclined. Now, the mind chooses the thing to which it is more disposed unless, through the reason discussing the matter, it become disinclined to it from motives of precaution. Hence it is chiefly under unforeseen circumstances that a person‘s conduct is a sign of his interior disposition. Now, it is not possible for a man‘s mind to be continually so wide awake as to deliberate about everything that is to be willed or done. Hence it follows that sometimes the mind chooses the object to which it is inclined, because the inclination remains. And so, if it be inclined to sin, it will not stay long without sinning through placing an obstacle to grace, unless it be restored to the state of rectitude. Ad hoc etiam operantur impetus corporalium passionum; et appetibilia secundum sensum; et plurimae occasiones male agendi; quibus de facili homo provocatur ad peccandum, nisi retrahatur per firmam inhaesionem ad ultimum finem, quam gratia facit. To this also the impulse of the bodily passions conduces, as do the objects of sensible appetite, and occasions of evil-doing. For by these things man is easily incited to sin, unless he be held in check by a firm adherence to his last end, which is the effect of grace. Unde apparet stulta Pelagianorum opinio, qui dicebant hominem in peccato existentem sine gratia posse vitare peccata. Cuius contrarium apparet ex hoc quod Psalmus petit: dum defecerit virtus mea, ne derelinquas me. Et dominus orare nos docet: et ne nos inducas in tentationem, sed libera nos a malo. Hence we can see the absurdity of the opinion of the Pelagians, who held that man, while in a state of sin, is able to avoid sin without grace. The contrary of this may be gathered from the petition of the Psalm: When my strength shall fail, do not forsake me (Ps 70:9). Moreover, our Lord taught us to pray: And lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil. Quamvis autem illi qui in peccato sunt, vitare non possint per propriam potestatem quin impedimentum gratiae ponant, ut ostensum est, nisi auxilio gratiae praeveniantur; nihilominus tamen hoc eis imputatur ad culpam, quia hic defectus ex culpa praecedente in eis relinquitur; sicut ebrius ab homicidio non excusatur quod per ebrietatem committit, quam sua culpa incurrit. However, although those who are in sin cannot, of their own power, avoid placing an obstacle to grace unless they be assisted by prevenient grace (as we have proved), nevertheless, this is imputed to them as sin, because the defect in question remains in them through their preceding fault. Even so a drunken man is not excused from murder committed through his being drunk, which he incurred through his own fault. Praeterea, licet ille qui est in peccato, non habeat hoc in propria potestate quod omnino vitet peccatum, habet tamen in potestate nunc vitare hoc vel illud peccatum, ut dictum est. Unde quodcumque committat, voluntarie committit. Et ita non immerito ei imputatur ad culpam. Moreover, although a man who is in sin has it not in his power to avoid sin altogether, yet it is in his power to avoid a particular sin at a given moment, as we have said. Hence, whatever sin he commits, he commits it deliberately. Consequently, it is not undeservedly imputed to him as a sin. Caput 161 Chapter 161 Quod Deus aliquos a peccato liberat, et aliquos in peccato relinquit That God delivers some from sin, and leaves others in sin Licet autem ille qui peccat impedimentum gratiae praestet, et, quantum ordo rerum exigit, gratiam non deberet recipere: tamen, quia Deus praeter ordinem rebus inditum operari potest, sicut cum caecum illuminat vel mortuum resuscitat; interdum, ex abundantia bonitatis suae, etiam eos qui impedimentum gratiae praestant, auxilio suo praevenit, avertens eos a malo et convertens ad bonum. Et sicut non omnes caecos illuminat, nec omnes languidos sanat, ut et in illis quos curat, opus virtutis eius appareat, et in aliis ordo naturae servetur; ita non omnes qui gratiam impediunt, auxilio suo praevenit ut avertantur a malo et convertantur ad bonum, sed aliquos, in quibus vult suam misericordiam apparere, ita quod in aliis iustitiae ordo manifestetur. Hinc est quod apostolus dicit, Rom. 9:22: volens Deus ostendere iram, et notam facere potentiam suam, sustinuit in multa patientia vasa irae apta in interitum, ut ostenderet divitias gloriae suae in vasa misericordiae, quae praeparavit in gloriam. Now, though he that sins places an obstacle to grace, and ought not to receive grace, so far as the order of things demands, yet, since God can act independently of the order implanted in things—as when he enlightens the blind, or raises the dead—sometimes, from the richness of his goodness, he comes to the assistance of those who put an obstacle in the way of grace, turns them from evil, and converts them to good. And even as he enlightens not all the blind, nor heals all the sick, in order that in those whom he restores the work of his power may be evidenced, and in the others, the order of nature be maintained; so too, he comes not to the assistance of all who hinder grace that they may turn away from evil, and be converted to good, but of some, in whom he wishes his mercy to appear, while in the others the order of justice is made manifest. Hence the Apostle says: God, desiring to show his wrath and to make known his power, has endured with much patience the vessels of wrath made for destruction, in order to make known the riches of his glory for the vessels of mercy, which he has prepared beforehand for glory (Rom 9:22–23). Cum autem Deus hominum qui in eisdem peccatis detinentur, hos quidem praeveniens convertat, illos autem sustineat, sive permittat secundum ordinem rerum procedere, non est ratio inquirenda quare hos convertat et non illos. Hoc enim ex simplici voluntate eius dependet: sicut ex simplici eius voluntate processit quod, cum omnia fierent ex nihilo, quaedam facta sunt aliis digniora; et sicut ex simplici voluntate procedit artificis ut ex eadem materia, similiter disposita, quaedam vasa format ad nobiles usus, et quaedam ad ignobiles. Hinc est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. 9:21: an non habet potestatem figulus luti ex eadem massa facere aliud quidem vas in honorem, aliud vero in contumeliam? And if, by his prevenient grace, God converts some of those who are held in thrall by sins, while others he suffers or allows to continue sinning in the ordinary way, we are not to ask why he converts certain ones and not others. For this depends on his simple will, even as it came from his simple will that though all things were made out of nothing, some were made to rank higher than others. Likewise, it depends on the simple will of the craftsman that, of the same matter similarly conditioned, he make some vessels for dignified purposes, and some for common purposes. Hence the Apostle says: Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for honor and another for dishonor? (Rom 9:21). Per hoc autem excluditur error Origenis, qui dicebat hos ad Deum converti et non alios, propter aliqua opera quae animae eorum fecerant antequam corporibus unirentur. Quae quidem positio in secundo libro diligentius improbata est. Hereby we refute the error of Origen, who said that these are converted to God, and not those, on account of certain works done by their souls before they were united to bodies. In the second book, we gave more particular attention to the refutation of this opinion. Caput 162 Chapter 162 Quod Deus nemini est causa peccandi That God is not the cause of any man sinning Quamvis autem quosdam peccatores Deus ad se non convertat, sed in peccatis, secundum eorum merita, eos relinquat, non tamen eos ad peccandum inducit. Although God does not convert certain sinners to himself, but leaves them in their sins, as they deserve to be, yet he does not lead them to sin. Homines enim peccant per hoc quod deviant ab ipso, qui est ultimus finis, ut ex superioribus patet. Cum autem omne agens agat ad proprium finem et sibi convenientem, impossibile est quod, Deo agente, aliqui avertantur ab ultimo fine, qui Deus est. Impossibile igitur est quod Deus aliquos peccare faciat. For man sins through wandering away from him who is his last end, as we have already shown. Now, as every agent acts for an end proper and proportionate to it, it is impossible that God should, by his own action, turn anyone away from his last end, which is God. Therefore, it is impossible that God make any man sin. Item. Bonum causa mali esse non potest. Sed peccatum est hominis malum: contrariatur enim proprio hominis bono, quod est vivere secundum rationem. Impossibile est igitur quod Deus sit alicui causa peccandi. Again, good cannot be a cause of evil. Now sin is man‘s evil: for it is contrary to man‘s proper good, which is to live according to reason. Therefore, God cannot be the cause of a man sinning. Praeterea. Omnis sapientia et bonitas hominis derivatur a sapientia et bonitate divina, sicut quaedam similitudo ipsius. Repugnat autem sapientiae et bonitati humanae quod aliquem peccare faciat. Igitur multo magis divinae. Further. All human wisdom and goodness flow from the divine wisdom and goodness, and are a kind of likeness thereof. Now it is incompatible with human wisdom and goodness to make a man sin. Much more, therefore, is it incompatible with divine wisdom. Adhuc. Peccatum omne ex aliquo defectu provenit proximi agentis, non autem ex influentia primi agentis: sicut peccatum claudicationis provenit ex dispositione tibiae, non autem ex virtute motiva; cum tamen ex ea sit quicquid de perfectione motus in claudicatione apparet. Proximum autem agens peccati humani est voluntas. Est igitur defectus peccati ex voluntate hominis, non autem a Deo, qui est primus agens: a quo tamen est quicquid ad perfectionem actionis pertinet in actu peccati. Moreover. All sin arises from a fault in the proximate agent, and not from the influence of the first agent. Thus the fault of limping is due to a defect in the tibia, and not to the motive power; to which, however, is due whatever there is of the perfection of movement in limping. Now, the proximate agent in human sin is the will. Therefore, the defect of sin arises from man’s will and not from God, who is the first agent, although whatever pertains to the perfection of action in the sinful act is due to him. Hinc est quod dicitur Eccli. 15:12: non dicas, ille me implanavit. Non enim necessarii sunt ei homines impii. Et infra: 20 nemini mandavit impie agere, et nemini dedit spatium peccandi. Et Iac. 1:13 dicitur: nemo, cum tentatur, dicat quoniam a Deo tentetur: Deus enim intentator malorum est. Hence it is said: Do not say, ‘It was he who led me astray,’ for he had no need of a sinful man (Sir 15:12). And further on: He has not commanded any one to be ungodly, and he has not given any one permission to sin (Sir 15:20). Also: Let no one say when he is tempted, ‘I am tempted by God,’ for God . . . himself tempts no one (Jas 1:13). Inveniuntur tamen quaedam in Scripturis ex quibus videtur quod Deus sit aliquibus causa peccandi. Dicitur enim Exodi 10:1, ego induravi cor Pharaonis et servorum illius et Isaiae 6:10, excaeca cor populi huius, et aures eius aggrava: ne forte videant oculis suis et convertantur, et sanem eos et Isaiae 63:17, errare nos fecisti de viis tuis, indurasti cor nostrum, ne timeremus te. Et Rom. 1:28, dicitur: tradidit illos Deus in reprobum sensum, ut faciant quae non conveniunt. Quae omnia secundum hoc intelligenda sunt, quod Deus aliquibus non confert auxilium ad vitandum peccatum, quod aliis quibusdam confert. There are, however, a few passages in Scripture which would seem to indicate that God is the cause of some sinning. For it is said: I have hardened Pharoah’s heart and the heart of his servants (Exod 10:1); and: Make the heart of this people blind, and their ears heavy . . . lest they see with their eyes . . . I heal them (Isa 6:10); and: You make us err from your ways and harden our heart so that we fear you not (Isa 63:17). Again, it is said: Since they did not see fit to acknowledge God, God gave them up to a base mind and to improper conduct (Rom 1:28). All these passages are to be understood in the sense that God does not assist some to avoid sin, whereas he does assist others.