Adhuc. Omnis res per suum motum vel actionem tendit in aliquod bonum sicut in finem, ut supra ostensum est. In tantum autem aliquid de bono participat, in quantum assimilatur primae bonitati, quae Deus est. Omnia igitur per motus suos et actiones tendunt in divinam similitudinem sicut in finem ultimum.
Again. Each thing by its movement or action tends to some good as its end, as proved above. Now a thing partakes of the good insofar as it is like to the highest goodness, which is God. Therefore, all things tend to a divine likeness as their last end by their movements and actions.
Quomodo res imitentur divinam bonitatem
How things imitate the divine goodness
Patet ergo ex his quae dicta sunt quod assimilari ad Deum est ultimus omnium finis. Id autem quod proprie habet rationem finis, est bonum. Tendunt igitur res in hoc quod assimilentur Deo proprie inquantum est bonus.
From what has been said it is clear that the last end of all things is to become like God. Now that which has properly the aspect of an end is the good. Therefore, properly speaking, things tend to become like to God insofar as he is good.
Bonitatem autem creaturae non assequuntur eo modo sicut in Deo est, licet divinam bonitatem unaquaeque res imitetur secundum suum modum. Divina enim bonitas simplex est, quasi tota in uno consistens. Ipsum enim divinum esse omnem plenitudinem perfectionis obtinet, ut in primo libro probatum est. Unde, cum unumquodque in tantum sit bonum in quantum est perfectum, ipsum divinum esse est eius perfecta bonitas: idem enim est Deo esse, vivere, sapientem esse, beatum esse, et quicquid aliud ad perfectionem et bonitatem pertinere videtur, quasi tota divina bonitas sit ipsum divinum esse. Rursumque ipsum divinum esse est ipsius Dei existentis substantia. In aliis autem rebus hoc accidere non potest. Ostensum est enim in secundo quod nulla substantia creata est ipsum suum esse. Unde, si secundum quod res quaelibet est, bona est; non est autem earum aliqua suum esse: nulla earum est sua bonitas, sed earum quaelibet bonitatis participatione bona est, sicut et ipsius esse participatione est ens.
Now, creatures do not acquire goodness in the way in which it is in God, although each thing imitates the divine goodness according to its mode. For the divine goodness is simple, being all in one, as it were. For the divine being contains the whole fullness of perfection, as we proved in the first book. Therefore, since a thing is good so far as it is perfect, God’s being is his perfect goodness: in God, to be, to live, to be wise, to be happy, and whatever else is seen to pertain to perfection and goodness, are one and the same, as though the total of his goodness were God’s very being. Again, God’s being is the substance of the existing God. But this cannot be so in other things. For it was proved in the second book that no created substance is its own being. Therefore, if a thing is good so far as it is, and nothing is its own being, then nothing its own goodness, and each one is good by having a share of good, even as by having a share of being it is a being.
Rursus. Non omnes creaturae in uno gradu bonitatis constituuntur. Nam quorundam substantia forma et actus est: scilicet cui secundum id quod est, competit esse actu et bonum esse. Quorundam vero substantia ex materia et forma composita est: cui competit actu esse et bonum esse, sed secundum aliquid sui, scilicet secundum formam. Divina igitur substantia sua bonitas est; substantia vero simplex bonitatem participat secundum id quod est; substantia autem composita secundum aliquid sui.
Also. All creatures are not placed on the same level of goodness. For in some the substance is both form and act, namely, such as are competent to be actually and to be good by the mere fact that they exist. But in others, the substance is composed of matter and form; such are competent to be actually and to be good, but by some part of their being (namely, their form). Accordingly, God’s substance is his goodness, but a simple substance participates in goodness by the very fact that it exists, and a composite substance by some part of itself.
In hoc autem tertio gradu substantiarum iterum diversitas invenitur quantum ad ipsum esse. Nam quorundam ex materia et forma compositorum totam materiae potentiam forma adimplet, ita quod non remanet in materia potentia ad aliam formam: et per consequens nec in aliqua alia materia potentia ad hanc formam. Et huiusmodi sunt corpora caelestia, quae ex tota materia sua constant. Quorundam vero forma non replet totam materiae potentiam: unde adhuc in materia remanet potentia ad aliam formam; et in alia materiae parte remanet potentia ad hanc formam; sicut patet in elementis et elementatis. Quia vero privatio est negatio in substantia eius quod substantiae potest inesse, manifestum est quod cum hac forma quae non implet totam materiae potentiam, adiungitur privatio formae: quae quidem adiungi non potest substantiae cuius forma implet totam materiae potentiam; neque illi quae est forma per suam essentiam; et multo minus illi cuius essentia est ipsum suum esse. Cum autem manifestum sit quod motus non potest esse ubi non est potentia ad aliud, quia motus est actus existentis in potentia; itemque manifestum sit quod malum est ipsa privatio boni: planum est quod in hoc ultimo substantiarum ordine est bonum mutabile et permixtionem mali oppositi habens; quod in superioribus substantiarum ordinibus accidere non potest. Possidet igitur haec substantia ultimo modo dicta, sicut ultimum gradum in esse, ita ultimum gradum in bonitate.
In this third degree of substances, diversity is to be found again in respect of being. For in some composed of matter and form, the form fills the entire potency of matter so that the matter retains no potency to another form. Consequently, neither is there in any other matter a potency to this same form. Such are the heavenly bodies, which consist of their entire matter. In others the form does not fill the whole potency of matter, so that the matter retains a potency to another form, and in another part of matter there remains potency to this form: for instance, in the elements and their compounds. Since, then, privation is the absence in substance of what can be in substance, it is clear that together with this form which does not fill the whole potency of matter, there is associated the privation of a form, which privation cannot be associated with a substance whose form fills the whole potency of matter, nor with that which is a form essentially, and much less with that one whose essence is its very being. And seeing that it is clear that there can be no movement where there is no potency to something else, for movement is the act of that which is in potency, it is clear that in this last order of substances, good is changeable and has an admixture of the opposite evil, since evil is the privation of good. This cannot occur in the higher orders of substances. Therefore, the substance answering to this last description stands lowest both in being and in goodness.
Inter partes etiam huius substantiae ex materia et forma compositae, bonitatis ordo invenitur. Cum enim materia sit ens in potentia secundum se considerata, forma vero sit actus eius; substantia vero composita sit actu existens per formam: forma quidem erit secundum se bona, substantia vero composita prout actu habet formam; materia vero secundum quod est in potentia ad formam. Et licet unumquodque sit bonum inquantum est ens, non tamen oportet quod materia, quae est ens solum in potentia, sit bona solum in potentia. Ens enim absolute dicitur, bonum autem etiam in ordine consistit: non enim solum aliquid bonum dicitur quia est finis, vel quia est obtinens finem; sed, etiam si nondum ad finem pervenerit, dummodo sit ordinatum in finem, ex hoc ipso dicitur bonum.
We find degrees of goodness also among the parts of this substance composed of matter and form. For, since matter considered in itself is being in potency, and since form is its act, and again, since a composite substance derives actual existence from its form, it follows that the form is good in itself; the composite substance is good as having its form actually; and the matter is good as being in potency to the form. And although a thing is good insofar as it is a being, it does not follow that matter, which is only being potentially, is only a potential good. For being is predicated absolutely, while good is founded on order: for a thing is said to be good not merely because it is an end, or possesses the end, but it is said to be good as long as it is directed to the end (even if it has not attained the end).
Materia ergo non potest simpliciter dici ens ex hoc quod est potentia ens, in quo importatur ordo ad esse: potest autem ex hoc simpliciter dici bona, propter ordinem ipsum. In quo apparet quod bonum quodammodo amplioris est ambitus quam ens: propter quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum se extendit ad existentia et non existentia. Nam et ipsa non existentia, scilicet materia secundum quod intelligitur privationi subiecta, appetit bonum, scilicet esse. Ex quo patet quod etiam sit bona: nihil enim appetit bonum nisi bonum.
Accordingly, matter cannot be called a being absolutely, because it is a potential being, by which it is shown to have an order towards being; yet this suffices for it to be called a good absolutely on account of this very order. This shows that the good extends further than being in a sense, for which reason Dionysius says that the good includes both existing and nonexisting things. For even nonexistent things (namely, matter considered as subject to privation) seek a good (namely, to exist). Hence it follows that matter also is good, for nothing but the good seeks the good.
Est et alio modo creaturae bonitas a bonitate divina deficiens. Nam, sicut dictum est, Deus in ipso suo esse summam perfectionem obtinet bonitatis. Res autem creata suam perfectionem non possidet in uno, sed in multis: quod enim est in supremo unitum, multiplex in infimis invenitur. Unde Deus secundum idem dicitur esse virtuosus, sapiens et operans, creatura vero secundum diversa: tantoque perfecta bonitas alicuius creaturae maiorem multiplicitatem requirit, quanto magis a prima bonitate distans invenitur. Si vero perfectam bonitatem non potest attingere, imperfectam retinebit in paucis. Et inde est quod, licet primum et summum bonum sit omnino simplex; substantiaeque ei in bonitate propinquae, sint pariter et quantum ad simplicitatem vicinae: infimae tamen substantiae inveniuntur simpliciores quibusdam superioribus eis, sicut elementa animalibus et hominibus, quia non possunt pertingere ad perfectionem cognitionis et intellectus, quam consequuntur animalia et homines.
In yet another way the creature’s goodness falls short from God’s. For, as we have stated, God has supreme perfection of goodness in his very being. But the creature has its perfection not in one thing but in many, because what is united in the highest is manifold in the lowest. Hence virtue, wisdom, and operation are predicated of God in respect of one and the same thing, but of creatures in respect of different things; the further a creature is from the highest goodness, the more does the perfection of its goodness require to be manifold. And if it be unable to attain to perfect goodness, it will reach to imperfect goodness in a few respects. Hence it is that although the first and highest good is utterly simple, and the substances nearest to it in goodness approach to it likewise in simplicity, yet the lowest substances are found to be more simple than some that are higher (for instance, elements than animals and men), because they are unable to reach the perfection of knowledge and understanding, to which animals and men attain.
Manifestum est ergo ex dictis quod, licet Deus secundum suum simplex esse perfectam et totam suam bonitatem habeat, creaturae tamen ad perfectionem suae bonitatis non pertingunt per solum suum esse, sed per plura. Unde, licet quaelibet earum sit bona inquantum est, non tamen potest simpliciter bona dici si aliis careat quae ad ipsius bonitatem requiruntur: sicut homo qui, virtute spoliatus, vitiis est subiectus, dicitur quidem bonus secundum quid, scilicet inquantum est ens et inquantum est homo, non tamen bonus simpliciter, sed magis malus. Non igitur cuilibet creaturarum idem est esse et bonum esse simpliciter: licet quaelibet earum bona sit inquantum est. Deo vero simpliciter idem est esse et esse bonum.
From what has been said, it is evident that although God possesses his perfect and entire goodness in respect of his simple being, creatures nevertheless do not attain to the perfection of their goodness through their being alone, but through many things. Therefore, although each one is good inasmuch as it exists, it cannot be called good absolutely if it lack other things that are required for its goodness. Thus a man who, being despoiled of virtue, is addicted to vice, is said indeed to be good in a restricted sense (namely, as a being and as a man), but not absolutely; in fact, he should rather be called evil. Accordingly, ‘to be’ and ‘to be good’ are not the same in every creature, although each one is good insofar as it exists. But in God, ‘to be’ and ‘to be good’ are simply one and the same.
Si autem res quaelibet tendit in divinae bonitatis similitudinem sicut in finem; divinae autem bonitati assimilatur aliquid quantum ad omnia quae ad propriam pertinent bonitatem; bonitas autem rei non solum in esse suo consistit, sed in omnibus aliis quae ad suam perfectionem requiruntur, ut ostensum est: manifestum est quod res ordinantur in Deum sicut in finem non solum secundum esse substantiale, sed etiam secundum ea quae ei accidunt pertinentia ad perfectionem; et etiam secundum propriam operationem, quae etiam pertinet ad perfectionem rei.
If, then, each thing tends to a likeness to God’s goodness as its end; and a thing is like God’s goodness in respect of whatever belongs to its goodness; and the goodness of a thing consists not merely in its being, but in whatever is required for its perfection, as we have proved, it is clear that things are directed to God as their end not only in respect of their substantial being, but also in respect of such things as are accidental to them and belong to their perfection, as well as in respect of their proper operation, which also belongs to a thing’s perfection.
Quod res intendunt naturaliter assimilari Deo in hoc quod est causa
That things have a natural tendency to be like God in that he is a cause
Ex his autem apparet quod res intendunt divinam similitudinem etiam in hoc quod sunt causae aliorum.
It is clear from the foregoing that things also have a tendency to be like God in being causes of others.
Tendit enim in divinam similitudinem res creata per suam operationem. Per suam autem operationem una res fit causa alterius. Ergo in hoc etiam res intendunt divinam similitudinem, ut sint aliis causae.
For the creature tends to be like God by its operation. Now one thing is the cause of another by its operation. Therefore, things also tend to a divine similitude in that they are causes of other things.
Adhuc. Res tendunt in divinam similitudinem inquantum est bonus, ut supra dictum est. Ex bonitate autem Dei est quod aliis esse largitur: unumquodque enim agit inquantum est actu perfectum. Desiderant igitur generaliter res in hoc Deo assimilari, ut sint aliorum causae.
Again. Things tend to be like God insofar as he is good, as stated above. Now it is out of his goodness that God bestows being on others, for all things act insofar as they are actually perfect. Therefore, all things seek to be like God by being causes of others.
Amplius. Ordo ad bonum boni rationem habet, ut ex dictis est manifestum. Unumquodque autem per hoc quod est causa alterius, ordinatur ad bonum: bonum enim solum causatur per se, malum autem per accidens tantum, ut ostensum est. Esse igitur aliorum causa est bonum. Secundum autem quodlibet bonum ad quod aliquid tendit, intendit divinam similitudinem: cum quodlibet bonum creatum sit ex participatione divinae bonitatis. Intendunt igitur res divinam similitudinem in hoc quod sunt aliorum causae.
Moreover. Order towards good is itself a good, as we have shown above. Now every thing, insofar as it is the cause of another, is directed to a good: for good alone is caused in itself, and evil is caused only by accident, as we have proved. Therefore, it is a good to be a cause of others. Now in respect of any good to which a thing tends, that thing’s tendency is to a divine similitude, since every created good is by reason of a share in the divine goodness. Therefore, things tend to a divine likeness by being causes of other things.
Item. Eiusdem rationis est quod effectus tendat in similitudinem agentis, et quod agens assimilet sibi effectum: tendit enim effectus in finem in quem dirigitur ab agente. Agens autem intendit sibi assimilare patiens non solum quantum ad esse ipsius, sed etiam quantum ad causalitatem: sicut enim ab agente conferuntur effectui naturali principia per quae subsistat, ita principia per quae aliorum sit causa; sicut enim animal, dum generatur, accipit a generante virtutem nutritivam, ita etiam virtutem generativam. Effectus igitur tendit in similitudinem agentis non solum quantum ad speciem ipsius, sed etiam quantum ad hoc quod sit aliorum causa. Sic autem tendunt res in similitudinem Dei sicut effectus in similitudinem agentis, ut ostensum est. Intendunt igitur res naturaliter assimilari Deo in hoc quod sunt causae aliorum.
Again. That the effect tends to be like the agent amounts to the same as that the agent causes its likeness in its effect, for the effect tends to the end towards which it is directed by the agent. Now the agent tends to assimilate the patient to itself, not only in respect of its being, but also in respect of its causality: for the agent gives to its natural effect not only those natural principles by which it subsists, but also those by which it is a cause of other things. Thus the animal, when begotten, receives from its begetter both the power of self-nourishment and the power of generation. Therefore, the effect tends to be like the agent not only in the point of species, but also in the point of its causality of other things. Now things tend to be like God even as effects tend to be like the agent, as proved above. Therefore, things have a natural tendency towards a divine likeness in that they are causes of other things.
Praeterea. Tunc maxime perfectum est unumquodque quando potest alterum sibi simile facere: illud enim perfecte lucet quod alia illuminare potest. Unumquodque autem tendens in suam perfectionem, tendit in divinam similitudinem. Per hoc igitur unumquodque tendit in divinam similitudinem, quod intendit aliorum causa esse.
Moreover. A thing is most perfect when it is able to produce its like, for that light shines perfectly which gives light to others. Now whatever tends to its own perfection tends to a divine likeness. Therefore, a thing tends to a divine likeness from the very fact that it tends to be the cause of other things.
Quia vero causa, inquantum huiusmodi, superior est causato, manifestum est quod tendere in divinam similitudinem per hunc modum ut sit aliorum causa, est superiorum in entibus.
Since, however, a cause as such is higher than its effect, it is evident that to tend in this way to a divine likeness, so as to be a cause of other things, belongs to the highest grade among things.
Item. Prius est unumquodque in se perfectum quam possit alterum causare, ut iam dictum est. Haec igitur perfectio ultimo accidit rei, ut aliorum causa existat. Cum igitur per multa tendat res creata in divinam similitudinem, hoc ultimum ei restat, ut divinam similitudinem quaerat per hoc quod sit aliorum causa. Unde Dionysius dicit, III cap. caelestis hierarchiae, quod omnium divinius est Dei cooperatorem fieri: secundum quod apostolus dicit, I Corinth. 3:9: Dei adiutores sumus.
Furthermore. A thing is perfect in itself before being able to cause another, as we have stated already. Hence to be the cause of other things is a perfection that accrues to a thing last. Since, then, the creature tends to a divine likeness in many points, this remains the last: it seeks a likeness to God by being a cause of others. Therefore, Dionysius says that it is of all things most godlike to be God’s cooperator; in which sense the Apostle says: We are God’s fellow workers (1 Cor 3:9).
Quomodo diversimode res ordinantur in suos fines
How things are directed in various ways to their respective ends
Ex praemissis autem manifestum esse potest quod ultimum per quod res unaquaeque ordinatur ad finem, est eius operatio: diversimode tamen, secundum diversitatem operationis.
It may be shown from the foregoing that a thing’s operation is the last means whereby it is directed to its end, but in various ways according to the variety of operations.
Nam quaedam operatio est rei ut aliud moventis, sicut calefacere et secare. Quaedam vero est operatio rei ut ab alio motae, sicut calefieri et secari. Quaedam vero operatio est perfectio operantis actu existentis in aliud transmutandum non tendens: quorum primo differunt a passione et motu; secundo vero, ab actione transmutativa exterioris materiae. Huiusmodi autem operatio est sicut intelligere, sentire et velle. Unde manifestum est quod ea quae moventur vel operantur tantum, sine hoc quod moveant vel faciant, tendunt in divinam similitudinem quantum ad hoc quod sint in seipsis perfecta; quae vero faciunt et movent, inquantum huiusmodi, tendunt in divinam similitudinem in hoc quod sint aliorum causae; quae vero per hoc quod moventur movent, intendunt divinam similitudinem quantum ad utrumque.
For some things have an operation by which they move something else—such are heating and cutting—and some have an operation in being moved by another—such are being heated, and being cut. Some operations are a perfection of an actually existing operator, and do not tend to the transmutation of something else: in the former respect these differ from passion and movement, and in the latter from an action which effects a transmutation on some external matter. As an instance of such an operation we have understanding, sensation, and will. Therefore, it is clear that things which are set to move or operate only, without moving or making any thing themselves, tend to the divine likeness in that they are perfect in themselves; those which make and move as such tend to a divine likeness in that they are causes of other things; those which move through being moved tend to the divine likeness in both ways.
Corpora autem inferiora, secundum quod moventur motibus naturalibus, considerantur ut mota tantum, non autem ut moventia, nisi per accidens: accidit enim lapidi quod, descendens, aliquod obvians impellat. Et similiter est in alteratione et aliis motibus. Unde finis motus eorum est ut consequantur divinam similitudinem quantum ad hoc quod sint in seipsis perfecta, utpote habentia propriam formam et proprium ubi.
The lower bodies, insofar as they are moved with natural movements, are considered to be moved only, and not to move except accidentally: for if a stone in its descent puts into motion something that stood in its path, it is an accident. (The same applies to alteration and other movements.) Therefore, the end of such movements is that they attain to a divine likeness in the point of their being perfect in themselves, as having their proper form and their proper place.
Corpora vero caelestia movent mota. Unde finis motus eorum est consequi divinam similitudinem quantum ad utrumque. Quantum quidem ad propriam perfectionem, inquantum corpus caeleste sit in aliquo ubi in actu in quo prius erat in potentia. Nec propter hoc minus suam perfectionem consequitur, quamvis ad ubi in quo prius erat actu, remaneat in potentia. Similiter enim et materia prima in suam perfectionem tendit per hoc quod acquirit in actu formam quam prius habebat in potentia, licet et aliam habere desinat quam prius actu habebat: sic enim successive materia omnes formas suscipit ad quas est in potentia, ut tota eius potentia reducatur in actum successive, quod simul fieri non poterat. Unde, cum corpus caeleste sit in potentia ad ubi sicut materia prima ad formam, perfectionem suam consequitur per hoc quod eius potentia tota ad ubi reducitur in actum successive, quod simul non poterat fieri.
The heavenly bodies, however, move because they are moved, so that the end of their movement is to attain to a divine likeness in both respects. It is thus as regards their own perfection insofar as a heavenly body may be actually where previously it was potentially. Nor does it for this reason attain less to its perfection, although it retains its potency to be where it was before. For in the same way does prime matter tend to its perfection by acquiring actually the form which it had potentially before, although it ceases to have the one which it had before actually. For thus matter receives successively all the forms to which it has a potency, so that its whole potency is actualized successively, which could not happen all at one time. Therefore, since a heavenly body is in potency to a particular place—even as prime matter is to a particular form—it attains to its perfection by the fact that its entire potency to a particular place is successively actualized, which could not happen simultaneously.
Inquantum vero movendo movent, est finis motus eorum consequi divinam similitudinem in hoc quod sint causae aliorum. Sunt autem aliorum causae per hoc quod causant generationem et corruptionem et alios motus in istis inferioribus. Motus igitur corporum caelestium, inquantum movent, ordinantur ad generationem et corruptionem quae est in istis inferioribus. Non est autem inconveniens quod corpora caelestia moveant ad generationem horum inferiorum, quamvis haec inferiora corpora sint caelestibus corporibus indigniora, cum tamen finem oporteat esse potiorem eo quod est ad finem.
Inasmuch as they move by moving, the end of their movement is the attainment of a divine likeness, in that they are causes of other things. Now they are the causes of other things by causing generation and corruption and other movements in this lower world. Accordingly, the movements of heavenly bodies, insofar as they are principles of movement, are directed to generation and corruption in the world beneath them. And it is not unreasonable that the movements of heavenly bodies conduce to the generation of these lower things, although these inferior bodies are of small account in comparison with the heavenly bodies, and yet the end should be of greater account than the means.
Generans enim agit ad formam generati: cum tamen generatum non sit dignius generante, sed in agentibus univocis sit eiusdem speciei cum ipso. Intendit enim generans formam generati, quae est generationis finis, non quasi ultimum finem: sed similitudinem esse divini in perpetuatione speciei, et in diffusione bonitatis suae, per hoc quod aliis formam speciei suae tradit, et aliorum sit causa. Similiter autem corpora caelestia, licet sint digniora inferioribus corporibus, tamen intendunt generationem eorum, et formas generatorum in actum educere per suos motus, non quasi ultimum finem: sed per hoc ad divinam similitudinem intendentes quasi ad ultimum finem, in hoc quod causae aliorum existant.
For the generator’s action tends to the form of the generated; yet that which is generated is not of greater worth than the generator, but, in univocal agents, is of the same species with it. For the generator does not intend the form of the generated as its ultimate end (which form is the end of generation), but the likeness to the divine being in the perpetuation of the species, and the diffusion of his goodness, by bestowing its specific form on others and being the cause of other things. Likewise, the heavenly bodies, although of more account than the lower bodies, nevertheless intend the generation of the latter bodies by means of their movements, and to bring to act the forms of things generated—not indeed as though this were their ultimate end, but as a means by which to attain to an ultimate end (namely, the divine likeness) in that they are causes of other things.
Considerandum autem quod unumquodque, inquantum participat similitudinem divinae bonitatis, quae est obiectum voluntatis eius, intantum participat de similitudine divinae voluntatis, per quam res producuntur in esse et conservantur. Superiora autem divinae bonitatis similitudinem participant simplicius et universalius: inferiora vero particularius et magis divisim. Unde et inter corpora caelestia et inferiora non attenditur similitudo secundum aequiparantiam, sicut in his quae sunt unius speciei: sed sicut universalis agentis ad particularem effectum. Sicut igitur agentis particularis in istis inferioribus intentio contrahitur ad bonum huius speciei vel illius, ita intentio corporis caelestis fertur ad bonum commune substantiae corporalis, quae per generationem conservatur et multiplicatur et augetur.
We must take note, however, that according as a thing participates in a likeness to God’s goodness (which is the object of his will), it has a share in a similitude to God’s will, by which things are brought into being and preserved. The higher beings, however, participate in a likeness to the divine goodness in a more simple and universal manner, but the lower beings in a more particular and divided way. Hence between heavenly and lower bodies we observe a likeness not of equiparance (as in things belonging to the same species), but as that which is to be observed between the universal agent and a particular effect. Therefore, just as in this lower world the intention of the particular agent is confined to good of this or that species, so is the intention of the celestial body inclined to the common good of the corporeal substance, which is preserved, multiplied, and increased by generation.
Cum vero, ut dictum est, quaelibet res mota, inquantum movetur, tendat in divinam similitudinem ut sit in se perfecta; perfectum autem sit unumquodque inquantum fit actu: oportet quod intentio cuiuslibet in potentia existentis sit ut per motum tendat in actum. Quanto igitur aliquis actus est posterior et magis perfectus, tanto principalius in ipsum appetitus materiae fertur. Unde oportet quod in ultimum et perfectissimum actum quem materia consequi potest, tendat appetitus materiae quo appetit formam, sicut in ultimum finem generationis.
But since, as already stated, everything moved, as such, tends towards a divine likeness to be perfect in itself, and since a thing is perfect insofar as it becomes actual, it follows that the intention of every thing that is in potency is to tend to act by way of movement. Consequently, the more an act is posterior and perfect, the more is the appetite of matter inclined to it. Therefore, the appetite whereby matter seeks a form must tend towards the last and most perfect act which matter can attain, as to the ultimate end of generation.
In actibus autem formarum gradus quidam inveniuntur. Nam materia prima est in potentia primo ad formam elementi. Sub forma vero elementi existens est in potentia ad formam mixti: propter quod elementa sunt materia mixti. Sub forma autem mixti considerata, est in potentia ad animam vegetabilem: nam talis corporis anima actus est. Itemque anima vegetabilis est potentia ad sensitivam; sensitiva vero ad intellectivam. Quod processus generationis ostendit: primo enim in generatione est fetus vivens vita plantae, postmodum vero vita animalis, demum vero vita hominis. Post hanc autem formam non invenitur in generabilibus et corruptibilibus posterior forma et dignior.
Now certain grades are to be found in the acts of forms. For prime matter is in potency, first of all, to the elemental form. While under the elemental form, it is in potency to the form of a mixed body, on account of which elements are the matter of a mixed body. Considered as under the form of a mixed body, it is in potency to a vegetative soul, for the act of such a body is a soul. Again, the vegetative soul is in potency to the sensitive, and the sensitive to the intellective. This is proved by the process of generation, for in generation we first have the fetus living with a plant life, afterwards with animal life, and lastly with human life. After this no later or more noble form is to be found in things subject to generation and corruption.
Ultimus igitur finis generationis totius est anima humana, et in hanc tendit materia sicut in ultimam formam. Sunt ergo elementa propter corpora mixta; haec vero propter viventia; in quibus plantae sunt propter animalia; animalia vero propter hominem. Homo igitur est finis totius generationis.
Therefore, the last end of all generation is the human soul, and to this does matter tend as its ultimate form. Consequently, the elements are for the sake of the mixed body, and the mixed body for the sake of living things. Of these, plants are for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of man. Therefore, man is the end of all generation.
Quia vero per eadem res generatur et conservatur in esse, secundum ordinem praemissum in generationibus rerum est etiam ordo in conservationibus earundem. Unde videmus quod corpora mixta sustentantur per elementorum congruas qualitates: plantae vero ex mixtis corporibus nutriuntur; animalia ex plantis nutrimentum habent; et quaedam etiam perfectiora et virtuosiora ex quibusdam imperfectioribus et infirmioribus. Homo vero utitur omnium rerum generibus ad sui utilitatem. Quibusdam quidem ad esum, quibusdam vero ad vestitum: unde et a natura nudus est institutus, utpote potens ex aliis sibi vestitum praeparare; sicut etiam nullum sibi congruum nutrimentum natura praeparavit nisi lac, ut ex diversis rebus sibi cibum conquireret. Quibusdam vero ad vehiculum: nam in motus celeritate, et in fortitudine ad sustinendos labores, multis animalibus infirmior invenitur, quasi aliis animalibus ad auxilium sibi praeparatis. Et super hoc omnibus sensibilibus utitur ad intellectualis cognitionis perfectionem. Unde et de homine in Psalmo dicitur, ad Deum directo sermone: omnia subiecisti sub pedibus eius. Et Aristoteles dicit, in I politicorum, quod homo habet naturale dominium super omnia animalia.
And whereas the same thing is the cause of generation and preservation of things, the order of the preservation of things is in keeping with the aforesaid order of their generation. Hence we find that mixed bodies are preserved by the qualities becoming to the elements; plants are nourished by mixed bodies; animals derive their nourishment from plants; and some that are more perfect and powerful from the imperfect and weak. Man employs all kinds of things for his own use, some for food, some for clothing. Hence by nature he was made naked, as being able to make himself clothes from other things, even as nature provided him with no suitable nourishment except milk, so that he might supply himself with food from a variety of things. Some he employs as a means of transit, for he is inferior to many animals in swiftness and strength for sustained work, as though other animals were furnished for his needs. And over and above he employs all things endowed with a sensitive life for the perfection of his intellectual knowledge. Hence, addressing the words to God, the Psalm say of man: You have put all things under his feet (Ps 8:6). And Aristotle says that man exercises a natural sovereignty over all animals.
Si igitur motio ipsius caeli ordinatur ad generationem; generatio autem tota ordinatur ad hominem sicut in ultimum finem huius generis: manifestum est quod finis motionis caeli ordinatur ad hominem sicut in ultimum finem in genere generabilium et mobilium.
If, therefore, the movement of the heaven is directed to generation, and all generation is directed to man as the last end of this genus, it is evident that the end of the heavenly movement is directed to man as its last end in the genus of things subject to generation and movement.