Caput 48 Chapter 48 Quod ultima hominis felicitas non sit in hac vita That man’s ultimate happiness is not in this life Si ergo humana felicitas ultima non consistit in cognitione Dei qua communiter ab omnibus vel pluribus cognoscitur secundum quandam aestimationem confusam, neque iterum in cognitione Dei qua cognoscitur per viam demonstrationis in scientiis speculativis, neque in cognitione Dei qua cognoscitur per fidem, ut in superioribus est ostensum; non est autem possibile in hac vita ad altiorem Dei cognitionem pervenire ut per essentiam cognoscatur, vel saltem ita quod aliae substantiae separatae intelligantur, ut ex his posset Deus quasi de propinquiori cognosci, ut ostensum est; oportet autem in aliqua Dei cognitione felicitatem ultimam poni, ut supra probatum est: impossibile est quod in hac vita sit ultima hominis felicitas. Seeing, then, that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in that knowledge of God whereby he is known by all or many in a vague kind of opinion, nor again in that knowledge of God whereby he is known in science through demonstration, nor in that knowledge whereby he is known through faith, as we have proved above; and seeing that it is not possible in this life to arrive at a higher knowledge of God in his essence, or at least so that we understand other separate substances, and thus know God in a way through that which is nearest to him, as we have proved; and since we must place our ultimate happiness in some kind of knowledge of God, as we have shown; it is impossible for man’s happiness to be in this life. Item. Ultimus finis hominis terminat eius appetitum naturalem, ita quod, eo habito, nihil aliud quaeritur: si enim adhuc movetur ad aliud, nondum habet finem in quo quiescat. Hoc autem in hac vita non est possibile accidere. Quanto enim plus aliquis intelligit, tanto magis in eo desiderium intelligendi augetur, quod est hominibus naturale: nisi forte aliquis sit qui omnia intelligat. Quod in hac vita nulli unquam accidit qui esset solum homo, nec est possibile accidere: cum in hac vita substantias separatas, quae sunt maxime intelligibilia, cognoscere non possimus, ut ostensum est. Non est igitur possibile ultimam hominis felicitatem in hac vita esse. Again. Man’s last end is the term of his natural appetite, so that when he has obtained it, he desires nothing more, because if he still has a movement towards something, he has not yet reached an end in which to be at rest. Now, this cannot happen in this life, since the more man understands, the more is the desire to understand increased in him—this being natural to man—unless perhaps someone there be who understands all things. And in this life this never did nor can happen to anyone who was a mere man; seeing that in this life we are unable to know separate substances, which in themselves are most intelligible, as we have proved. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness cannot possibly be in this life. Adhuc. Omne quod movetur in finem, desiderat naturaliter stabiliri et quiescere in illo: unde a loco quo corpus naturaliter movetur, non recedit nisi per motum violentum, qui contrariatur appetitui. Felicitas autem est ultimus finis, quem homo naturaliter desiderat. Est igitur hominis desiderium naturale ad hoc quod in felicitate stabiliatur. Nisi igitur cum felicitate pariter immobilem stabilitatem consequatur, nondum est felix, eius desiderio naturali nondum quiescente. Cum igitur aliquis felicitatem consequitur, pariter stabilitatem et quietem consequetur: unde et omnium haec est de felicitate conceptio, quod de sui ratione stabilitatem requirat; propter quod philosophus dicit, in I Eth., quod non aestimamus felicem esse chamaleontem quendam. In vita autem ista non est aliqua certa stabilitas: cuilibet enim, quantumcumque felix dicatur, possibile est infirmitates et infortunia accidere, quibus impeditur ab operatione, quaecumque sit illa, in qua ponitur felicitas. Non est igitur possibile in hac vita esse ultimam hominis felicitatem. Besides. Whatever is in motion towards an end has a natural desire to be established and at rest in it. Hence a body does not move away from the place towards which it has a natural movement, except by a violent movement which is contrary to that appetite. Now happiness is the last end which man desires naturally. Therefore, it is his natural desire to be established in happiness. Consequently, unless together with happiness he acquires a state of immobility, he is not yet happy, since his natural desire is not yet at rest. When, therefore, a man acquires happiness, he also acquires stability and rest, so that all agree in conceiving stability as a necessary condition of happiness. Hence the Philosopher says: We do not look upon the happy man as a kind of chameleon. Now, in this life there is no sure stability: for however happy a man may be, sickness and misfortune may come upon him, so that he is hindered in the operation, whatever it be, in which his happiness consists. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life. Amplius. Inconveniens videtur et irrationabile quod tempus generationis alicuius rei sit magnum, tempus autem durationis ipsius sit parvum: sequeretur enim quod natura in maiori tempore suo fine privaretur; unde videmus quod animalia quae parvo tempore vivunt, parvum etiam tempus ad hoc quod perficiantur habent. Si autem felicitas consistat in perfecta operatione secundum virtutem perfectam, vel intellectualem vel moralem, impossibile est eam advenire homini nisi post tempus diuturnum. Et hoc maxime in speculativis apparet, in quibus ultima felicitas hominis ponitur, ut ex dictis patet: nam vix in ultima aetate homo ad perfectum in speculatione scientiarum pervenire potest. Tunc autem, ut plurimum, modicum restat humanae vitae. Non est igitur possibile in hac vita ultimam hominis felicitatem esse. Moreover. It would seem unfitting and unreasonable for a thing to take a long time in becoming, and to have but a short time in being: for it would follow that for a longer duration of time nature would be deprived of its end. Hence we see that animals which live but a short time are perfected in a short time. But if happiness consists in a perfect operation according to perfect virtue, whether intellectual or moral, it cannot possibly come to man except after a long time. This is most evident in speculative matters, wherein man’s ultimate happiness consists, as we have proved: for man is hardly able to arrive at perfection in the speculations of science, even though he reach the last stage of life. And then in the majority of cases only a short space of life remains to him. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life. Praeterea. Felicitatem perfectum quoddam bonum omnes confitentur: alias appetitum non quietaret. Perfectum autem bonum est quod omnino caret admixtione mali: sicut perfecte album est quod est omnino impermixtum nigro. Non est autem possibile quod homo in statu istius vitae omnino sit immunis a malis: non solum corporalibus, quae sunt fames, sitis, aestus et frigus, et alia huiusmodi; sed etiam a malis animae. Nullus enim invenitur qui non aliquando inordinatis passionibus inquietetur; qui non aliquando praetereat medium, in quo virtus consistit, vel in plus vel in minus; qui non etiam in aliquibus decipiatur; vel saltem ignoret quae scire desiderat; aut etiam debili opinione concipiat ea de quibus certitudinem habere vellet. Non est igitur aliquis in hac vita felix. Further. All admit that happiness is a perfect good: otherwise it would not bring rest to the appetite. Now perfect good is that which is wholly free from any admixture of evil: just as that which is perfectly white is that which is entirely free from any admixture of black. But man cannot be wholly free from evils in this state of life; not only from evils of the body, such as hunger, thirst, heat, cold and the like, but also from evils of the soul. For no one is there who at times is not disturbed by inordinate passions; who sometimes does not go beyond the mean, in which virtue consists, either in excess or in deficiency; who is not deceived in some thing or another; or at least is ignorant of what he would wish to know, or feels doubtful about an opinion of which he would like to be certain. Therefore, no man is happy in this life. Adhuc. Homo naturaliter refugit mortem, et tristatur de ipsa: non solum ut nunc, cum eam sentit, eam refugiens, sed etiam cum eam recogitat. Hoc autem quod non moriatur, homo non potest assequi in hac vita. Non est igitur possibile quod homo in hac vita sit felix. Again. Man naturally shuns death, and is sad about it: not only shunning it now when he feels its presence, but also when he thinks about it. But man, in this life, cannot escape death. Therefore, it is not possible for man to be happy in this life. Amplius. Felicitas ultima non consistit in habitu, sed in operatione: habitus enim propter actus sunt. Sed impossibile est in hac vita continue agere quamcumque actionem. Impossibile est igitur in hac vita hominem totaliter esse felicem. Besides. Ultimate happiness consists not in a habit but in an operation, since habits are for the sake of actions. But in this life it is impossible to perform any action continuously. Therefore, man cannot be entirely happy in this life. Item. Quanto aliquid est magis desideratum et dilectum, tanto eius amissio maiorem dolorem vel tristitiam affert. Felicitas autem maxime desideratur et amatur. Maxime igitur eius amissio tristitiam habet. Sed si sit in hac vita ultima felicitas, certum est quod amitteretur, saltem per mortem. Et non est certum utrum duratura sit usque ad mortem: cum cuilibet homini possibile sit in hac vita accidere morbos quibus totaliter ab operatione virtutis impeditur, sicut phrenesim et alios huiusmodi, quibus impeditur rationis usus. Semper igitur talis felicitas habebit tristitiam naturaliter annexam. Non erit igitur perfecta felicitas. Further. The more a thing is desired and loved, the more does its loss bring sorrow and pain. Now happiness is most desired and loved. Therefore, its loss brings the greatest sorrow. But if there be ultimate happiness in this life, it will certainly be lost, at least by death. Nor is it certain that it will last till death, since it is possible for every man in this life to encounter disorders by which he is wholly hindered from the operation of virtue, such as madness and the like, which hinder the use of reason. Such happiness, therefore, always has sorrow naturally connected with it: consequently, it will not be perfect happiness. Potest autem aliquis dicere quod, cum felicitas sit bonum intellectualis naturae, perfecta et vera felicitas est illorum in quibus natura intellectualis perfecta invenitur, idest in substantiis separatis: in hominibus autem invenitur imperfecta, per modum participationis cuiusdam. Ad veritatem enim intelligendam plene, non nisi per quendam inquisitionis motum pertingere possunt; et ad ea quae sunt secundum naturam maxime intelligibilia, omnino deficiunt, sicut ex dictis patet. Unde nec felicitas, secundum suam perfectam rationem, potest hominibus adesse: sed aliquid ipsius participant, etiam in hac vita. Et haec videtur fuisse sententia Aristotelis de felicitate. Unde in I Ethicorum, ubi inquirit utrum infortunia tollant felicitatem, ostenso quod felicitas sit in operibus virtutis, quae maxime permanentes in hac vita esse videntur, concludit illos quibus talis perfectio in hac vita adest, esse beatos ut homines, quasi non simpliciter ad felicitatem pertingentes, sed modo humano. But someone might say that, since happiness is a good of the intellectual nature, perfect and true happiness is for those in whom the intellectual nature is perfect—namely, in separate substances—and that it is imperfect in man, by way of a kind of participation. For he can arrive at a full understanding of the truth only by a sort of movement of inquiry; and fails entirely to understand things that are by nature most intelligible, as we have proved. Therefore, neither is happiness, in its perfect form, possible to man; yet he has a certain participation in it, even in this life. This seems to have been Aristotle’s opinion about happiness. Therefore, inquiring whether misfortunes destroy happiness, he shows that happiness seems especially to consist in deeds of virtue, which seem to be most stable in this life, and concludes that those who in this life attain to this perfection are happy as men, as though not attaining to happiness simply, but in a human way. Quod autem praedicta responsio rationes praemissas non evacuet ostendendum est. We must now show that this explanation does not avoid the foregoing arguments. Homo enim etsi naturae ordine substantiis separatis sit inferior, creaturis tamen irrationabilibus superior est. Perfectiori igitur modo suum finem ultimum consequitur quam illa. Illa vero sic perfecte suum finem ultimum consequuntur quod nihil aliud quaerunt: grave enim, cum fuerit in suo ubi, quiescit; animalia etiam cum fruuntur delectabilibus secundum sensum, eorum naturale desiderium quietatur. Oportet igitur multo fortius quod, cum homo pervenerit ad suum finem ultimum, naturale eius desiderium quietetur. Sed hoc non potest fieri in vita ista. Ergo homo non consequitur felicitatem, prout est finis proprius eius, in hac vita, ut ostensum est. Oportet ergo quod consequatur post hanc vitam. For although man is below the separate substances in the natural order, he is above irrational creatures: therefore, he attains his ultimate end in a more perfect way than they. Now these attain their last end so perfectly that they seek nothing further: thus a heavy body rests when it is in its own proper place; and when an animal enjoys sensible pleasure, its natural desire is at rest. Much more, therefore, must man’s natural desire be at rest when he has obtained his last end. But this cannot happen in this life. Therefore, in this life man does not obtain happiness considered as his proper end, as we have proved. Therefore, he must obtain it after this life. Adhuc. Impossibile est naturale desiderium esse inane: natura enim nihil facit frustra. Esset autem inane desiderium naturae si nunquam posset impleri. Est igitur implebile desiderium naturale hominis. Non autem in hac vita, ut ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod impleatur post hanc vitam. Est igitur felicitas ultima hominis post hanc vitam. Again. The natural desire cannot be void, since nature does nothing in vain. But nature’s desire would be void if it could never be fulfilled. Therefore, man’s natural desire can be fulfilled; but it cannot be fulfilled in this life, as we have shown. Therefore, it must be fulfilled after this life. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness is after this life. Amplius. Quandiu aliquid movetur ad perfectionem, nondum est in ultimo fine. Sed omnes homines in cognoscendo veritatem semper se habent ut moti et tendentes ad perfectionem: quia illi qui sequuntur, superinveniunt aliqua illis quae a prioribus sunt inventa, sicut etiam dicitur in II metaphysicae. Non igitur homines in cognitione veritatis sic se habent quasi in ultimo fine existentes. Cum igitur in speculatione, per quam quaeritur cognitio veritatis, maxime videatur ultima felicitas hominis in hac vita consistere, sicut etiam ipse Aristoteles probat in X Eth., impossibile est dicere quod homo in hac vita ultimum suum finem consequatur. Moreover. As long as a thing is in motion towards perfection, it has not reached its last end. Now in the knowledge of truth all men are ever in motion and tending towards perfection, because those who follow make discoveries in addition to those made by their predecessors, as stated in 2 Metaphysics. Therefore, in the knowledge of truth man is not situated as though he had arrived at his last end. Since, then (as Aristotle himself shows), man’s ultimate happiness in this life appears to consist in speculation, whereby he seeks the knowledge of truth, we cannot possibly allow that man obtains his last end in this life. Praeterea. Omne quod est in potentia, intendit exire in actum. Quandiu igitur non est ex toto factum in actu, non est in suo fine ultimo. Intellectus autem noster est in potentia ad omnes formas rerum cognoscendas: reducitur autem in actum cum aliquam earum cognoscit. Ergo non erit ex toto in actu, nec in ultimo suo fine, nisi quando omnia, saltem ista materialia, cognoscit. Sed hoc non potest homo assequi per scientias speculativas, quibus in hac vita veritatem cognoscimus. Non est igitur possibile quod ultima felicitas hominis sit in hac vita. Moreover. Whatever is in potency tends to become actual: so that as long as it is not wholly actual, it has not reached its last end. Now our intellect is in potency to the knowledge of the forms of all things, and it becomes actual when it knows any one of them. Consequently, it will not be wholly actual, nor in possession of its last end, except when it knows everything, at least these material things. But man cannot obtain this through speculative sciences, by which in this life we know truth. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness cannot be in this life. Propter has autem et huiusmodi rationes, Alexander et Averroes posuerunt ultimam hominis felicitatem non esse in cognitione humana, quae est per scientias speculativas, sed per continuationem cum substantia separata, quam esse credebant possibilem homini in hac vita. Quia vero Aristoteles vidit quod non est alia cognitio hominis in hac vita quam per scientias speculativas, posuit hominem non consequi felicitatem perfectam, sed suo modo. For these and like reasons Alexander and Averroes held that man’s ultimate happiness does not consist in human knowledge obtained through speculative sciences, but in that which results from conjunction with a separate substance, which conjunction they deemed possible to man in this life. But as Aristotle realized that man has no knowledge in this life other than that which he obtains through speculative sciences, he maintained that man does not attain to perfect happiness, but proportionate to his capacity. In quo satis apparet quantam angustiam patiebantur hinc inde eorum praeclara ingenia. A quibus angustiis liberabimur si ponamus, secundum probationes praemissas, hominem ad veram felicitatem post hanc vitam pervenire posse, anima hominis immortali existente in quo statu anima intelliget per modum quo intelligunt substantiae separatae, sicut in secundo huius operis ostensum est. Hence it becomes sufficiently clear how these great minds suffered from being so straitened on every side. We, however, will avoid these straits if we suppose, in accordance with the foregoing arguments, that man is able to reach perfect happiness after this life, since man has an immortal soul; and that in that state his soul will understand in the same way as separate substances understand, as we proved in the second book. Erit igitur ultima felicitas hominis in cognitione Dei quam habet humana mens post hanc vitam, per modum quo ipsum cognoscunt substantiae separatae. Propter quod, Matth. 5:12, dominus mercedem nobis in caelis promittit; et Matth. 22:30, dicit quod sancti erunt sicut angeli, qui vident semper Deum in caelis, ut dicitur Matth. 18:10. Therefore, man’s ultimate happiness will consist in that knowledge of God which he possesses after this life, a knowledge similar to that by which separate substances know him. Hence our Lord promises us a reward in heaven (Matt 5:12) and states that the saints shall be as the angels (Matt 22:30), who always see God in heaven (Matt 18:10). Caput 49 Chapter 49 Quod substantiae separatae non vident Deum per essentiam ex hoc quod cognoscunt eum per suam essentiam That separate substances do not see God in his essence through knowing him by their own essences Oportet autem inquirere utrum haec ipsa cognitio qua substantiae separatae, et animae post mortem, cognoscunt Deum per suas essentias, sufficiat ad ipsarum ultimam felicitatem. We must now inquire whether this same knowledge (by which separate substances and souls after death know God by their own essences) is sufficient for their ultimate happiness. Ad cuius veritatis indaginem, primo ostendendum est quod per talem modum cognitionis non cognoscitur divina essentia. In order to discover the truth in this matter, we must first of all show that to know God in this way is not to know his essence. Contingit enim ex effectu cognoscere causam multipliciter. Uno modo, secundum quod effectus sumitur ut medium ad cognoscendum de causa quod sit, et quod talis sit: sicut accidit in scientiis, quae causam demonstrant per effectum. Alio modo, ita quod in ipso effectu videatur causa, inquantum similitudo causae resultat in effectu: sicut homo videtur in speculo propter suam similitudinem. Et differt hic modus a primo. Nam in primo sunt duae cognitiones, effectus et causae, quarum una est alterius causa: nam cognitio effectus est causa quod cognoscatur eius causa. In modo autem secundo una est visio utriusque: simul enim dum videtur effectus, videtur et causa in ipso. Tertio modo, ita quod ipsa similitudo causae in effectu sit forma qua cognoscit causam suus effectus: sicut si arca haberet intellectum, et per formam suam cognosceret artem a qua talis forma, velut eius similitudo, processit. Nullo autem istorum modorum per effectum potest cognosci de causa quid est, nisi sit effectus causae adaequatus, in quo tota virtus causae exprimatur. An effect may be known through its cause in several ways. First, when the effect is taken as the means of knowing the existence and qualities of the cause: this happens in sciences which prove the cause from the effect. Second, when the cause is seen in the effect itself, inasmuch as the likeness of the cause is reflected in the effect: thus a man is seen in a mirror on account of his likeness. This way differs from the first, because in the first there are two knowledges, of effect and of cause, one of which is the cause of the other: for the knowledge of the effect is the cause of our knowing its cause. But in the second way there is one sight of both, because while seeing the effect we see the cause in it at the same time. Third, when the very likeness of the cause in the effect is the form by which the cause is known by its effect: for instance, if a box had an intellect, and were to know by its own form the art from which that very form had been produced in likeness to that art. But by none of these ways is it possible to know from its effect what the cause is, unless the effect is equal to the cause, and expresses the whole power of the cause. Substantiae autem separatae cognoscunt Deum per suas substantias sicut causa cognoscitur per effectum: non autem primo modo, quia sic eorum cognitio esset discursiva, sed secundo modo, inquantum una videt Deum in alia; et modo tertio, inquantum quaelibet earum videt Deum in seipsa. Nulla autem earum est effectus adaequans virtutem Dei, ut in secundo libro ostensum est. Non est igitur possibile quod per hunc modum cognitionis ipsam divinam essentiam videant. Now separate substances know God by their substances in the same way as a cause is known from its effect; not, however, in the first way, because then their knowledge would be discursive; but in the second way, inasmuch as one of them sees God in another; and in the third way, inasmuch as each of them sees God in itself. Yet none of them is an effect equalling God’s power, as we have shown in the second book. Therefore, they cannot see the divine essence by this kind of knowledge. Amplius. Similitudo intelligibilis per quam intelligitur aliquid secundum suam substantiam, oportet quod sit eiusdem speciei, vel magis species eius; sicut forma domus quae est in mente artificis, est eiusdem speciei cum forma domus quae est in materia, vel potius species eius; non enim per speciem hominis intelligitur de asino vel equo quid est. Sed ipsa natura substantiae separatae non est idem specie cum natura divina, quinimmo nec genere, ut in primo libro ostensum est. Non est igitur possibile quod substantia separata intelligat divinam substantiam per propriam naturam. Besides. The intelligible likeness by which a thing is understood as to its substance must be of the same species—in fact, it must be its species (even as the form of the house, which is in the architect’s mind, is of the same species as the form of the house which exists in matter, or rather it is its species). For we do not understand what an ass is, or what a horse is, through the species of a man. But the nature of a separate substance is not of the same species as the divine nature; indeed, not even of the same genus, as we showed in the first book. Therefore, a separate substance cannot possibly understand God through its own nature. Item. Omne creatum ad aliquod genus vel speciem terminatur. Divina autem essentia est infinita, comprehendens in se omnem perfectionem totius esse, ut in primo libro ostensum est. Impossibile est igitur quod per aliquid creatum divina substantia videatur. Further. Every created thing is confined to a certain genus or species. But the divine essence is infinite, comprising within itself the entire perfection of all being, as we proved in the first book. Therefore, the divine substance cannot be seen through anything created. Praeterea. Omnis intelligibilis species per quam intelligitur quidditas vel essentia alicuius rei, comprehendit in repraesentando rem illam: unde et orationes significantes quod quid est terminos et definitiones vocamus. Impossibile est autem quod aliqua similitudo creata taliter Deum repraesentet: cum quaelibet similitudo creata sit alicuius generis determinati, non autem Deus, ut in primo ostensum est. Non est igitur possibile quod per aliquam similitudinem creatam divina substantia intelligatur. Moreover. Every intelligible species through which the quiddity or essence of a thing is understood comprehends that thing in representing it: hence words signifying what a thing is are called terms and definitions. But no created image can possibly represent God thus, since every created image belongs to some fixed genus, whereas God does not, as was proved in the first book. Therefore, it is not possible to understand the divine substance through a created image. Amplius. Divina substantia est suum esse ut in primo ostensum est. Ipsum autem esse substantiae separatae est aliud quam sua substantia, ut in secundo probatum est. Essentia igitur substantiae separatae non est sufficiens medium quo Deus per essentiam videri possit. Further. It was proved in the first book that God’s substance is his being. But the being of a separate substance is distinct from its substance, as we proved in the second book. Therefore, the essence of a separate substance is not a sufficient medium whereby God may be seen in his essence. Cognoscit tamen substantia separata per suam substantiam de Deo quia est; et quod est omnium causa; et eminentem omnibus; et remotum ab omnibus, non solum quae sunt, sed etiam quae mente creata concipi possunt. Ad quam etiam cognitionem de Deo nos utcumque pertingere possumus: per effectus enim de Deo cognoscimus quia est et quod causa aliorum est, aliis supereminens, et ab omnibus remotus. Et hoc est ultimum et perfectissimum nostrae cognitionis in hac vita, ut Dionysius dicit, in libro de mystica theologia, cum Deo quasi ignoto coniungimur: quod quidem contingit dum de eo quid non sit cognoscimus, quid vero sit penitus manet ignotum. Unde et ad huius sublimissimae cognitionis ignorantiam demonstrandam, de Moyse dicitur, Exodi 20:21, quod accessit ad caliginem in qua est Deus. And yet the separate substance, through its own substance, knows about God that he is; and that he is the cause of all things; and that he is above all and far removed from all not only from the things that are, but even from those that can be conceived by the created mind. This knowledge about God we also are able to obtain somewhat, because we know of God that he is from his effects, and that he is the cause of other things, surpassing all and remote from all. And this is the limit and the highest point of our knowledge in this life where, as Dionysius says, we are united to God as to something unknown. This happens when we know of him what he is not, while what he is remains utterly unknown. Hence in order to indicate the ignorance of this most sublime knowledge, it was said of Moses that he drew near to the thick darkness where God was (Exod 20:21). Quia vero natura inferior in sui summo non nisi ad infimum superioris naturae attingit oportet quod haec ipsa cognitio sit eminentior in substantiis separatis quam in nobis. Quod per singula patet. Nam quanto propinquior et expressior alicuius causae effectus cognoscitur, tanto evidentius apparet de causa eius quod sit. Substantiae autem separatae, quae per seipsas Deum cognoscunt, sunt propinquiores effectus, et expressius Dei similitudinem gerentes, quam effectus per quos nos Deum cognoscimus. Certius ergo sciunt substantiae separatae et clarius quam nos, quod Deus est. Since, however, the lower nature in its summit attains only to what is lowest in the higher nature, it follows that this same knowledge is more sublime in separate substances than in us. This can be shown as to each way of attaining to this knowledge. For if the cause be known by its effect, the nearer that effect is, and the clearer its resemblance to its cause, the more evident does it make the existence of that cause. Now separate substances, which know God by themselves, are nearer effects and bear a clearer resemblance to God than the effects through which we know God. Therefore, separate substances know more certainly and more clearly than we that God exists. Rursus: cum per negationes ad propriam cognitionem rei quoquo modo deveniatur, ut supra dictum est, quanto plura et magis propinqua quis ab aliquo remota esse cognoverit, tanto magis ad propriam ipsius cognitionem accedit: sicut magis accedit ad propriam hominis cognitionem qui scit eum non esse neque inanimatum neque insensibilem, quam qui scit solum eum non esse inanimatum, licet neuter sciat de homine quid sit. Substantiae autem separatae plura cognoscunt quam nos, et quae sunt Deo magis propinqua: et per consequens suo intellectu plura et magis propinqua a Deo removent quam nos. Magis igitur accedunt ad propriam ipsius cognitionem quam nos: licet nec ipsae, per hoc quod seipsas intelligunt, divinam substantiam videant. Again. Since by negations we come by any way whatever to a proper knowledge of a thing, as stated above, the more things one knows to be removed from God, and the greater their propinquity, the nearer does one approach to a proper knowledge of him. Even so, he who knows that man is neither inanimate nor insensible approaches nearer to a proper knowledge of man than one who knows only that he is not inanimate, although neither of them knows what man is. Now, separate substances know more than we, and the things that are nearer to God; consequently, by their intelligence they remove from God more things and nearer things than we do. Therefore, they approach nearer to a proper knowledge of God than we, although neither do they, through understanding themselves, see the divine substance. Item: tanto aliquis alicuius altitudinem magis novit, quanto altioribus scit eum esse praelatum: sicut, etsi rusticus sciat regem esse summum in regno, quia tamen non cognoscit nisi quaedam infima regni officia, cum quibus aliquid habet negotii, non ita cognoscit regis eminentiam sicut aliquis qui omnium principum regni dignitates novit, quibus scit regem esse praelatum; quamvis neuter altitudinem regiae dignitatis comprehendat. Nos autem nescimus nisi quaedam infima entium. Licet ergo sciamus Deum omnibus entibus eminere, non tamen ita cognoscimus eminentiam divinam sicut substantiae separatae, quibus altissimi rerum ordines noti sunt, et eis omnibus superiorem Deum esse cognoscunt. Again. The higher the persons over whom one knows a man to be placed, the better the knowledge one has of his eminence. Thus, although a peasant may know that the king is the highest in the land, yet since he knows only some of the lowest officials of the kingdom, with whom he has business, he does not realize the king’s exalted position as one does who knows the dignity of all the great men of the kingdom, over whom he knows the king to be placed (although neither of them comprehends the height of the kingly rank). Now we know none but the lowest things: consequently, although we know that God is far above all, we do not know the divine supereminence as the separate substances do, to whom the highest orders of things are known, while they know God to be higher than them all. Ulterius: manifestum est quod causalitas alicuius causae, et virtus eius, tanto magis cognoscitur, quanto plures et maiores eius effectus innotescunt. Ex quo manifestum fit quod substantiae separatae causalitatem Dei et eius virtutem magis cognoscunt quam nos, licet nos omnium entium eum esse causam sciamus. Again. It is clear that the causality and virtue of a cause are all the better known according as more and greater effects of it are known. Therefore, it evidently follows that separate substances know the divine causality and power better than we, although we know him to be the cause of all. Caput 50 Chapter 50 Quod in naturali cognitione quam habent substantiae separatae de Deo non quiescit earum naturale desiderium That the natural desire of the separate substances is not set at rest in the natural knowledge they have of God