Caput 51 Chapter 51 Quomodo Deus per essentiam videatur How God may be seen in his essence Cum autem impossibile sit naturale desiderium esse inane, quod quidem esset si non esset possibile pervenire ad divinam substantiam intelligendam, quod naturaliter omnes mentes desiderant; necesse est dicere quod possibile sit substantiam Dei videri per intellectum, et a substantiis intellectualibus separatis, et ab animabus nostris. Since, then, it is impossible for a natural desire to be void—and it would be were it impossible to arrive at understanding the divine substance, for all minds desire this naturally—we must conclude that it is possible for the divine substance to be seen by means of the intellect, both by separate intellectual substances and by our souls. Modus autem huius visionis satis iam ex dictis qualis esse debeat, apparet. Ostensum enim est supra quod divina substantia non potest videri per intellectum aliqua specie creata. Unde oportet, si Dei essentia videatur, quod per ipsammet essentiam divinam intellectus ipsam videat: ut sit in tali visione divina essentia et quod videtur, et quo videtur. It is sufficiently clear from what has been said what manner of vision this is. For we have proved that the divine substance cannot be seen by the intellect in any created species. Therefore, if God’s essence be seen at all, it must be that the intellect sees it in the divine essence itself, so that in that vision the divine essence is both the object and the medium of vision. Cum autem intellectus substantiam aliquam intelligere non possit nisi fiat actu secundum aliquam speciem informantem ipsum quae sit similitudo rei intellectae, impossibile videri potest alicui quod per essentiam divinam intellectus creatus possit videre ipsam Dei substantiam quasi per quandam speciem intelligibilem: cum divina essentia sit quiddam per seipsum subsistens; et in primo ostensum sit quod Deus nullius potest esse forma. Since, however, the intellect is unable to understand any particular substance unless it be actuated by some species informing it which is the image of the thing understood, someone might deem it impossible for a created intellect to see the very substance of God in the divine essence as an intelligible species, inasmuch as the divine essence is self-subsistent, and we have proved in the first book that God cannot be the form of anything. Ad huius igitur intelligentiam veritatis, considerandum est quod substantia quae est per seipsam subsistens, est vel forma tantum, vel compositum ex materia et forma. Illud igitur quod ex materia et forma compositum est, non potest alterius esse forma: quia forma in eo est iam contracta ad illam materiam, ut alterius rei forma esse non possit. Illud autem quod sic est subsistens ut tamen solum sit forma, potest alterius esse forma, dummodo esse suum sit tale quod ab aliquo alio participari possit, sicut in secundo ostendimus de anima humana. Si vero esse suum ab altero participari non posset, nullius rei forma esse posset: sic enim per suum esse determinatur in seipso, sicut quae sunt materialia per materiam. In order to understand this truth, we must note that a self-subsisting substance is either a form alone, or is composed of matter and form. Accordingly, that which is composed of matter and form cannot be the form of something else, because the form in it is already confined to that matter, so that it cannot be the form of another thing. But that which subsists so as nevertheless to be a form alone can be the form of something else, provided its being be such that some other thing can participate in it, as we have proved concerning the human soul in the second book. If, however, its being cannot be participated in by another, it cannot be the form of anything, because by its very being it is determined in itself, as material things are by their matter. Hoc autem, sicut in esse substantiali vel naturali invenitur, sic et in esse intelligibili considerandum est. Cum enim intellectus perfectio sit verum, illud intelligibile erit ut forma tantum in genere intelligibilium quod est veritas ipsa. Quod convenit soli Deo nam cum verum sequatur ad esse, illud tantum sua veritas est quod est suum esse, quod est proprium soli Deo, ut in secundo ostensum est. Alia igitur intelligibilia subsistentia sunt non ut pura forma in genere intelligibilium, sed ut formam in subiecto aliquo habentes: est enim unumquodque eorum verum, non veritas; sicut et est ens, non autem ipsum esse. Now we must consider this as being the case not only with regard to substantial or natural being, but also as regards intelligible being. For, since truth is the perfection of the intellect, that intelligible which is truth itself will be a pure form in the genus of intelligible things. This applies solely to God: for, since truth is consequent upon being, that alone is its own truth which is its own being, and this belongs to God alone, as we proved in the second book. Consequently, other subsistent intelligibles are not pure forms in the genus of intelligible things, but have a form in a subject: for each of them is a true thing, but not the truth, even as it is a being, but not being itself. Manifestum est igitur quod essentia divina potest comparari ad intellectum creatum ut species intelligibilis qua intelligit: quod non contingit de essentia alicuius alterius substantiae separatae. Nec tamen potest esse forma alterius rei secundum esse naturale: sequeretur enim quod, simul cum alio iuncta, constitueret unam naturam; quod esse non potest, cum essentia divina in se perfecta sit in sui natura. Species autem intelligibilis, unita intellectui, non constituit aliquam naturam, sed perficit ipsum ad intelligendum: quod perfectioni divinae essentiae non repugnat. It is therefore clear that the divine essence can be compared to the created intellect as an intelligible species by which it understands, which cannot be said of the essence of any separate substance. And yet it cannot be the form of another thing as to its natural being: for it would follow that, being united to this other, it would constitute one nature; which is impossible, since the divine essence is perfect in itself in its own nature. Whereas the intelligible species in its union with the intellect does not constitute a nature, but perfects the intellect to the effect of understanding: and this is not inconsistent with the perfection of the divine essence. Haec igitur visio immediata Dei repromittitur nobis in Scriptura, I Cor. 13:12: videmus nunc per speculum in aenigmate: tunc autem facie ad faciem. Quod corporali modo nefas est intelligere, ut in ipsa divinitate corporalem faciem imaginemur: cum ostensum sit Deum incorporeum esse; neque etiam sit possibile ut nostra corporali facie Deum videamus, cum visus corporalis, qui in facie nostra residet, non nisi rerum corporalium esse possit. Sic igitur facie ad faciem Deum videbimus, quia immediate eum videbimus, sicut hominem quem facie ad faciem videmus. This immediate vision of God is promised to us in Sacred Scripture: Now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face (1 Cor 13:12). It would be impious to understand this in a material way, and imagine a material face in the divinity, since we have proved that God has no body. Nor is it possible for us to see God with a bodily face since the eyes of the body, which are situate in the face, can only see bodily things. Thus then shall we see God face to face, because we shall see him immediately, even as a man whom we see face to face. Secundum autem hanc visionem maxime Deo assimilamur, et eius beatitudinis participes sumus: nam ipse Deus per suam essentiam suam substantiam intelligit, et haec est eius felicitas. Unde dicitur I Ioan. 3:2: cum autem apparuerit, similes ei erimus et videbimus eum sicuti est. Et Luc. 22, dominus dicit: ego dispono vobis sicut disposuit mihi pater meus mensam, ut edatis et bibatis super mensam meam in regno meo. Quod quidem non de corporali cibo vel potu intelligi potest, sed de eo qui in mensa sapientiae sumitur, de quo a sapientia dicitur, Proverb. 9:5: comedite panes meos, et bibite vinum quod miscui vobis. Super mensam ergo Dei manducant et bibunt qui eadem felicitate fruuntur qua Deus felix est, videntes eum illo modo quo ipse videt seipsum. It is according to this vision that we become most like unto God, and participators of his bliss, since God understands his substance by his essence, and this is his bliss. Hence it is said: When he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is (1 John 3:2). And our Lord said: As my Father appointed a table for me, so do I appoint for you that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom (Luke 22:29–30). Now these words cannot be understood as referring to the food and drink of the body, but to that which is taken from the table of wisdom, of which wisdom says: Come, eat of my bread and drink of the wine I have mixed (Prov 9:5). Accordingly, to eat and drink at God’s table is to enjoy the same bliss as that which makes God happy, and to see God as he sees himself. Caput 52 Chapter 52 Quod nulla creata substantia potest sua naturali virtute pervenire ad videndum Deum per essentiam That no created substance can by its natural power arrive at seeing God in his essence Non est autem possibile quod ad illum visionis divinae modum aliqua creata substantia ex virtute propria possit attingere. However, it is not possible for any created substance to attain to this way of seeing God by its own power. Quod enim est superioris naturae proprium, non potest consequi natura inferior nisi per actionem superioris naturae cuius est proprium: sicut aqua non potest esse calida nisi per actionem ignis. Videre autem Deum per ipsam essentiam divinam est proprium naturae divinae: operari enim per propriam formam est proprium cuiuslibet operantis. Nulla igitur intellectualis substantia potest videre Deum per ipsam divinam essentiam nisi Deo hoc faciente. For that which is proper to the higher nature cannot be acquired by a lower nature, except through the action of the higher nature to whom it properly belongs: thus water cannot become hot except through the action of heat. Now to see God in his essence is proper to the divine nature, since to operate through its own form is proper to the operator. Therefore, no intellectual substance can see God in the divine essence, unless God himself bring this about. Amplius. Forma alicuius propria non fit alterius nisi eo agente: agens enim facit sibi simile inquantum formam suam alteri communicat. Videre autem substantiam Dei impossibile est nisi ipsa divina essentia sit forma intellectus qua intelligit, ut probatum est. Impossibile est igitur quod aliqua substantia creata ad illam visionem perveniat nisi per actionem divinam. Again. A form proper to one thing does not become another’s except through the first’s agency, because an agent produces its like by communicating its form to another. Now it is impossible to see the divine substance unless the divine substance itself become the form by which the intellect understands, as we have proved. Therefore, no created substance can attain to that vision except through the divine agency. Adhuc. Si aliqua duo debeant ad invicem copulari quorum unum sit formale et aliud materiale, oportet quod copulatio eorum compleatur per actionem quae est ex parte eius quod est formale, non autem per actionem eius quod est materiale: forma enim est principium agendi, materia vero principium patiendi. Ad hoc autem quod intellectus creatus videat Dei substantiam, oportet quod ipsa divina essentia copuletur intellectui ut forma intelligibilis, sicut probatum est. Non est igitur possibile ad hanc visionem perveniri ab aliquo intellectu creato nisi per actionem divinam. Besides. If any two things have to be united together so that one be formal and the other material, their union must be completed by an action on the part of the one that is formal, and not by the action of the one that is material, because the form is the principle of action, whereas matter is the passive principle. Now in order that the created intellect see God’s substance, the divine essence itself must be united to the intellect as an intelligible form, as we have proved. Therefore, no created intellect can attain to this vision except through the divine agency. Item. Quod est per se, causa est eius quod est per aliud. Intellectus autem divinus per seipsum divinam substantiam videt: nam intellectus divinus est ipsa divina essentia, qua Dei substantia videtur, ut in primo probatum est. Intellectus autem creatus videt divinam substantiam per essentiam Dei, quasi per aliud a se. Haec igitur visio non potest advenire intellectui creato nisi per actionem Dei. Further. What is so of itself is the cause of what is so through another. Now the divine intelligence sees of itself the divine substance: for the divine intelligence is the divine essence, in which God’s substance is seen, as we proved in the first book: whereas the created intellect sees the divine substance in the divine essence as in something other than itself. Therefore, this vision cannot be acquired by the created intellect except through the action of God. Praeterea. Quidquid excedit limites alicuius naturae, non potest sibi advenire nisi per actionem alterius: sicut aqua non tendit sursum nisi ab aliquo alio mota. Videre autem Dei substantiam transcendit limites omnis naturae creatae: nam cuilibet naturae intellectuali creatae proprium est ut intelligat secundum modum suae substantiae; substantia autem divina non potest sic intelligi, ut supra ostensum est. Impossibile est ergo perveniri ab aliquo intellectu creato ad visionem divinae substantiae nisi per actionem Dei, qui omnem creaturam transcendit. Moreover. Whatever exceeds the limits of a nature cannot be acquired by that nature except through the agency of another: thus water does not flow upwards unless it be moved by something else. Now it is beyond the limits of any created nature to see God’s substance: for it is proper to every created intellectual nature to understand according to the mode of its substance, but the divine substance cannot be understood thus, as we proved above. Therefore, no created intellect can possibly attain to a vision of the divine substance except by the agency of God who surpasses all creatures. Hinc est quod Rom. 6:23 dicitur: gratia Dei vita aeterna. In ipsa enim divina visione ostendimus esse hominis beatitudinem, quae vita aeterna dicitur: ad quam sola Dei gratia dicimur pervenire, quia talis visio omnem creaturae facultatem excedit, nec est possibile ad eam pervenire nisi divino munere; quae autem sic adveniunt creaturae, Dei gratiae deputantur. Et Ioan. 14:21 dominus dicit: ego manifestabo ei meipsum. Hence it is said: The grace of God is life everlasting (Rom 6:23). For we have proved that man’s happiness consists in seeing God, which is called life everlasting: and we are said to obtain this by God’s grace alone, because that vision surpasses the faculty of every creature, and it is impossible to attain thereto except by God’s gift; and when such things are obtained by a creature, it is put down to God’s grace. Again, our Lord says: I will manifest myself to him (John 14:21). Caput 53 Chapter 53 Quod intellectus creatus indiget aliqua influentia divini luminis ad hoc quod Deum per essentiam videat That the created intellect needs a ray of the divine light in order to see God in his essence Oportet autem quod ad tam nobilem visionem intellectus creatus per aliquam divinae bonitatis influentiam elevetur. To so sublime a vision the created intellect needs to be raised by some kind of outpouring of the divine goodness. Impossibile est enim quod id quod est forma alicuius rei propria, fiat alterius rei forma, nisi res illa participet aliquam similitudinem illius cuius est propria forma: sicut lux non fit actus alicuius corporis nisi aliquid participet de diaphano. Essentia autem divina est propria forma intelligibilis intellectus divini, et ei proportionata: nam haec tria in Deo unum sunt, intellectus, quo intelligitur, et quod intelligitur. Impossibile est igitur quod ipsa essentia fiat intelligibilis forma alicuius intellectus creati, nisi per hoc quod aliquam divinam similitudinem intellectus creatus participat. Haec igitur divinae similitudinis participatio necessaria est ad hoc quod Dei substantia videatur. For it is impossible that the proper form of anything become the form of another, unless this other bear some resemblance to the thing to which that form properly belongs: thus light does not actuate a body which has nothing in common with the diaphanous. Now the divine essence is the proper intelligible form of the divine intellect, and is proportionate to it: for these three (understanding, medium of understanding, and object understood) are one in God. Therefore, that same essence cannot become the intelligible form of a created intellect, except through the created intellect participating in some divine likeness. Therefore, this participation in a divine likeness is necessary in order that the divine substance be seen. Adhuc. Nihil est susceptivum formae sublimioris nisi per aliquam dispositionem ad illius capacitatem elevetur: proprius enim actus in propria potentia fit. Essentia autem divina est forma altior omni intellectu creato. Ad hoc igitur quod essentia divina fiat intelligibilis species alicuius intellectus creati, quod requiritur ad hoc quod divina substantia videatur, necesse est quod intellectus creatus aliqua dispositione sublimiori ad hoc elevetur. Again. Nothing can receive a higher form unless it be disposed thereto through its capacity being raised, because every act is in its proper power. Now the divine essence is a higher form than any created intellect. Therefore, in order that the divine essence become the intelligible species to a created intellect, which is requisite in order that the divine substance be seen, the created intellect needs to be raised for that purpose by some sublime disposition. Amplius. Si aliqua duo prius fuerint non unita et postmodum uniantur, oportet quod hoc fiat per mutationem utriusque, vel alterius tantum. Si autem ponatur quod intellectus aliquis creatus de novo incipiat Dei substantiam videre, oportet, secundum praemissa, quod divina essentia copuletur ei de novo ut intelligibilis species. Impossibile est autem quod divina essentia moveatur, sicut supra ostensum est. Oportet igitur quod talis unio incipiat esse per mutationem intellectus creati. Quae quidem mutatio aliter esse non potest nisi per hoc quod intellectus creatus aliquam dispositionem de novo acquirat. Besides. If two things from not being united become united, this must be either through both being changed, or one only. Now if we suppose that some created intellect begin to see the divine essence, it follows from what we have said that the divine essence is united to that intellect as an intelligible species. But it is impossible that the divine essence be changed, as we have proved. Therefore, this union must begin through a change in the created intellect. And this change can only consist in the created intellect acquiring some new disposition. Idem autem sequitur si detur quod a principio suae creationis tali visione aliquis creatus intellectus potiatur. Nam si talis visio facultatem naturae creatae excedit, ut probatum est, potest intelligi quivis intellectus creatus in specie suae naturae consistere absque hoc quod Dei substantiam videat. Unde, sive a principio sive postmodum Deum videre incipiat, oportet eius naturae aliquid superaddi. The same conclusion follows if we suppose some created intellect to be endowed from the outset of its creation with such a vision. For if, as we have proved, this vision exceeds the faculty of nature, it is possible to conceive any created intellect as complete in its natural species without its seeing God’s substance. Consequently, whether it see God from the beginning, or begin to see him afterwards, its nature needs something to be added to it. Item. Nihil potest ad altiorem operationem elevari nisi per hoc quod eius virtus fortificatur. Contingit autem dupliciter alicuius virtutem fortificari. Uno modo, per simplicem intensionem ipsius virtutis: sicut virtus activa calidi augetur per intensionem caloris, ut possit efficere vehementiorem actionem in eadem specie. Alio modo, per novae formae appositionem: sicut diaphani virtus augetur ad hoc quod possit illuminare, per hoc quod fit lucidum actu per formam lucis receptam in ipso de novo. Et hoc quidem virtutis augmentum requiritur ad alterius speciei operationem consequendam. Virtus autem intellectus creati naturalis non sufficit ad divinam substantiam videndam, ut ex dictis patet. Oportet ergo quod augeatur ei virtus, ad hoc quod ad talem visionem perveniat. Non sufficit autem augmentum per intensionem naturalis virtutis: quia talis visio non est eiusdem rationis cum visione naturali intellectus creati; quod ex distantia visorum patet. Oportet igitur quod fiat augmentum virtutis intellectivae per alicuius novae dispositionis adeptionem. Further. Nothing can be raised to a higher operation except through its power being strengthened. Now a power may be increased in two ways. First, by a mere intensifying of the power: thus the active power of a hot subject is increased by the intensity of the heat, so that it is capable of a more vehement action in the same species. Second, by the addition of a new form: thus the power of a diaphanous body is increased so that it can give light through its being made actually lightsome by receiving the form of light anew. This increase of power is necessary in order that there result an operation of another species. Now the natural power of the created intellect is not sufficient for the vision of the divine substance, as we have shown. Therefore, its power needs to be increased, in order that it attain to that vision. But increase through intensification of the natural power is insufficient because that vision is not of the same kind as the natural vision of the created intellect, which is clear from the distance of the things seen. Therefore, there must be an increase of the intellective power through its receiving a new disposition. Quia vero in cognitionem intelligibilium ex sensibilibus pervenimus, etiam sensibilis cognitionis nomina ad intelligibilem cognitionem transumimus: et praecipue quae pertinent ad visum, qui inter ceteros sensus nobilior est et spiritualior, ac per hoc intellectui affinior; et inde est quod ipsa intellectualis cognitio visio nominatur. Et quia corporalis visio non completur nisi per lucem, ea quibus intellectualis visio perficitur, lucis nomen assumunt: unde et Aristoteles, in III de anima, intellectum agentem luci assimilat, ex eo quod intellectus agens facit intelligibilia in actu, sicut lux facit quodammodo visibilia actu. Illa igitur dispositio qua intellectus creatus ad intellectualem divinae substantiae visionem extollitur, congrue lux gloriae dicitur: non propter hoc quod faciat intelligibile in actu, sicut lux intellectus agentis; sed per hoc quod facit intellectum potentem actu intelligere. Now, owing to the fact that we derive our knowledge of intelligible beings from sensible things, we transfer the terms employed in sensual knowledge to our intellectual knowledge—especially those that appertain to the sight, which of all the senses is the highest and most spiritual, and therefore most akin to the intellect. And for this reason intellectual knowledge is called sight. And because bodily sight is not effected without light, those things which serve for the perfection of intellectual vision are called light: therefore, Aristotle compares the active intellect to light because the active intellect makes things actually intelligible, even as light somewhat makes things to be actually visible. Accordingly, the disposition whereby the created intellect is raised to the intellectual vision of the divine substance is rightly called the light of glory: not that it makes the object actually intelligible, as the light of the active intellect does, but because it makes the intellect able actually to understand. Hoc autem est lumen de quo in Psalmo dicitur: in lumine tuo videbimus lumen, scilicet divinae substantiae. Et Apoc. 22 dicitur: civitas, scilicet beatorum, non eget sole neque luna: nam claritas Dei illuminavit illam. Et Isaiae 60 dicitur: non erit tibi amplius sol ad lucendum per diem, nec splendor lunae illuminabit te: sed erit tibi dominus in lucem sempiternam, et Deus tuus in gloriam tuam. Inde est etiam, quia Deo idem esse est quod intelligere, et est omnibus causa intelligendi, quod dicitur esse lux, Ioan. 1:9: erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum; et I Ioan. 1:5: Deus lux est; et in Psalmo: amictus lumine sicut vestimento. Et propter hoc etiam tam Deus quam angeli in sacra Scriptura in figuris igneis describuntur, propter ignis claritatem. This is the light of which it is said: In your light we will see light (Ps 36:9[35:10]), namely, the light of the divine substance. Again it is said: The city, namely of the blessed, has no need of sun or moon to shine upon it, for the glory of God is its light (Rev 22:5). Again it is said: The sun shall be no more your light by day, nor for brightness shall the moon give light to you by night; but the Lord will be your everlasting light, and your God will be your glory (Isa 60:19). For this reason too, since in God to be is the same as to understand, and because he is to all the cause of their understanding, he is said to be the light: The true light that enlightens every man was coming into the world (John 1:9); and: God is light (1 John 1:5); and: You cover yourself with light as with a garment (Ps 104[103]:2). For this reason too, both God and the angels are described in Sacred Scripture in figures of fire, on account of the brilliance of fire. Caput 54 Chapter 54 Rationes quibus videtur probari quod Deus non possit videri per essentiam, et solutiones earum Arguments that would seem to prove that God cannot be seen in his essence, and their solution Obiiciet autem aliquis contra praedicta. Someone will object against the foregoing. Nullum enim lumen adveniens visui potest visum elevare ad videndum ea quae naturalem facultatem visus corporalis excedunt: non enim potest visus videre nisi colorata. Divina autem substantia excedit omnem intellectus creati capacitatem, etiam magis quam intellectus excedat capacitatem sensus. Nullo igitur lumine superveniente intellectus creatus elevari poterit ad divinam substantiam videndam. No additional light can help the sight to see things that surpass the natural faculty of corporeal sight, since the sight can see only colored objects. Now the divine substance surpasses the whole faculty of a created intellect, more even than intelligence surpasses the senses’ capacity. Therefore, no additional light can raise the created intellect to see the divine substance. Praeterea. Lumen illud quod in intellectu creato recipitur, creatum aliquid est. Et ipsum ergo in infinitum a Deo distat. Non potest igitur per huiusmodi lumen intellectus creatus ad divinae substantiae visionem elevari. Again. This light that is received into the created intellect is something created. Therefore, it also is infinitely distant from God: consequently, such a light cannot help the created intellect to see the divine substance. Item. Si hoc quidem potest facere lumen praedictum propter hoc quod est divinae substantiae similitudo, cum omnis intellectualis substantia, ex hoc ipso quod intellectualis est, divinam similitudinem gerat ipsa natura cuiuslibet intellectualis substantiae ad visionem divinam sufficiet. Besides. If the aforesaid light can do this for the reason that it is an image of the divine substance (since every intellectual substance, for the very reason that it is intellectual, bears a likeness to God), the nature itself of an intellectual substance will suffice for it to see God. Adhuc. Si lumen illud creatum est; nihil autem prohibet quod est creatum alicui rei creatae connaturale esse; poterit aliquis intellectus creatus esse qui suo connaturali lumine divinam substantiam videbit. Cuius contrarium ostensum est. Further. If this light is created, since there is no reason why that which is created should not be connatural to some creature, there might possibly be a creature that would see the divine substance through its connatural light. But the contrary of this has been proved.