Caput 6 Chapter 6 Solutio ipsarum rationum Answers to these arguments Ut autem positarum rationum solutio manifestior fiat, considerandum est quod malum considerari potest vel in substantia aliqua, vel in actione ipsius. Malum quidem in substantia aliqua est ex eo quod deficit ei aliquid quod natum est et debet habere: si enim homo non habet alas, non est ei malum, quia non est natus eas habere; si etiam homo capillos flavos non habet, non est malum, quia etsi natus sit habere, non tamen est debitum ut habeat; est tamen malum si non habeat manus, quas natus est et debet habere, si sit perfectus, quod tamen non est malum avi. Omnis autem privatio, si proprie et stricte accipiatur, est eius quod quis natus est habere et debet habere. In privatione igitur sic accepta semper est ratio mali. In order that the solution of the arguments here give may be made clear, we must observe that evil may be considered either as in a substance, or as in its action. Evil is in a substance through its lacking something natural and due to it, for it is not evil that a man does not have wings, because it is not natural for him to have them; and again if a man does not have blond hair, this is no evil, for although he may have it naturally, it is not due to him. But it is an evil if he has no hands, which are natural and due to him if he is perfect, and yet it is not an evil to a bird. Now every privation, if we take it properly and strictly, is the lack of something natural and due. Consequently, the aspect of evil is always understood thus in a privation. Materia autem, cum sit potentia ad omnes formas, omnes quidem nata est habere, nulla tamen est ei debita: cum sine quavis una earum possit esse perfecta in actu. Quaelibet tamen earum est debita alicui eorum quae ex materia constituuntur: nam non potest esse aqua nisi habeat formam aquae, nec potest esse ignis nisi habeat formam ignis. Privatio igitur formae huiusmodi, comparata ad materiam, non est malum materiae: sed comparata ad id cuius est forma, est malum eius, sicut privatio formae ignis est malum ignis. Matter, since it is in potency to all forms, is adapted to all of them by nature, yet no one is due to it, since it can be actually perfect without any particular one. Nevertheless, some one of them is due to one of those things that are made of matter: for there can be no water without the form of water, nor can there be fire without the form of fire. Accordingly, the privation of such a form in relation to matter is not an evil to matter, but in relation to that thing of which it is the form, it is its evil. Thus the privation of the form of fire is an evil of fire. Et quia tam privationes quam habitus et formae non dicuntur esse nisi secundum quod sunt in subiecto, si quidem privatio sit malum per comparationem ad subiectum in quo est, erit malum simpliciter: sin autem, erit malum alicuius, et non simpliciter. Hominem igitur privari manu, est malum simpliciter: materia autem privari forma aeris, non est malum simpliciter, sed est malum aeris. And since privations as well as habits and forms are not said to exist except insofar as they are in a subject, if privation be an evil in relation to the subject in which it is, it will be an evil simply; otherwise, it will be the evil of something but not simply. Hence that a man be deprived of a hand is an evil simply, but that matter be deprived of the form of air is not an evil simply, but an evil of the air. Privatio autem ordinis aut commensurationis debitae in actione, est malum actionis. Et quia cuilibet actioni est debitus aliquis ordo et aliqua commensuratio, necesse est ut talis privatio in actione simpliciter malum existat. On the other hand, privation of order or due proportion in an action is an evil of the action. And since to every action order and proportion are due, such a privation in an action must be an evil simply. His igitur visis, sciendum est quod non omne quod est praeter intentionem, oportet esse fortuitum vel casuale, ut prima ratio proponebat. Si enim quod est praeter intentionem, sit consequens ad id quod est intentum vel semper vel frequenter, non eveniet fortuito vel casualiter: sicut in eo qui intendit dulcedine vini frui, si ex potatione vini sequatur ebrietas, non erit fortuitum nec casuale; esset autem casuale si sequeretur ut in paucioribus. Accordingly, taking these remarks into account, we must note that what is unintentional is not always fortuitous or casual, as the first argument stated. For if that which is unintentional be always or frequently the result of that which was intended, it will not happen fortuitously or casually. Thus if a man intends to enjoy the sweetness of wine, and becomes drunk through drinking, this will be neither fortuitous nor casual; it would be casual if such a result were to occur only in few. Malum ergo corruptionis naturalis, etsi sequatur praeter intentionem generantis, consequitur tamen semper: nam semper formae unius est adiuncta privatio alterius. Unde corruptio non evenit casualiter neque ut in paucioribus: licet privatio quandoque non sit malum simpliciter, sed alicuius, ut dictum est. Si autem sit talis privatio quae privet id quod est debitum generato, erit casuale et simpliciter malum, sicut cum nascuntur partus monstruosi: hoc enim non consequitur de necessitate ad id quod est intentum, sed est ei repugnans; cum agens intendat perfectionem generati. Therefore, the evil of natural corruption, although it ensue beside the intention of the generator, nevertheless always follows, since the presence of one form is always accompanied by the privation of another. Therefore, corruption does not ensue casually, nor even seldom, although sometimes privation is not an evil simply, but the evil of some particular thing, as stated above. If, however, the privation be such as to deprive the thing generated of that which is due to it, it will be casual and an evil simply, as in the birth of monstrosities: for this does not follow of necessity from that which was intended, but is opposed to it, since the agent intends the perfection of the thing generated. Malum autem actionis accidit in naturalibus agentibus ex defectu virtutis activae. Unde si agens habet virtutem defectivam, hoc malum consequitur praeter intentionem, sed non erit casuale, quia de necessitate est consequens ad talem agentem: si tamen tale agens vel semper vel frequenter patitur hunc virtutis defectum. Erit autem casuale si hic defectus raro talem comitatur agentem. Evil of action occurs in natural agents through a defect in the active force. Hence if the agent’s force be defective, this evil ensues beside the intention; yet it will not be casual, because it follows of necessity from such an agent (provided always that the agent in question always or frequently suffer this defect). But it will be casual if this defect seldom accompanies this agent. In agentibus autem voluntariis intentio est ad bonum aliquod particulare, si debet sequi actio: nam universalia non movent, sed particularia, in quibus est actus. Si igitur illud bonum quod intenditur, habeat coniunctam privationem boni secundum rationem vel semper vel frequenter, sequitur malum morale non casualiter, sed vel semper vel frequenter: sicut patet in eo qui vult uti femina propter delectationem, cui delectationi adiuncta est inordinatio adulterii; unde malum adulterii non sequitur casualiter. Esset autem casuale malum si ad id quod intendit, sequeretur aliquod peccatum ut in paucioribus: sicut cum quis, proiiciens ad avem, interficit hominem. In voluntary agents the intention is directed to some particular good, if the action is to follow: for movement is not caused by universals but by particulars, in which are actions. Accordingly, if the good that is intended is accompanied always or frequently by the privation of a rational good, moral evil ensues not casually, but either always or frequently, as in the case of a man who desires intercourse with a woman for the sake of pleasure, to which pleasure is connected the inordination of adultery; hence the evil of adultery is not a casual sequel. It would, however, be a casual evil, if sin were to ensue seldom from what he intends, as in one who, while firing at a bird, kills a man. Quod autem huiusmodi bona aliquis intendat ut in pluribus quibus privationes boni secundum rationem consequuntur, ex hoc provenit quod plures vivunt secundum sensum, eo quod sensibilia sunt nobis manifesta, et magis efficaciter moventia in particularibus, in quibus est operatio: ad plura autem talium bonorum sequitur privatio boni secundum rationem. That anyone should intend such goods which frequently result in privation of a rational good is due to the fact that many live a sensuous life, because sensible things are the more manifest to us, and move more efficaciously in a world of individual things among which operation takes place. Privation of the rational good ensues from many goods of that kind. Ex quo patet quod, licet malum praeter intentionem sit, est tamen voluntarium, ut secunda ratio proponit, licet non per se, sed per accidens. Intentio enim est ultimi finis, quem quis propter se vult: voluntas autem est eius etiam quod quis vult propter aliud, etiam si simpliciter non vellet; sicut qui proiicit merces in mari causa salutis, non intendit proiectionem mercium, sed salutem, proiectionem autem vult non simpliciter, sed causa salutis. Similiter propter aliquod bonum sensibile consequendum aliquis vult facere inordinatam actionem, non intendens inordinationem, neque volens eam simpliciter, sed propter hoc. Et ideo hoc modo malitia et peccatum dicuntur esse voluntaria, sicut proiectio mercium in mari. Hence it follows that, although evil is beside the intention, it is nevertheless voluntary, as the second argument states—accidentally, however, and not essentially. For intention is directed to the last end, which we will for its own sake, while the will is directed also to that which we will for the sake of something else, even though we would not will it simply. For instance, the man who throws his cargo overboard for the sake of safety does not intend the throwing of his cargo, but safety, and he wills the throwing of the cargo not simply, but for the sake of safety. In like manner, for the sake of obtaining a sensible good a man wills to perform an inordinate action, neither intending the inordinateness nor willing it simply, but for the sake of something in particular. Therefore, sin and vice are said to be voluntary in the same way as the throwing of a ship’s cargo into the sea. Eodem autem modo patet solutio ad tertiam obiectionem. Nunquam enim invenitur mutatio corruptionis sine mutatione generationis: et per consequens nec finis corruptionis sine fine generationis. Natura ergo non intendit finem corruptionis seorsum a fine generationis, sed simul utrumque. Non enim est de intentione naturae absoluta quod non sit aqua, sed quod sit aer, quo existente non est aqua. Hoc ergo quod est esse aerem, intendit natura secundum se: quod vero est non esse aquam, non intendit nisi inquantum est coniunctum ei quod est esse aerem. Sic igitur privationes a natura non sunt secundum se intentae, sed secundum accidens: formae vero secundum se. The third objection is solved on the same lines. For the change of corruption is never found without the change of generation: consequently, neither is the end of corruption found without the end of generation. Hence nature does not intend the end of corruption apart from the end of generation, but both at the same time. For it is not the absolute intention of nature that there be no water, but that there be air, the existence of which precludes the existence of air. Accordingly, nature intends directly that there should be air; but it does not intend that there should not be water except insofar as this is involved by the existence of air. Therefore, privations are not intended by nature directly, but accidentally, whereas forms are intended directly. Patet ergo ex praemissis quod illud quod est simpliciter malum, omnino est praeter intentionem in operibus naturae, sicut partus monstruosi: quod vero non est simpliciter, sed alicui malum, non est intentum a natura secundum se, sed secundum accidens. From the foregoing it is clear that what is evil simply is utterly beside the intention in the operations of nature (for example, the birth of monstrosities), but what is evil not simply, but relatively is intended by nature not directly, but accidentally. Caput 7 Chapter 7 Quod malum non est aliqua essentia That evil is not an essence Ex his autem apparet quod nulla essentia est secundum se mala. From this it follows that no essence is evil in itself. Malum enim, ut dictum est, nihil est aliud quam privatio eius quod quis natus est et debet habere: sic enim apud omnes est usus huius nominis malum. Privatio autem non est aliqua essentia, sed est negatio in substantia. Malum igitur non est aliqua essentia in rebus. For evil, as we have said, is nothing else but the privation of what is connatural and due to anyone, for the word ‘evil’ is used in this sense by all. Now privation is not an essence, but is the nonexistence of something in a substance. Therefore, evil is not a real essence. Adhuc. Unumquodque secundum suam essentiam habet esse. Inquantum autem habet esse, habet aliquid boni: nam, si bonum est quod omnia appetunt, oportet ipsum esse bonum dicere, cum omnia esse appetant. Secundum hoc igitur unumquodque bonum est quod essentiam habet. Bonum autem et malum opponuntur. Nihil igitur est malum secundum quod essentiam habet. Nulla igitur essentia mala est. Again. A thing has being in respect of its essence. Now insofar as it has being, it has a share of good: for if good is what all desire, being itself must be called a good, since all things desire being. Therefore, a thing is good insofar as it has an essence. But good and evil are opposed to each other. Therefore, nothing is evil insofar as it has an essence. Therefore, no essence is evil. Amplius. Omnis res vel est agens, vel est facta. Malum autem non potest esse agens: quia quicquid agit, agit inquantum est actu existens et perfectum. Et similiter non potest esse factum: nam cuiuslibet generationis terminus est forma et bonum. Nulla igitur res secundum suam essentiam est mala. Moreover. Every thing is either an agent or something made. But evil cannot be an agent, for that which acts, acts inasmuch as it is actually existing and perfect. In like manner, neither can it be something made, since the term of every generation is a form and a good. Therefore, nothing is evil as to its essence. Item. Nihil tendit ad suum contrarium: unumquodque enim appetit quod est sibi simile et conveniens. Omne autem ens agendo intendit bonum, ut ostensum est. Nullum igitur ens, inquantum huiusmodi, est malum. Again. Nothing tends to its contrary, for everything desires what is like and becoming to it. Now everything intends a good by acting, as we proved above. Therefore, no being, as such, is evil. Adhuc. Omnis essentia est alicui rei naturalis. Si enim est in genere substantiae, est ipsa natura rei. Si vero sit in genere accidentis, oportet quod ex principiis alicuius substantiae causetur, et sic illi substantiae erit naturalis: licet forte alteri substantiae non sit naturalis, sicut caliditas est naturalis igni, licet sit innaturalis aquae. Quod autem est secundum se malum, non potest esse alicui naturale. De ratione enim mali est privatio eius quod est alicui natum inesse et debitum ei. Malum igitur, cum sit eius quod est naturale privatio, non potest esse alicui naturale. Unde et quicquid naturaliter inest alicui, est ei bonum, et malum si ei desit. Nulla igitur essentia est secundum se mala. Further. Every essence is natural to some thing. For if it be in the genus of substance, it is the very nature of that thing. And if it be in the genus of accident, it must flow from the principles of some substance, and thus will be natural to that substance, although perhaps it may not be natural to some other substance. Thus heat is natural to fire, although it is not natural to water. Now that which is evil in itself cannot be natural to a thing. For it belongs to the very nature of evil to be the privation of that which is connatural and due to a thing. Therefore, evil, since it is the privation of what is natural, cannot be natural to a thing. Hence whatever is in a thing naturally is good for that thing, and it is an evil if it be lacking. Therefore, no essence is evil in itself. Amplius. Quicquid habet essentiam aliquam, aut ipsummet est forma, aut habet formam aliquam: per formam enim collocatur unumquodque in genere vel specie. Forma autem, inquantum huiusmodi, habet rationem bonitatis: cum sit principium actionis; et finis quem intendit omne faciens; et actus quo unumquodque habens formam perfectum est. Quicquid igitur habet essentiam aliquam, inquantum huiusmodi, est bonum. Malum igitur non habet essentiam aliquam. Moreover. Whatever has an essence is either itself a form, or has a form, since it is by the form that each thing is placed in a genus or species. Now a form, as such, has the ratio of goodness: for it is the principle of action, and the end which every maker intends, and the act by which whatever has a form is perfect. Therefore, whatever has an essence, as such, is good. Therefore, evil has not an essence. Item. Ens per actum et potentiam dividitur. Actus autem, inquantum huiusmodi, bonum est: quia secundum quod aliquid est actu, secundum hoc est perfectum. Potentia etiam bonum aliquid est: tendit enim potentia ad actum, ut in quolibet motu apparet; et est etiam actui proportionata, non ei contraria; et est in eodem genere cum actu; et privatio non competit ei nisi per accidens. Omne igitur quod est, quocumque modo sit, inquantum est ens, bonum est. Malum igitur non habet aliquam essentiam. Further. Being is divided into act and potency. Now act, as such, is a good, because a thing is perfect insofar as it is in act. Again, potency is a good, for potency tends to act, as clearly may be seen in every kind of movement. Also, it is proportionate to act, and not contrary to it. Moreover, it is in the same genus as act. Also, privation does not apply to it save accidentally. Therefore, everything that is, in whatever way it is, is good insofar as it is a being. Therefore, evil has not an essence. Amplius. Probatum est in secundo huius, quod omne esse, quocumque modo sit, est a Deo. Deum autem esse perfectam bonitatem, in primo ostendimus. Cum igitur boni effectus malum esse non possit, impossibile est aliquod ens, inquantum est ens, esse malum. Again. It has been proved in the second book of this work that every being, in whatever way it is, is from God: and we have shown in the first book that God is perfect goodness. Since, then, evil cannot be the effect of good, it is impossible for a being, as such, to be evil. Hinc est quod Gen. 1:31 dicitur: vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona; et Eccle. 3:11: cuncta fecit bona in tempore suo; et I Tim. 4:4: omnis creatura Dei bona. Hence it is that it is said: God saw everything that he had made, and it was very good (Gen 1:31); and: He has made everything good in their time (Eccl 3:11); and: Everything created by God is good (1 Tim 4:4). Et Dionysius, cap. IV de Div. Nom., dicit quod malum non est existens, scilicet per se, nec aliquid in existentibus, quasi accidens, sicut albedo vel nigredo. Again, Dionysius says that evil is not a thing that exists, that is, in itself, nor is it something in things that exist, as an accident, like whiteness or blackness. Per hoc autem excluditur error Manichaeorum, ponentium aliquas res secundum suas naturas esse malas. By this is refuted the error of the Manicheans who held that there are certain things evil by their very nature. Caput 8 Chapter 8 Rationes quibus videtur probari quod malum sit natura vel res aliqua Arguments whereby it seems to be proved that evil is a nature or a thing Videtur autem quibusdam rationibus praedictae sententiae posse obviari. It would seem that certain arguments militate against the aforesaid statement. Ex propria enim differentia specifica unumquodque speciem sortitur. Malum autem est differentia specifica in aliquibus generibus, scilicet in habitibus et actibus moralibus: sicut enim virtus secundum suam speciem est bonus habitus, ita contrarium vitium est malus habitus secundum suam speciem; et similiter de actibus virtutum et vitiorum. Malum igitur est dans speciem aliquibus rebus. Est igitur aliqua essentia, et aliquibus rebus naturalis. For each thing derives its species from its proper difference. Now evil is a specific difference in certain genera (namely, in moral habits and acts), because as virtue is a good habit according to its species, so the contrary vice is an evil habit according to its species, and the same applies to virtuous and vicious acts. Therefore, evil gives certain things their species. Therefore, it is an essence, and is natural to certain things. Praeterea. Utrumque contrariorum est natura quaedam: si enim nihil poneret, alterum contrariorum esset privatio vel negatio pura. Sed bonum et malum dicuntur esse contraria. Malum igitur est natura aliqua. Further. Each of two contraries is a nature: for if it predicated nothing, one of the contraries would be a pure privation or negation. But good and evil are stated to be contraries. Therefore, evil is a nature. Item. Bonum et malum dicuntur esse genera contrariorum ab Aristotele, in praedicamentis. Cuiuslibet autem generis est essentia et natura aliqua: nam non entis non sunt species neque differentiae, et ita quod non est, non potest esse genus. Malum igitur est aliqua essentia et natura. Again. Aristotle in his Predicaments says that good and evil are the genera of contraries. Now every genus has an essence or nature: for there are no species or differences of non-being, so that what is not cannot be a genus. Therefore, evil is an essence and a nature. Adhuc. Omne quod agit, est res aliqua. Malum autem agit inquantum malum: repugnat enim bono et corrumpit ipsum. Malum igitur, inquantum malum, est res aliqua. Also. Whatever is active is a thing. Now evil as such is active: for it counteracts and corrupts good. Therefore, evil as such is a thing. Amplius. In quibuscumque invenitur magis et minus, oportet quod sint res aliquae habentes ordinem: negationes enim et privationes non suscipiunt magis et minus. Invenitur autem inter mala unum altero peius. Oportet igitur, ut videtur, quod malum sit res aliqua. Moreover. Whatever can be more or less must be a thing admitting of degrees, since negations and privations do not admit of being more or less. Now among evils we find one to be worse than another. Therefore, it seems that evil must be a thing.