Caput 64 Chapter 64 Quod Deus sua providentia gubernat res That God governs things by his providence Ex his autem quae praemissa sunt, sufficienter habetur quod Deus est rerum omnium finis. Ex quo haberi potest ulterius quod ipse sua providentia gubernet vel regat universa. From what has been laid down in the preceding chapters, it has been sufficiently proved that God is the end of all, from which we may further conclude that by his providence he governs or rules all. Quandocumque enim aliqua ordinantur ad aliquem finem, omnia dispositioni illius subiacent ad quem principaliter pertinet ille finis, sicut in exercitu apparet: omnes enim partes exercitus, et eorum opera, ordinantur ad bonum ducis, quod est victoria, sicut in ultimum finem; et propter hoc ad ducem pertinet totum exercitum gubernare. Similiter ars quae est de fine, imperat et dat leges arti quae est de his quae sunt ad finem: ut civilis militari, et militaris equestri, et ars gubernatoria navifactivae. Cum igitur omnia ordinentur ad bonitatem divinam sicut in finem, ut ostensum est, oportet quod Deus, ad quem principaliter illa bonitas pertinet, sicut substantialiter habita et intellecta et amata, sit gubernator omnium rerum. For whenever certain things are ordered to a certain end, they are all subject to the disposal of the one to whom chiefly that end belongs. This may be seen in an army, since all the parts of the army, and their actions, are directed to the good of the general (namely, victory) as their ultimate end: for which reason the government of the whole army belongs to the general. In the same way, that art which is concerned with the end dictates and gives laws to the art which is concerned with things directed to the end, as civics controls the military art, and this directs the art of horsemanship; and the art of sailing directs the art of ship-building. Since, then, all things are directed to the divine goodness as their last end, as we have shown above, it follows that God—to whom that goodness belongs chiefly as essentially possessed, understood, and loved—must be the governor of all. Adhuc. Quicumque facit aliquid propter finem, utitur illo ad finem. Ostensum autem est supra quod omnia quae habent esse quocumque modo, sunt effectus Dei; et quod Deus omnia facit propter finem qui est ipse. Ipse igitur utitur omnibus dirigendo ea in finem. Hoc autem est gubernare. Est igitur Deus per suam providentiam omnium gubernator. Again. Whoever makes a thing for the sake of an end makes use of it for that end. Now it has been shown above that whatsoever has being in any way is an effect of God: and that God makes all things for an end which is himself. Therefore, he uses everything by directing it to its end. But this is to govern. Therefore, God, by his providence, is the governor of all. Amplius. Ostensum est quod Deus est primum movens non motum. Primum autem movens non minus movet quam secunda moventia, sed magis: quia sine eo non movent alia. Omnia autem quae moventur, moventur propter finem, ut supra ostensum est. Movet igitur Deus omnia ad fines suos. Et per intellectum: ostensum enim est supra quod non agit per necessitatem naturae, sed per intellectum et voluntatem. Nihil est autem aliud regere et gubernare per providentiam quam movere per intellectum aliqua ad finem. Deus igitur per suam providentiam gubernat et regit omnia quae moventur in finem: sive moveantur corporaliter; sive spiritualiter, sicut desiderans dicitur moveri a desiderato. Besides. It has been shown that God is the first unmoved mover. Now the first mover moves no less than second movers; more so indeed, because without him they do not move other things. But all things that are moved, are moved for an end, as was shown above. Therefore, God moves each thing to its end. Moreover, he moves them by his intellect: for it has been proved above that he moves not by natural necessity, but by intellect and will. Now to rule and govern by providence is nothing else but to move certain things to their end by one’s intellect. Therefore, God by his providence governs and rules all things that are moved to their end, whether they be moved corporally or spiritually (as the seeker is said to be moved by the object desired). Item. Probatum est quod corpora naturalia moventur et operantur propter finem, licet finem non cognoscant, ex hoc quod semper vel frequentius accidit in eis quod melius est; et non aliter fierent si fierent per artem. Impossibile est autem quod aliqua non cognoscentia finem operentur propter finem et ordinate perveniant in ipsum nisi sint mota ab aliquo habente cognitionem finis: sicut sagitta dirigitur ad signum a sagittante. Oportet ergo quod tota operatio naturae ab aliqua cognitione ordinetur. Et hoc quidem vel mediate vel immediate oportet reducere in Deum: oportet enim quod omnis inferior ars et cognitio a superiori principia accipiat, sicut etiam in scientiis speculativis et operativis apparet. Deus igitur sua providentia mundum gubernat. Moreover. It was proved that natural bodies are moved and work towards an end, although they have no knowledge of an end, from the fact that always or nearly always that which is best happens to them: nor would they be made otherwise if they were made by art. Now it is impossible that things without knowledge of an end should act for an end, and attain to that end in an orderly manner, unless they be moved to that end by one who has knowledge of the end (as the arrow is directed to the mark by the archer). Therefore, the whole operation of nature must be directed by some knowledge. This must be traced back to God mediately or immediately, because every subordinate art and knowledge must take its principles from a higher one, as may be seen in speculative and practical sciences. Therefore, God governs the world by his providence. Adhuc. Ea quae sunt secundum suam naturam distincta, in unum ordinem non conveniunt nisi ab uno ordinante colligantur in unum. In universitate autem rerum sunt res distinctas et contrarias naturas habentes, quae tamen omnes in unum ordinem conveniunt, dum quaedam operationes quorundam excipiunt, quaedam etiam a quibusdam iuvantur vel imperantur. Oportet igitur quod sit universorum unus ordinator et gubernator. Further. Things distinct in nature do not converge into one order unless they be brought together by one ordainer. Now the universe is composed of things distinct from one another and of contrary natures, and yet they all converge into one order: some things acting on others, some helping or directing others. Therefore, there must be one ordainer and governor of the universe. Amplius. Eorum quae circa caelestium corporum motus apparent, ratio assignari non potest ex necessitate naturae: cum quaedam eorum habeant plures motus quibusdam, et omnino difformes. Oportet igitur quod illorum motuum ordinatio sit ab aliqua providentia. Et per consequens omnium inferiorum motuum et operationum, qui per illos motus disponuntur. Moreover. Natural necessity cannot be alleged as the reason for the various phenomena to be observed in the movements of the heavenly bodies, since the movements of some are more numerous than, and wholly different from, the movements of others. Therefore, the ordering of their movements must come from some providence: consequently, so must the ordering of all those movements and operations here below, that are controlled by the former movements. Item. Quanto aliquid propinquius est causae, tanto plus participat de effectu ipsius. Unde, si aliquid tanto participatur perfectius ab aliquibus quanto alicui rei magis appropinquant, signum est quod illa res sit causa illius quod diversimode participatur: sicut, si aliqua magis sunt calida secundum quod magis appropinquant igni, signum est quod ignis sit causa caloris. Inveniuntur autem tanto aliqua perfectius ordinata esse, quanto magis sunt Deo propinqua: nam in corporibus inferioribus, quae sunt maxime a Deo distantia naturae dissimilitudine, invenitur esse defectus aliquando ab eo quod est secundum cursum naturae, sicut patet in monstruosis et aliis casualibus; quod nunquam accidit in corporibus caelestibus, quae tamen sunt aliquo modo mutabilia; quod non accidit in substantiis intellectualibus separatis. Manifestum est ergo quod Deus est causa totius ordinis rerum. Est igitur ipse per suam providentiam gubernator totius universitatis rerum. Besides. The nearer a thing is to its cause, the greater share it has in the effect. Therefore, if we observe that a thing is the more perfectly shared by certain individuals, according as these are nearer to a certain thing, this is a sign that this thing is the cause of that which is shared in various degrees. Thus, if certain things are hotter according as they are nearer fire, this shows that fire is the cause of their heat. Now we see that things are all the more perfectly ordered according as they are nearer to God; in the lower bodies, which are farthest removed from God by unlikeness of nature, we sometimes find defects from the ordinary course of nature (as in monstrosities, and other casual happenings), but this never happens in the heavenly bodies (although they are changeable in a certain degree), nor in the separate intellectual substances. Therefore, God is the cause of the entire order of things: consequently, he is the governor of the whole universe by his providence. Adhuc. Sicut supra probatum est, Deus res omnes in esse produxit, non ex necessitate naturae, sed per intellectum et voluntatem. Intellectus autem et voluntatis ipsius non potest esse alius finis ultimus nisi bonitas eius, ut scilicet eam rebus communicaret, sicut ex praemissis apparet. Res autem participant divinam bonitatem per modum similitudinis, inquantum ipsae sunt bonae. Id autem quod est maxime bonum in rebus causatis, est bonum ordinis universi, quod est maxime perfectum, ut philosophus dicit: cui etiam consonat Scriptura divina, Gen. 1, cum dicitur, vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, et erant valde bona, cum de singulis operibus dixisset simpliciter quod erant bona. Bonum igitur ordinis rerum causatarum a Deo est id quod est praecipue volitum et causatum a Deo. Nihil autem aliud est gubernare aliqua quam eis ordinem imponere. Ipse igitur Deus omnia suo intellectu et voluntate gubernat. Further. As we proved above, God brought all things into being not by natural necessity, but by his intellect and will. Now his intellect and will can have no other ultimate end but his goodness, namely, the bestowal of his goodness on things, as was shown above. And things partake of the divine goodness by way of likeness, in being good themselves. And the greatest good in things made by him is the good consisting in the order of the universe, which is most perfect, as the Philosopher says. Divine Scripture says in like manner: God saw everything that he had made, and they were very good (Gen 1:31), whereas of each single work it was said simply that they were good. Consequently, that which is chiefly willed and caused by God is the good consisting in the order of things of which he is the cause. But to govern things is nothing else but to impose order on them. Therefore, God governs all things by his intellect and will. Amplius. Unumquodque intendens aliquem finem, magis curat de eo quod est propinquius fini ultimo: quia hoc etiam est finis aliorum. Ultimus autem finis divinae voluntatis est bonitas ipsius, cui propinquissimum in rebus creatis est bonum ordinis totius universi: cum ad ipsum ordinetur, sicut ad finem, omne particulare bonum huius vel illius rei, sicut minus perfectum ordinatur ad id quod est perfectius; unde et quaelibet pars invenitur esse propter suum totum. Id igitur quod maxime curat Deus in rebus creatis, est ordo universi. Est igitur gubernator ipsius. Moreover. Whoever has an end in view cares more for what is nearest to the last end, because the other ends are directed to this. Now the last end of God’s will is his goodness, the nearest thing to which among created things is the good consisting in the order of the universe, because every particular good of this or that thing is ordained to it as its end, just as the less perfect is ordained to that which is more perfect (even as each part is for the sake of its whole). Consequently, that which God cares for most in created things is the order of the universe. Therefore, he governs it. Item. Quaelibet res creata consequitur suam ultimam perfectionem per operationem propriam: nam oportet quod ultimus finis et perfectio rei sit vel ipsa operatio, vel operationis terminus aut effectus, forma vero secundum quam res est, est perfectio prima, ut patet in II de anima. Ordo autem rerum causatarum secundum distinctionem naturarum et gradum ipsarum, procedit ex divina sapientia, sicut in secundo est ostensum. Ergo et ordo operationum, per quas res causatae magis appropinquant ad ultimum finem. Ordinare autem actiones aliquarum rerum ad finem, est gubernare ipsa. Deus igitur per suae sapientiae providentiam rebus gubernationem et regimen praestat. Again. Every created thing attains its ultimate perfection by its proper operation, because a thing’s ultimate end and perfection must be either an operation or the term or effect of an operation; and the form whereby a thing exists is its first perfection, as stated in 2 De Anima. Now the order among effects in respect of different natures and their degrees issues from divine wisdom, as we showed in the second book. Therefore, the order among the operations, whereby things approach nearer to their ultimate end, also does so in like manner. But to direct the actions of things to their end is to govern them. Therefore, God governs and rules things by the providence of his wisdom. Hinc est quod sacra Scriptura Deum dominum et regem profitetur, secundum illud Psalmi, dominus ipse est Deus, et item, rex omnis terrae Deus: regis enim et domini est suo imperio regere et gubernare subiectos. Unde et rerum cursum sacra Scriptura divino praecepto adscribit, Iob 9:7, qui praecipit soli et non oritur, et stellas claudit quasi sub signaculo; et in Psalmo, praeceptum posuit et non praeteribit. Hence Sacred Scripture acclaims God as Lord and King, according to the Psalm: The Lord is God (Ps 100[99]:3), and again: God is the king of all the earth (Ps 47[46]:7), because the king and lord is he whose office it is to rule and govern subjects. Hence Sacred Scripture ascribes the course of events to the divine control, who commands the sun, and it does not rise; who seals up the stars (Job 9:7); and in the Psalm: He set a law which cannot pass away (Ps 148:6). Per hoc autem excluditur error antiquorum naturalium, qui dicebant omnia ex necessitate materiae provenire: ex quo sequebatur omnia casu accidere, et non ex aliquo providentiae ordine. Hereby is refuted the error of some physicists of old, who held that everything happens from natural necessity, from which it followed that all things happen by chance, and not by the ordinance of providence. Caput 65 Chapter 65 Quod Deus conservat res in esse That God preserves things in existence Ex eo autem quod Deus res sua providentia regit, sequitur quod in esse conservet. From the fact that God governs things by his providence, it follows that he preserves them in existence. Ad gubernationem enim aliquorum pertinet omne illud per quod suum finem consequuntur: secundum hoc enim aliqua regi vel gubernari dicuntur, quod ordinantur in finem. In finem autem ultimum quem Deus intendit, scilicet bonitatem divinam, ordinantur res non solum per hoc quod operantur, sed etiam per hoc quod sunt: quia inquantum sunt, divinae bonitatis similitudinem gerunt, quod est finis rerum, ut supra ostensum est. Ad divinam igitur providentiam pertinet quod res conserventur in esse. For everything whereby certain things obtain their end comes under the government of those things, because things are said to be governed or ruled according as they are directed to their end. Now things are directed to the ultimate end intended by God (that is, the divine goodness) not only in that they operate, but also in the very fact that they exist, because inasmuch as they exist they bear a likeness to the divine goodness, which is the end of all things, as we have proved. Therefore, it belongs to divine providence that things be preserved in existence. Item. Oportet quod idem sit causa rei, et conservationis ipsius: nam conservatio rei non est nisi continuatio esse ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus per suum intellectum et voluntatem est causa essendi omnibus rebus. Igitur per suum intellectum et voluntatem conservat res omnes in esse. Again. The cause of a thing must be the same as the cause of its preservation, because preservation is nothing else than continued existence. Now we have shown above that God is the cause of every thing’s existence by his intellect and will. Therefore, by his intellect and will he preserves things in existence. Item. Nullum particulare agens univocum potest esse simpliciter causa speciei: sicut hic homo non potest esse causa speciei humanae; esset enim causa omnis hominis, et per consequens sui ipsius, quod est impossibile. Est autem causa hic homo huius hominis, per se loquendo. Hic autem homo est per hoc quod natura humana est in hac materia, quae est individuationis principium. Hic igitur homo non est causa hominis nisi inquantum est causa quod forma humana fiat in hac materia. Hoc autem est esse principium generationis huius hominis. Patet ergo quod nec hic homo, nec aliquod aliud agens univocum in natura, est causa nisi generationis huius vel illius rei. Oportet autem ipsius speciei humanae esse aliquam per se causam agentem: quod ipsius compositio ostendit, et ordinatio partium, quae eodem modo se habet in omnibus, nisi per accidens impediatur. Et eadem ratio est de omnibus aliis speciebus rerum naturalium. Besides. No particular univocal agent can be the cause of its species simply: thus an individual man cannot be the cause of the human species, for then he would be the cause of every man, and consequently of himself, which is impossible. But properly speaking, the individual is the cause of the individual. Now the individual man exists insofar as the human nature is in this particular matter, which is the principle of his individuality. Therefore, the human individual is not the cause of a man except in the point of his being the cause of the human form being in this particular matter: and this is to be the principle of the generation of this particular man. It is consequently evident that neither the individual man, nor any other natural univocal agent, is a cause except of the generation of an individual. Now there must be some per se active cause of the human species: as is evidenced by his composite nature, and the order of his parts, which is always the same, unless it be hindered accidentally. And the same applies to all other species of natural things. Haec autem causa est Deus, vel mediate vel immediate: ostensum enim est quod ipse est prima omnium rerum causa. Oportet ergo quod ipse hoc modo se habeat ad species rerum sicut se habet hic generans in natura ad generationem, cuius est per se causa. Generatio autem cessat, cessante operatione generantis. Ergo et omnes species rerum cessarent, cessante operatione divina. Igitur ipse per suam operationem conservat res in esse. This cause is God, either mediately or immediately: for it has been shown that he is the first cause of all. Consequently, he stands in relation to the species of things as in nature the individual generator to the generation of which he is the per se cause. But generation ceases when the generator’s action ceases. Therefore, all the species of things would cease if the divine operation were to cease. Therefore, he preserves things in existence by his operation. Adhuc. Licet alicui existenti accidat motus, tamen motus est praeter esse rei. Nullum autem corporeum est causa alicuius rei nisi inquantum movetur: quia nullum corpus agit nisi per motum, ut Aristoteles probat. Nullum igitur corpus est causa esse alicuius rei inquantum est esse, sed est causa eius quod est moveri ad esse, quod est fieri rei. Esse autem cuiuslibet rei est esse participatum: cum non sit res aliqua praeter Deum suum esse, ut supra probatum est. Et sic oportet quod ipse Deus, qui est suum esse, sit primo et per se causa omnis esse. Sic igitur se habet ad esse rerum operatio divina, sicut motio corporis moventis ad fieri et moveri rerum factarum vel motarum. Impossibile autem est quod fieri et moveri alicuius rei maneat, cessante motione moventis. Impossibile ergo est quod esse alicuius rei remaneat nisi per operationem divinam. Moreover. Although movement may accidentally belong to an existing thing, it is something additional to the thing’s being. Now nothing corporeal is the cause of any thing except insofar as it is moved; because no body acts except through movement, as Aristotle proves. Therefore, no body is the cause of a thing’s existence, as such, but it is the cause of a thing’s being moved towards existence (that is, of its becoming). Now the existence of a thing is participated existence, since no thing save God is its own existence, as we proved above. Consequently, God, who is his own being, must be first and per se the cause of all being. Accordingly, the divine operation stands in the same relation to the existence of things as the movement of a corporeal mover to the being made and the being moved of things made or moved. Now it is impossible that a thing continue to be made or to be moved if the movement of the mover cease. Therefore, a thing cannot possibly continue to exist except through the divine operation. Amplius. Sicut opus artis praesupponit opus naturae, ita opus naturae praesupponit opus Dei creantis: nam materia artificialium est a natura, naturalium vero per creationem a Deo. Artificialia autem conservantur in esse virtute naturalium: sicut domus per soliditatem lapidum. Omnia igitur naturalia non conservantur in esse nisi virtute Dei. Further. As the operation of art presupposes the operation of nature, so the operation of nature presupposes the creative operation of God, because art takes its matter from nature, and nature receives its matter from God through creation. Now the products of art are preserved in being by virtue of the products of nature (a house, for instance, by the solidity of the stones). Therefore, all natural things would not continue to exist except by the power of God. Item. Impressio agentis non remanet in effectu, cessante actione agentis, nisi vertatur in naturam effectus. Formae enim generatorum, et proprietates ipsorum, usque in finem manent in eis post generationem, quia efficiuntur eis naturales. Et similiter habitus sunt difficile mobiles, quia vertuntur in naturam: dispositiones autem et passiones, sive corporales sive animales, manent aliquantum post actionem agentis, sed non semper, quia insunt ut in via ad naturam. Quod autem pertinet ad naturam superioris generis, nullo modo manet post actionem agentis: sicut lumen non manet in diaphano, recedente illuminante. Esse autem non est natura vel essentia alicuius rei creatae, sed solius Dei, ut in primo ostensum est. Nulla igitur res remanere potest in esse, cessante operatione divina. Again. The impression of the agent does not remain in the effect after the action of the agent has ceased, unless it merges into the nature of the effect. For the forms of things generated, and their properties, remain in them to the end after generation, because they become natural to them. In like manner, the reason why habits are hard to remove is that they merge into the nature: whereas dispositions and passions, whether in the body or in the soul, remain for a time after the action of the agent, but not forever, because they are in their subject as preparing a way to nature. On the other hand, that which belongs to the nature of a higher genus in no way remains after the action of the agent: thus light does not remain in the diaphanous body after the illuminant has been removed. Now existence is not the nature or essence of any created thing, but of God alone, as was proved in the first book. Therefore, nothing could continue to exist if the divine operation were to cease. Adhuc. Circa rerum originem duplex est positio: una fidei, quod res de novo fuerint a Deo productae in esse; et positio quorundam philosophorum, quod res a Deo ab aeterno effluxerint. Secundum autem utramque positionem oportet dicere quod res conserventur in esse a Deo. Nam si res a Deo productae sunt in esse postquam non fuerant, oportet quod esse rerum divinam voluntatem consequatur, et similiter non esse: quia permisit res non esse quando voluit, et fecit res esse cum voluit. Tandiu igitur sunt quandiu eas esse vult. Sua igitur voluntas conservatrix est rerum. Further. There are two explanations of the origin of things. One is that proposed by faith, that things were first brought into being by God; the other is that of certain philosophers holding that things emanated from God from eternity. According to either explanation, it is necessary to say that things are preserved in existence by God. For if things were brought into being by God after not being, their existence as well as their nonexistence must result from the divine will, because he permitted things not to be when he so willed, and caused them to be when he so willed. Therefore, they exist so long as he wills them to exist. Therefore, his will is the preserver of things. Si autem res ab aeterno a Deo effluxerunt, non est dare tempus aut instans in quo primo a Deo effluxerint. Aut igitur nunquam a Deo productae sunt: aut semper a Deo esse earum procedit quandiu sunt. Sua igitur operatione res in esse conservat. If, on the other hand, things emanated from God from eternity, we cannot assign a time or an instant when they first emanated from God. Either, therefore, they were never produced by God, or their existence is always emanating from God, as long as they exist. Therefore, he preserves things in existence by his operation. Hinc est quod dicitur Hebr. 1:3: portans omnia verbo virtutis suae. Et Augustinus dicit, IV super Gen. ad Litt.: creatoris potentia, et omnipotentis atque omnitenentis virtus, causa est subsistendi omnis creaturae. Quae virtus ab eis quae creata sunt regendis si aliquando cessaret, simul et eorum cessaret species, omnisque natura concideret. Neque enim sicut structuram aedium cum fabricaverit quis, abscedit atque, illo cessante atque abscedente, stat opus eius, ita mundus vel in ictu oculi stare poterit, si ei regimen Deus subtraxerit. Hence it is said: upholding the universe by his word of power (Heb 1:3). Augustine also says: The potency of the Creator, and the power of the Almighty and the upholder of all, is the cause of every creature’s subsistence. If this ruling power were withdrawn from his creatures, their form would cease at once, and all nature would collapse. When a man is building a house, and goes away, the building remains after he has ceased to work and has gone: but the world would not stand for a single instant, if God withdrew his support. Per hoc autem excluditur quorundam loquentium in lege Maurorum positio, qui, ad hoc quod sustinere possent mundum Dei conservatione indigere, posuerunt omnes formas esse accidentia, et quod nullum accidens durat per duo instantia, ut sic semper rerum formatio esset in fieri: quasi res non indigeret causa agente nisi dum est in fieri. Unde et aliqui eorum ponere dicuntur quod corpora indivisibilia, ex quibus omnes substantias dicunt esse compositas, quae sola, secundum eos, firmitatem habent, possunt ad horam aliquam remanere, si Deus suam gubernationem rebus subtraheret. Quorum etiam quidam dicunt quod res esse non desineret nisi Deus in ipsa accidens desitionis causaret. Quae omnia patet esse absurda. Hereby is refuted the statement of certain authorities quoted in the law of the Moors, who, in order to be able to maintain that the world needs to be preserved by God, held that all forms are accidents, and that no accident lasts for two instants, so that things would always be in the process of formation: as though a thing did not need an active cause except while being made. Therefore, some of them are stated to have maintained that the indivisible bodies of which, they say, all substances are composed, and which alone have any permanency (according to them), would be able for a time to remain in existence if God were to withdraw his government from things. Some of these say indeed that things would not cease to exist unless God caused in them the accident of ceasing-to-be. All of which is plainly absurd. Caput 66 Chapter 66 Quod nihil dat esse nisi inquantum agit in virtute divina That nothing gives existence except insofar as it acts by God’s power Ex hoc autem manifestum est quod omnia inferiora agentia non dant esse nisi inquantum agunt in virtute divina. It is evident from what has gone before that all inferior agents do not give existence except insofar as they act by God’s power. Nihil enim dat esse nisi inquantum est ens actu. Deus autem conservat res in esse per suam providentiam, ut ostensum est. Ex virtute igitur divina est quod aliquid det esse. Nothing gives existence except insofar as it is a being in act. Now God preserves things in existence by his providence, as we have proved. Therefore, it is by God’s power that a thing causes existence. Amplius. Quando aliqua agentia diversa sub uno agente ordinantur, necesse est quod effectus qui ab eis communiter fit, sit eorum secundum quod uniuntur in participando motum et virtutem illius agentis: non enim plura faciunt unum nisi inquantum unum sunt; sicut patet quod omnes qui sunt in exercitu operantur ad victoriam causandam, quam causant secundum quod sunt sub ordinatione ducis, cuius proprius effectus victoria est. Ostensum est autem in primo quod primum agens est Deus. Cum igitur esse sit communis effectus omnium agentium, nam omne agens facit esse actu; oportet quod hunc effectum producunt inquantum ordinantur sub primo agente, et agunt in virtute ipsius. Again. When several different agents are subordinate to one agent, the effect that proceeds from them in common must be ascribed to them insofar as they are united together in partaking of the movement and power of that agent: for many things do not make one, except insofar as they are one. Thus it is clear that all the men in an army work in order to effect a victory, and this effect they bring about insofar as they are subordinate to the general, whose proper effect is the victory. Now it was shown in the first book that the first agent is God. Since, then, existence is the effect common to all agents (for every agent makes a thing to be actually), it follows that they produce this effect insofar as they are subordinate to the first agent, and act by its power. Adhuc. In omnibus causis agentibus ordinatis illud quod est ultimum in generatione et primum in intentione, est proprius effectus primi agentis: sicut forma domus, quae est proprius effectus aedificatoris, posterius provenit quam praeparatio caementi et lapidis et lignorum, quae fiunt per artifices inferiores, qui subsunt aedificatori. In omni autem actione esse in actu est principaliter intentum, et ultimum in generatione: nam, eo habito, quiescit agentis actio et motus patientis. Est igitur esse proprius effectus primi agentis, scilicet Dei: et omnia quae dant esse, hoc habent inquantum agunt in virtute Dei. Besides. In all ordered active causes, the last thing in the order of generation and the first in the intention is the proper effect of the first cause: thus the form of a house, which is the proper effect of the builder, comes into being after the preparation of cement, stones and timber, which is the work of the inferior workmen who are subject to the builder. Now in every action, actual being is the chief thing intended, and is the last thing in the order of generation, because, when it is obtained, the active principle ceases to act, and the passive principle ceases to be acted upon. Therefore, existence is the proper effect of the first agent, namely God; and whatever gives being does so insofar as it acts by the power of God. Amplius. Ultimum in bonitate et perfectione inter ea in quae potest agens secundum, est illud in quod potest ex virtute agentis primi: nam complementum virtutis agentis secundi est ex agente primo. Quod autem est in omnibus effectibus perfectissimum, est esse: quaelibet enim natura vel forma perficitur per hoc quod est actu; et comparatur ad esse in actu sicut potentia ad actum. Ipsum igitur esse est quod agentia secunda agunt in virtute agentis primi. Moreover. Among the things that can be reached by the power of a secondary agent, the limit in goodness and perfection is that which comes within its range through the power of the first agent, because the secondary agent’s power receives its complement from the first agent. Now the most perfect of all effects is being, since every nature and form is perfected through being actually, and is compared to actual being as a potency to act. Therefore, existence is what secondary agents produce by the power of the first agent.