Attendendum est autem quod ad providentiam duo requiruntur: ordinatio, et ordinis executio. Quorum primum fit per virtutem cognoscitivam: unde qui perfectioris cognitionis sunt, ordinatores aliorum dicuntur, sapientis enim est ordinare. Secundum vero fit per virtutem operativam. E contrario autem se habet in his duobus: nam tanto perfectior est ordinatio, quanto magis descendit ad minima; minimorum autem executio condecet inferiorem virtutem, effectui proportionatam. In Deo autem quantum ad utrumque summa perfectio invenitur: est enim in eo perfectissima sapientia ad ordinandum, virtus perfectissima ad operandum. Oportet ergo quod ipse omnium ordines per sapientiam suam disponat, etiam minimorum: exequatur vero minima per alias inferiores virtutes, per quas ipse operetur, sicut virtus universalis et altior per inferiorem et particularem virtutem. Conveniens est igitur quod sint inferiores agentes divinae providentiae executores. It must be observed that two things are required for providence: the order and the execution of the order. The first is the work of the cognitive power; hence those that are more perfect in knowledge are said to order others, for it belongs to the wise man to order. The second is the work of the operative power. Now these two are in inverse proportion to each other. For the ordering is the more perfect according as it extends to the smallest things, whereas the execution of the least things belongs to the lower power proportionate to the effect. In God, we find the highest perfection as to both, since in him is the most perfect wisdom in ordering, and the most perfect power for operation. Consequently, it is he who by his wisdom disposes all things, even the very least, in their order, and who executes the least or lowest things by means of other inferior powers, through which he operates as a universal and higher power through an inferior and particular power. It is fitting, therefore, that there should be inferior active powers to execute divine providence. Item. Ostensum est supra quod divina operatio non excludit operationes causarum secundarum. Ea vero quae ex operationibus causarum secundarum proveniunt, divinae providentiae subiacent: cum Deus omnia singularia ordinet per seipsum, ut ostensum est. Sunt igitur secundae causae divinae providentiae executrices. Again. It was proved above that the divine operation does not exclude the operations of secondary causes. And whatever is effected by the operations of secondary causes is subject to divine providence, since God directs all individual things by himself, as was proved above. Therefore, secondary causes execute divine providence. Adhuc. Quanto virtus alicuius agentis est fortior, tanto in magis remota suam operationem extendit: sicut ignis, quanto est maior, magis remota calefacit. Hoc autem non contingit in agente quod non agit per medium: quia quidlibet in quod agit, est sibi proximum. Cum igitur virtus divinae providentiae sit maxima, per aliqua media ad ultima suam operationem perducere debet. Besides. The stronger the power of an agent, the further does its operation extend: thus the greater the fire, the more distant things does it heat. But this is not the case with an agent that does not act through an intermediary, because everything on which it acts is close to it. Since, then, the power of divine providence is supreme, it must bring its operation to bear on the most distant things through certain intermediaries. Amplius. Ad dignitatem regentis pertinet ut habeat multos ministros, et diversos sui regiminis executores: quia tanto altius et maius ostendetur suum dominium, quanto plures in diversis gradibus ei subduntur. Nulla autem dignitas alicuius regentis est comparabilis dignitati divini regiminis. Conveniens igitur est quod per diversos gradus agentium fiat divinae providentiae executio. Further. It belongs to the dignity of a ruler to have many ministers and various executors of his rule, because the greater the number of his subordinates of various degrees, the more complete and extensive is his dominion shown to be. But no government can compare with the divine in point of dignity. Therefore, it is fitting that the execution of divine providence be committed to agents of various degrees. Praeterea. Convenientia ordinis perfectionem providentiae demonstrat: cum ordo sit proprius providentiae effectus. Ad convenientiam autem ordinis pertinet ut nihil inordinatum relinquatur. Perfectio igitur divinae providentiae requirit ut excessum aliquarum rerum supra alias ad ordinem convenientem reducat. Hoc autem fit cum ex abundantia aliquorum magis habentium, provenit aliquod bonum minus habentibus. Cum igitur perfectio universi requirat quod quaedam aliis abundantius divinam bonitatem participent, ut supra ostensum est, exigit divinae providentiae perfectio ut per ea quae plenius divinam bonitatem participant, executio divini regiminis compleatur. Moreover. Suitable order is a proof of perfect providence, for order is the proper effect of providence. Now suitable order implies that nothing be allowed to be out of order. Consequently, the perfection of divine providence requires that it should reduce the excess of certain things over others to a suitable order. And this is done by allowing those who have less to benefit from the superabundance of others. Since, then, the perfection of the universe requires that some share more abundantly in the divine goodness, as we proved above, the perfection of divine providence demands that the execution of the divine government be fulfilled by those things which have the larger share of divine goodness. Adhuc. Nobilior est ordo causarum quam effectuum: sicut et causa potior est effectu. Magis igitur in eo perfectio providentiae demonstratur. Si autem non essent aliquae causae mediae exequentes divinam providentiam non esset in rebus ordo causarum, sed effectuum tantum. Exigit igitur divinae providentiae perfectio quod sint causae mediae executrices ipsius. Again. The order of causes excels the order of effects even as the cause excels the effect: consequently, it is a greater proof of the perfection of providence. Now if there were no intermediary causes to execute divine providence, there would be no order of causes in the world, but of effects only. Therefore, the perfection of divine providence requires intermediary causes for its fulfilment. Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: benedicite domino omnes virtutes eius, ministri eius, qui facitis voluntatem eius; et alibi: ignis, grando, nix, spiritus procellarum, quae faciunt verbum eius. Hence it is written in the Psalm: Bless the Lord, all his hosts, his ministers that do his will (Ps 103[102]:21); and: Fire and hail, snow and frost, stormy wind fulfilling his command (Ps 148:8). Providentia et creaturae intellectuales Providence and intellectual creatures Caput 78 Chapter 78 Quod mediantibus creaturis intellectualibus aliae creaturae reguntur a Deo That by means of intellectual creatures other creatures are ruled by God Quia vero ad providentiam divinam pertinet ut ordo servetur in rebus; congruus autem ordo est ut a supremis ad infima proportionaliter descendatur: oportet quod divina providentia secundum quandam proportionem usque ad res ultimas perveniat. Haec autem proportio est ut, sicut supremae creaturae sunt sub Deo et gubernantur ab ipso, ita inferiores creaturae sint sub superioribus et regantur ab ipsis. Inter omnes autem creaturas sunt supremae intellectuales, sicut ex superioribus patet. Exigit igitur divinae providentiae ratio ut ceterae creaturae per creaturas rationales regantur. Since it belongs to divine providence that order be preserved in the world, and suitable order consists in a proportionate descent from the highest to the lowest, divine providence must reach the most distant things according to a certain proportion. This proportion consists in this: just as the highest creatures are subject to God and governed by him, so the lower creatures are subject to and governed by the higher. Now of all creatures the highest is the intellectual, as was proved above. Therefore, the very nature of divine providence demands that the remaining creatures be ruled by rational creatures. Amplius. Quaecumque creatura exequitur divinae providentiae ordinem, hoc habet inquantum participat aliquid de virtute primi providentis: sicut et instrumentum non movet nisi inquantum per motum participat aliquid de virtute principalis agentis. Quae igitur amplius de virtute divinae providentiae participant, sunt executiva divinae providentiae in illa quae minus participant. Creaturae autem intellectuales plus aliis de ipsa participant: nam, cum ad providentiam requiratur et dispositio ordinis, quae fit per cognoscitivam virtutem, et executio, quae fit per operativam, creaturae rationales utramque virtutem participant, reliquae vero creaturae virtutem operativam tantum. Per creaturas igitur rationales omnes aliae creaturae sub divina providentia reguntur. Again. Whatever creature executes the order of divine providence does so insofar as it has a share of the power of the supreme providence, even as the instrument has no movement except insofar as it has a share in the power of the principal agent through being moved. Accordingly, those things which have the larger share of the power of divine providence are the executors of divine providence in regard to those whose share is smaller. Now intellectual creatures have a greater share of this than others because, while providence requires disposition of order (which is effected by the cognitive faculty), and execution (which is the work of the operative power), rational creatures have a share of both powers, whereas other creatures have only the latter. Therefore, all other creatures are ruled by rational creatures, under divine providence. Adhuc. Cuicumque datur a Deo aliqua virtus, datur ei in ordine ad effectum ipsius virtutis: sic enim optime omnia disponuntur, dum unumquodque ordinatur ad omnia bona quae ex ipso nata sunt provenire. Virtus autem intellectiva de se est ordinativa et regitiva: unde videmus quod, quando coniunguntur in eodem, virtus operativa sequitur regimen intellectivae virtutis; sicut in homine videmus quod ad imperium voluntatis moventur membra. Idem etiam apparet si in diversis existant: nam illi homines qui excedunt in virtute operativa, oportet quod dirigantur ab illis qui in virtute intellectiva excedunt. Exigit igitur divinae providentiae ratio quod creaturae aliae per intellectuales creaturas regantur. Moreover. To whomsoever God gives a power, it is given in relation to the effect of that power: for all things are disposed of in the best way when each one is directed to all the goods that it has a natural aptitude to produce. Now the intellective power by its very nature is a directive and governing faculty. Hence we see that when they are united in the one subject, the operative power follows the ruling of the intellective power, as in man the limb moves at the will’s command. The same may be seen also if they be in different subjects, since those men who excel in the operative power need to be directed by those who excel in the intellective faculty. Therefore, the nature of divine providence requires that other creatures be ruled by intellectual creatures. Item. Virtutes particulares natae sunt moveri a virtutibus universalibus: ut patet tam in arte quam in natura. Constat autem quod virtus intellectiva est universalior omni alia virtute operativa: nam virtus intellectiva continet formas universales, omnis autem virtus operativa tantum est ex aliqua forma propria operantis. Oportet igitur quod per virtutes intellectuales moveantur et regantur omnes aliae creaturae. Again. Particular powers are naturally adapted to be moved by universal powers, as may be seen both in art and in nature. Now it is evident that the intellective power is more universal than any other operative power, because it contains universal forms, whereas all operative powers proceed only from a form proper to the operator. Therefore, all other creatures must be moved and ruled by intellectual powers. Praeterea. In omnibus potentiis ordinatis una est directiva alterius, quae magis rationem cognoscit: unde videmus in artibus quod ars illa ad quam pertinet finis, ex quo sumitur ratio totius artificii, dirigit illam, et imperat ei, quae artificium operatur, sicut ars gubernatoria navifactivae; et illa quae formam inducit, imperat ei quae materiam disponit. Instrumenta vero, quae non cognoscunt aliquam rationem, reguntur tantum. Cum igitur solae intellectuales creaturae rationes ordinis creaturarum cognoscere possint, earum erit regere et gubernare omnes alias creaturas. Moreover. In all ordered powers, the one which has the better knowledge about the plan to be followed is directive of another. Thus in the arts we may observe that the art which is concerned with the end (from which is taken the entire scheme of the work to be produced) directs and governs the art that is immediately productive of that work. For instance, the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding, and the art which gives the form governs the art which prepares the material (whereas the instruments, through having no knowledge of the scheme, are governed only). Since, then, intellectual creatures alone are able to know the scheme of the ordering of creatures, it belongs to them to rule and govern all other creatures. Adhuc. Quod est per se, est causa eius quod est per aliud. Solae autem creaturae intellectuales operantur per seipsas, utpote suarum operationum per liberum voluntatis arbitrium dominae existentes: aliae vero creaturae ex necessitate naturae operantur, tanquam ab alio motae. Creaturae igitur intellectuales per suam operationem sunt motivae et regitivae aliarum creaturarum. Further. That which is of itself is the cause of that which is by another. Now intellectual creatures alone operate of themselves, since they are masters of their own actions through having free will, whereas other creatures operate through natural necessity, as being moved by another. Therefore, intellectual creatures by their operations move and rule other creatures. Caput 79 Chapter 79 Quod substantiae intellectivae inferiores reguntur per superiores That the lower intellectual substances are ruled by the higher Cum autem inter creaturas intellectuales quaedam sint aliis altiores, ut ex superioribus patet, oportet quod etiam inferiores intellectualium naturarum per superiores gubernentur. Since some intellectual creatures are higher than others, as we have shown, the lower intellectual nature must be governed by the higher. Adhuc. Virtutes magis universales sunt motivae virtutum particularium, sicut dictum est. Superiores autem inter intellectuales naturas habent formas magis universales, ut supra ostensum est. Sunt igitur ipsae regitivae inferiorum intellectualium naturarum. Again. The more universal powers move the particular powers, as already stated. And the higher intellectual natures have more universal forms, as we have proved. Therefore, they rule the lower intellectual natures. Item. Potentia intellectiva quae est propinquior principio, semper invenitur regitiva intellectualis virtutis quae magis a principio distat. Quod quidem apparet tam in scientiis speculativis quam in activis: scientia enim speculativa quae accipit ab alia principia ex quibus demonstrat, dicitur esse illi subalternata; et scientia activa quae est propinquior fini, qui est principium in operativis, est architectonica respectu magis distantis. Cum ergo inter intellectuales substantias quaedam sint primo principio, scilicet Deo, propinquiores, ut in secundo ostensum est, ipsae erunt aliarum regitivae. Besides. The intellective faculty that is nearer to the principle is always found to be the ruler of the intellectual faculty that is more distant from the principle: this is evident both in speculative and in practical science. For the speculative science that receives its principles of demonstration from another is said to be subalternate to it, and the practical science that is nearer to the end, which is the principle in practical matters, is the master science in comparison with the more distant. Since, then, some intellectual substances are nearer to the first principle (namely, God), as we have shown, they will be the rulers of the others. Adhuc. Superiores intellectuales substantiae perfectius divinae sapientiae influentiam in seipsis recipiunt: cum unumquodque recipiat aliquid secundum modum suum. Per sapientiam autem divinam omnia gubernantur. Et sic oportet quod ea quae magis divinam sapientiam participant, sint gubernativa eorum quae minus participant. Substantiae igitur intellectuales inferiores gubernantur per superiores. Moreover. The higher intellectual substances receive the influence of divine wisdom more perfectly, since each one receives something according to its mode. Now all things are governed by divine wisdom, so that those which have the greater share of divine wisdom govern those which have the smaller share. Therefore, the lower intellectual substances are governed by the higher. Dicuntur ergo superiores spiritus et angeli, inquantum inferiores spiritus dirigunt quasi eis annuntiando, nam angeli quasi nuntii dicuntur; et ministri, inquantum per suam operationem exequuntur, etiam in corporalibus, divinae providentiae ordinem, nam minister est quasi instrumentum animatum, secundum philosophum. Et hoc est quod dicitur in Psalmo. Qui facit angelos suos spiritus, et ministros suos flammam ignis. Therefore, the higher spirits are called angels, inasmuch as they direct the lower spirits as though by message (for angels are called messengers). They are also called ministers, insofar as by their operation they execute the order of divine providence even in corporeal things, because a minister is like an animate instrument, according to the Philosopher. This is what is said in the Psalm: Who makes your angels spirits, and your ministers a burning fire (Ps 104[103]:4). Caput 80 Chapter 80 De ordinatione angelorum ad invicem Of the order between one angel and another Cum autem corporalia per spiritualia regantur, ut ostensum est, corporalium autem est quidam ordo: oportet quod superiora corpora per superiores intellectuales substantias regantur, inferiora vero per inferiores. Quia etiam quanto aliqua substantia est superior, tanto virtus eius est universalior; virtus vero intellectualis substantiae est universalior virtute corporis: superiores quidem inter intellectuales substantias habent virtutes non explicabiles per aliquam virtutem corpoream, et ideo non sunt corporibus unitae; inferiores vero habent virtutes particulatas explicabiles per aliqua corporea instrumenta, et ideo oportet quod corporibus uniantur. Since corporeal things are governed by spiritual, as we have proved, and since there is order of a kind among corporeal things, it follows that the higher bodies are governed by the higher intellectual substances, and the lower bodies by the lower intellectual substances. And seeing that the higher a substance is, the more universal is its power, while the power of an intellectual substance is more universal than the power of a body, the higher intellectual substances have powers entirely independent of any corporeal power. Consequently, they are not united to bodies. But the lower intellectual substances have powers confined to certain limits and dependent on certain corporeal organs for their exercise, and consequently they need to be united to bodies. Sicut autem superiores inter substantias intellectuales sunt universalioris virtutis, ita etiam perfectius divinam dispositionem ab ipso recipiunt, in hoc quod usque ad singula ordinis rationem cognoscunt per hoc quod a Deo accipiunt. Haec autem divinae ordinationis manifestatio divinitus facta usque ad ultimas intellectualium substantiarum pertingit: sicut dicitur Iob 25:3: nunquid est numerus militum eius, et super quem non splendet lumen eius? Sed inferiores intellectus non in ea perfectione ipsam recipiunt quod per eam singula quae ad ordinem providentiae spectant, ab ipsis exequenda, cognoscere possint, sed solum in quadam communitate: quantoque sunt inferiores, tanto per primam illuminationem divinitus acceptam minus in speciali divini ordinis cognitionem accipiunt; in tantum quod intellectus humanus, qui est infimus secundum naturalem cognitionem, solum quorundam universalissimorum notitiam habet. And just as the higher intellectual substances have a more universal power, so too they receive from God more perfectly the divine disposal of things in that they are acquainted with the scheme of order, even as regards individuals, through receiving it from God. This manifestation of the divine governance made by God reaches to the uttermost intellectual substances: thus it is said: Is there any number to his armies? Upon whom does his light not arise? (Job 25:3). On the other hand, the lower intelligences do not receive this manifestation so perfectly as to be able to know thereby every detail of the order of divine providence left to their execution, but only in a general way. The lower their position, the less detailed knowledge of the divine government do they receive through this first manifestation received from above; so much so that the human intellect, which is the lowest in point of natural knowledge, has a knowledge of only certain most general things. Sic igitur substantiae intellectuales superiores perfectionem cognitionis praedicti ordinis immediate consequuntur a Deo, quam quidem perfectionem oportet quod aliae inferiores per eas consequantur: sicut supra diximus quod universalis discipuli cognitio per cognitionem magistri, qui in speciali cognoscit, perducitur ad perfectum. Accordingly, the higher intellectual substances receive immediately from God the perfection of the knowledge in question, which perfection the other lower intellectual substances need to receive through them: just as we have said above that the general knowledge of the disciple is brought to perfection by means of the specific knowledge of the master. Hinc est quod Dionysius de supremis intellectualibus substantiis, quas primae hierarchiae, idest sacri principatus nominat, 7 cap. Cael. Hier., dicit quod non per alias substantias sanctificatae, sed ab ipsa divinitate, in ipsam immediate extenduntur et ad immaterialem et invisibilem pulchritudinem, quantum fas est, in contemplationem adducuntur et ad divinorum operum scibiles rationes; et per has dicit suppositas caelestium essentiarum dispositiones erudiri. Sic ergo altiores intellectus in altiori principio cognitionis perfectionem suscipiunt. Hence it is that Dionysius speaking of the highest intellectual substances, which he assigns to the first hierarchy or holy sovereignty, says that they are not sanctified by means of other substances, but that they are placed by God himself immediately around him, and as far as possible close to his immaterial and incomprehensible beauty on which they gaze, and in which they contemplate the intelligible concept of his works; and by these, he says, the inferior ranks of heavenly substances are instructed. Accordingly, the higher intelligences receive their perfection from a higher source of knowledge. In qualibet autem dispositione providentiae ipsa ordinatio effectuum ex forma agentis derivatur: oportet enim effectus a causa secundum aliquam similitudinem procedere. Quod autem agens suae formae similitudinem effectibus communicet, est propter aliquem finem. Primum ergo principium in dispositione providentiae est finis; secundum, forma agentis; tertium, ipsa dispositio ordinis effectuum. Supremum igitur in ordine intellectus est quod in fine ordinis ratio attendatur; secundum autem, quod in forma; tertium vero, quod ipsa ordinis dispositio in seipsa, non in aliquo altiori principio cognoscatur. Unde et ars quae considerat finem, est architectonica respectu eius quae considerat formam, sicut gubernatoria respectu navis factivae; ea vero quae considerat formam, respectu eius quae considerat solum ordines motuum qui ordinantur ad formam, sicut navis factiva respectu manu artificum. Now in every disposition of providence, the order of effects is derived from the form of agents, since the effect must proceed from its cause in some kind of likeness. Now it is for the sake of an end that the cause communicates the likeness of its form to the effect. Hence the first principle in the dispositions of providence is the end; the second is the form of the agent; the third is the appointment of the order of effects. Consequently, in the order of the intellect the highest degree is the consideration of the idea of order in the end; the second degree is the same consideration in the form; while the third is the knowledge of the disposition of order in itself and not in a higher principle. Therefore, the art which considers the end governs the art which considers the form, as the art of sailing governs the art of shipbuilding. And the art which considers the form governs the art which considers only the order of movements which prepare the way for the form, as the art of shipbuilding governs the handiwork of the builders. Sic ergo inter illos intellectus qui immediate in ipso Deo perfectam cognitionem ordinis providentiae divinae percipiunt, est quidam ordo, quia supremi et primi ordinis providentiae rationem percipiunt in ipso ultimo fine, qui est divina bonitas; quidam tamen eorum aliis clarius. Et isti dicuntur ‘seraphim’, quasi ardentes vel incendentes, quia per incendium designari solet intensio amoris vel desiderii, quae sunt de fine. Unde Dionysius dicit, 7 cap. Cael. Hier., quod ex hoc eorum nomine designatur mobilitas eorum circa divina, fervens et flexibilis, et reductio inferiorum in Deum, sicut in finem. Accordingly, there is a certain order among the intelligences who take from God himself immediate and perfect cognizance of the order of divine providence. The first and highest perceive the ordered scheme of providence in the last end itself which is the divine goodness, some of them, however, clearer than others; and these are called ‘seraphim,’ that is, fiery or setting on fire, because fire is used to designate intensity of love or desire, which are about the end. Hence Dionysius says that this name indicates both their fervent and quivering activity towards God, and their leading lower things to God as their end. Secundi autem rationem ordinis providentiae in ipsa forma divina perfecte cognoscunt. Et hi dicuntur ‘cherubim’, quod interpretatur scientiae plenitudo: scientia enim per formam scibilis perficitur. Unde dicit Dionysius quod talis nominatio significat, quod sunt contemplativi in prima operatrice virtute divinae pulchritudinis. The second place belongs to those who acquire perfect knowledge of the scheme of providence in the divine form. These are called ‘cherubim,’ which signifies fullness of knowledge, for knowledge is made complete through the form of the thing known. Hence Dionysius says that their name indicates that they contemplate the highest operative power of the divine beauty. Tertii vero ipsam dispositionem divinorum iudiciorum in seipsa considerant. Et hi dicuntur ‘throni’: nam per thronum potestas iudiciaria designatur, secundum illud: sedes super thronum et iudicas iustitiam. Unde dicit Dionysius quod per hanc nominationem designatur quod sunt deiferi, et ad omnes divinas susceptiones familiariter aperti. The third grade is of those who contemplate the disposition of divine judgements in itself. They are called ‘thrones,’ because the throne is significative of judicial power, according to the Psalm: You have sat on the throne, giving righteous judgment (Ps 9:5). Hence Dionysius says that this name signifies that they are God-bearers and adapted for the obedient fulfilment of all divine undertakings. Non autem sic praemissa intelligenda sunt quasi aliud sit divina bonitas, aliud divina essentia, et aliud eius scientia rerum dispositionem continens: sed quia secundum haec alia et alia est eius consideratio. What has been said must, however, be understood not as though the divine goodness, essence, and knowledge of the disposition of things were three distinct things, but in the sense that, according to what we have been saying, we may look at the matter in question from different points of view. Inter ipsos etiam inferiores spiritus, qui divini ordinis per eos exequendi perfectam cognitionem per superiores spiritus consequuntur, oportet ordinem esse. Nam quae inter ea sunt altiora, virtutis etiam sunt universalioris in cognoscendo: unde cognitionem ordinis providentiae in principiis et causis magis universalibus adipiscuntur; inferiores vero in causis magis particularibus; altioris enim intellectus esset homo qui ordinem omnium naturalium considerare posset in corporibus caelestibus, quam qui indiget ad perfectam cognitionem ad inferiora corpora prospicere. Illi igitur qui in causis universalibus, quae sunt mediae inter Deum, qui est universalissima causa, et causas particulares, possunt ordinem providentiae perfecte cognoscere, medii sunt inter illos qui in ipso Deo rationem praedicti ordinis considerare sufficiunt, et eos qui in causis particularibus necesse habent considerare. Et hi a Dionysio ponuntur in media hierarchia, quae, sicut a suprema dirigitur, ita dirigit infimam: ut dicit in 8 cap. Cael. Hier. Again, there must be order among even the lower spirits, who receive from the higher spirits perfect knowledge of the divine order to be fulfilled by them. For the higher ones are also more universal in their power of understanding, so that they acquire their knowledge of the order of providence from more universal principles and causes, but those beneath them from more particular causes. For a man who could consider the entire physical order in the heavenly bodies would be of a higher intelligence than one who needed to turn his mind to lower things in order to perfect his knowledge. Accordingly, those who are able to know perfectly the order of providence from the universal causes which stand midway between God (the supremely universal cause) and particular causes are themselves between those who are able to consider the aforesaid order in God himself, and those who need to consider it in particular causes. Dionysius assigns these to the middle hierarchy, which he says governs the lowest even as it is governed by the highest. Inter has etiam intellectuales substantias oportet quod ordo quidam existat. Nam ipsa universalis providentiae dispositio distribuitur quidem, primo, in multos executores. Quod quidem fit per ordinem ‘dominationum’: dominorum enim est praecipere quid alii exequantur. Unde Dionysius dicit, 8 cap. Cael. Hier., quod nomen dominationis designat aliquam anagogen superpositam omni servituti, et omni subiectione superiorem. Again, among these intellectual substances there must also be some kind of order, since the universal disposition of providence is divided first among many executors. This belongs to the order of ‘dominations,’ because to command what others execute belongs to one having dominion. Hence Dionysius says that the name of domination signifies a certain liberty free from servile condition and any subjection.