Caput 82 Chapter 82 Quod inferiora corpora reguntur a Deo per corpora caelestia That the inferior bodies are ruled by God by means of the heavenly bodies Sicut autem in substantiis intellectualibus est superius et inferius, ita etiam in substantiis corporalibus. Substantiae autem intellectuales reguntur a superioribus, ut dispositio divinae providentiae proportionaliter descendat usque ad infima, sicut iam dictum est. Ergo, pari ratione, inferiora corpora per superiora disponuntur. Just as in intellectual substances some are of higher and some of lower degree, so too are there in corporeal substances. Now intellectual substances are governed by higher substances, so that the disposition of divine providence may reach down proportionately to the lowest things, as we have already said. Therefore, in like manner, bodies of lower degree are ruled by those of a higher. Amplius. Quanto aliquod corpus est superius loco, tanto invenitur esse formalius et propter hoc etiam rationabiliter est locus inferioris, nam formae est continere, sicut et loci; aqua enim est formalior terra, aer aqua, ignis aere. Sed corpora caelestia sunt omnibus loco superiora. Ipsa igitur sunt magis formalia omnibus aliis. Ergo magis activa. Agunt ergo in inferiora corpora. Et sic per ea inferiora disponuntur. Again. The higher a body is as regards its place, the more formal it is: hence it is reasonably the place of a lower body, because form contains even as place does. Thus water is more formal than earth, air than water, fire than air. Now the heavenly bodies have a higher place than all others. Therefore, they are more formal and consequently more active than all other bodies. Therefore, they act on lower bodies: consequently, the latter are ruled by them. Item. Quod est in sua natura perfectum absque contrarietate, est universalioris virtutis quam illud quod in sua natura non perficitur nisi cum contrarietate: contrarietas enim est ex differentiis determinantibus et contrahentibus genus; unde in acceptione intellectus, quia est universalis, species contrariorum non sunt contrariae, cum sint simul. Corpora autem caelestia sunt in suis naturis absque omni contrarietate perfecta: non enim sunt levia neque gravia, neque calida neque frigida. Corpora vero inferiora non perficiuntur in suis naturis nisi cum aliqua contrarietate. Et hoc etiam motus eorum demonstrant: nam motui circulari corporum caelestium non est aliquid contrarium, unde nec in eis violentia esse potest; motui autem inferiorum corporum contrarii sunt, scilicet motus deorsum motui sursum. Corpora ergo caelestia sunt universalioris virtutis quam corpora inferiora. Universales autem virtutes sunt motivae particularium, sicut ex dictis patet. Corpora igitur caelestia movent et disponunt corpora inferiora. Besides. That which in its nature is perfect without contrariety is of more universal power than that which in its nature is not perfected without contrariety, because contrariety arises from differences which determine and contract the genus. Hence in the conception of the intellect, insofar as it is universal, the species of contraries are not contrary to one another, since they coexist in the intellect. Now the heavenly bodies are perfect in their respective natures without any contrariety, for they are neither light nor heavy, neither hot nor cold; but the inferior bodies are not perfect in their respective natures without any contrariety. This is proved by their movements, for there is no contrary to the circular movement of the heavenly bodies, so that there can be nothing violent in them; whereas there are movements contrary to that of the lower bodies (for instance, downward movement is contrary to upward movement). Therefore, heavenly bodies have a more universal power than the inferior bodies. Now universal powers move particular powers, as we have proved. Therefore, the heavenly bodies move and govern lower bodies. Adhuc. Ostensum est supra quod per substantias intellectuales alia omnia reguntur. Corpora autem caelestia sunt similiora substantiis intellectualibus quam alia corpora, inquantum sunt incorruptibilia. Sunt etiam eis propinquiora, inquantum ab eis immediate moventur, ut supra ostensum est. Per ipsa igitur reguntur inferiora corpora. Moreover. We have shown that all other things are ruled by intellectual substances. Now the heavenly bodies resemble the intellectual substances more than other bodies do, insofar as they are incorruptible. Moreover, they are nearer to them inasmuch as they are moved by them immediately, as we have shown above. Therefore, the lower bodies are ruled by them. Praeterea. Oportet primum principium motus esse aliquid immobile. Quae ergo magis accedunt ad immobilitatem, debent esse aliorum motiva. Corpora autem caelestia magis accedunt ad immobilitatem primi principii quam inferiora: quia non moventur nisi una specie motus, scilicet motu locali; alia vero corpora moventur omnibus speciebus motus. Corpora igitur caelestia sunt motiva et regitiva inferiorum corporum. Further. The first principle of movement must be something immovable. Consequently, things that approach nearest to immobility must be the movers of others. Now heavenly bodies approach nearer to the immobility of a first principle than do the inferior bodies because they have but one species of movement (namely, local), but other bodies have all manner of movements. Therefore, the heavenly bodies move and rule the lower bodies. Amplius. Primum in quolibet genere est causa eorum quae sunt post. Inter omnes autem alios motus, primus est motus caeli. Primo quidem, quia motus localis est primus inter omnes motus. Et tempore: quia solus potest esse perpetuus, ut probatur in VIII Phys. Et naturaliter: quia sine eo non potest esse aliquis aliorum; non enim augmentatur aliquid nisi praeexistente alteratione, per quam quod prius erat dissimile, convertatur et fiat simile; neque alteratio potest esse nisi praeexistente loci mutatione, quia ad hoc quod fiat alteratio, oportet quod alterans magis sit propinquum alterato nunc quam prius. Est etiam perfectione prior: quia motus localis non variat rem secundum aliquid ei inhaerens, sed solum secundum aliquid extrinsecum; et propter hoc est rei iam perfectae. Again. In each genus the first is the cause of that which comes after. Now the heavenly movement is the first of all movements. First, because local movement precedes all others, both in point of time, because it alone can be everlasting (as is proved in 8 Physics), and naturally, because without it there could be no other. For a thing cannot be increased without a previous alteration by which what was dissimilar is transformed and assimilated. Nor can there be alteration without a previous change of place, since in order that there be alteration, the cause of alteration must become nearer to the subject altered than it was before. Likewise in perfection, because local movement does not cause a thing to vary in respect of something inherent, but only in respect of something extrinsic; for this reason it belongs to a thing already perfect. Secundo, quia etiam inter motus locales est motus circularis prior. Et tempore: quia solus ipse potest esse perpetuus, ut probatur in VIII Phys. Et naturaliter: quia est magis simplex et unus, cum non distinguatur in principium, medium et finem, sed totus sit quasi medium. Et etiam perfectione: quia reflectitur ad principium. Second, because even among local movements, circular movement holds the first place: both in point of time, because it alone can be everlasting, as proved in 8 Physics; and naturally, because it excels in simplicity and unity, since it is not divided into beginning, middle and end, but is all middle, as it were. And in perfection, because it returns to its principle. Tertio, quia solus motus caeli invenitur semper regularis et uniformis: in motibus enim naturalibus gravium et levium fit additio velocitatis in fine, in violentis autem additio tarditatis. Oportet ergo quod motus caeli sit causa omnium aliorum motuum. Third, because only the heavenly movement is always regular and uniform, since in the movements of heavy and light bodies the speed increases towards the end if the movement be natural, and decreases if the movement be violent. Therefore, the movement of the heaven must be the cause of all other movements. Adhuc. Sicut se habet immobile simpliciter ad motum simpliciter, ita se habet immobile secundum hunc motum ad motum talem. Id autem quod est immobile simpliciter, est principium omnis motus, ut supra probatum est. Quod ergo est immobile secundum alterationem, est principium omnis alterationis. Corpora autem caelestia sola inter corporalia sunt inalterabilia: quod demonstrat dispositio eorum, quae semper eadem invenitur. Est ergo corpus caeleste causa omnis alterationis in his quae alterantur. Alteratio autem in his inferioribus est principium omnis motus: nam per alterationem pervenitur ad augmentum et generationem; generans autem est motor per se in motu locali gravium et levium. Oportet ergo quod caelum sit causa omnis motus in istis inferioribus corporibus. Further. As that which is simply immovable is in comparison with movement simply, so is that which is immovable in respect of a particular kind of movement in comparison with that particular movement. Now that which is simply immovable is the principle of all movement, as we have proved. Therefore, that which is immovable in respect of alteration is the principle of all alteration. Now of all things corporeal the heavenly bodies alone are inalterable—this is proved by their disposition, which is always the same. Therefore, the heavenly body is the cause of alteration in all things alterable. But in this lower world alteration is the principle of all movement, because alteration leads to increase and generation, and the generator is of itself a mover in the local movement of heavy and light bodies. Consequently, the heaven must be the cause of all movement in these lower bodies. Sic ergo patet quod corpora inferiora a Deo per corpora caelestia reguntur. Therefore, it is evident that the lower bodies are governed by God by means of the heavenly bodies. Caput 83 Chapter 83 Epilogus praedictorum Conclusion of the foregoing Ex omnibus autem quae ostensa sunt colligere possumus quod, quantum ad ordinis excogitationem rebus imponendum, Deus omnia per seipsum disponit. Unde super illud Iob 33, quem posuit alium super orbem quem fabricatus est? Dicit Gregorius: mundum quippe per seipsum regit qui per seipsum condidit. Et Boetius, in III de Consol.: Deus per se solum cuncta disponit. From all that has been proved hitherto, we are able to conclude that as regards the design of the order to be imposed on things, God governs all things by himself. Therefore, commenting on Job, What other has he appointed over the earth? (Job 34:13), Gregory says: He who created the world by himself governs it by himself. And Boethius says: God rules all things by himself alone. Sed quantum ad executionem, inferiora per superiora dispensat. Corporalia quidem per spiritualia. Unde Gregorius dicit, in IV Dialog.: in hoc mundo visibili nihil nisi per invisibilem creaturam disponi potest. Inferiores vero spiritus per superiores. Unde dicit Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier., quod caelestes essentiae intellectuales primo in seipsas divinam edunt illuminationem, et in nos deferunt quae supra nos sunt manifestationes. Inferiora etiam corpora per superiora. Unde dicit Dionysius, IV cap., de Div. Nom., quod sol generationem visibilium corporum confert, et ad vitam ipsam movet, et nutrit et auget et perficit, et mundat et renovat. As to the execution, however, he governs the lower by means of the higher things. He governs bodily things by means of spiritual things. Hence Gregory says: In this visible world nothing can be ruled except by means of the invisible creature. He governs the lower spirits by the higher. Hence Dionysius says that the intelligent heavenly substances first of all shed forth the divine enlightenment on themselves, and bestow on us those manifestations which surpass our capacity. And he governs the lower bodies by the higher. Hence Dionysius says that the sun contributes to the generation of visible bodies, as also to life itself, by means of nourishment, growth and perfection, by cleansing and renewing them. De his autem omnibus simul dicit Augustinus, in III de Trin.: quemadmodum corpora crassiora et inferiora per subtiliora et potentiora quodam ordine reguntur, ita omnia corpora per spiritum vitae rationalem; et spiritus rationalis peccator per spiritum rationalem iustum. Of all these together Augustine says: As the grosser and lower bodies are ruled in a certain orderly way by bodies of greater subtlety and power, so all bodies are ruled by the rational spirit of life, and the sinful rational spirit by the righteous rational spirit. Caput 84 Chapter 84 Quod corpora caelestia non imprimant in intellectus nostros That the heavenly bodies do not impress on our intellect Ex his autem quae praemissa sunt, in promptu apparet quod eorum quae sunt circa intellectum, corpora caelestia causae esse non possunt. Iam enim ostensum est quod divinae providentiae ordo est ut per superiora regantur inferiora et moveantur. Intellectus autem naturae ordine omnia corpora excedit: ut etiam ex praedictis patet. Impossibile est igitur quod corpora caelestia agant in intellectum directe. Non igitur possunt esse causa per se eorum quae sunt circa intellectum. From what has been said it is at once clear that the heavenly bodies cannot be the causes of things concerning our intellect. For it has already been shown that the order of divine providence requires the lower things to be ruled and moved by the higher. Now the intellect, in the natural order, surpasses all bodies, as we have proved already. Consequently, heavenly bodies cannot act directly on the intellect. Therefore, they cannot be the direct cause of things concerning the intellect. Adhuc. Nullum corpus agit nisi per motum: ut probatur in VIII Physicor. Quae autem sunt immobilia, non causantur ex motu: nihil enim causatur ex motu alicuius agentis nisi inquantum movet passum dum movetur. Quae igitur sunt omnino extra motum, non possunt esse causata a corporibus caelestibus. Sed ea quae sunt circa intellectum, sunt omnino extra motum, per se loquendo, sicut patet per philosophum in VII Phys.: quinimmo per quietem a motibus fit anima prudens et sciens, ut ibidem dicitur. Impossibile est ergo quod corpora caelestia sint per se causa eorum quae circa intellectum sunt. Again. No body acts except through movement, as is proved in 8 Physics. Now things that are immovable are not caused by movement, because nothing is the result of the movement of an agent except through the agent moving the patient, while the latter is moved. Consequently, things that are wholly outside movement cannot be caused by the heavenly bodies. But things concerning the intellect are wholly outside movement properly speaking, as the Philosopher states: In fact, the soul becomes prudent and wise through being free from movement. It is not possible, therefore, that the heavenly bodies be the direct cause of things concerning the intellect. Amplius. Si nihil causatur ab aliquo corpore nisi inquantum movet dum movetur, oportet omne illud quod recipit impressionem alicuius corporis, moveri. Nihil autem movetur nisi corpus, ut probatur in VI Phys. Oportet ergo omne quod recipit impressionem alicuius corporis, esse corpus, vel aliquam virtutem corpoream. Ostensum est autem in secundo quod intellectus neque est corpus neque virtus corporea. Impossibile est igitur quod corpora caelestia directe imprimant in intellectum. Besides. If nothing be caused by a body except insofar as the latter causes movement through being moved, it follows that whatever receives an impression from a body must be moved. Now nothing is moved except a body, as is proved in 6 Physics. Therefore, whatever receives an impression from a body must be either a body or a power of a body. But it was proved in the second book that the intellect is neither a body nor a power of the body. Therefore, the heavenly bodies cannot directly make an impression on the intellect. Item. Omne quod movetur ab aliquo, reducitur ab eo de potentia in actum. Nihil autem reducitur ab aliquo de potentia in actum nisi per id quod est actu. Oportet ergo omne agens et movens esse aliquo modo in actu respectu eorum ad quae passum et motum est in potentia. Corpora autem caelestia non sunt actu intelligibilia: cum sint quaedam singularia sensibilia. Cum igitur intellectus noster non sit in potentia nisi ad intelligibilia in actu, impossibile est quod corpora caelestia directe agant in intellectum. Further. Whatever is moved by a thing is reduced thereby from potency to act. Now nothing is reduced from potency to act except by something in act. Therefore, every agent and mover must be, in some way, in act with regard to those things to which the subject, passive or moved, is in potency. But the heavenly bodies are not actually intelligible, because they are singular sensibles. Since, then, our intellect is not in potency except to what is actually intelligible, it is impossible for the heavenly bodies to act directly on the intellect. Adhuc. Propria operatio rei consequitur naturam ipsius, quae rebus generatis per generationem acquiritur, simul cum propria operatione: sicut patet de gravi et levi, quae habent statim proprium motum in termino suae generationis, nisi sit aliquid impediens, ratione cuius generans dicitur movens. Illud ergo quod secundum principium suae naturae non est subiectum actionibus corporum caelestium, neque secundum suam operationem potest esse eis subiectum. Pars autem intellectiva non causatur ab aliquibus principiis corporalibus, sed est omnino ab extrinseco, ut supra est probatum. Operatio igitur intellectus non subiacet directe corporibus caelestibus. Moreover. A thing’s proper operation follows its nature, which generated things acquire by generation, together with their proper operation. This may be seen in heavy and light things, which have their proper movement as soon as they are generated, unless there be an obstacle, and for this reason the generator is said to be a mover. Consequently, that which is not subject to the action of the heavenly bodies as regards the principle of its nature cannot be subject to them in respect of its operation. Now the intellective faculty is not caused by any bodily principles, but is entirely from an extrinsic source, as we proved above. Therefore, the operation of the intellect is not directly subject to the heavenly bodies. Amplius. Ea quae causantur ex motibus caelestibus, tempori subduntur, quod est numerus primi motus caelestis. Quae igitur omnino abstrahunt a tempore, non sunt caelestibus subiecta. Intellectus autem in sua operatione abstrahit a tempore, sicut et a loco: considerat enim universale, quod est abstractum ab hic et nunc. Non igitur operatio intellectualis subditur caelestibus motibus. Again. Things caused by the heavenly movements are subject to time, which is the measure of the first heavenly movement. Therefore, those that wholly abstract from time are not subject to heavenly movements. Now the intellect in its operation abstracts from time, as also from place: for it considers the universal which abstracts from here and now. Therefore, the operation of the intellect is not subject to heavenly bodies. Adhuc. Nihil agit ultra suam speciem. Ipsum autem intelligere transcendit speciem et formam cuiuscumque corporis agentis: quia omnis forma corporea est materialis et individuata; ipsum autem intelligere habet speciem a suo obiecto, quod est universale et immateriale. Unde nullum corpus per formam suam corpoream intelligere potest. Multo igitur minus potest quodcumque corpus causare ipsum intelligere in alio. Further. Nothing acts outside its species. Now the act of the intellect transcends the species and form of any corporeal agent, since every corporeal form is material and individualized; but the act of the intellect is universal and immaterial. Consequently, no body can understand by means of its corporeal form. Much less, therefore, can any body whatsoever cause the act of intelligence in another. Item. Secundum illud quo aliquid unitur superioribus, non est inferioribus subiectum. Anima autem nostra, secundum quod intelligit, unitur substantiis intellectualibus, quae sunt superiores ordine naturae corporibus caelestibus: non enim potest anima nostra intelligere nisi secundum quod lumen intellectuale inde sortitur. Impossibile est ergo quod intellectualis operatio directe motibus caelestibus subdatur. Besides. A thing is not subject to that which is beneath it in respect of that by which it is united to things above it. Now our soul, inasmuch as it is intelligent, is united to intellectual substances, which in the order of nature are above heavenly bodies, because our soul cannot understand except insofar as it derives its intellectual light from those substances. Therefore, the intellectual operation cannot be directly subject to the heavenly movements. Praeterea. Huic rei fidem faciet si consideremus ea quae a philosophis circa hoc sunt dicta. Antiqui enim philosophi naturales, ut Democritus, Empedocles, et huiusmodi, posuerunt quod intellectus non differt a sensu: ut patet in IV Metaph., et in III de anima. Et ideo sequebatur quod, cum sensus sit quaedam virtus corporea sequens corporum transmutationem, quod ita esset etiam de intellectu. Et propter hoc dixerunt quod, cum transmutatio inferiorum corporum sequatur transmutationem corporum superiorum, intellectualis operatio sequatur corporum caelestium motus: secundum illud Homeri: talis est intellectus in diis et hominibus terrenis qualem in die ducit pater virorum deorumque: idest sol; vel magis Iupiter, quem dicebant summum Deum, intelligentes per ipsum totum caelum, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de civitate Dei. Moreover. We shall find a confirmation of this if we consider what philosophers have said in the matter. The natural philosophers of old, like Democritus, Empedocles and others, held that intellect differs not from sense, as stated in 4 Metaphysics, and 3 De Anima. Hence it follows that, as sense is a corporeal power resulting from a corporeal transmutation, so is the intellect likewise. Therefore, they said that intellectual operation follows the movements of the heavenly bodies as transmutation of the lower bodies follows transmutation of the higher bodies, according to the words of Homer: The mind of gods and men on earth is even as their day which comes from the father of men and gods, namely, the sun, or rather Jove, whom they called the supreme god, by whom they understood the whole heaven, as Augustine says. Hinc etiam processit Stoicorum opinio, qui dicebant cognitionem intellectus causari ex hoc quod imagines corporum nostris mentibus imprimuntur, sicut speculum quoddam, vel sicut pagina recipit litteras impressas, absque hoc quod aliquid agat: ut Boetius narrat in V de consolatione. Secundum quorum sententiam sequebatur quod maxime ex impressione corporum caelestium intellectuales notiones nobis imprimerentur. Unde et Stoici fuerunt qui praecipue necessitate quadam fatali hominum vitam duci posuerunt. Hence too followed the opinion of the Stoics, who said that the knowledge of the intellect is caused by images of bodies being imprinted on the mind like in a mirror, or like a page receives the imprinted characters without any action on its part (as Boethius relates). According to this opinion, it followed that our intellectual knowledge was chiefly the result of impressions received from heavenly bodies: consequently, it was chiefly the Stoics who held that man’s life was bound by a kind of fatal necessity. Sed haec positio inde falsa apparet, ut Boetius ibidem dicit, quia intellectus componit et dividit, et comparat suprema ad infima et cognoscit universalia et simplices formas, quae in corporibus non inveniuntur. Et sic manifestum est quod intellectus non est sicut recipiens tantum imagines corporum, sed habet aliquam virtutem corporibus altiorem: nam sensus exterior, qui solum imagines corporum recipit, ad praedicta non se extendit. This opinion however is shown to be false, as Boethius says, by the fact that the intellect is capable of synthesis and analysis, and compares the highest with the lowest, and is cognitive of universals and simple forms, none of which is within the capacity of bodies. Consequently, it is evident that the intellect does not merely receive the images of bodies, but is possessed of a power that transcends bodies: for the external senses, which receive only images of bodies, do not extend to the things mentioned above. Omnes autem sequentes philosophi, intellectum a sensu discernentes, causam nostrae scientiae non aliquibus corporibus, sed rebus immaterialibus attribuerunt: sicut Plato posuit causam nostrae scientiae esse ideas; Aristoteles autem intellectum agentem. All subsequent philosophers, however, discerned intellect from sense, and assigned not bodies but immaterial things as the cause of our knowledge: thus Plato ascribed this to ideas, and Aristotle to the active intellect. Ex his omnibus est accipere quod ponere corpora caelestia esse causam nobis intelligendi, est consequens opinioni eorum qui ponebant intellectum a sensu non differre: ut patet etiam per Aristotelem, in libro de anima. Hanc autem opinionem manifestum est esse falsam. Igitur manifestum est et eam esse falsam quae ponit corpora caelestia esse nobis causa intelligendi directe. From all this we may gather that to say that the heavenly bodies are the cause of our knowledge is a sequel to the opinion of those who held that intellect differs not from sense, as Aristotle observes. Now it is evident that this opinion is false. Therefore, the opinion of those who maintained that the heavenly bodies are the direct cause of our knowledge is manifestly false. Hinc est etiam quod sacra Scriptura causam nostrae intelligentiae attribuit, non alicui corpori, sed Deo: Iob 35:10 ubi est Deus qui fecit me, qui dedit carmina in nocte, qui docet nos super iumenta terrae, super volucres caeli erudit nos? Et in Psalmo, qui docet hominem scientiam. For this reason Sacred Scripture assigns as the cause of our knowledge, not a body, but God: Where is God my Maker, who gives songs in the night, who teaches us more than the beasts of the earth, and makes us wiser than the birds of the air? (Job 35:10–11). And in the Psalm: He who teaches men knowledge (Ps 94[93]:10). Sciendum est tamen quod, licet corpora caelestia directe intelligentiae nostrae causae esse non possint, aliquid tamen ad hoc operantur indirecte. Licet enim intellectus non sit virtus corporea, tamen in nobis operatio intellectus compleri non potest sine operatione virtutum corporearum, quae sunt imaginatio et vis memorativa et cogitativa, ut ex superioribus patet. Et inde est quod, impeditis harum virtutum operationibus propter aliquam corporis indispositionem, impeditur operatio intellectus: sicut patet in phreneticis et lethargicis, et aliis huiusmodi. Et propter hoc etiam bonitas dispositionis corporis humani facit aptum ad bene intelligendum, inquantum ex hoc praedictae vires fortiores existunt: unde dicitur in II de anima quod molles carne bene aptos mente videmus. Nevertheless, we must observe that although heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of our knowledge, they can cooperate indirectly towards it. For though the intellect is not a force of the body, yet in us the operation of the intellect cannot be exercised without the operation of bodily forces—namely, the imagination and the powers of memory and thought, as we have already shown. Hence it is that when the activity of these powers is hampered by some bodily indisposition, the activity of the intellect is hampered also, as may be seen in cases of frenzy, lethargy and the like. For the same reason, goodness of disposition in a man’s body fits him to understand easily, inasmuch as those forces are strengthened by such a disposition. Hence it is said in 2 De Anima that it is to be observed that men of soft flesh are of quick intelligence. Dispositio autem corporis humani subiacet caelestibus motibus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in V de civitate Dei, quod non usquequaque absurde dici potest ad solas corporum differentias afflatus quosdam valere sidereos. Et Damascenus dicit in secundo libro, quod alii et alii planetae diversas complexiones et habitus et dispositiones in nobis constituunt. Et ideo indirecte corpora caelestia ad bonitatem intelligentiae operantur. Et sic, sicut medici possunt iudicare de bonitate intellectus ex corporis complexione sicut ex dispositione proxima, ita astrologus ex motibus caelestibus sicut ex causa remota talis dispositionis. Et per hunc modum potest verificari quod Ptolomaeus in Centilogio dicit: cum fuerit Mercurius in nativitate alicuius in aliqua domorum Saturni, et ipse fortis in esse suo, dat bonitatem intelligentiae medullitus in rebus. Now the disposition of the human body is subject to the heavenly movements. For Augustine says that it is not altogether absurd to ascribe the mere differences between bodies to the influence of the stars. And Damascene says that the various planets produce in us various temperaments, habits and dispositions. Consequently, the heavenly bodies cooperate indirectly to the goodness of our intelligence. Thus, even as physicians are able to judge of a man’s intelligence from his bodily temperament (as a proximate disposition to it), so too can an astrologer from the heavenly movements (as being a remote cause of this disposition). In this sense we can approve of the saying of Ptolemy: When Mercury is in one of Saturn’s houses at the time of a man’s birth, he bestows on him a quick intelligence of the inner nature of things. Caput 85 Chapter 85