Caput 84 Chapter 84 Quod corpora caelestia non imprimant in intellectus nostros That the heavenly bodies do not impress on our intellect Ex his autem quae praemissa sunt, in promptu apparet quod eorum quae sunt circa intellectum, corpora caelestia causae esse non possunt. Iam enim ostensum est quod divinae providentiae ordo est ut per superiora regantur inferiora et moveantur. Intellectus autem naturae ordine omnia corpora excedit: ut etiam ex praedictis patet. Impossibile est igitur quod corpora caelestia agant in intellectum directe. Non igitur possunt esse causa per se eorum quae sunt circa intellectum. From what has been said it is at once clear that the heavenly bodies cannot be the causes of things concerning our intellect. For it has already been shown that the order of divine providence requires the lower things to be ruled and moved by the higher. Now the intellect, in the natural order, surpasses all bodies, as we have proved already. Consequently, heavenly bodies cannot act directly on the intellect. Therefore, they cannot be the direct cause of things concerning the intellect. Adhuc. Nullum corpus agit nisi per motum: ut probatur in VIII Physicor. Quae autem sunt immobilia, non causantur ex motu: nihil enim causatur ex motu alicuius agentis nisi inquantum movet passum dum movetur. Quae igitur sunt omnino extra motum, non possunt esse causata a corporibus caelestibus. Sed ea quae sunt circa intellectum, sunt omnino extra motum, per se loquendo, sicut patet per philosophum in VII Phys.: quinimmo per quietem a motibus fit anima prudens et sciens, ut ibidem dicitur. Impossibile est ergo quod corpora caelestia sint per se causa eorum quae circa intellectum sunt. Again. No body acts except through movement, as is proved in 8 Physics. Now things that are immovable are not caused by movement, because nothing is the result of the movement of an agent except through the agent moving the patient, while the latter is moved. Consequently, things that are wholly outside movement cannot be caused by the heavenly bodies. But things concerning the intellect are wholly outside movement properly speaking, as the Philosopher states: In fact, the soul becomes prudent and wise through being free from movement. It is not possible, therefore, that the heavenly bodies be the direct cause of things concerning the intellect. Amplius. Si nihil causatur ab aliquo corpore nisi inquantum movet dum movetur, oportet omne illud quod recipit impressionem alicuius corporis, moveri. Nihil autem movetur nisi corpus, ut probatur in VI Phys. Oportet ergo omne quod recipit impressionem alicuius corporis, esse corpus, vel aliquam virtutem corpoream. Ostensum est autem in secundo quod intellectus neque est corpus neque virtus corporea. Impossibile est igitur quod corpora caelestia directe imprimant in intellectum. Besides. If nothing be caused by a body except insofar as the latter causes movement through being moved, it follows that whatever receives an impression from a body must be moved. Now nothing is moved except a body, as is proved in 6 Physics. Therefore, whatever receives an impression from a body must be either a body or a power of a body. But it was proved in the second book that the intellect is neither a body nor a power of the body. Therefore, the heavenly bodies cannot directly make an impression on the intellect. Item. Omne quod movetur ab aliquo, reducitur ab eo de potentia in actum. Nihil autem reducitur ab aliquo de potentia in actum nisi per id quod est actu. Oportet ergo omne agens et movens esse aliquo modo in actu respectu eorum ad quae passum et motum est in potentia. Corpora autem caelestia non sunt actu intelligibilia: cum sint quaedam singularia sensibilia. Cum igitur intellectus noster non sit in potentia nisi ad intelligibilia in actu, impossibile est quod corpora caelestia directe agant in intellectum. Further. Whatever is moved by a thing is reduced thereby from potency to act. Now nothing is reduced from potency to act except by something in act. Therefore, every agent and mover must be, in some way, in act with regard to those things to which the subject, passive or moved, is in potency. But the heavenly bodies are not actually intelligible, because they are singular sensibles. Since, then, our intellect is not in potency except to what is actually intelligible, it is impossible for the heavenly bodies to act directly on the intellect. Adhuc. Propria operatio rei consequitur naturam ipsius, quae rebus generatis per generationem acquiritur, simul cum propria operatione: sicut patet de gravi et levi, quae habent statim proprium motum in termino suae generationis, nisi sit aliquid impediens, ratione cuius generans dicitur movens. Illud ergo quod secundum principium suae naturae non est subiectum actionibus corporum caelestium, neque secundum suam operationem potest esse eis subiectum. Pars autem intellectiva non causatur ab aliquibus principiis corporalibus, sed est omnino ab extrinseco, ut supra est probatum. Operatio igitur intellectus non subiacet directe corporibus caelestibus. Moreover. A thing’s proper operation follows its nature, which generated things acquire by generation, together with their proper operation. This may be seen in heavy and light things, which have their proper movement as soon as they are generated, unless there be an obstacle, and for this reason the generator is said to be a mover. Consequently, that which is not subject to the action of the heavenly bodies as regards the principle of its nature cannot be subject to them in respect of its operation. Now the intellective faculty is not caused by any bodily principles, but is entirely from an extrinsic source, as we proved above. Therefore, the operation of the intellect is not directly subject to the heavenly bodies. Amplius. Ea quae causantur ex motibus caelestibus, tempori subduntur, quod est numerus primi motus caelestis. Quae igitur omnino abstrahunt a tempore, non sunt caelestibus subiecta. Intellectus autem in sua operatione abstrahit a tempore, sicut et a loco: considerat enim universale, quod est abstractum ab hic et nunc. Non igitur operatio intellectualis subditur caelestibus motibus. Again. Things caused by the heavenly movements are subject to time, which is the measure of the first heavenly movement. Therefore, those that wholly abstract from time are not subject to heavenly movements. Now the intellect in its operation abstracts from time, as also from place: for it considers the universal which abstracts from here and now. Therefore, the operation of the intellect is not subject to heavenly bodies. Adhuc. Nihil agit ultra suam speciem. Ipsum autem intelligere transcendit speciem et formam cuiuscumque corporis agentis: quia omnis forma corporea est materialis et individuata; ipsum autem intelligere habet speciem a suo obiecto, quod est universale et immateriale. Unde nullum corpus per formam suam corpoream intelligere potest. Multo igitur minus potest quodcumque corpus causare ipsum intelligere in alio. Further. Nothing acts outside its species. Now the act of the intellect transcends the species and form of any corporeal agent, since every corporeal form is material and individualized; but the act of the intellect is universal and immaterial. Consequently, no body can understand by means of its corporeal form. Much less, therefore, can any body whatsoever cause the act of intelligence in another. Item. Secundum illud quo aliquid unitur superioribus, non est inferioribus subiectum. Anima autem nostra, secundum quod intelligit, unitur substantiis intellectualibus, quae sunt superiores ordine naturae corporibus caelestibus: non enim potest anima nostra intelligere nisi secundum quod lumen intellectuale inde sortitur. Impossibile est ergo quod intellectualis operatio directe motibus caelestibus subdatur. Besides. A thing is not subject to that which is beneath it in respect of that by which it is united to things above it. Now our soul, inasmuch as it is intelligent, is united to intellectual substances, which in the order of nature are above heavenly bodies, because our soul cannot understand except insofar as it derives its intellectual light from those substances. Therefore, the intellectual operation cannot be directly subject to the heavenly movements. Praeterea. Huic rei fidem faciet si consideremus ea quae a philosophis circa hoc sunt dicta. Antiqui enim philosophi naturales, ut Democritus, Empedocles, et huiusmodi, posuerunt quod intellectus non differt a sensu: ut patet in IV Metaph., et in III de anima. Et ideo sequebatur quod, cum sensus sit quaedam virtus corporea sequens corporum transmutationem, quod ita esset etiam de intellectu. Et propter hoc dixerunt quod, cum transmutatio inferiorum corporum sequatur transmutationem corporum superiorum, intellectualis operatio sequatur corporum caelestium motus: secundum illud Homeri: talis est intellectus in diis et hominibus terrenis qualem in die ducit pater virorum deorumque: idest sol; vel magis Iupiter, quem dicebant summum Deum, intelligentes per ipsum totum caelum, ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de civitate Dei. Moreover. We shall find a confirmation of this if we consider what philosophers have said in the matter. The natural philosophers of old, like Democritus, Empedocles and others, held that intellect differs not from sense, as stated in 4 Metaphysics, and 3 De Anima. Hence it follows that, as sense is a corporeal power resulting from a corporeal transmutation, so is the intellect likewise. Therefore, they said that intellectual operation follows the movements of the heavenly bodies as transmutation of the lower bodies follows transmutation of the higher bodies, according to the words of Homer: The mind of gods and men on earth is even as their day which comes from the father of men and gods, namely, the sun, or rather Jove, whom they called the supreme god, by whom they understood the whole heaven, as Augustine says. Hinc etiam processit Stoicorum opinio, qui dicebant cognitionem intellectus causari ex hoc quod imagines corporum nostris mentibus imprimuntur, sicut speculum quoddam, vel sicut pagina recipit litteras impressas, absque hoc quod aliquid agat: ut Boetius narrat in V de consolatione. Secundum quorum sententiam sequebatur quod maxime ex impressione corporum caelestium intellectuales notiones nobis imprimerentur. Unde et Stoici fuerunt qui praecipue necessitate quadam fatali hominum vitam duci posuerunt. Hence too followed the opinion of the Stoics, who said that the knowledge of the intellect is caused by images of bodies being imprinted on the mind like in a mirror, or like a page receives the imprinted characters without any action on its part (as Boethius relates). According to this opinion, it followed that our intellectual knowledge was chiefly the result of impressions received from heavenly bodies: consequently, it was chiefly the Stoics who held that man’s life was bound by a kind of fatal necessity. Sed haec positio inde falsa apparet, ut Boetius ibidem dicit, quia intellectus componit et dividit, et comparat suprema ad infima et cognoscit universalia et simplices formas, quae in corporibus non inveniuntur. Et sic manifestum est quod intellectus non est sicut recipiens tantum imagines corporum, sed habet aliquam virtutem corporibus altiorem: nam sensus exterior, qui solum imagines corporum recipit, ad praedicta non se extendit. This opinion however is shown to be false, as Boethius says, by the fact that the intellect is capable of synthesis and analysis, and compares the highest with the lowest, and is cognitive of universals and simple forms, none of which is within the capacity of bodies. Consequently, it is evident that the intellect does not merely receive the images of bodies, but is possessed of a power that transcends bodies: for the external senses, which receive only images of bodies, do not extend to the things mentioned above. Omnes autem sequentes philosophi, intellectum a sensu discernentes, causam nostrae scientiae non aliquibus corporibus, sed rebus immaterialibus attribuerunt: sicut Plato posuit causam nostrae scientiae esse ideas; Aristoteles autem intellectum agentem. All subsequent philosophers, however, discerned intellect from sense, and assigned not bodies but immaterial things as the cause of our knowledge: thus Plato ascribed this to ideas, and Aristotle to the active intellect. Ex his omnibus est accipere quod ponere corpora caelestia esse causam nobis intelligendi, est consequens opinioni eorum qui ponebant intellectum a sensu non differre: ut patet etiam per Aristotelem, in libro de anima. Hanc autem opinionem manifestum est esse falsam. Igitur manifestum est et eam esse falsam quae ponit corpora caelestia esse nobis causa intelligendi directe. From all this we may gather that to say that the heavenly bodies are the cause of our knowledge is a sequel to the opinion of those who held that intellect differs not from sense, as Aristotle observes. Now it is evident that this opinion is false. Therefore, the opinion of those who maintained that the heavenly bodies are the direct cause of our knowledge is manifestly false. Hinc est etiam quod sacra Scriptura causam nostrae intelligentiae attribuit, non alicui corpori, sed Deo: Iob 35:10 ubi est Deus qui fecit me, qui dedit carmina in nocte, qui docet nos super iumenta terrae, super volucres caeli erudit nos? Et in Psalmo, qui docet hominem scientiam. For this reason Sacred Scripture assigns as the cause of our knowledge, not a body, but God: Where is God my Maker, who gives songs in the night, who teaches us more than the beasts of the earth, and makes us wiser than the birds of the air? (Job 35:10–11). And in the Psalm: He who teaches men knowledge (Ps 94[93]:10). Sciendum est tamen quod, licet corpora caelestia directe intelligentiae nostrae causae esse non possint, aliquid tamen ad hoc operantur indirecte. Licet enim intellectus non sit virtus corporea, tamen in nobis operatio intellectus compleri non potest sine operatione virtutum corporearum, quae sunt imaginatio et vis memorativa et cogitativa, ut ex superioribus patet. Et inde est quod, impeditis harum virtutum operationibus propter aliquam corporis indispositionem, impeditur operatio intellectus: sicut patet in phreneticis et lethargicis, et aliis huiusmodi. Et propter hoc etiam bonitas dispositionis corporis humani facit aptum ad bene intelligendum, inquantum ex hoc praedictae vires fortiores existunt: unde dicitur in II de anima quod molles carne bene aptos mente videmus. Nevertheless, we must observe that although heavenly bodies cannot be the direct cause of our knowledge, they can cooperate indirectly towards it. For though the intellect is not a force of the body, yet in us the operation of the intellect cannot be exercised without the operation of bodily forces—namely, the imagination and the powers of memory and thought, as we have already shown. Hence it is that when the activity of these powers is hampered by some bodily indisposition, the activity of the intellect is hampered also, as may be seen in cases of frenzy, lethargy and the like. For the same reason, goodness of disposition in a man’s body fits him to understand easily, inasmuch as those forces are strengthened by such a disposition. Hence it is said in 2 De Anima that it is to be observed that men of soft flesh are of quick intelligence. Dispositio autem corporis humani subiacet caelestibus motibus. Dicit enim Augustinus, in V de civitate Dei, quod non usquequaque absurde dici potest ad solas corporum differentias afflatus quosdam valere sidereos. Et Damascenus dicit in secundo libro, quod alii et alii planetae diversas complexiones et habitus et dispositiones in nobis constituunt. Et ideo indirecte corpora caelestia ad bonitatem intelligentiae operantur. Et sic, sicut medici possunt iudicare de bonitate intellectus ex corporis complexione sicut ex dispositione proxima, ita astrologus ex motibus caelestibus sicut ex causa remota talis dispositionis. Et per hunc modum potest verificari quod Ptolomaeus in Centilogio dicit: cum fuerit Mercurius in nativitate alicuius in aliqua domorum Saturni, et ipse fortis in esse suo, dat bonitatem intelligentiae medullitus in rebus. Now the disposition of the human body is subject to the heavenly movements. For Augustine says that it is not altogether absurd to ascribe the mere differences between bodies to the influence of the stars. And Damascene says that the various planets produce in us various temperaments, habits and dispositions. Consequently, the heavenly bodies cooperate indirectly to the goodness of our intelligence. Thus, even as physicians are able to judge of a man’s intelligence from his bodily temperament (as a proximate disposition to it), so too can an astrologer from the heavenly movements (as being a remote cause of this disposition). In this sense we can approve of the saying of Ptolemy: When Mercury is in one of Saturn’s houses at the time of a man’s birth, he bestows on him a quick intelligence of the inner nature of things. Caput 85 Chapter 85 Quod corpora caelestia non sunt causae voluntatum et electionum nostrarum That the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our willing and choosing Ex hoc autem ulterius apparet quod corpora caelestia non sunt causa voluntatum nostrarum neque nostrarum electionum. It is also evident from the foregoing that the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our willing and choosing. Voluntas enim in parte intellectiva animae est: ut patet per philosophum in III de anima. Si igitur corpora caelestia non possunt imprimere directe in intellectum nostrum, ut ostensum est, neque etiam in voluntatem nostram directe imprimere poterunt. For the will is in the intellective part of the soul, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, if the heavenly bodies cannot make a direct impression on our intellect, as we have proved, neither will they be able to influence the will directly. Amplius. Omnis electio et actualis voluntas in nobis immediate ex apprehensione intelligibili causatur: bonum enim intellectum est obiectum voluntatis, ut patet in III de anima et propter hoc non potest sequi perversitas in eligendo nisi intellectus iudicium deficiat in particulari eligibili, ut patet per philosophum in VII Ethicorum. Corpora autem caelestia non sunt causa intelligentiae nostrae. Ergo neque electionis nostrae possunt esse causa. Moreover. Every act of choice or will in us is caused immediately through an intellectual apprehension, for the apprehended good is the object of the will. Hence there cannot ensue perverseness of choice unless the judgment of the intellect err in the particular object of choice, as the Philosopher states. But the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our intellectual apprehension. Therefore, neither can they be the cause of our choice. Item. Quaecumque ex impressione corporum caelestium in istis inferioribus eveniunt, naturaliter contingunt: cum haec inferiora sint naturaliter sub illis ordinata. Si ergo electiones nostrae eveniunt ex impressione corporum caelestium, oportet quod naturaliter eveniant: ut scilicet sic naturaliter homo eligat operari suas operationes, sicut naturali instinctu bruta operantur, et naturaliter corpora inanimata moventur. Non ergo erunt propositum et natura duo principia agentia, sed unum tantum, quod est natura. Cuius contrarium patet per Aristotelem in II physicorum. Non est igitur verum quod ex impressione corporum caelestium nostrae electiones proveniant. Further. Whatever takes place in this lower world through the influence of heavenly bodies happens naturally, since the things here below are naturally subordinate to them. If, therefore, the heavenly bodies have any influence on our choice, this must happen naturally. Thus, in fact, man naturally chooses to perform his actions, even as dumb animals perform theirs from natural instinct, and as inanimate bodies are moved naturally. Consequently, there will not be two active principles—namely, purpose and nature—but only one—namely, nature. But Aristotle proves the contrary. Therefore, it is untrue that the influence of heavenly bodies is the cause of our choice. Praeterea. Ea quae naturaliter fiunt, determinatis mediis perducuntur ad finem, unde semper eodem modo contingunt: natura enim determinata est ad unum. Electiones autem humanae diversis viis tendunt in finem, tam in moralibus quam in artificialibus. Non igitur electiones humanae sunt naturaliter. Besides. Things that happen naturally are brought to their end by definite means; hence they always happen in the same way, for nature is determined to one method. But man’s choice tends to the end in various ways, both in morals and in things made by art. Therefore, man’s choosing does not come from nature. Amplius. Ea quae naturaliter fiunt, ut plurimum recte fiunt: natura enim non deficit nisi in paucioribus. Si igitur homo naturaliter eligeret, ut in pluribus electiones essent rectae. Quod patet esse falsum. Non igitur homo naturaliter eligit. Quod oporteret si ex impulsu corporum caelestium eligeret. Again. Things which are done naturally for the most part are done rightly, since nature fails but seldom. Consequently, if man chose by nature, his choice would be right for the most part—which is clearly false. Therefore, man does not choose naturally. Yet this would be the case if his choice were subject to the influence of heavenly bodies. Item. Ea quae sunt eiusdem speciei, non diversificantur in operationibus naturalibus quae naturam speciei consequuntur: unde omnis hirundo similiter facit nidum, et omnis homo similiter intelligit prima principia, quae sunt naturaliter nota. Electio autem est operatio consequens speciem humanam. Si igitur homo naturaliter eligeret, oporteret quod omnes homines eodem modo eligerent. Quod patet esse falsum, tam in moralibus quam in artificialibus. Further. Things of the same species do not differ in those natural operations which result from the specific nature. Hence each swallow makes its nest in the same way, and every man equally understands the first principles which are known naturally. Now choosing is an operation that results from the human species. Consequently, if man chose naturally, all men would choose in the same way. This is evidently untrue, both in morals and in things made by art. Adhuc. Virtutes et vitia sunt electionum principia propria: nam virtuosus et vitiosus differunt ex hoc quod contraria eligunt. Virtutes autem politicae et vitia non sunt nobis a natura, sed ex assuetudine: ut probat philosophus, in II Ethic., ex hoc quod quales operationes assuescimus, et maxime a puero, ad tales habitum habemus. Ergo electiones nostrae non sunt nobis a natura. Non ergo causantur ex impressione corporum caelestium, secundum quam res naturaliter procedunt. Moreover. Virtue and vice are proper principles of choice, because the virtuous and the vicious man differ through choosing contraries. Now civic virtues and vices are not in us by nature but by habituation. The Philosopher proves this from the fact that we acquire the habit of those operations to which we are accustomed, especially from childhood. In us, therefore, choosing does not come from nature: consequently, it is not caused by the influence of heavenly bodies, in respect of which things happen naturally. Adhuc. Corpora caelestia non imprimunt directe nisi in corpora, ut ostensum est. Si igitur sint causa electionum nostrarum, aut hoc erit inquantum imprimunt in corpora nostra, aut inquantum imprimunt in exteriora. Neutro autem modo sufficienter possunt esse causa electionis nostrae. Non enim est sufficiens causa nostrae electionis quod aliqua corporalia nobis exterius praesententur: patet enim quod ad occursum alicuius delectabilis, puta cibi vel mulieris, temperatus non movetur ad eligendum ipsum, intemperatus autem movetur. Similiter etiam non sufficit ad nostram electionem quaecumque immutatio possit esse in nostro corpore ab impressione caelestis corporis: cum per hoc non sequantur in nobis nisi quaedam passiones, vel magis vel minus vehementes; passiones autem, quantumcumque vehementes, non sunt causa sufficiens electionis, quia per easdem passiones incontinens inducitur ad eas sequendum per electionem, continens autem non inducitur. Non potest igitur dici quod corpora caelestia sunt causae nostrarum electionum. Again. Heavenly bodies make no direct impression except on bodies, as we have shown. Consequently, if they are the cause of our choosing, this will be by an impression made either on our bodies, or on external bodies. Yet in neither way can they be a sufficient cause of our choosing. For the objective presentation of some corporeal thing cannot be an adequate cause of our choice, since it is clear that when a man meets with something that pleases him, be it meat or woman, the temperate man is not moved to choose these things, whereas the intemperate is. Again, no possible change wrought in our bodies by an impression of the heavenly bodies can suffice to cause us to make a choice, since all that results from those are certain passions, more or less impetuous. Passions, however turbulent, are not a sufficient cause of choosing, since the same passions lead the incontinent to follow them by choice, and fail to induce the continent man. Therefore, it must not be said that the heavenly bodies cause our choice. Amplius. Nulla virtus datur alicui rei frustra. Homo autem habet virtutem iudicandi et consiliandi de omnibus quae per ipsum operabilia sunt, sive in usu exteriorum rerum, sive in admittendo vel repellendo intrinsecas passiones. Quod quidem frustra esset, si electio nostra causaretur a corporibus caelestibus, non existens in nostra potestate. Non igitur corpora caelestia sunt causa nostrae electionis. Further. No faculty is bestowed without a purpose. Now man has the faculty of judging and counselling about all matters relative to his own actions, whether in the use of externals, or in giving a loose or a tight rein to our internal passions. But this would be of no use if our choice were the result of the heavenly bodies, and not in our own power. Therefore, the heavenly bodies are not the cause of our choice. Praeterea. Homo naturaliter est animal politicum, vel sociale. Quod quidem ex hoc apparet quod unus homo non sufficit sibi si solus vivat, propterea quod natura in paucis homini providit sufficienter, dans ei rationem, per quam posset sibi omnia necessaria ad vitam praeparare, sicut cibum, indumenta, et alia huiusmodi ad quae omnia operanda non sufficit unus homo. Unde naturaliter est inditum homini ut in societate vivat. Sed ordo providentiae non aufert alicui rei quod est sibi naturale, sed magis unicuique providetur secundum suam naturam, ut ex dictis patet. Non igitur per ordinem providentiae sic est homo ordinatus ut vita socialis tollatur. Tolleretur autem si electiones nostrae ex impressionibus corporum caelestium provenirent, sicut naturales instinctus aliorum animalium. Besides. Man is naturally a civil or social animal. This is evident from the fact that one man does not suffice for himself if he lives alone, because the things are few in which nature makes adequate provision for man, since she gave him his reason by means of which he might provide himself with all necessaries of life, such as food, clothes, and so forth—for the production of which one man is not enough. Hence man has a natural inclination for social life. Now, the order of providence does not deprive a thing of what is natural to it: rather, each thing is provided for according to its nature, as we have said above. Therefore, man is not so made by the order of providence that he be deprived of social life. Yet he would be deprived of it were our choice to proceed from the influence of heavenly bodies, like the natural instinct of other animals. Frustra etiam darentur leges et praecepta vivendi, si homo suarum electionum dominus non esset. Frustra etiam adhiberentur poenae et praemia bonis aut malis, ex quo non est in nobis haec vel illa eligere. His autem desinentibus, statim socialis vita corrumpitur. Non igitur homo est sic secundum ordinem providentiae institutus ut electiones eius ex motibus caelestium corporum proveniant. Moreover, laws and precepts of conduct would be useless were man not the master of his own choice: and useless too would be punishments and rewards for good and wicked, if it were not in our power to choose this or that. And yet, if there were not such things, there would be at once an end to social life. Consequently, man is not so made, according to the order of providence, that his choice should result from the movements of heavenly bodies. Adhuc. Electiones hominum ad bona et mala se habent. Si igitur electiones nostrae ex motibus stellarum provenirent, sequeretur quod stellae per se essent causa malarum electionum. Quod autem est malum, non habet causam in natura: nam malum incidit ex defectu alicuius causae, et non habet causam per se, ut supra ostensum est. Non igitur est possibile quod electiones nostrae directe et per se a corporibus caelestibus proveniant sicut ex causis. Again. A man’s choice is of good and evil things. Hence, if our choosing is the result of the movements of the stars, it would follow that the stars are the essential cause of wicked deeds. But that which is evil has no natural cause, since evil is incidental to a defective cause, and has no essential cause, as we have proved. Therefore, it is impossible that our choice be the direct and essential effect of the heavenly bodies. Potest autem aliquis huic rationi obviare dicendo quod omnis mala electio ex alicuius boni appetitu provenit, ut supra ostensum est: sicut electio adulteri provenit appetitu boni delectabilis quod est in venereis. Ad quod quidem bonum universale aliqua stella movet. Et hoc necessarium est ad generationes animalium perficiendas: nec debuit hoc commune bonum praetermitti propter malum particulare huius, qui ex hoc instinctu eligit malum. Someone, however, might endeavor to meet this argument by saying that every evil choice results from the desire of some particular good, as we have proved above: thus the choice of the lustful man arises from his desire for a good consisting in sexual pleasure, and some star causes movement to this good in general. In fact, this is necessary for the generating of animals, and this common good was not to be omitted on account of the particular evil of an individual, who through this instigation chooses an evil. Haec autem responsio sufficiens non est, si ponantur corpora caelestia per se causa electionum nostrarum, utpote per se imprimentia in intellectum et voluntatem. Nam impressio universalis causae recipitur in unoquoque secundum modum suum. Effectus ergo stellae moventis ad delectationem quae est in coniunctione ordinata ad generationem, recipietur in quolibet secundum modum proprium sibi: sicut videmus quod diversa animalia habent diversa tempora et diversos modos commixtionis, secundum congruentiam suae naturae, ut Aristoteles dicit in libro de historiis animalium. Recipient ergo intellectus et voluntas impressionem illius stellae secundum modum suum. Cum autem aliquid appetitur secundum modum, intellectus et rationis, non accidit peccatum in electione, quae quidem semper ex hoc mala est quod non est secundum rationem rectam. Non igitur, si corpora caelestia essent causa electionum nostrarum, esset unquam in nobis electio mala. But this reply is not sufficient if we suppose the heavenly bodies to be the essential cause of our choice through making direct impressions on our intellect and will. For the impression made by a universal cause is received in a thing according to that thing’s mode. Consequently, the effect of a star which causes a movement towards the pleasure in the union ordered to generation will be received into a thing according to the mode proper to it: thus we see that various animals have various ways and various times of coming together, as becomes their nature, as Aristotle remarks. Hence the intellect and will receive the impression of that star according to their mode. Now when a thing is desired according to the mode of the intellect and reason, there is no sin in the choice, which is always evil through not being according to right reason. Therefore, if the heavenly bodies were the cause of our choice, we should never make an evil choice. Amplius. Nulla virtus activa se extendit ad ea quae sunt supra speciem et naturam agentis: quia omne agens agit per suam formam. Sed ipsum velle transcendit omnem speciem corporalem, sicut et ipsum intelligere: sicut enim intelligimus universalia, ita et voluntas nostra in aliquod universale fertur, puta quod odimus omne latronum genus, ut philosophus dicit in sua rhetorica. Nostrum igitur velle non causatur a corpore caelesti. Further. No active power extends to things above the species and nature of the agent, because every agent acts through its form. Now, to will, as also to understand, transcends every corporeal species, for just as our intellect understands the universal, so also is our will referred to the universal. For instance, we dislike every kind of thief, as the Philosopher says. Therefore, the act of the will is not caused by a heavenly body.