Ad aliud igitur tendit intentio particularis agentis, et universalis: nam particulare agens tendit ad bonum partis absolute, et facit eam quanto meliorem potest; universale autem agens tendit ad bonum totius. Unde aliquis defectus est praeter intentionem particularis agentis, qui est secundum intentionem agentis universalis. Sicut patet quod generatio feminae est praeter intentionem naturae particularis, idest, huius virtutis quae est in hoc semine, quae ad hoc tendit quod perficiat conceptum quanto magis potest: est autem de intentione naturae universalis, idest, virtutis universalis agentis ad generationem inferiorum, quod femina generetur, sine qua generatio multorum animalium compleri non posset. Et eodem modo corruptio, et diminutio, et omnis defectus, est de intentione naturae universalis, non autem naturae particularis: nam quaelibet res fugit defectum, tendit vero ad perfectionem, quantum in se est. Patet ergo quod de intentione agentis particularis est quod effectus suus fiat perfectus quantumcumque potest in genere suo: de intentione autem naturae universalis est quod hic effectus fiat perfectus tali perfectione, puta perfectione masculi, ille autem perfectione feminae. Accordingly, the intention of the particular agent differs from that of the universal agent, for the particular agent aims at the good of the part absolutely, and makes it as good as it can, whereas the universal agent aims at the good of the whole. Consequently, a defect is beside the intention of the particular agent, but according to the intention of the universal agent. Thus the generation of a female is clearly beside the intention of a particular nature (namely, of this particular virtue in this particular seed, the tendency of which is to make the embryo as perfect as possible); on the other hand, it is the purpose of universal nature (namely of the power of the universal cause of generation in inferior beings) that a female be generated, which is a necessary condition for the generation of many animals. In like manner, corruption, diminution, and every defect is in the purpose of universal nature, but not of the particular nature, because each thing shuns deficiency and, for its own part, aims at perfection. It is clear, then, that the particular agent aims at the greatest possible perfection of its effect in its kind; while the universal nature aims at a particular perfection in a particular effect (for instance, the perfection of a male in one effect, that of a female in another). Inter partes autem totius universi prima distinctio apparet secundum contingens et necessarium: superiora enim in entibus sunt necessaria et incorruptibilia et immobilia; a qua quidem conditione tanto magis deficiunt, quanto in inferiori gradu constituuntur; ita quod infima corrumpuntur quidem quantum ad esse suum, moventur vero quantum ad suas dispositiones, suos etiam effectus non de necessitate, sed contingenter producunt. Quodlibet igitur agens quod est pars universi, intendit quantum potest in suo esse et naturali dispositione persistere, et suum stabilire effectum: Deus autem, qui est universi gubernator, intendit quod effectum eius hic quidem stabiliatur per modum necessitatis, hic autem contingenter. Et secundum hoc diversas eis causas adaptat, his quidem necessarias, his autem contingentes. Cadit igitur sub ordine divinae providentiae non solum hunc effectum esse, sed hunc effectum esse contingenter, alium autem necessario. Et secundum hoc, quaedam eorum quae divinae providentiae subduntur sunt necessaria, quaedam vero contingentia, non autem omnia necessaria. Among the parts of the whole universe the first distinction to be observed is between the contingent and the necessary, since the higher beings are necessary, incorruptible, and unchangeable. But the lower a thing is, the more it falls short of this condition; thus the lowest are corruptible in their very being, are changeable in their disposition, and produce their effects not of necessity, but contingently. Therefore, every agent that is a part of the universe has a tendency to remain firm in its being and natural disposition, and to establish its effect, while God, who governs the universe, intends to establish some of his effects by way of necessity, and others by way of contingency. Accordingly, he adapts various causes to those effects, to some necessary, to others contingent causes. Therefore, it belongs to the order of divine providence not only that such and such an effect be produced, but that it be caused necessarily, and that some other effect be produced contingently. Consequently, some of the things subject to divine providence are necessary, and some contingent, and not all necessary. Patet ergo quod, etsi divina providentia est per se causa huius effectus futuri; et est in praesenti vel praeterito, magis autem ab aeterno: non sequitur, ut prima ratio procedebat, quod effectus iste sit de necessitate futurus; est enim divina providentia per se causa quod hic effectus contingenter proveniat. Et hoc cassari non potest. It is therefore evident that although divine providence is the per se cause of a particular future effect, and more truly eternal even though it is present and past, yet it does not follow (as the first argument pretended) that this particular effect necessarily will be. For the divine providence is the per se cause that this particular effect will happen contingently, and this cannot fail. Ex quo etiam patet quod haec conditionalis est vera, si Deus providit hoc futurum, hoc erit: sicut secunda ratio procedebat. Sed sic erit sicut Deus providit illud esse futurum. Providit autem illud esse futurum contingenter. Sequitur ergo infallibiliter quod erit contingenter, et non necessario. From which it is clear that this conditional proposition is true: if God foresaw that this would happen, it will be so, as the second argument stated. But it will be as God foresaw that it would be. Now, he foresaw that it would happen contingently. It follows, then, infallibly that it will be contingently and not of necessity. Patet etiam quod hoc quod ponitur esse provisum a Deo ut sit futurum, si sit de genere contingentium, poterit non esse secundum se consideratum: sic enim provisum est ut sit contingens, potens non esse. Non tamen est possibile quod ordo providentiae deficiat quin contingenter eveniat. Et sic tertia ratio solvitur. Unde potest poni quod iste non sit regnaturus si secundum se consideretur: non autem si consideretur ut provisum. It is also clear that if this thing which we suppose to be foreseen by God as future be of a contingent nature, it will be possible for it not to happen considered in itself: for it is foreseen in such a way as to be contingent, and possible not to be. Yet the order of divine providence cannot fail; thus it will happen contingently. Thus the third argument is solved. Consequently, we may say that the man in question might not reign if we consider the statement in itself, but not if we consider it as foreseen. Illud etiam quod Tullius obiicit, secundum praemissa frivolum apparet. Cum enim divinae providentiae non solum subdantur effectus, sed etiam causae et modi essendi, sicut ex praemissis patet, non sequitur quod, si omnia divina providentia aguntur, quod nihil sit in nobis. Sic enim sunt a Deo provisa ut per nos libere fiant. Again, the argument advanced by Cicero appears of small account in the light of what we have said. For, seeing that not only effects but also causes and modes of being are subject to divine providence, as is clear from the foregoing, it does not follow that nothing is under our control if all things are ruled by divine providence. Thus they are foreseen by God so as to be freely done by us. Neque autem defectibilitas causarum secundarum, quibus mediantibus effectus providentiae producuntur, certitudinem divinae providentiae potest auferre, ut quinta ratio procedebat: cum ipse Deus in omnibus operetur, et pro suae arbitrio voluntatis, ut supra ostensum est. Unde ad eius providentiam pertinet ut causas defectibiles quandoque sinat deficere, quandoque eas a defectu conservet. Nor can the defectibility of second causes, by means of which the effects of providence are produced, deprive divine providence of certainty, as the fifth objection argued. For God himself works in all things according to the decree of his will, as we proved above. Consequently, it belongs to his providence sometimes to allow defectible causes to fail, and sometimes to preserve them from failing. Ea vero quae ad necessitatem provisorum a Deo possent assumi ex certitudine scientiae, supra soluta sunt, cum de Dei scientia ageretur. Such arguments as might be used to prove the necessity of things foreseen by God from the certitude of his knowledge were solved above, when we were treating of the divine knowledge. Caput 95 Chapter 95 Quod immobilitas divinae providentiae utilitatem orationis non excludit That the unchangeableness of divine providence does not exclude the usefulness of prayer Considerare etiam oportet quod, sicut providentiae immobilitas necessitatem rebus provisis non imponit, ita etiam nec orationis utilitatem excludit. Non enim ad hoc oratio ad Deum funditur ut aeterna providentiae dispositio immutetur, hoc enim impossibile est: sed ut aliquis illud quod desiderat, assequatur a Deo. We must also observe that as the unchangeableness of providence does not impose necessity on things foreseen, so neither does it exclude the usefulness of prayer. For we do not pray that the eternal disposition of his providence may be changed, since this is impossible, but that he may grant what we desire. Piis enim desideriis rationalis creaturae conveniens est quod Deus assentiat, non tanquam desideria nostra moveant immobilem Deum: sed ex sua bonitate procedit ut convenienter desiderata perficiat. Cum enim omnia naturaliter bonum desiderent, ut supra probatum est; ad supereminentiam autem divinae bonitatis pertinet quod esse, et bene esse, omnibus ordine quodam distribuat: consequens est ut, secundum suam bonitatem, desideria pia, quae per orationem explicantur, adimpleat. For it is fitting that God should assent to the pious yearnings of the rational creature—not as though our desires have the effect of changing a God who is unchangeable, but as an effect befitting his goodness in granting our desires. For, since all things naturally desire the good, as we have proved, and since it belongs to the supereminent divine goodness to bestow being and well-being on all things in a certain order, it follows that he fulfils, according to his goodness, the pious desires of which our prayers are the expression. Adhuc. Ad moventem pertinet ut id quod movetur, perducat ad finem: unde et per eandem naturam aliquid movetur ad finem, et consequitur finem, et in eo quiescit. Omne autem desiderium est quidam motus ad bonum. Qui quidem non potest rebus inesse nisi a Deo, qui est per essentiam suam bonus, et fons bonitatis: movens enim omne movet ad aliquid simile sibi. Ad Deum igitur pertinet, secundum suam bonitatem, quod desideria convenientia, quae per orationes explicantur, ad effectum convenientem perducat. Again. He who causes a thing to move should lead that thing to the end, so that by the same nature, a thing is moved to its end, attains to that end, and rests in it. Now every desire is a movement to a good, and it cannot be in a thing except it come from God, who is good in his essence, and the source of goodness: for every mover moves to its like. Therefore, it belongs to God, according to his goodness, to bring to a fitting issue the reasonable desires which are expressed by means of one’s prayers. Item. Quanto aliqua sunt propinquiora moventi, tanto efficacius impressionem moventis assequuntur: nam et quae propinquiora sunt igni, magis ab ipso calefiunt. Substantiae autem intellectuales propinquiores sunt Deo quam substantiae naturales inanimatae. Efficacior est igitur impressio divinae motionis in substantiis intellectualibus quam in substantiis aliis naturalibus. Corpora autem naturalia in tantum participant de motione divina quod naturalem boni appetitum consequuntur ex eo, et etiam appetitus impletionem, quod quidem fit dum proprios fines consequuntur. Multo igitur magis intellectuales substantiae desideriorum suorum, quae per orationem Deo offeruntur, impletionem consequuntur. Besides. The nearer things are to their mover, the more effectively do they receive the mover’s impression: thus the things nearer to a fire are more heated thereby. Now intellectual substances are nearer to God than inanimate natural substances. Consequently, the impression of the divine motion is more efficacious in intellectual substances than in other natural substances. Now natural bodies participate in the divine motion to this extent that they receive from it a natural appetite for the good, as well as the fulfilment of that appetite, which is realized when they attain to their respective ends. Much more, therefore, do intellectual substances attain to the fulfilment of their desires which are proffered to God in their prayers. Amplius. De ratione amicitiae est quod amans velit impleri desiderium amati, inquantum vult eius bonum et perfectionem: propter quod dicitur quod amicorum est idem velle. Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus suam creaturam amat; et tanto magis unamquamque quanto plus de eius bonitate participat, quae est primum et principale amatum ab ipso. Vult igitur impleri desideria rationalis creaturae, quae perfectissime divinam bonitatem participat inter ceteras creaturas. Sua autem voluntas est perfectiva rerum: est enim causa rerum per suam voluntatem, ut supra ostensum est. Ad bonitatem igitur divinam pertinet ut impleat desideria rationalis creaturae sibi per orationem proposita. Moreover. It is essential to friendship that the lover wish the desire of the beloved to be fulfilled, inasmuch as he seeks his good and perfection. Hence it has been said that friends have but one will. Now we have proved that God loves his creature, and so much the more as it has a greater share of his goodness, which is the first and chief object of his love. Hence he wills the desires of the rational creature to be fulfilled, since of all creatures it participates most perfectly in the divine goodness. Now it is from his will that things derive their being, because he is the cause of things through his will, as was proved above. Therefore, it belongs to God’s goodness to fulfill the rational creature’s desires, as laid before him in our prayers. Praeterea. Bonum creaturae derivatum est secundum quandam similitudinem a bonitate divina. Hoc autem maxime commendabile in hominibus apparet, ut iuste petentibus assensum non denegent: ex hoc enim vocantur liberales, clementes, misericordes et pii. Maxime igitur hoc ad divinam bonitatem pertinet, ut pias orationes exaudiat. Besides. The creature’s good flows from the divine goodness, in a kind of likeness to it. Now it is seemingly a most praiseworthy trait in a man if he grant the prayers of those who ask aright; since for this reason is he said to be liberal, gentle, merciful and kind. Therefore, it belongs in a special manner to the divine goodness to grant pious prayers. Hinc est quod dicitur in Psalmo: voluntatem timentium se faciet, et orationes eorum exaudiet, et salvos faciet eos. Et Matth. 7:8, dominus dicit: omnis qui petit accipit, et qui quaerit invenit, et pulsanti aperietur. Hence it is said in the Psalm: He fulfils the desire of all who fear him, he also hears their cry, and saves them (Ps 145[144]:19); and our Lord says: Every one who asks receives, and he who seeks finds, and to him who knocks it will be opened (Matt 7:8). Caput 96 Chapter 96 Quod non est inconveniens si quandoque etiam petitiones orantium non admittantur a Deo That it is not unfitting if sometimes the petitions of those who pray be not granted by God Non est autem inconveniens si quandoque etiam petitiones orantium non admittantur a Deo. And yet it is not unfitting that sometimes the petitions of those who pray be not granted by God. Ea enim ratione ostensum est quod Deus desideria rationalis creaturae adimplet, inquantum desiderat bonum. Quandoque autem contingit quod id quod petitur non est verum bonum, sed apparens, simpliciter autem malum. Non est igitur talis oratio Deo exaudibilis. Hinc est quod dicitur Iac. 4:3: petitis et non accipitis, eo quod male petatis. For it was proved that God fulfils the desires of the rational creature, inasmuch as the good is the object of the creature’s desire. Sometimes, however, it happens that what we seek is good not truly but apparently, and is simply evil. Such a prayer, therefore, cannot be granted by God. Hence it is said: You ask and do not receive, because you ask wrongly (Jas 4:3). Similiter autem ex hoc quod Deus ad desiderandum movet, ostensum est conveniens esse quod desideria impleat. Mobile autem ad finem motus non perducitur a movente nisi motus continuetur. Si igitur motus desiderii per orationis instantiam non continuetur, non est inconveniens si oratio effectum debitum non sortiatur. Hinc est quod dominus dicit, Lucae 18:1: quoniam oportet semper orare, et non deficere. Et I Thess. 5:17, dicit apostolus: sine intermissione orate. Again, it was shown to be fitting that God fulfils our desires because he moves us to desire. Now the thing moved is not brought to the end of its movement unless the movement continue. Accordingly, if the movement of desire be not continued by repeated prayer, it is not unfitting if the prayer be ineffectual. Thus our Lord says that they ought always to pray and not lose heart (Luke 18:1); and the Apostle says: Pray without ceasing (1 Thess 5:17). Rursus. Ostensum est quod Deus rationalis creaturae decenter desiderium implet inquantum ei appropinquat. Appropinquat autem ei aliquis per contemplationem, et devotam affectionem, et humilem et firmam intentionem. Illa igitur oratio quae sic Deo non appropinquat, non est a Deo exaudibilis. Unde et in Psalmo dicitur: respexit in orationem humilium; Iac. 1:6: postulet autem in fide, nihil haesitans. Further. We proved that God fittingly fulfils the desire of the rational creature on account of its being near to God. Now a man approaches to God by contemplation, devout affections, and humble but firm resolutions. A prayer, therefore, that lacks these conditions in its approach to God does not deserve to be granted by him. Hence it is said in the Psalm: He has had regard to the prayer of the humble (Ps 102:17[101:18]); and: Let him ask in faith, without doubting (Jas 1:6). Item. Ostensum est quod ratione amicitiae, Deus vota piorum exaudit. Qui igitur a Dei amicitia declinat, non est dignum ut eius oratio exaudiatur. Hinc est quod Prov. 28:9 dicitur: qui declinat aurem suam ne audiat legem, oratio eius erit execrabilis. Et Isaiae 1:15: cum multiplicaveritis orationes, non exaudiam: manus enim vestrae sanguine plenae sunt. Moreover. We proved that God grants the prayers of the devout on the score of friendship. Consequently, if a man rejects God’s friendship, his prayer is unworthy of being granted. Hence it is said: If one turns away his ear from hearing the law, even his prayer is an abomination (Prov 28:9); and: Even though you make many prayers, I will not listen; for your hands are full of blood (Isa 1:15). Ex hac etiam radice procedit quod quandoque aliquis Dei amicus non auditur quando pro his rogat qui non sunt Dei amici: secundum illud Ierem. 7:16: tu ergo noli orare pro populo hoc, nec assumas pro eis laudem et orationem, et non obsistas mihi: quia non exaudiam te. It is on the same principle that sometimes a friend of God is not heard when he prays for those who are not God’s friends. Thus it is said: Do not pray for this people, or lift up cry or prayer for them, and do not intercede with me, for I will not hear you (Jer 7:16). Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis ex amicitia denegat quod petitur ab amico, quia cognoscit hoc ei esse nocivum, vel contrarium ei magis expedire: ut medicus infirmanti quandoque negat quod petit, considerans quod non expedit ei ad salutem corporis consequendam. Unde, cum ostensum sit quod Deus ex amore quem ad creaturam rationalem habet, eius desideria impleat sibi per orationem proposita, non est mirandum si quandoque eorum etiam quos praecipue diligit, petitionem non implet, ut impleat quod petenti magis expedit ad salutem. Propter quod a Paulo stimulum carnis non amovit, quamvis hoc ter peteret, providens hoc ei esse utile ad humilitatis conservationem, ut habetur II Cor. 12:8–9. Unde et Matth. 20:22, quibusdam dominus dicit: nescitis quid petatis. Et Rom. 8:26 dicitur: nam quid oremus sicut oportet, nescimus. Et propter hoc Augustinus dicit, in Epist. ad Paul. et Ther.: bonus dominus, qui non tribuit saepe quod volumus, ut quod mallemus attribuat. It happens, too, sometimes that a man refuses his friend’s request through friendship because he knows it to be hurtful to him, or the contrary to be better for him. Thus a physician will sometimes refuse a sick man what he asks, knowing that it is not good for his health. Hence, since it has been proved that God, for love of the rational creature, fulfils the desires set forth in his prayers, we must not be surprised if sometimes he does not fulfill the prayers of those even who are most dear to him so that he may accomplish what is best for the welfare of the suppliant. For this reason, he did not remove from Paul the thorn in his flesh, though thrice he prayed for this, because he foresaw that this would be good for him by keeping him humble, as related in 2 Cor 12:8–9. Hence also our Lord said to some: You do not know what you are asking (Matt 20:22); and it is said: We do not know how to pray as we ought (Rom 8:26). For this reason Augustine says: The Lord is good, for often he grants not what we want, that he may give what we want more. Patet igitur ex praemissis quod aliquorum quae fiunt a Deo, causa sunt orationes et pia desideria. Ostensum est autem supra quod divina providentia causas alias non excludit: quin potius ordinat eas ad hoc quod ordo quem apud se statuit, rebus imponatur; et sic causae secundae non repugnant providentiae, sed magis providentiae exequuntur effectum. Sic igitur orationes apud Deum efficaces sunt, nec tamen ordinem immutabilem divinae providentiae solvunt: quia et hoc ipsum quod tali petenti hoc concedatur, sub ordine divinae providentiae cadit. Simile est ergo dicere non esse orandum ut aliquid consequamur a Deo quia ordo suae providentiae est immutabilis, ac si diceretur quod non est ambulandum ut perveniamus ad locum, nec comedendum ut nutriamur: quae omnia patent esse absurda. It is clear, then, from what has been said that prayers and pious desires are the cause of some of the things done by God. Now it has been shown that God’s providence does not exclude other causes: rather indeed does he dispose of them so that the order appointed by his providence may be established in things. Consequently, second causes are not inconsistent with providence—in fact, they accomplish the effect of providence. Accordingly, prayers are efficacious before God, yet they do not upset the unchangeable order of divine providence, since even the granting of each suppliant’s prayer is included in the order of divine providence. To say, therefore, that we must not pray that we may obtain something from God because the order of his providence is unchangeable is like saying that we must not walk in order to arrive at a place, nor eat that we may have nourishment, both of which are clearly absurd. Excluditur ergo ex praemissis duplex error circa orationem. Quidam enim dixerunt nullum esse orationis fructum. Quod quidem dicebant tam illi qui negabant divinam providentiam omnino, sicut Epicurei; quam illi qui res humanas divinae providentiae subtrahebant, sicut aliqui Peripateticorum; necnon et illi qui omnia quae providentiae subsunt, ex necessitate contingere arbitrabantur, sicut Stoici. Ex his enim omnibus sequitur quod nullus sit orationis fructus, et per consequens quod omnis deitatis cultus fiat in vanum: qui quidem error tangitur Malach. 3:14: dixistis, inquit, vanus est qui servit Deo. Et quod emolumentum quia custodivimus praecepta eius, et quia ambulavimus tristes coram domino exercituum? By the foregoing we refute a twofold error about prayer. For some have said that prayer has no fruit. This was asserted both by those who, like the Epicureans, utterly denied divine providence, and by those who (like certain Peripatetics) withdrew human affairs from the providence of God, and again by those who, with the Stoics, contended that all things subject to providence happen of necessity. For it results from all these opinions that prayer produces no fruit, and that consequently all worship of the divinity is in vain. There is an allusion to this error in Malachi: It is vain to serve God. What is the good of our keeping his charge or of walking as in mourning before the Lord of hosts? (Mal 3:14). Quidam vero e contrario divinam dispositionem orationibus vertibilem esse dicebant: sicut et Aegyptii dicebant quod fatum orationibus et quibusdam imaginibus, subfumigationibus, sive incantationibus, vertebatur. On the other hand, some have contended that the divine ordinance can be changed by our prayers: thus the Egyptians said that fate was averted by prayers, certain images, incensings or incantations. Et ad hunc sensum pertinere videntur quaedam quae in Scripturis divinis dicuntur, secundum id quod prima facie apparet ex eis. Dicitur enim Isaiae 38 quod Isaias, ex mandato domini, dixit Ezechiae regi, haec dicit dominus: dispone domui tuae, quia morieris tu, et non vives; et quod post orationem Ezechiae, factum est verbum domini ad Isaiam dicens, vade, et dic Ezechiae: audivi orationem tuam. Ecce, ego adiiciam super dies tuos quindecim annos. Et Ierem. 18 dicitur ex persona domini: repente loquar adversus gentem et adversus regnum, ut eradicem et destruam et disperdam illud. Si poenitentiam egerit gens illa a malo suo, quod locutus sum adversus eam, agam et ego poenitentiam super malo quod cogitavi ut facerem ei. Et Ioelis 2:13 convertimini ad dominum Deum vestrum, quia benignus et misericors est. Quis scit si convertatur et ignoscat Deus? Certain passages in Sacred Scripture would seem at the first glance to admit of being taken in this sense. For it is related that Isaias, at God’s command, said to King Ezechias: Thus says the Lord: Set your house in order; for you shall die, you shall not live (Isa 38:1), and that after Ezechias had prayed, the word of the Lord came to Isaiah: Go and say to Ezechias: I have heard your prayer . . . Behold, I will add fifteen years to your life (Isa 38:4–5). Also, it is said in the name of God: If at any time I declare concerning a nation or a kingdom, that I will pluck up and break down and destroy it, and if that nation concerning which I have spoken turns from its evil, I will repent of the evil that I intended to do to it (Jer 18:7–8). And: Return to the Lord your God, for he is gracious and merciful . . . Who knows whether he will not turn and repent? (Joel 2:13–14). Haec autem si secundum suam superficiem intelligantur, ad inconveniens ducunt. Sequitur enim primo, quod voluntas Dei sit mutabilis. Item, quod aliquid ex tempore Deo adveniat. Et ulterius, quod aliqua quae temporaliter in creaturis sunt, sint causa alicuius existentis in Deo. Quae sunt manifeste impossibilia, sicut ex superioribus patet. These passages, if taken in their superficial sense, lead to an impossibility. For, in the first place, it follows that God’s will is changeable. Also, that God acquires something from the course of time. Further, that things happening in time to creatures cause something that is in God. These are all impossible, as is evident from what has been already laid down. Adversantur etiam auctoritatibus sacrae Scripturae, quae infallibilem continent veritatem et expressam. Dicitur enim Num. 23:19: non est Deus quasi homo, ut mentiatur; nec ut filius hominis, ut mutetur. Dixit ergo, et non faciet? Locutus est, et non implebit? Et I Reg. 15:29: triumphator in Israel non parcet, et poenitudine non flectetur: neque enim homo est, ut agat poenitentiam. Et Malach. 3:6: ego dominus, et non mutor. They are also contrary to Sacred Scripture, which contains the expression of infallible truth. For it is said: God is not man, that he should lie, or a son of man, that he should repent. Has he said, and will he not do it? Or has he spoken, and will he not fulfill it? (Num 23:19). And: The triumpher in Israel will not lie or repent; for he is not a man, that he should repent (1 Sam 15:29). And: I, the Lord, do not change (Mal 3:6). Si quis autem diligenter consideret circa praedicta, inveniet quod omnis error qui in his accidit, ex hoc provenit quod non consideratur differentia inter universalem ordinem et particularem. Cum enim omnes effectus ordinem ad invicem habeant secundum quod in una causa conveniunt, oportet tanto esse communiorem ordinem, quanto est universalior causa. Unde ab universali causa, quae Deus est, ordo proveniens necesse est quod omnia complectatur. Nihil igitur prohibet aliquem particularem ordinem vel per orationem, vel per aliquem alium modum immutari: est enim extra illum ordinem aliquid quod possit ipsum immutare. Propter quod non est mirum si Aegyptii, reducentes rerum humanarum ordinem in corpora caelestia, posuerunt fatum ex stellis proveniens aliquibus orationibus et ritibus posse immutari: nam extra caelestia corpora, et supra ea, est Deus, qui potest impedire caelestium corporum effectum qui in istis inferioribus ex illorum impressione secuturus erat. Now it suffices to consider carefully what we have said above for one to realize that every error occurring in the present matter is due to one’s overlooking the difference between the universal and the particular orders. For, since all effects are ordained one to another insofar as they have one common cause, this order must be the more general as the cause is more universal. Hence the order appointed by the universal cause, which is God, must of necessity include all things. There is nothing, therefore, to prevent a particular order being changed through prayer or in some other manner, because there is something that can change it outside that order. Therefore, it is not strange that the Egyptians, who referred the ordering of human affairs to the heavenly bodies, held that fate, having its origin in the stars, can be changed by certain prayers and rites. This is because outside and above the heavenly bodies there is God, who can hinder the heavenly bodies from producing the effect which was to have taken place in this lower world as a result of their influence. Sed extra ordinem complectentem omnia, non potest poni aliquid per quod possit ordo ab universali causa dependens everti. Propter quod Stoici, qui in Deum sicut in causam universalem omnium ordinis rerum reductionem considerabant, ponebant quod ordo institutus a Deo nulla ratione potest immutari. Sed in hoc iterum a consideratione universalis ordinis recedebant, quod ponebant orationes ad nihil utiles esse, tanquam arbitrarentur voluntates hominum et eorum desideria, ex quibus orationes procedunt, sub illo universali ordine non comprehendi. Cum enim dicunt quod, sive orationes fiant sive non, nihilominus idem effectus sequitur in rebus ex universali ordine rerum, manifeste ab illo universali ordine vota orantium sequestrant. Si enim haec sub illo ordine comprehendantur, sicut per alias causas, ita et per haec, ex divina ordinatione, aliqui effectus sequentur. Idem ergo erit excludere orationis effectum, et omnium aliarum causarum. Quod si aliis causis immobilitas divini ordinis effectus non subtrahit, neque orationum efficaciam tollit. Valent igitur orationes, non quasi ordinem aeternae dispositionis immutantes, sed quasi sub tali ordine etiam ipsae existentes. But outside that order, which includes all things, it is not possible to assign a thing whereby the order depending on the universal cause can be subverted. For this reason, the Stoics, who referred the ordering of all things to God as the universal cause, held that the order appointed by God is utterly unchangeable. But these again failed to consider the universal order in that they held prayers to be altogether useless, thus implying that man’s volitions and desires, which lead him to pray, are not included in that universal order. For when they say that the result is the same on account of the universal order of things whether we pray or not, it is clear that they exclude the suppliant’s prayers from that order. For if they were contained in that order, effects would follow through the divine ordinance from these, even as they follow through other causes. Accordingly, to deny the efficacy of prayer is to deny the efficacy of all other causes. And if the unchangeableness of the divine order does not deprive other causes of their efficacy, neither does it destroy the efficacy of prayer. Therefore, prayers are useful not as though they brought about a change in the order appointed from eternity, but as included in that very order. Nihil autem prohibet per orationum efficaciam aliquem particularem ordinem alicuius inferioris causae mutari, Deo faciente, qui omnes supergreditur causas, unde sub nulla necessitate ordinis alicuius causae continetur, sed, e converso, omnis necessitas ordinis inferioris causae continetur sub ipso quasi ab eo institutus. Inquantum ergo per orationem immutatur aliquid de ordine inferiorum causarum instituto a Deo, propter orationes piorum, dicitur Deus converti, vel poenitere: non quod aeterna eius dispositio mutetur, sed quia mutatur aliquis eius effectus. Unde et Gregorius dicit quod non mutat Deus consilium etsi quandoque mutet sententiam: non, inquam, illam quae exprimit dispositionem aeternam; sed illam sententiam quae exprimit ordinem inferiorum causarum, secundum quem Ezechias erat moriturus, vel gens aliqua pro suis peccatis evertenda. Talis autem sententiae mutatio dicitur transumptiva locutione Dei poenitentia, inquantum Deus ad similitudinem poenitentis se habet, cuius est mutare quod fecerat. Per quem modum dicitur etiam metaphorice irasci, inquantum puniendo facit irascentis effectum. On the other hand, there is no reason why the particular order of an inferior cause should not be changed by God through the efficacy of prayer: for he transcends all causes, so that he is not bound by the order of any cause, but on the contrary all necessity imposed by the order of a lower cause is subject to him, because it originated from him. Accordingly, when some change is brought about by prayer in the order of inferior causes, God is said to return or to repent—not as though his eternal ordinance is changed, but that some effect of his is changed. Hence Gregory says that God changes not his mind, although at times he changes his sentence. I say not that one which expresses his eternal decree, but that which expresses the order of lower causes—in keeping with which Ezechias was to die, and a nation was to be exterminated for its sins. Such a change of sentence is described metaphorically as repentance in God insofar as he behaves like a penitent, who shows himself penitent by changing his behaviour. In the same way, he is said figuratively to be angry insofar as he does what an angry man does by punishing. Caput 97 Chapter 97