Caput 11 Chapter 11 Quomodo accipienda sit generatio in divinis, et quae de filio Dei dicuntur in Scripturis The meaning of generation in God, and of the scriptural references to the Son of God Principium autem huius intentionis hinc sumere oportet, quod secundum diversitatem naturarum diversus emanationis modus invenitur in rebus: et quanto aliqua natura est altior, tanto id quod ex ea emanat, magis ei est intimum. To carry out this purpose we must begin by observing that where things differ in nature, we find different modes of emanation, and further, that from the higher nature things proceed in a more intimate way. In rebus enim omnibus inanimata corpora infimum locum tenent: in quibus emanationes aliter esse non possunt nisi per actionem unius eorum in aliquod alterum. Sic enim ex igne generatur ignis, dum ab igne corpus extraneum alteratur, et ad qualitatem et speciem ignis perducitur. Now, of all things the inanimate obtain the lowest place, and from them no emanation is possible except by the action of one on another: thus, fire is engendered from fire when an extraneous body is transformed by fire, and receives the quality and form of fire. Inter animata vero corpora proximum locum tenent plantae, in quibus iam emanatio ex interiori procedit inquantum scilicet humor plantae intraneus in semen convertitur, et illud semen, terrae mandatum, crescit in plantam. Iam ergo hic primus gradus vitae invenitur: nam viventia sunt quae seipsa movent ad agendum; illa vero quae non nisi exteriora movere possunt, omnino sunt vita carentia. In plantis vero hoc indicium vitae est, quod id quod in ipsis est, movet ad aliquam formam. Est tamen vita plantarum imperfecta: quia emanatio in eis licet ab interiori procedat, tamen paulatim ab interioribus exiens quod emanat, finaliter omnino extrinsecum invenitur. Humor enim arboris primo ab arbore egrediens fit flos; et tandem fructus ab arboris cortice discretus, sed ei colligatus; perfecto autem fructu, omnino ab arbore separatur, et in terram cadens, sementina virtute producit aliam plantam. Si quis etiam diligenter consideret, primum huius emanationis principium ab exteriori sumitur: nam humor intrinsecus arboris per radices a terra sumitur, de qua planta suscipit nutrimentum. The next place to inanimate bodies belongs to plants, whence emanation proceeds from within insofar as the plant’s intrinsic humor is converted into seed, which, being committed to the soil, grows into a plant. Accordingly, here we find the first traces of life, since living things are those which move themselves to act, whereas those which can only move extraneous things are wholly lifeless. It is a sign of life in plants that something within them is the cause of a form. Yet the plant’s life is imperfect, because, although emanation proceeds from within it, that which emanates comes forth by little and little, and in the end becomes altogether extraneous. Thus the humor of a tree gradually comes forth from the tree and eventually becomes a blossom, and then takes the form of fruit distinct from the branch, though united to it. And when the fruit is perfect it is altogether severed from the tree, and falling to the ground, produces by its seminal force another plant. Indeed, if we consider the matter carefully we shall see that the first principle of this emanation is something extraneous, since the intrinsic humor of the tree is drawn through the roots from the soil, whence the plant derives its nourishment. Ultra plantarum vero vitam, altior gradus vitae invenitur, qui est secundum animam sensitivam: cuius emanatio propria, etsi ab exteriori incipiat, in interiori terminatur; et quanto emanatio magis processerit, tanto magis ad intima devenitur. Sensibile enim exterius formam suam exterioribus sensibus ingerit; a quibus procedit in imaginationem; et ulterius in memoriae thesaurum. In quolibet tamen huius emanationis processu, principium et terminus pertinent ad diversa: non enim aliqua potentia sensitiva in seipsam reflectitur. Est ergo hic gradus vitae tanto altior quam vita plantarum, quanto operatio huius vitae magis in intimis continetur: non tamen est omnino vita perfecta, cum emanatio semper fiat ex uno in alterum. There is yet above that of the plants a higher form of life, which is that of the sensitive soul, whose proper emanation terminates within, though beginning from without. Also, the further the emanation proceeds, the more does it penetrate within; for the sensible object impresses a form on the external senses, from which it proceeds to the imagination and, further still, to the storehouse of the memory. Yet in every process of this kind of emanation, the beginning and the end are in different subjects, for no sensitive power reflects on itself. Therefore, this degree of life transcends that of plants insofar as it is more intimate; yet it is not a perfect life, since the emanation is always from one thing to another. Est igitur supremus et perfectus gradus vitae qui est secundum intellectum: nam intellectus in seipsum reflectitur, et seipsum intelligere potest. Sed et in intellectuali vita diversi gradus inveniuntur. Nam intellectus humanus, etsi seipsum cognoscere possit, tamen primum suae cognitionis initium ab extrinseco sumit: quia non est intelligere sine phantasmate, ut ex superioribus patet. Perfectior igitur est intellectualis vita in angelis, in quibus intellectus ad sui cognitionem non procedit ex aliquo exteriori, sed per se cognoscit seipsum. Nondum tamen ad ultimam perfectionem vita ipsorum pertingit: quia, licet intentio intellecta sit eis omnino intrinseca, non tamen ipsa intentio intellecta est eorum substantia; quia non est idem in eis intelligere et esse, ut ex superioribus patet. Ultima igitur perfectio vitae competit Deo, in quo non est aliud intelligere et aliud esse, ut supra ostensum est, et ita oportet quod intentio intellecta in Deo sit ipsa divina essentia. Therefore, the highest degree of life is that which is according to the intellect: for the intellect reflects on itself, and can understand itself. There are, however, various degrees in the intellectual life, because the human mind, though able to know itself, takes its first steps to knowledge from without: for it cannot understand apart from phantasms, as we have already made clear. Accordingly, intellectual life is more perfect in the angels whose intellect does not proceed from something extrinsic to acquire self-knowledge, but knows itself by itself. Yet their life does not reach the highest degree of perfection because, though the intelligible species is altogether within them, it is not their very substance, because in them to understand and to be are not the same thing, as we have already shown. Therefore, the highest perfection of life belongs to God, whose understanding is not distinct from his being, as we have proved. Therefore, the intelligible species in God must be the divine essence itself. Dico autem intentionem intellectam id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta. Quae quidem in nobis neque est ipsa res quae intelligitur; neque est ipsa substantia intellectus; sed est quaedam similitudo concepta in intellectu de re intellecta, quam voces exteriores significant; unde et ipsa intentio verbum interius nominatur, quod est exteriori verbo significatum. Et quidem quod praedicta intentio non sit in nobis res intellecta, inde apparet quod aliud est intelligere rem, et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dum super suum opus reflectitur: unde et aliae scientiae sunt de rebus, et aliae de intentionibus intellectis. Quod autem intentio intellecta non sit ipse intellectus in nobis, ex hoc patet quod esse intentionis intellectae in ipso intelligi consistit: non autem esse intellectus nostri, cuius esse non est suum intelligere. By intelligible species I mean that which the intellect conceives within itself of the thing understood. Now, in us, this is neither the thing itself that is understood, nor the substance of the intellect, but is an intelligible image of the thing understood, and is expressed by external speech. Therefore, the intelligible species is known as the inner word that is signified by the outward word. That this same intelligible species is not the thing which we understand is evident from the fact that to understand a thing is quite distinct from understanding its intelligible species. The intellect does this when it reflects on its action, for which reason sciences that treat of things are distinct from those that treat of ideas. Again, it is clear that in us the intelligible species is not the intellect itself, because the being of the idea as understood consists in an act of understanding, whereas the being of our intellect does not, seeing that its being is not its act. Cum ergo in Deo sit idem esse et intelligere, intentio intellecta in ipso est ipse eius intellectus. Et quia intellectus in eo est res intellecta, intelligendo enim se intelligit omnia alia, ut in primo ostensum est; relinquitur quod in Deo intelligente seipsum sit idem intellectus, et res quae intelligitur, et intentio intellecta. Hence as in God to be is to understand, the intelligible species in him is his act of understanding; and since in him the act of understanding is the thing understood (for by understanding himself he understands all other things, as we have proved), it follows that in God understanding himself, understanding, the thing understood, and the intelligible species are all one and the same. His igitur consideratis, utcumque concipere possumus qualiter sit divina generatio accipienda. Patet enim quod non est possibile sic accipi generationem divinam sicut in rebus inanimatis generatio invenitur, in quibus generans imprimit suam speciem in exteriorem materiam. Oportet enim, secundum positionem fidei, quod filius a Deo genitus veram habeat deitatem, et sit verus Deus. Ipsa autem deitas non est forma materiae inhaerens; neque Deus est ex materia existens; ut in primo probatum est. Similiter autem non potest accipi divina generatio ad modum generationis quae in plantis invenitur, et etiam in animalibus, quae communicant cum plantis in nutritiva et generativa virtute. Separatur enim aliquid quod erat in planta vel animali, ad generationem similis in specie, quod in fine generationis est omnino extra generantem. A Deo autem, cum indivisibilis sit, non potest aliquid separari. Ipse etiam filius a Deo genitus non est extra patrem generantem, sed in eo: sicut ex superioribus auctoritatibus patet. Neque etiam potest generatio divina intelligi secundum modum emanationis quae invenitur in anima sensitiva. Non enim Deus ab aliquo exteriori accipit ut in alterum influere possit: non enim esset primum agens. Operationes etiam animae sensitivae non complentur sine corporalibus instrumentis: Deum autem manifestum est incorporeum esse. Relinquitur igitur quod generatio divina secundum intellectualem emanationem sit intelligenda. With these principles before our eyes, we can to some extent understand the meaning of generation in God. For it is clear that in God generation cannot possibly have the same meaning as in inanimate beings, where the generator impresses its likeness on extraneous matter. For, as our faith declares, the Son begotten of God must have true divinity and be true God, and the divinity is not a form adhering to matter, nor is God a material being, as we have proved. Again, generation in God cannot be of the same kind as that which we observe in plants; or again in animals, which have the powers of nutrition and generation in common with plants, because something that was in the plant or animal is severed so as to engender a being of like species and, when finally engendered, is wholly extraneous to the generator. But nothing can be severed from God, since he is indivisible; and the Son begotten of God is not extraneous to the Father who begets him, but is in him, as proved by the authorities quoted above. Nor again can the divine generation be taken to signify an emanation such as we find in the sensitive soul, for God does not receive from without the ability to cause an impression on another thing, since otherwise he would not be the first agent. Again, the operations of the sensitive soul are performed by means of bodily instruments; but God is manifestly incorporeal. Consequently, generation in God must be understood to indicate an intellectual emanation. We must explain this as follows. Hoc autem sic manifestari oportet. Manifestum est enim ex his quae in primo declarata sunt, quod Deus seipsum intelligit. Omne autem intellectum, inquantum intellectum, oportet esse in intelligente: significat enim ipsum intelligere apprehensionem eius quod intelligitur per intellectum; unde etiam intellectus noster, seipsum intelligens, est in seipso, non solum ut idem sibi per essentiam, sed etiam ut a se apprehensum intelligendo. Oportet igitur quod Deus in seipso sit ut intellectum in intelligente. Intellectum autem in intelligente est intentio intellecta et verbum. Est igitur in Deo intelligente seipsum verbum Dei quasi Deus intellectus: sicut verbum lapidis in intellectu est lapis intellectus. Hinc est quod Ioan. 1:1 dicitur: verbum erat apud Deum. It is evident from what has been already proved that God understands himself. Now every understood thing, as such, must be in the one who understands, because to understand means the apprehension of the object understood by the intellect. Hence our intellect, in understanding itself, remains within itself not only as essentially one with itself, but as understanding the object of its apprehension. Therefore, God must be within himself as the understood object is in the one who understands. Now the understood object in the one who understands is the intelligible species and word. Accordingly, in God understanding himself is God’s word, or God understood, even as in the intellect the idea of a stone is a stone understood. Hence it is said: The Word was with God (John 1:1). Quia vero intellectus divinus non exit de potentia in actum, sed semper est actu existens, ut in primo probatum est; ex necessitate oportet quod semper seipsum intellexerit. Ex hoc autem quod se intelligit, oportet quod verbum ipsius in ipso sit, ut ostensum est. Necesse est igitur semper verbum eius in Deo extitisse. Est igitur coaeternum Deo verbum ipsius, nec accedit ei ex tempore, sicut intellectui nostro accedit ex tempore verbum interius conceptum, quod est intentio intellecta. Hinc est quod Ioan. 1:1 dicitur: in principio erat verbum. But, since the divine intellect does not pass from potency to act, but is always in act, as we proved above, it follows of necessity that God has always understood himself. Now for the very reason that he understands himself, his Word must be in him, as we have shown. Therefore, God’s Word must have been in him always. Consequently, his Word is co-eternal with him, and does not come to him in course of time, as the word that we conceive within ourselves—namely, the intelligible species—comes into our intellect in course of time. Hence it is said: In the beginning was the Word (John 1:1). Cum autem intellectus divinus non solum sit semper in actu, sed etiam sit ipse actus purus, ut in primo probatum est; oportet quod substantia intellectus divini sit ipsum suum intelligere, quod est actus intellectus; esse autem verbi interius concepti, sive intentionis intellectae, est ipsum suum intelligi. Idem ergo esse est verbi divini, et intellectus divini; et per consequens ipsius Dei, qui est suus intellectus. Esse autem Dei est eius essentia vel natura, quae idem est quod ipse Deus, ut in primo ostensum est. Verbum igitur Dei est ipsum esse divinum et essentia eius, et ipse verus Deus. Non autem sic est de verbo intellectus humani. Cum enim intellectus noster seipsum intelligit, aliud est esse intellectus, et aliud ipsum eius intelligere: substantia enim intellectus erat in potentia intelligens antequam intelligeret actu. Sequitur ergo quod aliud sit esse intentionis intellectae, et aliud intellectus ipsius: cum intentionis intellectae esse sit ipsum intelligi. Unde oportet quod in homine intelligente seipsum, verbum interius conceptum non sit homo verus, naturale hominis esse habens; sed sit homo intellectus tantum, quasi quaedam similitudo hominis veri ab intellectu apprehensa. Ipsum vero verbum Dei, ex hoc ipso quod est Deus intellectus, est verus Deus, habens naturaliter esse divinum: eo quod non est aliud naturale esse Dei et aliud eius intelligere, ut dictum est. Hinc est quod Ioan. 1:1 dicitur: Deus erat verbum. Quod quia absolute dicitur, demonstrat verbum Dei verum Deum debere intelligi. Verbum enim hominis non posset dici simpliciter et absolute homo, sed secundum quid, scilicet homo intellectus: unde haec falsa esset, homo est verbum; sed haec vera potest esse, homo intellectus est verbum. Cum ergo dicitur, Deus erat verbum, ostenditur verbum divinum non solum esse intentionem intellectam, sicut verbum nostrum; sed etiam rem in natura existentem et subsistentem. Deus enim verus res subsistens est: cum maxime sit per se ens. And since the divine intellect is not only always in act, but is also pure act, as we have proved, it follows that the very substance of the divine intellect is its own understanding, or act of the intellect. Now the being of the word conceived within the mind (or of the intelligible species) consists in its being understood. Therefore, the same being is that of the divine Word and of the divine intellect, and therefore of God himself, since he is his own act of intelligence. Now God’s being is his essence or nature, which is God himself, as we proved above. Therefore, the Word of God is the divine being and essence, and God in very truth. It is not so with the word of the human intellect. For when our intellect understands itself, the being of the intellect is not identified with its act of understanding, because the substance of the intellect was in potency to the act of understanding, ere it understood actually. Consequently, the being of the intelligible species is distinct from the act of understanding, since its being consists in its being understood. Therefore, in the man who understands himself, the inwardly conceived word is not a real man, having the natural being of a man, but is merely a man understood—that is, the likeness of a true man apprehended by the intellect. But the Word of God, for the very reason that it is God understood, is true God having by nature the divine being, because the natural being of God is not distinct from his act of understanding, as we have already stated. Hence it is said: The Word was God (John 1:1); which shows, since the statement is absolute, that the Word of God signifies God in very truth. For man’s word cannot be called a man simply and absolutely, but only with a qualification, namely, a man understood. Hence this statement would be untrue, ‘The word is a man,’ whereas this may be true, ‘The word is a man understood.’ Accordingly, when it is stated: The Word was God, this shows that the divine Word is not merely an intelligible species as our word is, but that it is indeed a real and subsistent being, because the true God is subsistent, since he is supremely being by his essence. Non sic autem natura Dei est in verbo ut sit una specie et numero differens. Sic enim verbum habet naturam Dei sicut intelligere Dei est ipsum esse eius, ut dictum est. Intelligere autem est ipsum esse divinum. Verbum igitur habet ipsam essentiam divinam non solum specie, sed numero eandem. Nevertheless, the divinity is not in the Word so as to be the same in species and distinct numerically, because the Word has the nature of God inasmuch as God’s understanding is his being, as we have said. Now understanding is the very being of God. Therefore, the Word has the divine essence itself—identical not merely in species, but even in number. Item, natura quae est una secundum speciem, non dividitur in plura secundum numerum nisi propter materiam. Divina autem natura omnino immaterialis est. Impossibile est igitur quod natura divina sit una specie et numero differens. Verbum igitur Dei in eadem natura numero communicat cum Deo. Propter quod verbum Dei, et Deus cuius est verbum, non sunt duo dii, sed unus Deus. Nam quod apud nos duo habentes humanam naturam sint duo homines, ex hoc contingit quod natura humana numero dividitur in duobus. Ostensum est autem in primo libro ea quae in creaturis divisa sunt, in Deo simpliciter unum esse: sicut in creatura aliud est essentia et esse; et in quibusdam est etiam aliud quod subsistit in sua essentia, et eius essentia sive natura, nam hic homo non est sua humanitas nec suum esse; sed Deus est sua essentia et suum esse. Again, a nature that is one specifically is not divided numerically save by reason of matter. But the divine nature is wholly immaterial. Therefore, it is impossible that the divine nature be one in species and be differentiated in number. Consequently, the divine Word has the one identical nature in common with God; thus the Word of God and God, whose Word he is, are not two gods, but one God. That two having human nature are two men with us is because human nature is divided numerically in two subjects. Now it was shown above that things which in creatures are divided are simply one in God. Thus in creatures essence and existence are distinct; and in some, that which subsists in its essence is distinct from its essence or nature (for an individual man is neither his humanity nor his existence); but God is his essence and his existence. Et quamvis haec in Deo unum sint verissime, tamen in Deo est quicquid pertinet ad rationem vel subsistentis, vel essentiae, vel ipsius esse: convenit enim ei non esse in aliquo, inquantum est subsistens; esse quid, inquantum est essentia; et esse in actu, ratione ipsius esse. Oportet igitur, cum in Deo sit idem intelligens, et intelligere, et intentio intellecta, quod est verbum ipsius; quod verissime in Deo sit et quod pertinet ad rationem intelligentis; et quod pertinet ad rationem eius quod est intelligere; et quod pertinet ad rationem intentionis intellectae, sive verbi. Est autem de ratione interioris verbi, quod est intentio intellecta, quod procedat ab intelligente secundum suum intelligere, cum sit quasi terminus intellectualis operationis: intellectus enim intelligendo concipit et format intentionem sive rationem intellectam, quae est interius verbum. Oportet igitur quod a Deo secundum ipsum suum intelligere procedat verbum ipsius. Comparatur igitur verbum Dei ad Deum intelligentem, cuius est verbum, sicut ad eum a quo est: hoc enim est de ratione verbi. Cum igitur in Deo intelligens, intelligere, et intentio intellecta, sive verbum, sint per essentiam unum, et per hoc necesse sit quod quodlibet horum sit Deus; remanet tamen sola distinctio relationis, prout verbum refertur ad concipientem ut a quo est. Hinc est quod Evangelista, quia dixerat, Deus erat verbum; ne omnino distinctio sublata intelligeretur verbi a Deo dicente sive concipiente verbum, subiunxit: hoc erat in principio apud Deum: quasi dicat: hoc verbum, quod Deum esse dixi, aliquo modo distinctum est a Deo dicente, ut sic possit dici apud Deum esse. And, though these two in God are one, yet whatever pertains to his subsistence, essence, or existence, is most truly in God: for it befits him not to be in another, inasmuch as he is subsistent; to be a particular thing, inasmuch as he is an essence; and to be in act, by reason of his existence. Consequently, as in God intelligent being, the act of intelligence, and the intelligible species, which is his Word, are all one and the same thing, whatever pertains to the intelligent subject, or to the act of intelligence, or to the intelligible species or Word must be most truly in God. Now it belongs to the interior word or intelligible species to proceed from the intelligent being through the latter’s act of intelligence, since it is the term of its intellectual operation; for the intellect by understanding conceives and forms the understood species or idea which is the interior word. Therefore, God’s Word must proceed from him by reason of his act of intelligence. Hence God’s Word stands in relation to God understanding, whose Word he is, as to him from whom he proceeds; for such a relation is implied by the very nature of a word. Since, then, in God the intelligent subject, the act of intelligence, and the intelligible species or word are essentially one, and since for this reason each one of these must be God, it follows that there is only a distinction of relation between them, insofar as the Word is referred to the cause of his conception as to the source whence he proceeds. Hence the evangelist, lest the phrase the Word was God should seem to remove any distinction whatsoever between the Word and God (the speaker and conceiver of the Word), added: The same was in the beginning with God, as though to say: This same Word, whom I have stated to be God, is in some way distinct from God the speaker of the Word, and thus may be described as being with God. Verbum autem interius conceptum est quaedam ratio et similitudo rei intellectae. Similitudo autem alicuius in altero existens vel habet rationem exemplaris, si se habeat ut principium: vel habet potius rationem imaginis, si se habeat ad id cuius est similitudo sicut ad principium. Utriusque autem exemplum in nostro intellectu perspicitur. Quia enim similitudo artificiati existens in mente artificis est principium operationis per quam artificiatum constituitur, comparatur ad artificiatum ut exemplar ad exemplatum: sed similitudo rei naturalis in nostro intellectu concepta comparatur ad rem cuius similitudo existit ut ad suum principium, quia nostrum intelligere a sensibus principium accipit, qui per res naturales immutantur. Cum autem Deus et seipsum intelligat et alia, ut in primo ostensum est, eius intelligere principium est rerum intellectarum ab ipso, cum ab eo causentur per intellectum et voluntatem: sed ad intelligibile quod est ipse, comparatur ut ad principium; est enim hoc intelligibile idem cum intellectu intelligente, cuius quaedam emanatio est verbum conceptum. Oportet igitur quod verbum Dei comparetur ad res alias intellectas a Deo sicut exemplar; et ad ipsum Deum, cuius est verbum, sicut eius imago. Hinc est quod de verbo Dei dicitur, Coloss. 1:15, quod est imago invisibilis Dei. Now the inwardly conceived word is a kind of form and image of the thing understood: for when the likeness of a thing exists in something else, it is either an exemplar, if it is by way of being a principle; or else it is an image, if it be compared to the thing of which it is a likeness as to its principle. We have an example of both cases in our own intellect, because in the mind of the craftsman there is the image of his handiwork. This image is the principle of the operation that produces the handiwork, and is compared to that handiwork as the exemplar to the exemplate. On the other hand, the image which our mind conceives of a natural thing is compared to the thing of which it is an image as to its principle, because our act of intelligence takes its principle from the senses, which are impressed by natural things. Now, since God understands both himself and other things, as we have shown, his act of understanding is the principle of the things understood by him, because they are caused by him through his intellect and will. But to that intelligible being, which is himself, he is compared as a thing to its principle, since this intelligible being is identical with the intellect understanding it, and the Word conceived is an emanation of it. Consequently, the Word of God is compared to other things understood by God as their exemplar, and to God himself whose Word he is, as his image. Hence it is said of the Word of God that he is the image of the invisible God (Col 1:15). Est autem differentia inter intellectum et sensum: nam sensus apprehendit rem quantum ad exteriora eius accidentia, quae sunt color, sapor, quantitas, et alia huiusmodi; sed intellectus ingreditur ad interiora rei. Et quia omnis cognitio perficitur secundum similitudinem quae est inter cognoscens et cognitum, oportet quod in sensu sit similitudo rei sensibilis quantum ad eius accidentia: in intellectu vero sit similitudo rei intellectae quantum ad eius essentiam. Verbum igitur in intellectu conceptum est imago vel exemplar substantiae rei intellectae. Cum ergo verbum Dei sit imago Dei, ut ostensum est, necesse est quod sit imago Dei quantum ad eius essentiam. Hinc est quod apostolus dicit, Hebr. 1:3, quod est figura substantiae Dei. There is, however, this difference between intellect and sense: the latter apprehends the external accidents of things, such as color, taste, quantity, and the like, whereas the former penetrates within. And since all knowledge is effected by reason of a likeness between knower and known, it follows that there must be in the senses a likeness of the accidents of the sensible object, and in the intellect a likeness of the essence of the object understood. Hence the word conceived in the intellect is the image or exemplar of the substance of the thing understood. And as the Word of God is the image of God, as we have shown, he must be God’s image in respect of the essence. Therefore, the Apostle says that he is the figure of his substance (Heb 1:3). Imago autem alicuius rei est duplex. Est enim aliqua imago quae non communicat in natura cum eo cuius est imago: sive sit imago eius quantum ad exteriora accidentia, sicut statua aenea est imago hominis, nec tamen est homo; sive sit imago quantum ad substantiam rei; ratio enim hominis in intellectu non est homo, nam, ut philosophus dicit, lapis non est in anima sed species lapidis. Imago autem alicuius rei quae eandem naturam habet cum re cuius est imago, est sicut filius regis, in quo imago patris apparet et est eiusdem naturae cum ipso. Ostensum est autem quod verbum Dei est imago dicentis quantum ad ipsam eius essentiam; et quod in eadem natura cum dicente communicat. Relinquitur igitur quod verbum Dei non solum sit imago, sed etiam filius. Non enim sic esse imaginem alicuius ut eiusdem naturae cum illo sit, in aliquo invenitur qui filius dici non possit, dummodo hoc in viventibus accipiatur: nam quod procedit ex aliquo vivente in similitudinem speciei, dicitur filius eius. Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: dominus dixit ad me, filius meus es tu. Now the image of a thing is twofold. There is the image that has not the same nature as that which it represents, whether it represent it as to its external accidents—thus a bronze statue is the image of a man, yet it is not a man—or whether it represent it as to its substance, for the intellect’s idea of a man is not a man, because, as the Philosopher says, not a stone, but its image, is in the soul. But an image that has the same nature as the thing it represents is like the king’s son, in whom we see his father’s image, and who has the same nature as his father. Now it has been shown that God’s Word is the image of the speaker in his very essence, and that he has the same nature in common with him. Consequently, God’s Word is not only his image but also his Son, because it is not possible to be both the image of another and of the same nature as that other without being this other’s son, so long as we speak of living beings, because that which proceeds from a living being in likeness of nature is said to be its son. Hence it is said: the Lord said to me: ‘You are my son’ (Ps 2:7). Rursus considerandum est quod, cum in qualibet natura processio filii a patre sit naturalis, ex quo verbum Dei filius Dei dicitur, oportet quod naturaliter a patre procedat. Et hoc quidem supra dictis convenit: ut ex his quae in intellectu nostro accidunt, perspici potest. Intellectus enim noster aliqua naturaliter cognoscit: sicut prima intelligibilium principia, quorum intelligibiles conceptiones, quae verba interiora dicuntur, naturaliter in ipso existunt et ex eo procedunt. Sunt etiam quaedam intelligibilia quae non naturaliter intellectus noster cognoscit, sed in eorum cognitionem ratiocinando pertingit: et horum conceptiones in intellectu nostro naturaliter non existunt, sed cum studio quaeruntur. Manifestum est autem quod Deus seipsum naturaliter intelligit, sicut et naturaliter est: suum enim intelligere est suum esse, ut in primo probatum est. Verbum igitur Dei seipsum intelligentis naturaliter ab ipso procedit. Et cum verbum Dei sit eiusdem naturae cum Deo dicente, et sit similitudo ipsius; sequitur quod hic naturalis processus sit in similitudinem eius a quo est processio cum identitate naturae. Haec est autem verae generationis ratio in rebus viventibus, quod id quod generatur, a generante procedat ut similitudo ipsius et eiusdem naturae cum ipso. Est ergo verbum Dei genitum vere a Deo dicente: et eius processio generatio vel nativitas dici potest. Hinc est quod in Psalmo dicitur: ego hodie genui te: idest, in aeternitate, quae semper est praesens, et nulla est in ea ratio praeteriti et futuri. Unde patet falsum esse quod Ariani dixerunt, quod pater genuit filium voluntate. Quae enim voluntate sunt, non naturalia sunt. Since, then, the Word of God is called the Son of God, we must also observe, seeing that in every nature the procession of son from father is natural, that the Son of God is begotten of and proceeds from the Father naturally. This is in keeping with what we have been saying, and may be understood from the operation of our own intellect. For our intellect knows certain things naturally, such as the first principles of matters intelligible, of which the intelligible concepts, or interior words, exist in it and proceed from it naturally. There are also certain intelligible matters which our intellect does not know naturally, but comes to know by reasoning. The concepts of these things are not in our intellect naturally, and it has to make an effort to seek them. Now it is evident that God understands himself naturally, even as he exists naturally, since his act of intelligence is his being, as we have proved. Hence the Word spoken by God understanding himself proceeds from him naturally; and as the Word of God is of the same nature with God speaking and is his image, it follows that the term of this natural procession is the image of that from which it proceeds in identity of nature. Now the essence of true generation in living things is that the thing begotten proceeds from the begetter as its image and with the same nature. Therefore, God’s Word is truly begotten of God’s utterance; and his procession may be called a ‘begetting’ or ‘birth.’ Hence it is said: Today I have begotten you (Ps 2:7); that is to say, in eternity, which is ever present, and contains no trace of past or future. It is therefore clear how false was the assertion of the Arians that the Father begot the Son by his will. For that which is done voluntarily is not natural. Considerandum est etiam quod id quod generatur, quandiu in generante manet, dicitur esse conceptum. Verbum autem Dei ita est a Deo genitum quod tamen ab ipso non recedit, sed in eo manet, ut ex superioribus patet. Recte ergo verbum Dei potest dici a Deo conceptum. Hinc est quod Proverb. 8:24, Dei sapientia dicit: nondum erant abyssi, et ego iam concepta eram. Est autem differentia inter conceptionem verbi Dei, et materialem conceptionem quae apud nos in animalibus invenitur. Nam proles, quandiu concepta est et in utero clauditur, nondum habet ultimam perfectionem, ut per se subsistat a generante secundum locum distinctum: unde oportet quod in corporali generatione animalium aliud sit genitae prolis conceptio, atque aliud partus ipsius, secundum quem etiam loco separatur proles genita a generante, ab utero generantis egrediens. Verbum autem Dei, in ipso Deo dicente existens, est perfectum, in se subsistens, distinctum a Deo dicente: non enim expectatur ibi localis distinctio, sed sola relatione distinguuntur, ut dictum est. Idem est ergo in generatione verbi Dei et conceptio et partus. Et ideo, postquam ex ore sapientiae dictum est, ego iam concepta eram, post pauca subditur: ante colles ego parturiebar. We must also take note that the thing generated, so long as it remains in the generator, is said to be conceived. Now, God’s Word is generated of God in such a way that he does not depart from God but abides in him, as stated above. Rightly, therefore, may God’s Word be described as conceived of God. Hence the Wisdom of God says: When there were no depths I was already conceived (Prov 8:24). There is, however, a difference between the conception of God’s Word and the material conception which we observe in animals. For the offspring, during the period of conception and gestation, is as yet imperfect, and unable to subsist by itself apart from its generator. Hence when an animal’s body is begotten, the conception of the offspring is distinct from its birth, when it is severed from its generator by being brought forth from the womb. On the other hand, God’s Word, abiding in God the speaker, subsists perfectly in himself, and distinct from God the speaker—for no distinction of place is needed where there is only a distinction of relationship (as stated above). Accordingly, in the generation of the Word of God, conception is the same as birth. And hence, after wisdom had said: I was already conceived, the text, after a few words, continues: Before the hills I was brought forth (Prov 8:25). Sed quia conceptio et partus in rebus corporalibus cum motu sunt, oportet in eis quandam successionem esse: cum conceptionis terminus sit esse concepti in concipiente; terminus autem partus sit esse eius qui paritur distinctum a pariente. Necesse est igitur in corporalibus quod id quod concipitur, nondum sit; et id quod parturitur, in parturiendo non sit a parturiente distinctum. Conceptio autem et partus intelligibilis verbi non est cum motu, nec cum successione: unde simul dum concipitur, est; et simul dum parturitur, distinctum est; sicut quod illuminatur, simul dum illuminatur, illuminatum est, eo quod in illuminatione successio nulla est. Yet because conception and birth in corporeal beings include movement and consequently some kind of succession—since the term of conception is the existence in the conceiver of that which has been conceived, and the term of birth is the separate existence of the offspring apart from the parent—it follows that in corporeal beings what is being conceived is not as yet, and that the offspring while in the womb is not distinct from the parent. On the other hand, when an intelligible word is conceived and brought forth, there is no movement or succession; hence it exists as soon as it is conceived, and it has a separate existence as soon as it is brought forth. Thus the illuminated object is lit up as soon as there is light, since there is no succession in the diffusion of light. Et cum hoc inveniatur in intelligibili verbo nostro, multo magis competit verbo Dei: non solum quia intelligibilis conceptio et partus est; sed quia in aeternitate existit utrumque, in qua prius et posterius esse non possunt. Hinc est quod, postquam ex ore sapientiae dictum est, ante colles ego parturiebar; ne intelligeretur quod, dum parturiretur, non esset, subditur: quando praeparabat caelos, aderam: ut sic, cum in generatione carnali animalium prius aliquid concipiatur, deinde parturiatur, et deinde conveniat sibi adesse parturienti, quasi sibi consociatum ut ab eo distinctum; haec omnia in divina generatione simul esse intelligantur; nam verbum Dei simul concipitur, parturitur et adest. Et quia quod paritur, ex utero procedit, sicut generatio verbi Dei, ad insinuandam perfectam distinctionem eius a generante, dicitur partus, simili ratione dicitur generatio ex utero, secundum illud Psalmi: ex utero ante Luciferum genui te. And if this is the case with our intelligible word, much more does it apply to the Word of God, not only because his conception and birth are in the intelligible order, but also because both are in eternity, where there can be nothing prior nor posterior. Hence after the words of wisdom: Before the hills I was brought forth (Prov 8:25), lest this might seem to imply that he did not exist until he was brought forth, the text continues: When he established the heavens, I was there (Prov 8:27). Accordingly, whereas in the carnal generation of animals there is first conception, then gestation, and association without separate existence of offspring with parent, in the divine generation all these things are simultaneous, since the Word of God is at once conceived, begotten, and present. And since that what is begotten is brought forth from the womb, even as the generation of God’s Word is called birth, in order to indicate his perfect distinction from his begetter, so in like manner it is called generation from the womb, according to the Psalm: From the womb, before the day-star, I have begotten you (Ps 110[109]:3). Quia tamen non est talis distinctio verbi a dicente quae impediat verbum esse in dicente, ut ex dictis patet; sicut ad insinuandam distinctionem verbi, dicitur parturiri, vel ex utero genitum esse; ita, ad ostendendum quod talis distinctio non excludit verbum esse in dicente, dicitur Ioan. 1:18, quod est in sinu patris. Yet, because the distinction between word and speaker is not such as to hinder the word from being in the speaker, as already stated, just as the Word is said to be begotten or brought forth from the womb, so as to indicate distinction, so is he said to be in the bosom of the Father (John 1:18), to show that this distinction does not prevent the Word being in the speaker. Attendendum est autem quod generatio carnalis animalium perficitur per virtutem activam et passivam: et ab activa quidem virtute dicitur pater, a passiva vero dicitur mater. Unde eorum quae ad generationem prolis requiruntur, quaedam conveniunt patri, quaedam conveniunt matri: dare enim naturam et speciem prolis competit patri; concipere autem et parturire competit matri, tanquam patienti et recipienti. Cum autem processio verbi secundum hoc dicta sit esse quod Deus seipsum intelligit; ipsum autem divinum intelligere non est per aliquam virtutem passivam, sed quasi activam, quia intellectus divinus non est in potentia, sed actu tantum: in generatione verbi Dei non competit ratio matris, sed solum patris. Unde quae in generatione carnali distinctim patri et matri conveniunt, omnia in generatione verbi patri attribuuntur in sacris Scripturis: dicitur enim pater et dare filio vitam, et concipere et parturire. Now we must observe that the carnal generation of animals is effected by an active and a passive function. The father takes an active part, while the mother’s part is passive, so that the begetting of offspring belongs to the father as regards certain conditions, and to the mother as regards others. It belongs to the father to give his offspring its nature and species, while conception and gestation belong to the mother, whose part is passive and receptive. Accordingly, since (as we have stated) the procession of the Word lies in the fact that God understands himself, and God understands himself not by a passive power, but by an quasi-active power (because the divine intellect is not in potency but in act only), it follows that there is no place for a mother but only for a father in the generation of God’s Word. Consequently, the parts which belong severally to father and mother in carnal generation are all ascribed by Scripture to the Father in the generation of the Word. Thus the Father is said to give life to the Son, and to conceive and beget him. Caput 12 Chapter 12 Quomodo filius Dei dicatur Dei sapientia How the Son of God is called the Wisdom of God Quia vero ea quae de sapientia divina dicuntur, ad generationem verbi adduximus, consequens est ostendere quod per divinam sapientiam, ex cuius persona, praemissa verba proponuntur, verbum Dei intelligi possit. Seeing that we have applied to the generation of the Word the things that are said of Divine Wisdom, it remains to be shown how Divine Wisdom, in whose person those things are said, may be taken to be the Word of God. Et ut a rebus humanis ad divinorum cognitionem perveniamus, considerare oportet quod sapientia in homine dicitur habitus quidam quo mens nostra perficitur in cognitione altissimorum: et huiusmodi sunt divina. Cum vero secundum sapientiae habitum in intellectu nostro aliqua formatur conceptio de divinis, ipsa conceptio intellectus, quae est interius verbum, sapientiae nomen accipere solet: secundum illum modum loquendi quo actus et effectus nominibus habituum a quibus procedunt, nominantur; quod enim iuste fit, interdum iustitia dicitur; et quod fit fortiter, fortitudo; et generaliter quod virtuose fit, virtus dicitur. Et per hunc modum, quod sapienter excogitatur, dicitur sapientia alicuius. And that we may obtain knowledge of things divine from human things, we must observe that in man, wisdom is a habit perfecting our mind in the knowledge of the highest things—and such are divine things. And when through the habit of wisdom there arises in our intellect an idea of divine things, this very idea or inward word tends to be called wisdom, by that figure of speech whereby acts and species are denominated from the habits from which they proceed. Thus sometimes a just action is called justice, a brave action bravery, and a virtuous action is commonly called virtue. And in this way a man’s wise conceptions are called wisdom. In Deo autem sapientiam quidem oportet dici, ex eo quod seipsum cognoscit: sed quia non cognoscit se per aliquam speciem nisi per essentiam suam, quinimmo et ipsum eius intelligere est eius essentia, sapientia Dei habitus esse non potest, sed est ipsa Dei essentia. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod Dei filius est verbum et conceptio Dei intelligentis seipsum. Sequitur igitur quod ipsum Dei verbum, tanquam sapienter mente divina conceptum, proprie concepta seu genita sapientia dicatur: unde apostolus Christum Dei sapientiam nominat, I ad Cor. 1:24. Now in God wisdom must be referred to the fact that he knows himself. But, since he knows himself not by an intelligible species but by his essence—indeed, his very act of intelligence is his essence—therefore God’s wisdom cannot be a habit, but is the divine essence. Now it is evident from what has been said that the Son of God is the Word and concept of God understanding himself. Therefore, the Word of God is rightly called conceived or begotten wisdom, as being the wise conception of the divine mind. Hence the Apostle calls Christ the Wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:24). Ipsum autem sapientiae verbum mente conceptum est quaedam manifestatio sapientiae intelligentis: sicut et in nobis omnes habitus per actus manifestantur. Quia ergo divina sapientia lux dicitur, prout in puro actu cognitionis consistit; lucis autem manifestatio splendor ipsius est ab ea procedens: convenienter et verbum divinae sapientiae splendor lucis nominatur, secundum illud apostoli de filio dicentis: cum sit splendor gloriae. Unde et filius manifestationem patris sibi adscribit, Ioan. 17:6, dicens: pater, manifestavi nomen tuum hominibus. Now the word of wisdom conceived in the mind is a manifestation of the understander’s wisdom, even as all our habits are revealed by their acts. Since, then, Divine Wisdom is called light because it consists in a pure act of knowledge, and the manifestation of light is its splendor proceeding from it, the Word of Divine Wisdom is fittingly called the splendor of light, according to the words of the Apostle speaking of the Son: being the splendor of his glory (Heb 1:3). Hence the Son ascribed to himself the manifestation of the Father, when he said: Father, I have manifested your name to men (John 17:6). Sed tamen, licet filius, qui est Dei verbum, proprie sapientia concepta dicatur; nomen tamen sapientiae absolute dictum oportet esse commune patri et filio: cum sapientia quae per verbum resplendet sit patris essentia, ut dictum est essentia vero patris sit sibi et filio communis. Yet though the Son, who is God’s Word, is rightly called Begotten Wisdom, the name ‘Wisdom’ taken absolutely must be common to Father and Son, since the wisdom that shines through the Word is the essence of the Father, as we have said above, and the Father’s essence is common to him and the Son. Caput 13 Chapter 13 Quod non est nisi unus filius in divinis That there is only one Son in God Quia vero Deus, intelligendo seipsum omnia alia intelligit, ut in primo ostensum est; seipsum autem uno et simplici intuitu intelligit, cum suum intelligere sit suum esse necesse est verbum Dei esse unicum tantum. Cum autem in divinis nihil aliud sit filii generatio quam verbi conceptio, sequitur quod una sola sit generatio in divinis, et unicus filius solus a patre genitus. Unde Ioan. 1:14 dicitur: vidimus eum quasi unigenitum a patre; et iterum: unigenitus, qui est in sinu patris, ipse nobis enarravit. Since God understands all other things by understanding himself, as we proved in the first book; and since he understands himself in one simple glance, for his act of understanding is his being, it follows of necessity that there is only one Word of God. And as in God the generation of the Son is nothing else but the conception of the Word, it follows that there is but one generation in God, and but one Son begotten of the Father. Hence it is said: We have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father (John 1:14), and again: The only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known (John 1:18). Videtur tamen ex praemissis sequi quod et verbi divini sit aliud verbum, et filii sit alius filius. Ostensum est enim quod verbum Dei sit verus Deus. Oportet igitur omnia quae Deo conveniunt, verbo Dei convenire. Deus autem ex necessitate seipsum intelligit. Et verbum igitur Dei seipsum intelligit. Si igitur ex hoc quod Deus seipsum intelligit, verbum ab eo genitum in Deo ponitur, consequi videtur quod etiam et verbo, inquantum seipsum intelligit, aliud verbum attribuatur. Et sic verbi erit verbum, et filii filius; et illud verbum, si Deus est, iterum seipsum intelliget et habebit aliud verbum; et sic in infinitum generatio divina procedet. It would seem, however, to follow from the foregoing that there is yet another word of the divine Word, and another son proceeding from the Son. For we proved that the Word of God is true God: consequently whatever belongs to God belongs to the Word of God. Now God of necessity understands himself: therefore the Word of God also understands himself. If then, because God understands himself, there is in God the Word begotten of him, it would seem to follow that we must ascribe to the Word also yet another word, inasmuch as he understands himself. Thus there will be a word of the Word, and a son of the Son. And this other word, if it be God, will also understand himself, and will have another word, so that there will be an infinite process of divine generations.