Caput 24 Chapter 24 Quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a filio That the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son Quidam vero circa spiritus sancti processionem errare inveniuntur, dicentes spiritum sanctum a filio non procedere. Et ideo ostendendum est spiritum sanctum a filio procedere. Now some are in error about the procession of the Holy Spirit, and hold that he does not proceed from the Son. Accordingly, we must show that the Holy Spirit does proceed from the Son. Manifestum est enim ex sacra Scriptura quod Spiritus Sanctus est spiritus filii: dicitur enim Rom. 8:9: si quis spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius. Sed ne aliquis posset dicere quod alius sit spiritus qui procedit a patre, et alius qui est filii, ostenditur ex verbis eiusdem apostoli quod idem Spiritus Sanctus sit patris et filii. Nam hoc quod inductum est, si quis spiritum Christi non habet, hic non est eius, subiunxit postquam dixerat, si spiritus Dei habitat in nobis, et cetera. Non autem potest dici Spiritus Sanctus esse spiritus Christi ex hoc solo quod eum habuit tanquam homo, secundum illud Luc. 4:1, Iesus, plenus spiritu sancto, regressus est a Iordane. Dicitur enim Galat. 4:6: quoniam estis filii Dei, misit Deus spiritum filii sui in corda vestra, clamantem, abba (pater). Ex hoc ergo Spiritus Sanctus nos facit filios Dei, inquantum est spiritus filii Dei. Efficimur autem filii Dei adoptivi per assimilationem ad filium Dei naturalem: secundum illud Rom. 8:29: quos praescivit, et praedestinavit fieri conformes imaginis filii eius, ut sit ipse primogenitus in multis fratribus. Sic igitur est Spiritus Sanctus spiritus Christi, inquantum est filius Dei naturalis. Non potest autem secundum aliam habitudinem Spiritus Sanctus dici spiritus filii Dei nisi secundum aliquam originem: quia haec sola distinctio in divinis invenitur. Necesse est igitur dicere quod Spiritus Sanctus sic sit filii quod ab eo procedat. It is evident from Sacred Scripture that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, for it is said: Any one who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him (Rom 8:9). And, lest anyone say that the Spirit proceeding from the Father is distinct from the Spirit of the Son, it is plain from the words of the same Apostle that the same Holy Spirit is the Father’s and the Son’s. For the words quoted above: Any one who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him, are preceded by these: If the Spirit of God really dwells in you (Rom 8:9). Now, the Holy Spirit cannot be called the Spirit of Christ merely because Christ possessed him as man: Jesus, full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the Jordan (Luke 4:1); since it is said: Because you are sons, God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying: ‘Abba! Father!’ (Gal 4:6). Accordingly, the Holy Spirit makes us to be sons of God inasmuch as he is the Spirit of the Son of God. Now, we become sons of God by adoption through being conformed to him who is Son of God by nature: For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the first-born among many brethren (Rom 8:29). Hence the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ inasmuch as he is the natural Son of God. But the Holy Spirit cannot be called the Spirit of Christ by reason of any other relationship, save that of origin, since this is the only distinction to be found in God. Therefore, we must say that the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of Christ in the sense that he proceeds from him. Item. Spiritus Sanctus a filio mittitur: secundum illud Ioan. 15:26: cum venerit Paraclitus, quem ego mittam vobis a patre. Mittens autem auctoritatem aliquam habet in missum. Oportet igitur dicere quod filius habeat aliquam auctoritatem respectu spiritus sancti. Non autem dominii vel maioritatis, sed secundum solam originem. Sic igitur Spiritus Sanctus est a filio. Si quis autem dicat quod etiam filius mittitur a spiritu sancto, quia dicitur Luc. 4:18–21, quod dominus dixit in se impletum illud Isaiae, spiritus domini super me, evangelizare pauperibus misit me: sed considerandum est quod filius a spiritu sancto mittitur secundum naturam assumptam. Spiritus autem sanctus non assumpsit naturam creatam, ut secundum eam possit dici missus a filio, vel filius habere auctoritatem respectu ipsius. Relinquitur igitur quod respectu personae aeternae filius super spiritum sanctum auctoritatem habeat. Again. The Holy Spirit is sent by the Son: When the Counselor comes, whom I shall send to you from the Father (John 15:26). Now, the sender has a certain authority in respect of the person sent. Hence we must say that the Son has a certain authority in respect of the Holy Spirit—not an authority of dominion or greatness, but only in point of origin. Therefore, the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. But someone might say that the Son also is sent by the Holy Spirit, because our Lord declares that in himself was fulfilled the saying of Isaias: The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he has anointed me to preach good news to the poor (Luke 4:18–21). To this we reply that the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit in respect of his human nature. Now, the Holy Spirit did not assume a created nature in such a way that in respect of that nature he could be said to be sent by the Son, or that the Son has authority in relation to him. It follows, therefore, that the Son has authority over the Holy Spirit with regard to the eternal person. Amplius. Ioan. 16:14, dicit filius de spiritu sancto: ille me clarificabit, quia de meo accipiet. Non autem potest dici quod accipiat id quod est filii, non tamen accipiat a filio: utputa si dicatur quod accipiat essentiam divinam, quae est filii a patre; unde et subditur, omnia quaecumque habet pater, mea sunt. Propterea dixi vobis quia de meo accipiet: si enim omnia quae patris sunt et filii sunt, oportet quod auctoritas patris, secundum quam est principium spiritus sancti, sit et filii. Sicut ergo Spiritus Sanctus accipit de eo quod est patris a patre, ita accipit de eo quod est filii a filio. Moreover. The Son says of the Holy Spirit: He will glorify me, for he will take what is mine and declare it to you (John 16:14). Now, he cannot be said to receive what is the Son’s, unless he receive from the Son—for example, if he be said to receive the divine essence, which is the Son’s from the Father. Hence the text continues: All that the Father has is mine; therefore I said that he will take what is mine and declare it to you (John 16:15). For if whatsoever the Father has is the Son’s, it follows that the Father’s authority, inasmuch as he is the principle of the Holy Spirit, must be the Son’s also. Consequently, as the Holy Spirit receives from the Father of what is the Father’s, so from the Son he receives of what is the Son’s. Ad hoc etiam induci possunt auctoritates doctorum Ecclesiae, etiam Graecorum. Dicit enim Athanasius: Spiritus Sanctus a patre et filio, non factus nec creatus nec genitus, sed procedens. Cyrillus etiam, in epistola sua, quam synodus Chalcedonensis recepit, dicit: spiritus veritatis nominatur et est spiritus veritatis et profluit ab eo, sicut denique et ex Deo patre. Didymus etiam dicit, in libro de Spiritu Sancto: neque quid est aliud filius exceptis his quae ei dantur a patre; neque alia est spiritus sancti substantia praeter id quod ei datur a filio. Besides, we can quote the authority of the doctors of the Church, even of the Greeks. Thus Athanasius says: The Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; not made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding. Cyril also, in his epistle received by the Council of Chalcedon, says: He is called the Spirit of Truth, and is the Spirit of Truth: for he proceeds therefrom, as also from God the Father. And Didymus says: Neither is the Son distinct, save in those things which he receives from the Father, nor is the Holy Spirit of another substance besides what is conceded; namely, that he is from the Son and proceeds from him. Ridiculosum est autem quod quidam concedunt spiritum sanctum esse a filio, vel profluere ab ipso, sed non procedere ab ipso. Verbum enim processionis inter omnia quae ad originem pertinent, magis invenitur esse commune: quicquid enim quocumque modo est ab aliquo, ab ipso procedere dicimus. Et quia divina melius per communia quam per specialia designantur, verbum processionis in origine divinarum personarum maxime est accommodum. Unde si concedatur quod Spiritus Sanctus sit a filio, vel profluat ab eo, sequitur quod ab eo procedat. But it is ridiculous to concede that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, or flows from the Son, but not that he proceeds from him. For this word ‘procession,’ among all those that indicate origin, is the widest in its signification. Thus, in whatever way anything is from anything else, it is said to proceed from it. And, since divine things are better expressed in general than in special terms, the word ‘procession’ as denoting the origin of the divine persons is to be specially noted. Hence, if it be granted that the Holy Spirit is from the Son, or flows from the Son, it follows that he proceeds from him. Item. Habetur in determinatione quinti Concilii: sequimur per omnia sanctos patres et doctores Ecclesiae, Athanasium, Hilarium, Basilium, Gregorium theologum et Gregorium Nyssenum, Ambrosium, Augustinum, Theophilum, Ioannem Constantin., Cyrillum, Leonem, Proclum: et suscipimus omnia quae de recta fide et condamnatione haereticorum exposuerunt. Manifestum est autem ex multis auctoritatibus Augustini, et praecipue in libro de Trinitate, et super Ioannem, quod Spiritus Sanctus sit a filio. Oportet igitur concedi quod Spiritus Sanctus sit a filio sicut et a patre. Again. We read in the decree of the fifth Council: In all things we follow the teaching of the holy Fathers and doctors of the Church, of Athanasius, Hilary, Basil, Gregory the Theologian, Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrose, Augustine, Theophilus, John of Constantinople, Cyril, Leo, Probus. We subscribe to all that they taught concerning the true faith and the condemnation of heresies. Now, it is clear from many of Augustine’s works, especially the book On the Trinity and his Commentary on John, that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Therefore, it must be granted that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Hoc etiam evidentibus rationibus apparet. In rebus enim, remota materiali distinctione, quae in divinis personis locum habere non potest, non inveniuntur aliqua distingui nisi per aliquam oppositionem. Quae enim nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem, simul esse possunt in eodem, unde per ea distinctio causari non potest: album enim et triangulare, licet diversa sint, quia tamen non opponuntur, in eodem esse contingit. Oportet autem supponere, secundum fidei Catholicae documenta, quod Spiritus Sanctus a filio distinguatur: aliter enim non esset Trinitas, sed dualitas in personis. Oportet igitur huiusmodi distinctionem per aliquam oppositionem fieri. Non autem oppositione affirmationis et negationis: quia sic distinguuntur entia a non entibus. Nec etiam oppositione privationis et habitus: quia sic distinguuntur perfecta ab imperfectis. Neque etiam oppositione contrarietatis. Quia sic distinguuntur quae sunt secundum formam diversa: nam contrarietas, ut philosophi docent, est differentia secundum formam. Quae quidem differentia divinis personis non convenit, cum earum sit una forma, sicut una essentia: secundum illud apostoli, Philipp. 2:6, de filio dicentis, qui cum in forma Dei esset, scilicet patris. The same may be evidently proved by reason. Apart from the distinction of matter, which can have no place in the divine persons, there can be no distinction in things except by way of opposition, since things which are in no way distinct from one another can be together in the same subject, so that they cannot be a cause of distinction. Thus ‘white’ and ‘triangular,’ although diverse, yet, because they are not opposed to each other, can be in the same subject. Now, according to the teaching of the Catholic faith, we must grant a distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit: otherwise there would not be three, but two persons. Consequently, this distinction must result from some kind of opposition. But it cannot be the opposition of affirmation and negation, since such is the distinction between being and non-being. Nor can it be the opposition of privation and habit, since such is the distinction between perfect and imperfect. Nor can it be the opposition of contrariety, since such is the distinction between things having different forms: for contrariety is difference of form (as the philosophers teach), and such a difference is incompatible in the divine persons inasmuch as they have one form, even as they have one essence. Thus the Apostle, speaking of the Son, says: who, being in the form of God (Phil 2:6), namely of the Father. Relinquitur igitur unam personam divinam ab alia non distingui nisi oppositione relationis: sic enim filius a patre distinguitur secundum oppositionem relativam patris et filii. Non enim in divinis personis alia relativa oppositio esse potest nisi secundum originem. Nam relative opposita vel supra quantitatem fundatur, ut duplum et dimidium; vel super actionem et passionem, ut dominus et servus, movens et motum, pater et filius. Rursus, relativorum quae super quantitatem fundantur, quaedam fundantur super diversam quantitatem, ut duplum et dimidium, maius et minus; quaedam super ipsam unitatem, ut idem, quod significat unum in substantia; et aequale, quod significat unum in quantitate; et simile, quod significat unum in qualitate. Divinae igitur personae distingui non possunt relationibus fundatis super diversitatem quantitatis: quia sic tolleretur trium personarum aequalitas. Neque iterum relationibus quae fundantur super unum: quia huiusmodi relationes distinctionem non causant, immo magis ad convenientiam pertinere inveniuntur, etsi forte aliqua eorum distinctionem praesupponunt. In relationibus vero omnibus super actionem vel passionem fundatis, semper alterum est ut subiectum, et inaequale secundum virtutem, nisi solum in relationibus originis, in quibus nulla minoratio designatur, eo quod invenitur aliquid producere sibi simile et aequale secundum naturam et virtutem. Relinquitur igitur quod divinae personae distingui non possunt nisi oppositione relativa secundum originem. Oportet igitur quod, si Spiritus Sanctus a filio distinguitur, quod sit ab eo: non enim est dicere quod filius sit a spiritu sancto, cum Spiritus Sanctus magis filii esse dicatur, et a filio detur. It follows, therefore, that one divine person is not distinct from another save by relative opposition: thus the Son is distinct from the Father in respect of the relative opposition between a father and his son. For there can be no other relative opposition in God save that which is according to origin, since relative opposition is founded either on quantity, as ‘double’ and ‘half,’ or on action and passion, as ‘master’ and ‘servant,’ ‘mover’ and ‘moved,’ ‘father’ and ‘son’. Again, of those relatives that are founded on quantity, some are based on difference in quantity, as ‘double’ and ‘half,’ ‘more’ and ‘less’; some on unity itself—for example, ‘same,’ which signifies one in substance, and ‘equal,’ which signifies one in quantity, and ‘like,’ which signifies one in quality. Accordingly, the divine persons cannot be distinguished by relations based on diversity of quantity, because this would destroy the equality of the three persons; nor by relations based on unity, because such relations do not cause distinction—in fact they are more akin to conformity, although it may be that one or the other of them presupposes distinction. But in all the relations based on action and passion, one of them is always subject and unequal in power, except only in relations of origin, where no inferiority is indicated, because in their case something produces its like and equal in nature and power. Therefore, it follows that the divine persons cannot be distinguished save by relative opposition of origin. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, he must proceed from him, since it cannot be said that the Son proceeds from the Holy Spirit, because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Son, and is given by him. Item. A patre est filius et Spiritus Sanctus. Oportet igitur patrem referri et ad filium et ad spiritum sanctum ut principium ad id quod est a principio. Refertur autem ad filium ratione paternitatis, non autem ad spiritum sanctum: quia tunc Spiritus Sanctus esset filius; paternitas enim non dicitur nisi ad filium. Oportet igitur in patre esse aliam relationem qua referatur ad spiritum sanctum, et vocetur spiratio. Similiter, cum in filio sit quaedam relatio qua refertur ad patrem, quae dicitur filiatio, oportet quod in spiritu sancto sit etiam alia relatio qua referatur ad patrem, et dicatur processio. Et sic secundum originem filii a patre sint duae relationes, una in originante, alia in originato, scilicet paternitas et filiatio; et aliae duae ex parte originis spiritus sancti, scilicet spiratio et processio. Paternitas igitur et spiratio non constituunt duas personas, sed ad unam personam patris pertinent: quia non habent oppositionem ad invicem. Neque igitur filiatio et processio duas personas constituerent, sed ad unam pertinerent, nisi haberent oppositionem ad invicem. Non est autem dare aliam oppositionem nisi secundum originem. Oportet igitur quod sit oppositio originis inter filium et spiritum sanctum, ita quod unus sit ab alio. Again. Both Son and Holy Spirit proceed from the Father. Consequently, the Father must be related to both Son and Holy Spirit as the principle is related to that which proceeds from it. Now he is related to the Son by reason of paternity, but not so to the Holy Spirit, since then the Holy Spirit would be his Son: for paternity is a relation to none but a son. Therefore, there must be another relation in the Father, whereby he is related to the Holy Spirit; this is called spiration. In like manner, since there is a relation in the Son whereby he is related to the Father, and which is called filiation, there must also be in the Holy Spirit another relation whereby he is related to the Father, and which is called procession. Thus there are two relations corresponding to the origin of the Son from the Father, one in the person who is the origin, and one in the person originated, namely, paternity and filiation. And again, two relations corresponding to the origin of the Holy Spirit, namely, spiration and procession. Hence paternity and spiration do not constitute two persons, but belong to the one person of the Father, because they are not opposite to each other. Neither, therefore, would filiation and procession constitute two persons, but would belong to one person, unless they were opposed to one another. Now, no other opposition is possible, save that of origin. Therefore, there must be opposition of origin between the Son and the Holy Spirit, so that the one proceeds from the other. Adhuc. Quaecumque conveniunt in aliquo communi, si distinguantur ad invicem, oportet quod distinguantur secundum aliquas differentias per se, et non per accidens, pertinentes ad illud commune: sicut homo et equus conveniunt in animali, et distinguuntur ab invicem, non per album et nigrum, quae se habent per accidens ad animal, sed per rationale et irrationale, quae per se animal pertinent; quia, cum animal sit quod habet animam, oportet quod hoc distinguatur per hoc quod est habere animam talem vel talem, utputa rationalem vel irrationalem. Manifestum est autem quod filius et Spiritus Sanctus conveniunt in hoc quod est esse ab alio, quia uterque est a patre: et secundum hoc pater convenienter differt ab utroque, inquantum est innascibilis. Si igitur Spiritus Sanctus distinguatur a filio, oportet quod hoc sit per differentias quae per se dividant hoc quod est ens ab alio. Quae quidem non possunt esse nisi differentiae eiusdem generis scilicet ad originem pertinentes, ut unus eorum sit ab alio. Relinquitur igitur quod ad hoc quod Spiritus Sanctus distinguatur a filio, necesse est quod sit a filio. Further. Things that have something in common, if they are distinct from each other, must be distinguished by essential differences, and not by differences accidentally belonging to what they have in common. Thus man and horse agree in animal nature, and are differentiated not by black and white (which are accidental to animal), but by rational and irrational which belong to animal essentially. For, since ‘animal’ means that which has a soul (anima), it follows that it must be differentiated in the point of its having this or that kind of soul (for instance, rational or irrational). Now it is manifest that the Son and the Holy Spirit agree in the point of proceeding from another, since each is from the Father: accordingly, the Father is fittingly distinguished from both in that he is innascible. If, then, the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son, this must be by distinctions which essentially divide the fact of being from another: and such distinctions must be of the same kind—that is, distinctions of origin, so that one of them proceed from the other. It follows, therefore, that the Holy Spirit must proceed from the Son in order to be distinct from him. Amplius. Si quis dicat spiritum sanctum distingui a filio, non quia sit a filio, sed propter diversam originem utriusque a patre: in idem hoc realiter redire necesse est. Si enim Spiritus Sanctus est alius a filio, oportet quod alia sit origo vel processio utriusque. Duae autem origines non possunt distingui nisi per terminum, vel principium, vel subiectum. Sicut origo equi differt ab origine bovis ex parte termini: secundum quod hae duae origines terminantur ad naturas specie diversas. Ex parte autem principii: ut si supponamus in eadem specie animalis quaedam generari ex virtute activa solis tantum; quaedam autem, simul cum hac, ex virtute activa seminis. Ex parte vero subiecti, differt generatio huius equi et illius secundum quod natura speciei in diversa materia recipitur. Haec autem distinctio quae est ex parte subiecti, in divinis personis locum habere non potest: cum sint omnino immateriales. Similiter etiam ex parte termini, ut ita liceat loqui, non potest esse processionum distinctio: quia unam et eandem divinam naturam quam accipit filius nascendo, accipit Spiritus Sanctus procedendo. Relinquitur igitur quod utriusque originis distinctio esse non potest nisi ex parte principii. Manifestum est autem quod principium originis filii est pater solus. Si igitur processionis spiritus sancti principium sit solus pater, non erit alia processio spiritus sancti a generatione filii: et sic nec Spiritus Sanctus distinctus a filio. Ad hoc igitur quod sint aliae processiones et alii procedentes, necesse est dicere quod Spiritus Sanctus non sit a solo patre, sed a patre et filio. Moreover. Someone might say that the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Son not because he proceeds from him, but on account of the difference in the origin of each from the Father. But these amount to the same thing. For if the Holy Spirit is other than the Son, their respective origins or processions must differ. Now, two origins cannot differ save as to term, principle, or subject. Thus the origin of a horse differs from the origin of an ox as regards the term, insofar as these two origins terminate in specifically distinct natures. On the part of the principle—thus in the same animal species, there may be some animals engendered by the active force of the sun alone, while others are engendered by the same force co-operating with the active power of seed. On the part of the subject—the engendering of one horse differs from that of another insofar as the specific nature is received into a different matter. Now, this distinction on the part of the subject cannot be ascribed to the divine persons, since they are utterly devoid of matter. Again, on the part of the term, if one may use the expression, there can be no difference in the processions, because the Holy Spirit, by proceeding, receives one and the same divine nature as the Son receives by being born. Consequently, the distinction of their respective origins can only be on the part of the principle. Now, it is plain that the Father alone is the principle of the Son’s origin. Therefore, if the Father alone be the principle of the procession of the Holy Spirit, the procession of the Holy Spirit will not be distinct from the generation of the Son, and so the Holy Spirit will not be distinct from the Son. Consequently, if there is a distinction of processions and of persons proceeding, we must conclude that the Holy Spirit is not from the Father alone, but from the Father and the Son. Si quis vero iterum dicat quod differunt processiones secundum principium inquantum pater producit filium per modum intellectus ut verbum, spiritum autem sanctum per modum voluntatis quasi amorem: secundum hoc oportebit dici quod secundum differentiam voluntatis et intellectus in Deo patre distinguantur duae processiones et duo procedentes. Sed voluntas et intellectus in Deo patre non distinguuntur secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem: ut in primo libro ostensum est. Sequitur igitur quod duae processiones et duo procedentes differant solum ratione. Ea vero quae solum ratione differunt, de se invicem praedicantur: verum enim dicetur quod divina voluntas est intellectus eius, et e converso. Verum ergo, erit dicere quod Spiritus Sanctus est filius et e converso: quod est Sabellianae impietatis. Non igitur sufficit ad distinctionem spiritus sancti et filii dicere quod filius procedat per modum intellectus, et Spiritus Sanctus per modum voluntatis, nisi cum hoc dicatur quod Spiritus Sanctus sit a filio. Again, someone might say that the processions differ as to the principle inasmuch as the Father produces the Son as the Word proceeding from his intellect, and the Holy Spirit as the love proceeding from his will. Then we shall have to say that the two processions and the two proceeding persons are distinct by reason of the difference between will and intellect in God the Father. But will and intellect are not really distinct in God the Father, but only logically, as we have proved. Consequently, there will only be a logical distinction between the two processions, and the two proceeding persons. Now, things that differ only logically are predicated of one another: for it is true that God’s will is his intellect and vice versa. Hence it will be true that the Holy Spirit is the Son, and vice versa, which is the impious statement of Sabellius. Therefore, to account for the distinction between the Holy Spirit and the Son, it is not enough to say that the Son proceeds by way of the intelligence, and the Holy Spirit by way of the will, unless we add that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Praeterea. Ex hoc ipso quod dicitur quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit per modum voluntatis, et filius per modum intellectus, sequitur quod Spiritus Sanctus sit a filio. Nam amor procedit a verbo: eo quod nihil amare possumus nisi verbo cordis illud concipiamus. Further. From the very fact that the Holy Spirit is said to proceed by way of the will, and the Son by way of the intellect, it follows that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, because love proceeds from the word, since we cannot love a thing unless we first conceive it in the word of our hearts. Item. Si quis diversas species rerum consideret, in eis quidam ordo ostenditur: prout viventia sunt supra non viventia, et animalia supra plantas, et homo super alia animalia, et in singulis horum diversi gradus inveniuntur secundum diversas species; unde et Plato species rerum dixit esse numeros qui specie variantur per additionem vel subtractionem unitatis. Unde in substantiis immaterialibus non potest esse distinctio nisi secundum ordinem. In divinis autem personis, quae sunt omnino immateriales, non potest esse alius ordo nisi originis. Non igitur sunt duae personae ab una procedentes, nisi una earum procedat ab altera. Et sic oportet spiritum sanctum procedere a filio. Again. If we consider the various species of things, we shall observe a certain order in them, in that living beings are above lifeless things, animals above plants, and man above other animals; and that there are various grades in each one of these in respect of their various species. Hence Plato said that species are like numbers, which differ specifically by the addition or subtraction of unity. Consequently, in substances devoid of matter, there can be no distinction but by reason of order. Now, the divine persons are immaterial, and in them there can be no order but that of origin. Therefore, two persons cannot proceed from one unless one of them proceed from the other. Thus the Holy Spirit must proceed from the Son. Adhuc. Pater et filius, quantum ad unitatem essentiae, non differunt nisi in hoc quod hic est pater et hic est filius. Quicquid igitur praeter hoc est, commune est patri et filio. Esse autem principium spiritus sancti est praeter rationem paternitatis et filiationis: nam alia relatio est qua pater est pater, et qua pater est principium spiritus sancti, ut supra dictum est. Esse igitur principium spiritus sancti est commune patri et filio. Again. The Father and Son, as regards the unity of essence, do not differ save in that the one is the Father, and the other the Son. Whatsoever, therefore, is in addition to this is common to Father and Son. Now, to be the principle of the Holy Spirit is in addition to paternity and filiation, since the relation whereby the Father is father is distinct from that whereby he is the principle of the Holy Spirit, as stated above. Therefore, it is common to Father and Son to be the principle of the Holy Spirit. Amplius. Quicquid non est contra rationem alicuius, non est impossibile ei convenire, nisi forte per accidens. Esse autem principium spiritus sancti non est contra rationem filii. Neque inquantum est Deus: quia pater est principium spiritus sancti. Neque inquantum est filius: eo quod alia est processio spiritus sancti et filii; non est autem repugnans id quod est a principio secundum unam processionem, esse principium processionis alterius. Relinquitur igitur quod non sit impossibile filium esse principium spiritus sancti. Quod autem non est impossibile, potest esse. In divinis autem non differt esse et posse. Ergo filius est principium spiritus sancti. Moreover. Whatsoever is not against the nature of a thing can be ascribed to it, unless there be something accidental in the way. Now, to be the principle of the Holy Spirit is not incompatible in the Son, neither as God (since the Father, who is God, is the principle of the Holy Spirit), nor as Son (since the procession of the Holy Spirit differs from that of the Son). Also, to proceed from a principle by one kind of procession is not incompatible with being the principle of another’s procession. Consequently, it is not impossible for the Son to be the principle of the Holy Spirit. Now, what is not impossible is possible; in God, what is possible is not different from what is. Therefore, the Son is the principle of the Holy Spirit. Caput 25 Chapter 25 Rationes ostendere volentium quod Spiritus Sanctus non procedat a filio, et solutio ipsarum Arguments of those who would prove that the Holy Spirit proceeds not from the Son, and their solution Quidam vero, pertinaciter veritati resistere volentes, quaedam in contrarium inducunt, quae vix responsione sunt digna. Dicunt enim quod dominus, de processione spiritus sancti loquens, eum a patre procedere dixit, nulla mentione facta de filio: ut patet Ioan. 15:26, ubi dicitur: cum venerit Paraclitus, quem ego mittam vobis a patre, spiritum veritatis, qui a patre procedit. Unde, cum de Deo nihil sit sentiendum nisi quod in Scriptura traditur, non est dicendum quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a filio. Some men, in their obstinate opposition to the truth, adduce arguments to the contrary, but they scarcely deserve a reply. They say that when our Lord spoke of the procession of the Holy Spirit, he stated that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, and makes no mention of the Son, as when he says: When the Counselor comes, whom I shall send to you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father, he will bear witness to me (John 15:26). Therefore, as we must not believe anything about God save what we are taught by the Scriptures, we must not say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son. Sed hoc omnino frivolum est. Nam propter unitatem essentiae, quod in Scripturis de una persona dicitur, et de alia oportet intelligi, nisi repugnet proprietati personali ipsius, etiam si dictio exclusiva adderetur. Licet enim dicatur, Matth. 11:27, quod nemo novit filium nisi pater, non tamen a cognitione filii vel ipse filius, vel Spiritus Sanctus excluditur. Unde etiam si diceretur in Evangelio quod Spiritus Sanctus non procedit nisi a patre, non per hoc removeretur quin procederet a filio: cum hoc proprietati filii non repugnet, ut ostensum est. Nec est mirum si dominus spiritum sanctum a patre procedere dixit, de se mentione non facta: quia omnia ad patrem referre solet, a quo habet quicquid habet; sicut cum dicit, Ioan. 7:16: mea doctrina non est mea, sed eius qui misit me, patris. Et multa huiusmodi in verbis domini inveniuntur, ad commendandam in patre auctoritatem principii. Nec tamen in auctoritate praemissa omnino reticuit se esse spiritus sancti principium: cum dixit eum spiritum veritatis, se autem prius dixerat veritatem. Now this is utter nonsense. By reason of the unity of essence, whatsoever the Scripture says about one person must be understood to apply to another person, even though an exclusive term be employed, unless it be incompatible with the latter person’s personal property. For though it is said: No one knows the Son except the Father (Matt 11:27), neither the Son himself, nor the Holy Spirit is excluded from knowledge of the Son. Hence, even were it said in the Gospel that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, this would not imply that he does not proceed from the Son, since this is not incompatible with the Son’s property, as we have proved. Nor need we wonder if our Lord said that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, without mentioning himself, because he is wont to refer all things to the Father, from whom he has whatsoever he has. Thus he says: My teaching is not mine, but his who sent me (John 7:16); that is, the Father’s. We find many such utterances of our Lord, stressing the Father’s authority as principle. And yet, in the passage quoted above, he does not wholly omit to say that he is the principle of the Holy Spirit, for he calls him the Spirit of truth, and he had previously called himself the truth (John 14:6). Obiiciunt etiam quod in quibusdam Conciliis invenitur sub interminatione anathematis prohibitum ne aliquid addatur in symbolo in Conciliis ordinato: in quo tamen de processione spiritus sancti a filio mentio non habetur. Unde arguunt Latinos anathematis reos, qui hoc in symbolo addiderunt. They also object that in some Councils it was forbidden, under pain of anathema, to make any addition to the Creed approved by the Councils: and that in this Creed no mention is made of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son. Therefore, they argue that the Latins who made this addition to the Creed are anathematised. Sed haec efficaciam non habent. Nam in determinatione synodi Chalcedonensis, dicitur quod patres apud Constantinopolim congregati doctrinam Nicaenae synodi corroboraverunt, non quasi aliquid minus esset inferentes, sed de spiritu sancto intellectum eorum, adversum eos qui dominum eum respuere tentaverunt, Scripturarum testimoniis declarantes. Et similiter dicendum est quod processio spiritus sancti a filio implicite continetur in Constantinopolit. symbolo, in hoc quod ibi dicitur quod procedit a patre: quia quod de patre intelligitur, oportet et de filio intelligi, ut dictum est. Et ad hoc addendum suffecit auctoritas Romani pontificis, per quam etiam inveniuntur antiqua Concilia esse confirmata. But this avails nothing, because it is stated in the decree of the Council of Chalcedon, that when the Fathers assembled at Constantinople confirmed the doctrine of the Council of Nicea: They did not imply that the previous Council contained less doctrine, but their object was to explain the mind of the fathers by quoting the authority of Scripture against those who denied that the Holy Spirit is the Lord. In like manner, we must say that the procession of the Holy Spirit is implicitly recognized in the Creed of Constantinople, inasmuch as it states that he proceeds from the Father, because what applies to the Father applies also to the Son, as we have said above. Moreover, the authority of the Roman pontiff suffices to make this addition: by which authority the early Councils were confirmed. Inducunt etiam quod Spiritus Sanctus, cum sit simplex, non potest esse a duobus; et quod Spiritus Sanctus, si perfecte procedat a patre, non procedit a filio; et alia huiusmodi. Quae facile est solvere etiam parum in theologicis exercitato. Nam pater et filius sunt unum principium spiritus sancti, propter unitatem divinae virtutis, et una productione producunt spiritum sanctum: sicut etiam tres personae sunt unum principium creaturae, et una actione creaturam producunt. They also argue that since the Holy Spirit is simple, he cannot proceed from two persons; and that if he proceed from the Father perfectly, he does not proceed from the Son; and adduce many similar arguments, which can easily be solved even by those who are not far advanced in theology. For the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit, on account of the unity of the divine power, and by one productive act produce the Holy Spirit. Thus too the three persons are one principle of the creature, and create by one action. Caput 26 Chapter 26 Quod non sunt nisi tres personae in divinis pater, filius et Spiritus Sanctus That there are no more than three persons in God: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit Ex his igitur quae dicta sunt, accipere oportet quod in divina natura tres personae subsistunt, pater et filius et Spiritus Sanctus, et quod hi tres sunt unus Deus, solis relationibus ad invicem distincti. Pater enim a filio distinguitur paternitatis relatione, et innascibilitate; filius autem a patre relatione filiationis; pater autem et filius a spiritu sancto spiratione, ut dicatur; spiritus autem sanctus a patre et filio processione amoris, qua ab utroque procedit. We gather from what has been said in the preceding chapters that in the divine nature there subsist three persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and that these three are one God, being distinct in relations alone. The Father is distinct from the Son by the relation of paternity, and by innascibility; the Son from the Father, by the relation of sonship; the Father and the Son from the Holy Spirit by spiration, as it may be called; and the Holy Spirit from Father and Son, by the procession of love, whereby he proceeds from both. Praeter has tres personas non est quartam in divina natura ponere. Personae enim divinae, cum in essentia conveniant, non possunt distingui nisi per relationem originis, ut ex dictis patet. Has autem originis relationes accipere oportet, non secundum processionem in exteriora tendentem, sic enim procedens non esset coessentiale suo principio: sed oportet quod processio interius consistat. Quod autem aliquid procedat manens intra suum principium, invenitur solum in operatione intellectus et voluntatis, ut ex dictis patet. Unde personae divinae multiplicari non possunt nisi secundum quod exigit processio intellectus et voluntatis in Deo. Non est autem possibile quod in Deo sit nisi una processio secundum intellectum: eo quod suum intelligere est unum et simplex et perfectum, quia intelligendo se intelligit omnia alia. Et sic non potest esse in Deo nisi una verbi processio. Similiter autem oportet et processionem amoris esse unam tantum: quia etiam divinum velle est unum et simplex, amando enim se amat omnia alia. Non est igitur possibile quod sint in Deo nisi duae personae procedentes: una per modum intellectus ut verbum, scilicet filius; et alia per modum amoris, ut Spiritus Sanctus. Est etiam et una persona non procedens, scilicet pater. Solum igitur tres personae in Trinitate esse possunt. Besides these three persons, there is no fourth in the divine nature. Since the divine persons agree in essence, they cannot be distinct save by relations of origin, as we have already made clear. Now these relations of origin do not arise from a procession tending to external things (for thus the thing that proceeds is not of the same essence as its principle), but from a procession that remains within. And it is only in the working of the intellect and will that a thing is found to proceed so as to remain within its principle, as we have explained. Therefore, the divine persons cannot be multiplied except insofar as this is necessitated by the processions of intellect and will in God. Now in God there can be only one procession according to the intellect, because his act of intelligence is one, simple and perfect. For in understanding himself, he understands all things else, so that in God there can be but one procession of the word. In like manner, there can be but one procession of love, since the divine volition is one and simple, because in loving himself, he loves all other things. Consequently, in God there can be no more than two proceeding persons: one by way of intelligence, as word, namely the Son; the other by way of love, namely the Holy Spirit. There is also one person who does not proceed, namely the Father. Therefore, there are but three persons in the Trinity. Item. Si secundum processionem oportet personas divinas distingui; modus autem personae quantum ad processiones non potest esse nisi triplex; ut scilicet sit aut omnino non procedens, quod patris est; aut a non procedente procedens, quod filii est; aut a procedente procedens, quod spiritus sancti est: impossibile est igitur ponere plures quam tres personas. Again. The persons are distinguished according to procession. Now in respect of procession, there are but three modes possible in a person: either he proceeds not at all, like the Father; or, as the Son, he proceeds from one that does not proceed; or, like the Holy Spirit, he proceeds from one who proceeds. Therefore, there cannot be more than three persons. Licet autem in aliis viventibus possint relationes originis multiplicari, ut scilicet sint in natura humana plures patres et plures filii, in divina natura hoc omnino impossibile est esse. Nam filiatio, cum in una natura sit unius speciei, non potest multiplicari nisi secundum materiam aut subiectum, sicut est etiam de aliis formis. Unde, cum in Deo non sit materia aut subiectum; et ipsae relationes sint subsistentes, ut ex supra dictis patet: impossibile est quod in Deo sint plures filiationes. Et eadem ratio est de aliis. Et sic in Deo sunt solum tres personae. And although, in other living beings, relations of origin can be multiplied—thus in human nature there can be many fathers and many sons—in the divine nature this is quite impossible. For, since in one nature filiation is of one species, it cannot be multiplied except in respect of its matter or subject, as in the case of other forms. Hence, as in God there is no matter or subject, and as the very relations are subsistent (as we have proved), there cannot be several filiations in God. The same applies to the other relations. Thus in God there are but three persons. Si quis autem obiiciens dicat quod in filio, cum sit perfectus Deus, est virtus intellectiva perfecta, et sic potest producere verbum; et similiter, cum in spiritu sancto sit bonitas infinita, quae est communicationis principium, poterit alteri divinae personae naturam divinam communicare: considerare debet quod filius est Deus ut genitus, non ut generans: unde virtus intellectiva est in eo ut in procedente per modum verbi, non ut in producente verbum. Et similiter, cum Spiritus Sanctus sit Deus ut procedens, est in eo bonitas infinita ut in persona accipiente, non ut in communicante alteri bonitatem infinitam. Non enim distinguuntur ab invicem nisi solis relationibus, ut ex supra dictis patet. Tota igitur plenitudo divinitatis est in filio, et eadem numero quae est in patre: sed cum relatione nativitatis, sicut in patre cum relatione generationis activae. Unde, si relatio patris attribueretur filio, omnis distinctio tolleretur. Et eadem ratio est de spiritu sancto. Someone may object that since the Son is perfect God, he has perfect intellectual power, and consequently he can produce a word; and in like manner, as there is infinite goodness in the Holy Spirit whereby he is the principle of the communication of goodness, he will be able to bestow the divine nature on another. To this we reply that the Son is God as begotten, and not as begetting. Hence the intellectual power is in him as in one proceeding by way of word, and not as in the one producing the word. In like manner, since the Holy Spirit is God as proceeding, infinite goodness is in him as the recipient, and not as communicating the infinite goodness to another. For they are not distinguished from one another except by the relations alone, as we have shown. Hence the whole fullness of the divinity is in the Son, identically the same as that which is in the Father. But in the Son it is with the relation of birth; in the Father, with the relation of active generation. Thus, if the Father’s relation were ascribed to the Son, there would no longer be any distinction between them. And the same applies to the Holy Spirit. Huius autem divinae Trinitatis similitudinem in mente humana possumus considerare. Ipsa enim mens, ex hoc quod se actu intelligit, verbum suum concipit in seipsa: quod nihil aliud est quam ipsa intentio intelligibilis mentis, quae et mens intellecta dicitur, in mente existens. Quae dum ulterius seipsam amat, seipsam producit in voluntate ut amatum. Ulterius autem non procedit intra se, sed concluditur circulo, dum per amorem redit ad ipsam substantiam a qua processio incoeperat per intentionem intellectam: sed fit processio ad exteriores effectus, dum ex amore sui procedit ad aliquid faciendum. Et sic tria in mente inveniuntur: mens ipsa, quae est processionis principium, in sua natura existens; et mens concepta in intellectu; et mens amata in voluntate. Non tamen haec tria sunt una natura: quia intelligere mentis non est eius esse, nec eius velle est eius esse aut intelligere. Et propter hoc etiam mens intellecta et mens amata non sunt personae: cum non sint subsistentes. Mens etiam ipsa, in sua natura existens, non est persona: cum non sit totum quod subsistit, sed pars subsistentis, scilicet hominis. We may now consider the likeness to the divine Trinity in the human mind. The mind, by actually understanding itself, produces its word within itself. This word is the intelligible reflection of the mind, and is called the idea existing in the soul, and when it loves itself, it reproduces itself in the will as loved. Further than this, it does not proceed within itself, but completes the circle, when by love it returns to the very substance from which the procession began in the idea. There is, however, a procession towards external effects, when through love of self one proceeds to action. Thus there are three things in the mind: the mind itself in its natural existence (which is the starting-point of the procession); the conception of the mind in the intellect; and the mind loved in the will. Yet these three are not one nature, since the mind’s act of intelligence is not its being; and its volition is neither its being nor its act of intelligence. For this reason the mind understood and the mind loved are not persons, since they are not subsistent: nor is the mind a person in its natural existence, for it is not the whole subsistence, but only part of the subsistence—that is to say, of man. In mente igitur nostra invenitur similitudo Trinitatis divinae quantum ad processionem, quae multiplicat Trinitatem cum ex dictis manifestum sit esse in divina natura Deum ingenitum, qui est totius divinae processionis principium, scilicet patrem; et Deum genitum per modum verbi in intellectu concepti, scilicet filium; et Deum per modum amoris procedentem, scilicet spiritum sanctum. Ulterius autem intra divinam naturam nulla processio invenitur, sed solum processio in exteriores effectus. In hoc autem deficit a repraesentatione divinae Trinitatis, quod pater et filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unius naturae, et singulis horum est persona perfecta, eo quod intelligere et velle sunt ipsum esse divinum, ut ostensum est. Et propter hoc, sic consideratur divina similitudo in homine sicut similitudo Herculis in lapide: quantum ad repraesentationem formae, non quantum ad convenientiam naturae. Unde et in mente hominis dicitur esse imago Dei: secundum illud Gen. 1:26: faciamus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram. Accordingly, in our mind there is a likeness to the divine Trinity as regards the processions which multiply the persons. For we have sufficiently shown that in the divine nature there is God unbegotten, namely the Father, who is the principle of the whole divine procession; God begotten, as the word is conceived in the intellect, and this is the Son; and God proceeding as love, who is the Holy Spirit. There are no further processions within the divine nature, but only those that terminate in external effects. This likeness, then, falls short of being a representation of the divine Trinity, in that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are of one nature, and each of them is a perfect person, since God’s very being is intelligence and will, as we have shown. Hence the divine likeness is reproduced in man in respect of the form represented, as the likeness of Hercules is reproduced in stone, but not by community of nature. Therefore, God’s image is stated to be in the human mind: Let us make man in our image, after our likeness (Gen 1:26). Invenitur etiam in aliis rebus divinae Trinitatis similitudo: prout quaelibet res in sua substantia una est: et specie quadam formatur; et ordinem aliquem habet. Sicut autem ex dictis patet, conceptio intellectus in esse intelligibili est sicut informatio speciei in esse naturali: amor autem est sicut inclinatio vel ordo in re naturali. Unde et species naturalium rerum a remotis repraesentat filium: ordo autem spiritum sanctum. Et ideo, propter remotam repraesentationem et obscuram in irrationabilibus rebus, dicitur in eis esse Trinitatis vestigium, non imago: secundum illud Iob 11:7: numquid vestigia Dei comprehendes et cetera. In other things also there is a likeness to the Trinity inasmuch as each thing is one in its substance, informed by a certain species, and has a certain order. Now, as we have already clearly stated, the intellectual concept in intelligible being is like the information of the species in natural being, and love is like the inclination or order of a natural thing. Thus in natural things species represents the Son remotely, and order represents the Holy Spirit. Hence, on account of the likeness in irrational things being remote and obscure, we say that there is in them a trace but not an image of the Trinity: Perhaps you will understand the traces of God (Job 11:7).