Amplius. Omnis mutatio vel passio conveniens corpori alicuius, potest attribui ei cuius est corpus: si enim corpus Petri vulneretur, flagelletur, aut moriatur, potest dici quod Petrus vulneratur, flagellatur, aut moritur. Sed corpus illius hominis fuit corpus verbi Dei, ut ostensum est. Ergo omnis passio quae in corpore illius hominis facta fuit, potest verbo Dei attribui. Recte igitur dici potest quod verbum Dei, et Deus, est passus, crucifixus, mortuus et sepultus. Quod ipsi negabant.
Moreover. Any change or suffering affecting the body of a man can be ascribed to the person to whom that body belongs. Thus if Peter’s body be wounded, scourged, or dies, it can be said that Peter is wounded, scourged, or dies. Now the body of this man was the body of God’s Word, as we have shown. Hence whatsoever that body suffered, the Word of God may be said to have suffered. Rightly, therefore, may we say that the Word of God, or God, suffered, was crucified, died, and was buried. But those men denied this.
Item. Apostolus dicit, Hebr. 2:10: decebat eum propter quem omnia, et per quem omnia, qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat, auctorem salutis eorum, per passionem consummari: ex quo habetur quod ille propter quem sunt omnia, et per quem sunt omnia, et qui homines in gloriam adducit, et qui est auctor salutis humanae, passus est et mortuus. Sed haec quatuor singulariter sunt Dei, et nulli alii attribuuntur: dicitur enim Proverb. 16:4, universa propter semetipsum operatus est dominus; et Ioan. 1:3, de verbo Dei dicitur, omnia per ipsum facta sunt; et in Psalmo, gratiam et gloriam dabit dominus; et alibi, salus autem iustorum a domino. Manifestum est igitur recte dici Deum, Dei verbum, esse passum et mortuum.
Again. The Apostle says: It was fitting that he, for whom and by whom all things exist, in bringing many sons to glory, should make the pioneer of their salvation perfect through suffering (Heb 2:10). From this we gather that he for whom are all things, who brings men into glory, and who is the author of man’s salvation, suffered and died. Now these four things belong exclusively to God, and are ascribed to no one else. For it is said: The Lord has made everything for himself (Prov 16:4); and of God’s Word it is said: All things were made through him (John 1:3); and: The Lord will give grace and glory (Ps 84:12); and elsewhere: The salvation of the just is from the Lord (Ps 37:39). Therefore, it is evidently right to say that God, the Word of God, suffered and died.
Praeterea. Licet aliquis homo participatione dominii dominus dici possit, nullus tamen homo, neque creatura aliqua, potest dici dominus gloriae: quia gloriam futurae beatitudinis solus Deus ex natura possidet, alii vero per donum gratiae; unde et in Psalmo dicitur, dominus virtutum ipse est rex gloriae. Sed apostolus dicit dominum gloriae esse crucifixum, I ad Cor. 2:8. Vere igitur dici potest quod Deus sit crucifixus.
Moreover. Though a man may be called a lord by reason of his sharing in the divine lordship, no man (nor indeed any creature) can be called the Lord of glory, because God alone by nature possesses the glory of the happiness to come; others possess it by the gift of grace. Hence it is said: The Lord of hosts, he is the king of glory (Ps 24:10). Now the Apostle says that the Lord of glory was crucified: If they had, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory (1 Cor 2:8). Therefore, it may be truly said that God was crucified.
Adhuc. Verbum Dei dicitur Dei filius per naturam, ut ex supra dictis patet: homo autem, propter inhabitationem Dei, dicitur Dei filius per gratiam adoptionis. Sic igitur in domino Iesu Christo, secundum positionem praedictam, est accipere utrumque filiationis modum: nam verbum inhabitans est Dei filius per naturam; homo inhabitatus est Dei filius per gratiam adoptionis. Unde homo ille non potest dici proprius, vel unigenitus Dei filius, sed solum Dei verbum, quod, secundum proprietatem nativitatis, singulariter a patre genitum est. Attribuit autem Scriptura proprio et unigenito Dei filio passionem et mortem. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. cap. 8:32: proprio filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum. Et Ioan. 3:16: sic Deus dilexit mundum ut filium suum unigenitum daret, ut omnis qui credit in illum non pereat, sed habeat vitam aeternam. Et quod loquatur de traditione ad mortem, patet per id quod eadem verba supra praemiserat de filio hominis crucifixo, dicens: sicut Moyses exaltavit serpentem in deserto, ita oportet exaltari filium hominis, ut omnis qui credit in illum et cetera. Et apostolus mortem Christi indicium divinae dilectionis ad mundum esse ostendit, dicens, Rom. 5:8 commendat suam caritatem Deus in nobis, quoniam, cum adhuc inimici essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. Recte igitur dici potest quod verbum Dei, Deus, sit passus et mortuus.
Further. The Word of God is the Son of God by nature, as we have shown; but man, by reason of God dwelling in him, is called a son of God by the grace of adoption. Hence, according to the opinion aforesaid, we shall find in our Lord Jesus Christ both kinds of sonship, because the indwelling Word is God’s Son by nature, and the man in whom he dwells is God’s son by the grace of adoption. Consequently, that man cannot be called God’s own, or only-begotten, Son, but only God’s Word, who by reason of the special manner of his birth, was the only offspring of the Father. Now Scripture ascribes Passion and death to God’s own and only-begotten Son. For the Apostle says: He who did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all, will he not also give us all things with him (Rom 8:32). Again, it is said: God so loved the world that he gave his only Son, that whoever believes in him should not perish but have eternal life (John 3:16). That he is speaking of being delivered up to death is clear from his using the same terms in relation to the crucified Son of Man: As Moses lifted up the serpent in the desert, so must the Son of Man be lifted up, so that whoever believes in him may not perish, but may have life everlasting (John 3:14–15). Again, the Apostle declares Christ’s death to be a sign of God’s love for the world: God shows his love for us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us (Rom 5:8). Rightly, therefore, may we say that God, the Word of God, suffered and died.
Item. Ex hoc dicitur aliquis filius alicuius matris, quia corpus eius ex ea sumitur, licet anima non sumatur ex matre, sed ab exteriori sit. Corpus autem illius hominis ex virgine matre sumptum est: ostensum est autem corpus illius hominis esse corpus filii Dei naturalis, idest verbi Dei. Convenienter igitur dicitur quod beata virgo sit mater verbi Dei, et etiam Dei, licet divinitas verbi a matre non sumatur: non enim oportet quod filius totum quod est de sua substantia a matre sumat, sed solum corpus.
Again. A man is said to be his mother’s son because he derives his body from her, although he does not receive his soul from her, but from another source. Now the body of this man was taken from the body of his Virgin Mother; and it has been shown that the body of this man is the body of God’s natural Son—that is, of the Word of God. Therefore, it is right to call the Blessed Virgin, the Mother of God’s Word, and even the Mother of God, although the Word’s divinity is not from her, because it is not necessary for a son to receive his entire substance from his mother, but only his body.
Amplius. Apostolus dicit, ad Galat. 4:4: misit Deus filium suum factum ex muliere: ex quibus verbis ostenditur qualiter missio filii Dei sit intelligenda: eo enim dicitur missus quo factus est ex muliere. Quod quidem verum esse non posset nisi filius Dei ante fuisset quam factus esset ex muliere: quod enim in aliquid mittitur, prius esse intelligitur quam sit in eo quo mittitur. Sed homo ille, filius adoptivus, secundum Nestorium, non fuit antequam natus esset ex muliere. Quod ergo dicit, misit Deus filium suum, non potest intelligi de filio adoptivo, sed oportet quod intelligatur de filio naturali, idest de Deo Dei verbo. Sed ex hoc quod aliquis factus est ex muliere, dicitur filius mulieris. Deus ergo, Dei verbum, est filius mulieris.
Moreover. The Apostle says: When the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman (Gal 4:4). Now from these words we are able to gather the sense in which the Son of God was sent. For we are told that he was sent inasmuch as he was made of a woman, and this would not be true unless the Son of God had been in existence before he was made of a woman, since what is sent into something must exist before being in that thing. Now, according to Nestorius, this man, who is an adopted son, was not in existence before being born of a woman. Hence the words, God sent forth his Son, cannot refer to an adopted son, but to his Son by nature—namely God, the divine Word. But it is through being made of a woman that a man is said to be the son of a woman. Therefore, God, the divine Word, is the son of a woman.
Sed forte dicet aliquis non debere verbum apostoli sic intelligi quod Dei filius ad hoc sit missus ut sit factus ex muliere: sed ita quod Dei filius qui est factus ex muliere et sub lege, ad hoc sit missus ut eos qui sub lege erant redimeret. Et secundum hoc, quod dicit filium suum, non oportebit intelligi de filio naturali, sed de homine illo qui est filius adoptionis. Sed hic sensus excluditur ex ipsis apostoli verbis. Non enim a lege potest absolvere nisi ille qui supra legem existit, qui est auctor legis. Lex autem a Deo posita est. Solius igitur Dei est a servitute legis eripere. Hoc autem attribuit apostolus filio Dei de quo loquitur. Filius ergo Dei de quo loquitur, est filius naturalis. Verum est ergo dicere quod naturalis Dei filius, idest Deus Dei verbum, est factus ex muliere.
Perhaps, however, someone might object that the saying of the Apostle means not that the Son of God was sent to be the son of a woman, but that the Son of God, who was made of a woman and under the Law, was sent to redeem those who were under the Law. In this case the words his Son refer not to his Son by nature, but to this man who is son by adoption. But this interpretation is excluded by the very words of the Apostle. For no one can absolve from a law unless he is above the law; that is, the author of the law. Now the Law was given by God; therefore, God alone can free anyone from the bondage of the Law. But the Apostle ascribes this to the Son of God, of whom he is speaking. Therefore, the Son of God, of whom he is speaking, is God’s Son by nature. Therefore, it is true to say that God’s Son by nature (namely, the divine Word of God), was made of a woman.
Praeterea. Idem patet per hoc quod redemptio humani generis ipsi Deo attribuitur in Psalmo: redemisti me, domine Deus veritatis.
Moreover. The same conclusion follows from the fact that the redemption of mankind is ascribed to God himself: You have redeemed me, Lord God of truth (Ps 31:6).
Adhuc. Adoptio filiorum Dei fit per spiritum sanctum: secundum illud Rom. 8:15: accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum. Spiritus autem sanctus non est donum hominis, sed Dei. Adoptio ergo filiorum non causatur ab homine, sed a Deo. Causatur autem a filio Dei misso a Deo et facto ex muliere: quod patet per id quod apostolus subdit, ut adoptionem filiorum reciperemus. Oportet igitur verbum apostoli intelligi de filio Dei naturali. Deus igitur, Dei verbum, factus est ex muliere, idest ex virgine matre.
Again. The adoption of the sons of God is the work of the Holy Spirit: You have received the spirit of sonship (Rom 8:15). Now the Holy Spirit is not a gift of man, but of God. Therefore, the adoption of sons is effected not by a man, but by God. Now it is the work of the Son of God, sent by God, made of a woman, as evidenced by the Apostle continuing the text: that we might receive the adoption of sons (Gal 4:5). Therefore, the text of the Apostle refers to God’s Son by nature. Consequently, God, the Word of God, was made of a woman—that is to say, of the Virgin Mother.
Item. Ioannes dicit: verbum caro factum est. Non autem habet carnem nisi ex muliere. Verbum igitur factum est ex muliere, idest ex virgine matre. Virgo igitur est mater Dei verbi.
Further. John says: The Word was made flesh (John 1:14). Now he did not take flesh except of a woman. Therefore, the Word was made flesh of a woman, that is to say, of the Virgin Mother. Therefore, the Virgin is the Mother of the Word of God.
Amplius. Apostolus dicit, Rom. 9:5, quod Christus est ex patribus secundum carnem, qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula. Non autem est ex patribus nisi mediante virgine. Deus igitur, qui est super omnia, est ex virgine secundum carnem. Virgo igitur est mater Dei secundum carnem.
Moreover, the Apostle says that Christ is from the fathers according to the flesh, who is over all things, God blessed forever (Rom 9:5). But he is not from the fathers except through the Virgin. Therefore, God, who is over all things, is from the Virgin according to the flesh. The Virgin, therefore, is the Mother of God according to the flesh.
Adhuc. Apostolus dicit, Philipp. 2 de Christo Iesu, quod cum in forma Dei esset, exinanivit semetipsum, formam servi accipiens, in similitudinem hominum factus. Ubi manifestum est si, secundum Nestorium, Christum dividamus in duos, scilicet in hominem illum qui est filius adoptivus, et in filium Dei naturalem, qui est verbum Dei, quod non potest intelligi de homine illo. Ille enim homo, si purus homo sit, non prius fuit in forma Dei, ut postmodum in similitudinem hominum fieret: sed magis e converso homo existens divinitatis particeps factus est, in quo non fuit exinanitus, sed exaltatus. Oportet igitur quod intelligatur de verbo Dei, quod prius fuerit ab aeterno in forma Dei, idest in natura Dei, et postmodum exinanivit semetipsum, in similitudinem hominum factus.
Moreover. The Apostle, speaking of Jesus Christ, says: Who, though he was in the form of God . . . emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being born in the likeness of men (Phil 2:6–7). From these words it is clear that if, with Nestorius, we distinguish in Christ two persons, namely the man, who is a son by adoption, and the Word of God, who is God’s son by nature, these words cannot refer to this man. For if this man were a mere man, he was not first in the form of God, and afterwards made in the likeness of men. On the contrary, after being a man, he became a participator in the divinity; by this he was not emptied, but exalted. Therefore, the text means that the Word of God, who first was from eternity in the form of God (namely, in the nature of God), afterwards emptied himself . . . being born in the likeness of men.
Non potest autem intelligi ista exinanitio per solam inhabitationem verbi Dei in homine Iesu Christo. Nam verbum Dei in omnibus sanctis, a principio mundi, habitavit per gratiam, nec tamen dicitur exinanitum: quia Deus sic suam bonitatem creaturis communicat quod nihil ei subtrahitur, sed magis quodammodo exaltatur, secundum quod eius sublimitas ex bonitate creaturarum apparet, et tanto amplius quanto creaturae fuerint meliores. Unde, si verbum Dei plenius habitavit in homine Christo quam in aliis sanctis, minus etiam hic quam in aliis convenit exinanitio verbi.
Nor can this emptying mean simply the indwelling of God’s Word in the man Christ Jesus, because from the beginning of the world, God’s Word has dwelt in all holy men by grace, and yet he did not empty himself by so doing. For God suffers no loss in giving a share of his own goodness to creatures, but in a sense is exalted, insofar as the height of his perfection is manifest by the goodness of creatures; the greater the creature’s goodness, the more is God exalted. Hence, if the Word of God dwelt with greater plenitude in the man Christ than in other holy persons, he emptied himself less in him than in the others.
Manifestum est igitur quod unio verbi ad humanam naturam non est intelligenda secundum solam inhabitationem verbi Dei in homine illo, ut Nestorius dicebat: sed secundum hoc quod verbum Dei vere factum est homo. Sic enim solum habebit locum exinanitio: ut scilicet dicatur verbum Dei exinanitum, idest parvum factum, non amissione propriae magnitudinis, sed assumptione humanae parvitatis; sicut si anima praeexisteret corpori, et diceretur fieri substantia corporea quae est homo, non mutatione propriae naturae, sed assumptione naturae corporeae.
Consequently, it is clear that the union of the Word with human nature does not merely mean, as Nestorius contended, that God’s Word dwell in that man, but that the Word of God was truly made flesh. For there can be no emptying save in the sense that the Word of God emptied or lowered himself by putting on human lowliness, not by putting away his own greatness. Thus if the soul existed before the body, we might say that it becomes a corporeal substance (namely man) not by a change in its own nature, but by being united to a corporeal nature.
Praeterea. Manifestum est quod Spiritus Sanctus in homine Christo habitavit: dicitur enim Lucae 4:1, quod Iesus plenus spiritu sancto regressus est a Iordane. Si igitur incarnatio verbi secundum hoc solum intelligenda est quod verbum Dei in homine illo plenissime habitavit, necesse erit dicere quod etiam Spiritus Sanctus erit incarnatus. Quod est omnino alienum a doctrina fidei.
Again. It is evident that the Holy Spirit dwelt in the man Christ, since it is said that Jesus, full of the Holy Spirit, returned from the Jordan (Luke 4:1). Consequently, if the Incarnation of the Word means nothing more than that the Word of God dwelt with the greatest plenitude in that man, we shall have to say that the Holy Spirit also became incarnate. This is utterly contrary to the teaching of faith.
Adhuc. Manifestum est verbum Dei in sanctis angelis habitare, qui participatione verbi intelligentia replentur. Dicit autem apostolus, Hebr. 2:16: nusquam angelos apprehendit, sed semen Abrahae apprehendit. Manifestum est igitur quod assumptio humanae naturae a verbo non est secundum solam inhabitationem accipienda.
Further. It is certain that the Word of God dwells in the holy angels, for they are filled with understanding by participating in the Word. Thus the Apostle says: Surely it is not with angels that he is concerned but with the descendants of Abraham (Heb 2:16). It clearly follows, then, that the assumption of human nature by the Word does not merely mean his dwelling in it.
Adhuc. Si, secundum positionem Nestorii, Christus separaretur in duos secundum hypostasim differentes, idest in verbum Dei et hominem illum, impossibile est quod verbum Dei Christus dicatur. Quod patet tum ex modo loquendi Scripturae, quae nunquam ante incarnationem Deum, aut Dei verbum, nominat Christum. Tum etiam ex ipsa nominis ratione. Dicitur enim Christus quasi unctus. Unctus autem intelligitur oleo exultationis, idest spiritu sancto, ut Petrus exponit, Act. 10:38. Non autem potest dici quod verbum Dei sit unctum spiritu sancto: quia sic Spiritus Sanctus esset maior filio, ut sanctificans sanctificato. Oportebit igitur quod hoc nomen Christus solum pro homine illo possit intelligi. Quod ergo dicit apostolus, ad Philipp. 2:5, hoc sentite in vobis quod et in Christo Iesu, ad hominem illum referendum est. Subdit autem, 6 qui cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse se aequalem Deo. Verum est igitur dicere quod homo ille est in forma, idest in natura Dei, et aequalis Deo. Licet autem homines dicantur dii, vel filii Dei, propter inhabitantem Deum, nunquam tamen dicitur quod sint aequales Deo. Patet igitur quod homo Christus non per solam inhabitationem dicitur Deus.
Again. If, as Nestorius contended, there are two distinct personalities in Christ—namely, the Word of God and the man—the Word of God cannot possibly be given the name of Christ. This is evident both from the way of speaking usual in Scripture (where, before the Incarnation, God or his Word is never given the name of Christ), and from the very meaning of that name. For Christ is so called because he is anointed with the oil of gladness, that is, with the Holy Spirit, as Peter expounds it (Acts 10:38). Now it cannot be said that the Word of God was anointed by the Holy Spirit, since then the Holy Spirit would be greater than the Son, as the sanctifier is greater than the sanctified. Consequently, this name Christ can only indicate the man. When, therefore, the Apostle says: Have this mind among yourselves, which was in Christ Jesus (Phil 2:5), he is referring to the man. Now he continues: who, though he was in the form of God, did not count equality with God a thing to be grasped (Phil 2:6). Therefore, we may say with truth that this man is in the form, that is to say, in the nature, of God, and equal with God. And, though men are called ‘gods’ or ‘children of God’ on account of God dwelling in them, they are never said to be equal with God. Therefore, the man Christ is called God not merely because God dwelt in him.
Item. Licet nomen Dei ad sanctos homines transferatur propter inhabitationem gratiae, nunquam tamen opera quae sunt solius Dei, sicut creare caelum et terram, vel aliquid huiusmodi, de aliquo sanctorum propter inhabitationem gratiae dicitur. Christo autem homini attribuitur omnium creatio. Dicitur enim Hebr. 3:1 considerate apostolum et pontificem confessionis nostrae Iesum Christum, qui fidelis est ei qui fecit illum sicut et Moyses, in omni domo illius: quod oportet de homine illo, et non de Dei verbo intelligi tum quia ostensum est quod, secundum positionem Nestorii, verbum Dei Christus dici non potest; tum quia verbum Dei non est factum, sed genitum. Addit autem apostolus: 3 ampliori gloria iste prae Moyse dignus habitus est, quanto ampliorem honorem habet domus qui fabricavit illam. Homo igitur Christus fabricavit domum Dei. Quod consequenter apostolus probat, subdens: 4 omnis namque domus fabricatur ab aliquo: qui autem omnia creavit, Deus est. Sic igitur apostolus probat quod homo Christus fabricavit domum Dei, per hoc quod Deus creavit omnia. Quae probatio nulla esset nisi Christus esset Deus creans omnia. Sic igitur homini illi attribuitur creatio universorum: quod est proprium opus Dei. Est igitur homo Christus ipse Deus secundum hypostasim, et non ratione inhabitationis tantum.
Moreover. Though the name of God is applied to holy men, on account of indwelling grace, none of the things that belong to God alone (such as the creation of heaven and earth, and the like) are ever ascribed to any saint by reason of the grace dwelling in him. Yet the creation of all things is ascribed to the man Christ. For it is said: Consider Jesus, the apostle and high priest of our confession. He was faithful to him who appointed him, just as Moses also was faithful in all God’s house (Heb 3:1–2). Now these words refer to the man, and not to the Word of God, both because the Word of God, according to the view of Nestorius, cannot be called Christ (as we have shown), and because the Word of God was not made, but begotten. And the Apostle continues: Jesus has been counted worthy of as much more glory than Moses as the builder of a house has more honor than the house (Heb 3:3). Hence the man Christ built the house of God, and the Apostle goes on to prove this: For every house is built by some one, but the builder of all things is God (Heb 3:4). Accordingly, the Apostle proves that the man Christ built the house of God from the fact that God created all things. But this argument would prove nothing unless Christ were God the Creator of all. Thus, then, the creation of all things, which is the work of God alone, is ascribed to this man. Therefore, the man Christ is God in person, and not merely by God dwelling in him.
Amplius. Manifestum est quod homo Christus, loquens de se, multa divina dicit et supernaturalia: ut est illud Ioan. 6:40, ego resuscitabo illum in novissimo die; et Ioan. 10:28, ego vitam aeternam do eis. Quod quidem esset summae superbiae, si ille homo loquens non esset secundum hypostasim ipse Deus, sed solum haberet Deum inhabitantem. Hoc autem homini Christo non competit, qui de se dicit, Matth. 11:29: discite a me quia mitis sum et humilis corde. Est igitur eadem persona hominis illius et Dei.
Further. It is quite clear that the man Christ ascribes many divine and supernatural attributes to himself. For instance, I will raise him up in the last day (John 6:40); and: I give them eternal life (John 10:28). And it would indicate the highest degree of pride if the man who spoke thus were not God in person, and merely had God dwelling in him. But this accusation cannot be brought against the man Christ, who says: Learn from me; for I am gentle and lowly in heart (Matt 11:29). Therefore, this man and God are one and the same person.
Praeterea. Sicut legitur in Scripturis quod homo ille est exaltatus, dicitur enim Act. 2:33, dextera igitur Dei exaltatus etc., ita legitur quod Deus sit exinanitus, Philipp. 2:7, exinanivit semetipsum et cetera. Sicut igitur sublimia possunt dici de homine illo ratione unionis, ut quod sit Deus, quod resuscitet mortuos, et alia huiusmodi; ita de Deo possunt dici humilia, ut quod sit natus de virgine, passus, mortuus et sepultus.
Moreover. Just as the Scriptures state that this man was exalted: Being exalted at the right hand of God (Acts 2:33), so do they say that God was emptied: he emptied himself (Phil 2:7). Therefore, even as sublime things may be ascribed to the man by reason of the union—for instance, that he is God, that he raises the dead to life, and so forth—so may lowly things be attributed to God—for instance, that he was born of the Virgin, that he suffered, died, and was buried.
Adhuc. Relativa tam verba quam pronomina idem suppositum referunt. Dicit autem apostolus, Coloss. 1:16, loquens de filio Dei, in ipso condita sunt universa in caelo et in terra, visibilia et invisibilia; et postea subdit, 18 et ipse est caput corporis Ecclesiae, qui est principium, primogenitus ex mortuis. Manifestum est autem quod hoc quod dicitur, in ipso condita sunt universa, ad verbum Dei pertinet: quod autem dicitur, primogenitus ex mortuis, homini Christo competit. Sic igitur Dei verbum et homo Christus sunt unum suppositum, et per consequens una persona; et oportet quod quicquid dicitur de homine illo, dicatur de verbo Dei, et e converso.
Again. Relative terms, nouns or pronouns, relate to the same suppositum. Now the Apostle, speaking of the Son of God, says: In him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible (Col 1:16), and afterwards he adds: He is the head of the body, the church; he is the beginning, the first-born from the dead (Col 1:18). Now it is clear that the words: In him all things were created, refer to the Word of God; and the words: The first-born from the dead, to the man Christ. Consequently, the Word of God and the man Christ are one suppositum, and therefore one person; and whatsoever is said of that man may be ascribed to the Word of God, and vice versa.
Item. Apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. 8:6: unus est dominus Iesus Christus, per quem omnia. Manifestum est autem quod Iesus, nomen illius hominis per quem omnia, convenit verbo Dei. Sic igitur verbum Dei et homo ille sunt unus dominus, nec duo domini nec duo filii, ut Nestorius dicebat. Et ex hoc ulterius sequitur quod verbi Dei et hominis sit una persona.
Further. The Apostle says: One Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things (1 Cor 8:6). Now Jesus, the name of that man through whom are all things, evidently is the name of the Word of God. Accordingly, the Word of God and this man are one Lord, neither two lords nor two sons, as Nestorius maintained. And hence it also follows that the Word of God and this man are one person.
Si quis autem diligenter consideret, haec Nestorii opinio quantum ad incarnationis mysterium, parum differt ab opinione Photini. Quia uterque hominem illum Deum dici asserebat solum propter inhabitationem gratiae: quamvis Photinus dixerit quod ille homo nomen divinitatis et gloriam per passionem et bona opera meruit; Nestorius autem confessus est quod a principio suae conceptionis huiusmodi nomen et gloriam habuit, propter plenissimam habitationem Dei in ipso. Circa generationem autem aeternam verbi multum differebant: nam Nestorius eam confitebatur; Photinus vero negabat omnino.
Now, if we consider the matter carefully, this opinion of Nestorius as regards the Incarnation differs but little from the opinion of Photinus, since both of them asserted that this man was God solely by reason of indwelling grace. Photinus, however, asserted that this man merited to be called God and to be raised to glory through his Passion and good works; but Nestorius admitted that he had this name and glory from the moment of his conception, by reason of the singular fullness of God dwelling in him. But as regards the eternal generation of the Word, they differed utterly, since Nestorius admitted it, whereas Photinus denied it altogether.
Contra errorem Eutychetis
Against the error of Eutyches
Quia ergo, sicut multipliciter ostensum est, ita oportet mysterium incarnationis intelligi quod verbi Dei et hominis sit una eademque persona, relinquitur quaedam circa huius veritatis considerationem difficultas. Naturam enim divinam necesse est ut sua personalitas consequatur. Similiter autem videtur et de humana natura: nam omne quod subsistit in intellectuali vel rationali natura, habet rationem personae. Unde non videtur esse possibile quod sit una persona et sint duae naturae, divina et humana.
We have proved in many ways that the mystery of the Incarnation is to be understood in such a way that God’s Word and man are united in one and the same person. Nevertheless, there still remains a difficulty in the study of this truth. The divine nature is necessarily accompanied by its personality. And the same would seem to apply to human nature, since ‘that which subsists in an intellectual or rational nature’ is the definition of a person. Hence it seems impossible that there be one person with two natures, divine and human.
Ad huius autem difficultatis solutionem diversi diversas positiones attulerunt. Eutyches enim, ut unitatem personae contra Nestorium servaret in Christo, dicit in Christo esse etiam unam naturam, ita quod, quamvis ante unionem essent duae naturae distinctae, divina et humana, in unione tamen coierunt in unam naturam. Et sic dicebat Christi personam ex duabus naturis esse, non autem in duabus naturis subsistere. Propter quod in Chalcedonensi synodo est condemnatus.
In order to solve this difficulty, various explanations have been offered. Eutyches, in order to safeguard the unity of person in Christ against Nestorius, contended that there was also but one nature in Christ, so that although before the union there were two distinct natures, divine and human, in the very union they coalesced into one. Hence he said that Christ’s person was of two natures, but not subsisting in two natures. On this account he was condemned in the Council of Chalcedon.
Huius autem positionis falsitas ex multis apparet. Ostensum enim est supra quod in Christo Iesu et corpus fuit, et anima rationalis, et divinitas. Et manifestum est quod corpus Christi, etiam post unionem, non fuit ipsa verbi divinitas: nam corpus Christi, etiam post unionem, palpabile fuit, et corporeis oculis visibile, et lineamentis membrorum distinctum; quae omnia aliena sunt a divinitate verbi, ut ex superioribus patet. Similiter etiam anima Christi post unionem aliud fuit a divinitate verbi: quia anima Christi, etiam post unionem, passionibus tristitiae et doloris et irae affecta fuit; quae etiam divinitati verbi nullo modo convenire possunt, ut ex praemissis patet. Anima autem humana et corpus constituunt humanam naturam. Sic igitur, etiam post unionem, humana natura in Christo fuit aliud a divinitate verbi, quae est natura divina. Sunt igitur in Christo, etiam post unionem, duae naturae.
The falseness of this view may be shown in many ways. We have proved above that in Jesus Christ there was a body, a rational soul, and the divinity. Moreover, it is evident that Christ’s body, even after the union, was not the divinity of the Word; since that body, even after the union, was passible, visible to the eye, and confined within the lines of its members. All of this is foreign to the divine nature of the Word, as we have sufficiently proved above. Likewise, Christ’s soul after the union was distinct from the divine nature of the Word, since even after the union it was affected by the passions of sorrow, fear, and anger, which in no way can be ascribed to the divinity of the Word, as we have shown. Now the human soul and body constitute the human nature. Therefore, even after the union, the human nature in Christ was distinct from the divinity of the Word, which is the divine nature. Therefore, after the union, there were two natures in Christ.
Item. Natura est secundum quam res aliqua dicitur res naturalis. Dicitur autem res naturalis ex hoc quod habet formam, sicut et res artificialis: non enim dicitur domus antequam habeat formam artis, et similiter non dicitur equus antequam habeat formam naturae suae. Forma igitur rei naturalis est eius natura. Oportet autem dicere quod in Christo sint duae formae, etiam post unionem. Dicit enim apostolus, Philipp. 2, de Christo Iesu, quod, cum in forma Dei esset, formam servi accepit.
Again. A thing is said to be natural in reference to nature. Now a thing is said to be natural by reason of its having a form, even as that which is made by art. We do not call the building a house until it has the form designed by art; nor is a thing a horse until it has the form pertaining to that nature. Accordingly, the form of a natural thing is its nature. Hence we must say that there were two forms in Christ, even after the union. Thus, speaking of Jesus Christ, the Apostle says that when he was in the form of God . . . he took the form of a servant (Phil 2:6–7).
Non autem potest dici quod sit eadem forma Dei, et forma servi: nihil enim accipit quod iam habet; et sic, si eadem est forma Dei et forma servi, cum iam formam Dei habuisset, non accepisset formam servi. Neque iterum potest dici quod forma Dei in Christo per unionem sit corrupta: quia sic Christus post unionem non esset Deus. Neque iterum potest dici quod forma servi sit corrupta in unione: quia sic non accepisset formam servi. Sed nec dici potest quod forma servi sit permixta formae Dei: quia quae permiscentur, non manent integra, sed partim utrumque corrumpitur; unde non diceret quod accepisset formam servi, sed aliquid eius. Et sic oportet dicere, secundum verba apostoli, quod in Christo, etiam post unionem, fuerunt duae formae. Ergo duae naturae.
Now we cannot say that the form of God is the same as the form of a servant. For nothing takes what it has already; so that if the form of God and the form of a servant are the same, since he already had the form of God, he would not have taken the form of a servant. Nor can it be said that the form of God in Christ was destroyed through the union, because then Christ would not be God after the union. Nor again can it be said that the form of a servant was destroyed in the union, because then he would not have taken the form of a servant. But neither can it be said that the form of a servant was mixed with the form of God, because when things are made into a mixture, they lose their integrity, and each is partly destroyed. Therefore, it could not be said that he took the form of a servant, but a part thereof. Therefore, according to the words of the Apostle, we must say that there were two forms in Christ after the union, and consequently two natures.
Amplius. Nomen naturae primo impositum est ad significandum ipsam generationem nascentium. Et exinde translatum est ad significandum principium generationis huiusmodi. Et inde ad significandum principium motus intrinsecum mobili. Et quia huiusmodi principium est materia vel forma, ulterius natura dicitur forma vel materia rei naturalis habentis in se principium motus. Et quia forma et materia constituunt essentiam rei naturalis, extensum est nomen naturae ad significandum essentiam cuiuscumque rei in natura existentis: ut sic natura alicuius rei dicatur essentia, quam significat definitio. Et hoc modo hic de natura est quaestio: sic enim dicimus humanam naturam esse in Christo et divinam.
Further. The word ‘nature’ was first employed to signify the coming into being of things by nativity, and from that it was transferred to indicate the principle of this kind of generation; and then further still to signify the intrinsic principle of movement in a movable thing. And since this principle is matter or form, ‘nature’ also stands for the form or matter of a natural thing having within itself the principle of its movement. And, seeing that form and matter constitute the essence of a natural thing, the meaning of the word ‘nature’ is made to extend to the essence of anything existing in nature; thus the nature of a thing is its essence indicated by its definition. It is in this sense that we are using the term now, and in which we say that there are a divine and a human nature in Christ.
Si igitur, ut Eutyches posuit, humana natura et divina fuerunt duae ante unionem, sed ex eis in unione conflata est una natura, oportet hoc esse aliquo modorum secundum quos ex multis natum est unum fieri.
Accordingly, if (as Eutyches maintained) the human and the divine nature were two before the union, and if through the union they combined together to form one nature, this must have been by one of the ways in which one thing is made out of many.
Fit autem unum ex multis, uno quidem modo, secundum ordinem tantum: sicut ex multis domibus fit civitas, et ex multis militibus fit exercitus. Alio modo, ordine et compositione: sicut ex partibus domus coniunctis et parietum colligatione fit domus. Sed hi duo modi non competunt ad constitutionem unius naturae ex pluribus. Ea enim quorum forma est ordo vel compositio, non sunt res naturales, ut sic eorum unitas possit dici unitas naturae.
This happens first of all by mere coordination: thus many houses make a town, and many soldiers make an army. Second, by coordination and composition: thus a house is made of many conjoined parts coordinated and bound together. These two ways, however, do not suffice to form one nature out of several. Accordingly, things that are formed by coordination or composition are not natural things, and their unity is not unity of nature.
Tertio modo, ex pluribus fit unum per commixtionem: sicut ex quatuor elementis fit corpus mixtum. Hic etiam modus nullo modo competit ad propositum. Primo quidem, quia mixtio non est nisi eorum quae communicant in materia, et quae agere et pati ad invicem nata sunt. Quod quidem hic esse non potest: ostensum est enim in primo libro quod Deus immaterialis et omnino impassibilis est. Secundo, quia ex his quorum unum multum excedit aliud, mixtio fieri non potest: si quis enim guttam vini mittat in mille amphoras aquae, non erit mixtio, sed corruptio vini; propter quod etiam nec ligna in fornacem ignis missa dicimus misceri igni, sed ab igne consumi, propter excellentem ignis virtutem. Divina autem natura in infinitum humanam excedit: cum virtus Dei sit infinita, ut in primo ostensum est. Nullo igitur modo posset fieri mixtio utriusque naturae. Tertio quia, dato quod fieret mixtio, neutra natura remaneret salvata: miscibilia enim in mixto non salvantur, si sit vera mixtio. Facta igitur permixtione utriusque naturae, divinae scilicet et humanae, neutra natura remaneret, sed aliquod tertium: et sic Christus neque esset Deus neque homo. Non igitur sic potest intelligi quod Eutyches dixit, ante unionem fuisse duas naturas, post unionem vero unam in domino Iesu Christo, quasi ex duabus naturis sit constituta una natura. Relinquitur ergo quod hoc intelligatur hoc modo, quod altera tantum earum post unionem remanserit. Aut igitur fuit in Christo sola natura divina, et id quod videbatur in eo humanum fuit phantasticum, ut Manichaeus dixit; aut divina natura conversa est in humanam, ut Apollinaris dixit; contra quos supra disputavimus. Relinquitur igitur hoc esse impossibile, ante unionem fuisse duas naturas in Christo, post unionem vero unam.
The third way in which one thing is made of several is by mixture: thus a mixed body is formed from the four elements. Yet neither does this way apply to the case in point. First, because only those things can be mixed together which agree in matter, and which are of such a nature as to be active or passive in relation to one another. Now this does not apply to our case, since it has been proved that God is immaterial and wholly impassible. Second, because it is impossible to mix together two things, one of which far exceeds the other. Thus if one were to put a drop of wine into a thousand gallons of water, there will be no mixture, but destruction of the wine. Thus again logs placed on a furnace are not said to be mixed with the fire; they are consumed by it, on account of its exceeding power. Now the divine nature infinitely surpasses the nature of man, because God’s power is infinite, as we have proved. Therefore, a mixture of the two natures is quite impossible. Third, because granted that such a mixture were made, neither nature would retain its integrity, because the ingredients do not remain entire in a real mixture. Consequently, after the two natures (namely, the divine and human) have been mixed together, neither nature would remain, but a third thing, and so Christ would be neither God nor man. Therefore, we cannot admit the explanation of Eutyches that, whereas there were two natures before the union, there was but one nature in our Lord Jesus Christ after the union, through the fusion of the two natures into one. Consequently, it must be explained by saying that only one of the natures remained after the union. Either, then, in Christ there was only the nature of God, and what in him seemed human was purely imaginary, as the Manicheans said; or the divine nature was changed into the human, as Apollinaris maintained: both of which views we have already refuted. Therefore, it is impossible that there were two natures before, and only one after, the union.
Amplius. Nunquam invenitur ex duabus naturis manentibus fieri unam: eo quod quaelibet natura est quoddam totum, ea vero ex quibus aliquid constituitur, cadunt in rationem partis; unde, cum ex anima et corpore fiat unum, neque corpus neque anima natura dici potest, sicut nunc loquimur de natura, quia neutrum habet speciem completam, sed utrumque est pars unius naturae. Cum igitur natura humana sit quaedam natura completa, et similiter natura divina, impossibile est quod concurrant in unam naturam, nisi vel utraque vel altera corrumpatur. Quod esse non potest: cum ex supra dictis pateat unum Christum et verum Deum et verum hominem esse. Impossibile est igitur in Christo unam esse tantum naturam.
Further. Two complete natures never combine together to form one, because each is a whole in itself; but when one thing is made out of several, these come under the heading of parts. Hence, since one thing is made out of a soul and a body, neither soul nor body can be called a nature, in the sense in which we are now speaking, because neither has a complete species, but each is a part of a nature. Accordingly, as the human nature is a complete nature, and so likewise is the divine nature, they cannot possibly combine together to form one nature, unless both or one of them be corrupted. But this is impossible, since we have shown that the one Christ is both true God and true man. Therefore, it is impossible that there be but one nature in Christ.
Item. Ex duobus manentibus una natura constituitur vel sicut ex partibus corporalibus, sicut ex membris constituitur animal: quod hic dici non potest, cum divina natura non sit aliquid corporeum. Vel sicut ex materia et forma constituitur aliquid unum, sicut ex anima et corpore animal. Quod etiam non potest in proposito dici: ostensum est enim in primo libro quod Deus neque materia est, neque alicuius forma esse potest. Si igitur Christus est verus Deus et verus homo, ut ostensum est, impossibile est quod in eo sit una natura tantum.
Again, one nature may result from two permanent things. This may be as from bodily parts—for instance, an animal is made of various members—and this does not apply to the case in point, since the divine nature is not corporeal. Or it may be as one thing is made from matter and form—for instance, an animal from soul and body—and neither does this apply to the case, since God is neither matter, nor can he be the form of anything, as proved above. Accordingly, if Christ is true God and true man, as we have proved, it is impossible that there be but one nature in him.