Ad tertiam etiam rationem patet responsio. Homo enim, cum sit constitutus ex spirituali et corporali natura, quasi quoddam confinium tenens utriusque naturae, ad totam creaturam pertinere videtur quod fit pro hominis salute. Nam inferiores creaturae corporales in usum hominis cedere videntur et ei quodammodo esse subiectae. Superior autem creatura spiritualis, scilicet angelica, commune habet cum homine ultimi finis consecutionem, ut ex superioribus patet. Et sic conveniens videtur ut universalis omnium causa illam creaturam in unitatem personae assumeret in qua magis communicat cum omnibus creaturis. The third objection is easily answered. Man is composed of a spiritual and corporeal nature, standing on the boundaries of both, as it were, so that whatsoever is done for man’s good would seem to affect all creatures. Thus the lower material creatures are employed by man and, to a certain extent, are subject to him, while the higher spiritual creature—namely, the angel—has the same last end to obtain as man, as we have already shown. Accordingly, it would seem fitting that the universal cause of all should assume, in unity of person, the creature in whom, more than in any other, he unites himself to all creatures. Considerandum est etiam quod solius rationalis naturae est per se agere: creaturae enim irrationales magis aguntur naturali impetu quam agant per seipsas. Unde magis sunt in ordine instrumentalium causarum quam se habeant per modum principalis agentis. Assumptionem autem talis creaturae a Deo oportuit esse quae per se agere posset tanquam agens principale. Nam ea quae agunt sicut instrumenta, agunt inquantum sunt mota ad agendum: principale vero agens ipsum per se agit. Si quid igitur agendum fuit divinitus per aliquam irrationalem creaturam, suffecit, secundum huius creaturae conditionem, quod solum moveretur a Deo: non autem quod assumeretur in persona ut ipsamet ageret, quia hoc eius naturalis conditio non recepit, sed solum conditio rationalis naturae. Non igitur fuit conveniens quod Deus aliquam irrationalem naturam assumeret, sed rationalem, scilicet angelicam vel humanam. We must also observe that the rational creature alone acts of itself, for irrational creatures are driven by their own bias, rather than act of themselves; thus they are to be regarded as instruments rather than principal agents. Now it was fitting that God should assume a creature capable of acting of itself as principal agent, because an instrumental agent acts through being moved to action, whereas the principal agent acts itself and of itself. Accordingly, if God were to do anything by means of an irrational creature, all that is required in accordance with that creature’s natural condition is that it be moved by God, and there is no need for it to be assumed into personal union so as to act itself, since this would be inconsistent with its natural condition, and is consistent with the rational nature alone. Hence it was fitting that God should assume not an irrational, but a rational creature—that is to say, either an angel or a man. Et quamvis angelica natura quantum ad naturales proprietates inveniatur excellentior quam humana natura, ut quarta ratio proponebat, tamen humana congruentius fuit assumpta. Primo quidem, quia in homine peccatum expiabile esse potest: eo quod eius electio non immobiliter fertur in aliquid, sed a bono potest perverti in malum, et a malo reduci in bonum: sicut etiam in hominis ratione contingit, quae, quia ex sensibilibus et per signa quaedam colligit veritatem, viam habet ad utrumque oppositorum. Angelus autem, sicut habet immobilem apprehensionem, quia per simplicem intellectum immobiliter cognoscit, ita etiam habet immobilem electionem: unde vel in malum omnino non fertur; vel, si in malum feratur, immobiliter fertur; unde eius peccatum expiabile esse non potest. Cum igitur praecipua causa videatur divinae incarnationis esse expiatio peccatorum, ut ex Scripturis divinis docemur, congruentius fuit humanam naturam quam angelicam assumi a Deo. Secundo, quia assumptio creaturae a Deo est in persona, non in natura, ut ex superioribus patet. Convenientius igitur assumpta est hominis natura quam angelica: quia in homine aliud est natura et persona, cum sit ex materia et forma compositus; non autem in angelo, qui immaterialis est. Tertio, quia angelus, secundum proprietatem suae naturae, propinquior erat ad Deum cognoscendum quam homo, cuius cognitio a sensu oritur. Sufficiebat igitur quod angelus a Deo intelligibiliter instrueretur de veritate divina. Sed conditio hominis requirebat ut Deus sensibiliter hominem de seipso homine instrueret. Quod per incarnationem est factum. Ipsa etiam distantia hominis a Deo magis repugnare videbatur fruitioni divinae. Et ideo magis indiguit homo quam angelus assumi a Deo, ad spem de beatitudine concipiendam. Homo etiam, cum sit creaturarum terminus, quasi omnes alias creaturas naturali generationis ordine praesupponens, convenienter primo rerum principio unitur, ut quadam circulatione perfectio rerum concludatur. And though (as the fourth objection argued) the angelic nature is more excellent than human nature as regards its natural properties, it was nevertheless more expedient for the human nature to be assumed. First, because in man sin is reparable, inasmuch as his choice is not set upon a thing unchangeably, but may turn from good to evil, and return from evil to good; and man’s reason, gathering the truth from sensible objects and signs, can be led in opposite directions. On the other hand, just as an angel’s apprehension is unchangeable, since he has unchangeable knowledge by simple intuition, so too is his choice unchangeable. Consequently he is either not moved at all to evil, or if he is so moved, he is moved unchangeably. Therefore, his sin is irreparable. Since, then, the expiation of sins was apparently the chief motive of the Incarnation as we learn from Scripture, it was more fitting that God should assume the human than the angelic nature. Second, because God assumed the creature in unity of person, not of nature, as we have already proved. Hence it was more fitting that he should assume the human than the angelic nature, because nature and person are distinct in man, inasmuch as he is composed of matter and form; but in the angel, they are not distinct because he is immaterial. Third, because an angel, by a property of his nature, is nearer to knowing God than man, whose knowledge arises from the senses. Hence for an angel it was enough that he learned divine things from God through his intelligence, but man’s natural condition required that through his senses he should learn about himself from God, and this was done by the Incarnation. Moreover, the very distance between man and God seemed to make it more difficult for him to arrive at the enjoyment of God; therefore he needed to be assumed by God more than the angel, so that he might conceive the hope of going to heaven. Again, since man was the terminus of creation, as though postulating all other creatures in the natural order of generation, he was fittingly united to the first principle of things, so as to complete the circle of creation. Ex hoc autem quod Deus humanam naturam assumpsit, non datur erroris occasio, ut quinta ratio proponebat. Quia assumptio humanitatis, ut supra habitum est, facta est in unitate personae: non in unitate naturae, ut sic oporteat nos consentire his qui posuerunt Deum non esse super omnia exaltatum, dicentes Deum esse animam mundi, vel aliquid huiusmodi. The assumption of human nature by God does not prove an occasion of error, as the fifth argument suggested. The assumption of human nature, as we have stated, was made in unity of person, and not in unity of nature. Consequently, there is no occasion for us to agree with those who held that God is not above all, and said that he is the soul of the world, or something of the kind. Licet autem circa incarnationem Dei sint aliqui errores exorti, ut sexto obiiciebatur, tamen manifestum est multo plures errores post incarnationem fuisse sublatos. Sicut enim ex creatione rerum, a divina bonitate procedente, aliqua mala sunt consecuta, quod competebat conditioni creaturarum, quae deficere possunt; ita etiam non est mirum si, manifestata divina veritate, sunt aliqui errores exorti ex defectu mentium humanarum. Qui tamen errores exercuerunt fidelium ingenia ad diligentius divinorum veritatem exquirendam et intelligendam: sicut et mala quae in creaturis accidunt, ordinat Deus ad aliquod bonum. It is true, as the sixth objection states, that many errors arose concerning God’s Incarnation; yet, surely, many more came to an end after the Incarnation. Just as, in keeping with the defectible nature of the creature, some evils resulted from the creation of things, although it proceeded from the divine goodness, so neither is it a matter for astonishment if, after the manifestation of the divine truth, some errors arose through the defectible nature of the human mind. And yet these errors sharpened the wits of the faithful for a more diligent search of the truth in divine things, just as God directs the evils that occur among creatures to some good. Quamvis autem omne bonum creatum, divinae bonitati comparatum, exiguum inveniatur, tamen quia in rebus creatis nihil potest esse maius quam salus rationalis creaturae, quae consistit in fruitione ipsius bonitatis divinae; cum ex incarnatione divina consecuta sit salus humana, non parum utilitatis praedicta incarnatio attulit mundo, ut septima ratio procedebat. Nec oportuit propter hoc quod ex incarnatione divina omnes homines salvarentur: sed tantum illi qui praedictae incarnationi adhaerent per fidem et fidei sacramenta. Est siquidem incarnationis divinae virtus sufficiens ad omnium hominum salutem: sed quod non omnes ex hoc salvantur, ex eorum indispositione contingit, quod incarnationis fructum in se suscipere nolunt, incarnato Deo per fidem et amorem non inhaerendo. Non enim erat hominibus subtrahenda libertas arbitrii, per quam possunt vel inhaerere vel non inhaerere Deo incarnato: ne bonum hominis coactum esset, et per hoc absque merito et illaudabile redderetur. Although all created good is small in comparison with the divine goodness, nevertheless nothing among created things can be greater than the salvation of the rational creature, consisting, as it does, in the enjoyment of that same divine goodness. Now the salvation of mankind was the result of God’s Incarnation. Therefore, as the seventh objection argued, the world derived no little benefit from the Incarnation. But it does not follow that all men should be saved through God’s Incarnation, but only those who would adhere to the Incarnation by faith and the sacraments of faith. The efficacy of the Incarnation is indeed sufficient to save all men: that not all are saved is due to their evil disposition, in that they are unwilling to receive the fruit of the Incarnation by adhering to God incarnate by faith and love. For man was not to be deprived of his free-will, whereby he can adhere to God incarnate or not adhere to him; otherwise, man’s good would be compulsory, and would be rendered unmeritorious and undeserving of praise. Praedicta etiam Dei incarnatio sufficientibus indiciis hominibus manifestata est. Divinitas enim nullo modo convenientius manifestari potest quam per ea quae sunt propria Dei. Est autem Dei proprium quod naturae leges immutare possit, supra naturam aliquid operando, cuius ipse est auctor. Convenientissime igitur probatur aliquid esse divinum per opera quae supra leges naturae fiunt, sicut quod caeci illuminentur, leprosi mundentur, mortui suscitentur. Huiusmodi quidem opera Christus effecit. Unde et ipse per haec opera quaerentibus tu es qui venturus es, an alium expectamus? Suam divinitatem demonstravit, dicens: caeci vident, claudi ambulant, surdi audiunt et cetera. Alium autem mundum creare necesse non erat: nec ratio divinae sapientiae, nec rerum natura hoc habebat. Si autem dicatur, ut octava ratio proponebat, quod huiusmodi miracula etiam per alios esse facta leguntur: tamen considerandum est quod multo differentius et divinius Christus effecit. Nam alii orando haec fecisse leguntur: Christus autem imperando, quasi ex propria potestate. Et non solum ipse haec fecit, sed et aliis eadem et maiora faciendi tribuit potestatem, qui ad solam invocationem nominis Christi huiusmodi miracula faciebant. Et non solum corporalia miracula per Christum facta sunt, sed etiam spiritualia, quae sunt multo maiora: scilicet quod per Christum, et ad invocationem nominis eius, Spiritus Sanctus daretur, quo accenderentur corda caritatis divinae affectu; et mentes instruerentur subito in scientia divinorum; et linguae simplicium redderentur disertae, ad divinam veritatem hominibus proponendam. Huiusmodi autem opera indicia sunt expressa divinitatis Christi, quae nullus purus homo facere potuit. Unde apostolus, ad Hebr., dicit quod salus hominum, cum initium accepisset enarrari per dominum, per eos qui audierunt in nos confirmata est, attestante Deo signis et virtutibus et variis spiritus sancti distributionibus. The Incarnation of God was made known to man by adequate signs. The divinity cannot be better evidenced than by those things that are proper to God. Now it is proper to God to be able to change the laws of nature by performing a work that is above nature, whose author he is. Hence it is a most appropriate proof of divinity if works are done that transcend the laws of nature, such as giving sight to the blind, cleansing lepers, and raising the dead to life. Now, Christ performed such works as thes. Hence when he was asked: Are you he who is to come, or shall we look for another? (Luke 7:20), he proved his divinity by these works, replying: The blind receive their sight, the lame walk . . . the deaf hear (Luke 7:22). And there was no need to create another world, for this was neither in the plan of Divine Wisdom, nor in the nature of things. If, however, it be contended that like miracles are related to have been done by others, as the eighth argument suggested, we must observe that Christ’s way of doing them was very different, and more divine. Others did these things by praying; Christ, by commanding, as acting by his own power. Moreover, not only did he do these things himself, but gave the power to do these and greater things still, to others who worked miracles by merely calling on his name. Again, Christ worked miracles not only on men’s bodies, but also on their souls: which latter works are much greater. Thus, for instance, through him and the invocation of his name, the Holy Spirit was given, by whom men’s hearts were kindled with the fire of divine love, their minds suddenly filled with the knowledge of divine things, and the tongues of simple men made eloquent in declaring God’s truth to the people. Such works are an evident proof of Christ’s divinity, for no mere man could have done them. Hence the Apostle says that the salvation of mankind was declared at first by the Lord, and it was attested to us by those who heard him, while God also bore witness by signs and wonders and various miracles and by gifts of the Holy Spirit distributed according to his own will (Heb 2:3–4). Licet autem saluti totius humani generis Dei incarnatio necessaria foret, non tamen oportuit quod a principio mundi Deus incarnaretur, ut nono obiiciebatur. Primo quidem, quia per Deum incarnatum oportebat hominibus medicinam afferri contra peccata, ut superius habitum est. Contra peccatum autem alicui convenienter medicina non affertur nisi prius suum defectum recognoscat: ut sic per humilitatem homo, de seipso non praesumens, iactet spem suam in Deum, a quo solo potest sanari peccatum, ut supra habitum est. Poterat autem homo de seipso praesumere et quantum ad scientiam, et quantum ad virtutem. Relinquendus igitur aliquando fuit sibi, ut experiretur quod ipse sibi non sufficeret ad salutem: neque per scientiam naturalem, quia ante tempus legis scriptae, homo legem naturae transgressus est; neque per virtutem propriam, quia, data sibi cognitione peccati per legem, adhuc ex infirmitate peccavit. Et sic oportuit ut demum homini, neque de scientia neque de virtute praesumenti, daretur efficax auxilium contra peccatum per Christi incarnationem: scilicet gratia Christi, per quam et instrueretur in dubiis, ne in cognitione deficeret; et roboraretur contra tentationum insultus, ne per infirmitatem deficeret. Sic igitur factum est quod essent tres status humani generis: primus ante legem; secundus sub lege; tertius sub gratia. Although God’s Incarnation was necessary for the salvation of all mankind, there was no need, as the ninth objection states, for God to become incarnate from the very beginning of the world. In the first place, the incarnate God was necessary that man might have a remedy for sin, as stated above. Now it is not expedient to offer a man a remedy for sin unless he first acknowledge his fault, so that, no longer trusting in himself, he puts his trust in God, who alone can heal him of his sin, as stated above. Now man could presume on himself in point of knowledge, and in point of strength. Hence it was expedient that he should be left to himself for a time, that he might learn by experience his inability to save his soul. His natural knowledge was insufficient, since he disobeyed the law of nature before the time of the written Law; and his own strength was inadequate since even when, by the Law, he knew what was sinful, he sinned through weakness. Thus, when at length man no longer presumed either on his knowledge or on his own strength, it was expedient that he should be given an efficacious assistance against sin by Christ’s Incarnation—namely, the grace of Christ supplies his lack of knowledge by removing his doubts, and strengthening him against the assaults of temptation, lest he fail through weakness. Hence it is that the human race has experienced three states, before the Law, under the Law, and under grace. Deinde per Deum incarnatum praecepta et documenta perfecta hominibus danda erant. Requirit autem hoc conditio humanae naturae, quod non statim ad perfectum ducatur, sed manuducatur per imperfecta ut ad perfectionem perveniat: quod in instructione puerorum videmus, qui primo de minimis instruuntur, nam a principio perfecta capere non valent. Similiter etiam, si alicui multitudini aliqua inaudita proponerentur et magna, non statim caperet nisi ad ea assuesceret prius per aliqua minora. Sic igitur conveniens fuit ut a principio humanum genus instrueretur de his quae pertinent ad suam salutem per aliqua levia et minora documenta per patriarchas et legem et prophetas, et tandem, in consummatione temporum, perfecta doctrina Christi proponeretur in terris: secundum quod apostolus dicit, ad Gal.: at ubi venit plenitudo temporis, misit Deus filium suum in terris. Et ibidem dicitur quod lex paedagogus noster fuit in Christo, sed iam non sumus sub paedagogo. Second, perfect law and doctrine were to be given to man by God incarnate. Now, the condition of human nature is such that it does not reach perfection at once, but is led through a stage of imperfection before it reaches that of perfection. We have an example of this in the education of children: we instruct them at first in very little things, because they cannot grasp the great things from the very beginning. In like manner, if a man were to tell his audience things they have never heard before, or that are above their intelligence, they would not grasp them at once; he must prepare their minds beforehand with things that are less out of the ordinary. Accordingly, it was expedient that in things concerning his salvation, man should receive at first a slight and elementary instruction through the patriarchs, the Law, and the prophets; and that at length in the fullness of time, the perfect teaching of Christ should be published on earth. Hence, the Apostle says: When the time had fully come, God sent forth his Son (Gal 4:4). And again it is said that the Law was our pedagogue until Christ . . . but we are no longer under a pedagogue (Gal 3:24–25). Simul etiam considerandum est quod, sicut adventum magni regis oportet aliquos nuntios praecedere, ut praeparentur subditi ad eum reverentius suscipiendum; ita oportuit adventum Dei in terras multa praecedere, quibus homines essent parati ad Deum incarnatum suscipiendum. Quod quidem factum est dum per praecedentia promissa et documenta hominum mentes dispositae sunt, ut facilius ei crederent qui ante praenuntiatus erat, et desiderantius susciperetur propter priora promissa. It must also be noted that just as the coming of a great king should be preceded by heralds so that his subjects may be ready to receive him with due respect, so was it proper that the coming of God on earth should be heralded by many things, in order that men might be ready to receive God incarnate. This was done by promises and admonitions preceding him, whereby man’s mind was prepared to believe more easily in one who was already announced, and to receive him more earnestly on account of the promises made of old. Et licet adventus Dei incarnati in mundum esset maxime necessarius humanae saluti, tamen non fuit necessarium quod usque ad finem mundi cum hominibus conversaretur, ut decima ratio proponebat. Hoc enim derogasset reverentiae quam homines debebant Deo incarnato exhibere: dum, videntes ipsum carne indutum aliis hominibus similem, nihil de eo ultra alios homines aestimassent. Sed eo, post mira quae gessit in terris, suam praesentiam hominibus subtrahente, magis ipsum revereri coeperunt. Propter quod etiam suis discipulis plenitudinem spiritus sancti non dedit quandiu cum eis conversatus fuit, quasi per eius absentiam eorum animis ad spiritualia munera magis praeparatis. Unde ipse eis dicebat: si non abiero, Paraclitus non veniet ad vos: si autem abiero, mittam eum ad vos. Although the coming of God incarnate into the world was so necessary for man’s salvation, there was no need for him to live among men until the end of the world, as the tenth objection contended. This would have been detrimental to the reverence which men owe to the incarnate God, since, seeing him in the flesh and like the rest of men, they would have esteemed him no better than others. On the other hand, when he withdrew his presence from among men after doing wonders on earth, they began to revere him all the more. For this very reason he did not give his disciples the fullness of the Holy Spirit while as yet he lived among them, because his absence would make their souls more ready to receive the gifts of the spirit. Hence he said to them: If I do not go away, the Counselor will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you (John 16:7). Non oportuit autem Deum carnem impassibilem et immortalem suscipere, secundum quod undecima ratio proponebat: sed magis passibilem et mortalem. Primo quidem, quia necessarium erat hominibus quod beneficium incarnationis cognoscerent, ut ex hoc ad divinum amorem inflammarentur. Oportuit autem, ad veritatem incarnationis manifestandam, quod carnem similem aliis hominibus sumeret, scilicet passibilem et mortalem. Si enim impassibilem et immortalem carnem suscepisset, visum fuisset hominibus, qui talem carnem non noverant, quod aliquod phantasma esset, et non veritas carnis. It was not expedient for God to take impassible and immortal flesh, as the eleventh objection stated, but rather that he should assume a flesh that was subject to suffering and death. In the first place, it was necessary for man to know of the blessing bestowed on him through the Incarnation, in order that he might be inflamed with divine love. Now, that the truth of the Incarnation might be evident to man, it was necessary that God should take flesh like that of other men—namely, passible and mortal. For had he taken impassible and immortal flesh, men (who were unacquainted with flesh of that kind) would have deemed it to be imaginary and not real. Secundo, quia necessarium fuit Deum carnem assumere ut pro peccato humani generis satisfaceret. Contingit autem unum pro alio satisfacere, ut in tertio ostensum est, ita tamen quod poenam pro peccato alteri debitam ipse, sibi non debitam, voluntarie assumat. Poena autem consequens humani generis peccatum est mors et aliae passibilitates vitae praesentis, sicut supra dictum est: unde et apostolus dicit, ad Rom.: per unum hominem peccatum in hunc mundum intravit, et per peccatum mors. Oportuit igitur ut carnem passibilem et mortalem Deus assumeret absque peccato, ut sic, patiendo et moriendo, pro nobis satisfaceret et peccatum auferret. Et hoc est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom., quod Deus misit filium suum in similitudinem carnis peccati, idest, habentem carnem similem peccatoribus, scilicet passibilem et mortalem; et subdit, ut de peccato damnaret peccatum in carne, idest, ut per poenam quam in carne pro peccato nostro sustinuit, peccatum a nobis auferret. Second, it was necessary for God to take flesh in order to atone for the sin of mankind. Now, as we have shown, one man can atone for another; on the condition, however, that he take upon himself willingly the punishment due to another and not due to himself. And the punishment resulting from the sin of the human race is death as well as other sufferings of the present life, as indicated above. Therefore, the Apostle says that sin came into the world through one man and death through sin (Rom 5:12). Hence it was expedient that God should take suffering and mortal flesh without sin, so that by suffering and dying for us he would make atonement and take sin away. This is expressed in the words of the Apostle, God . . . sent his Son in the likeness of sinful flesh (Rom 8:3)—that is to say, having flesh like to that of sinners, passible and mortal. He adds, that of sin he might condemn sin in the flesh—that is to say, that by the pain he bore in his flesh for our sins he might take our sins away. Tertio, quia per hoc quod carnem passibilem et mortalem habuit, efficacius dedit nobis exempla virtutis, passiones carnis fortiter superando, et eis virtuose utendo. Third, since his flesh was subject to suffering and death, he was the more able to give us an example of virtue by his fortitude in overcoming the sufferings in the flesh, and by the godly use he made of them. Quarto, quia per hoc magis ad spem immortalitatis erigimur, quod ipse de statu carnis passibilis et mortalis mutatus est in impassibilitatem et immortalitatem carnis: quod etiam de nobis sperare possumus, qui carnem gerimus passibilem et mortalem. Si vero a principio carnem impassibilem et immortalem assumpsisset, nulla daretur occasio immortalitatem sperandi his qui in seipsis mortalitatem et corruptibilitatem experiuntur. Hoc etiam mediatoris officium requirebat quod, cum communem haberet nobiscum passibilem carnem et mortalem, cum Deo vero virtutem et gloriam: ut auferens a nobis quod nobiscum commune habebat, scilicet passionem et mortem, ad id nos duceret quod sibi et Deo erat commune. Fuit enim mediator ad coniungendum nos Deo. Fourth, we are all the more raised to the hope of immortality by seeing that he was transformed from the state of suffering and mortal flesh to that of a flesh that knows neither suffering nor death: and so we also hope that it will be the same with us, who are now clothed in flesh, passible and mortal. But if he had taken impassible and immortal flesh from the very first, we who know ourselves to be mortal and corruptible would have had no reason to hope for immortality. Moreover, the office of mediator required that he should be a partner with us in suffering and mortal flesh, and with God in power and glory, so that he might take away from us that which he shared with us—namely, suffering and death—and lead us to that which he shared with God. For he was the mediator so that he might unite us to God. Similiter etiam non fuit expediens quod Deus incarnatus vitam in hoc mundo ageret opulentam et honoribus seu dignitatibus sublimem, ut duodecima ratio concludebat. Primo quidem, quia ad hoc venerat ut mentes hominum, terrenis deditas, a terrenis abstraheret et ad divina elevaret. Unde oportuit, ut suo exemplo homines in contemptum divitiarum et aliorum quae mundani desiderant duceret, quod inopem et privatam vitam ageret in hoc mundo. Secundo quia, si divitiis abundasset et in aliqua maxima dignitate constitutus fuisset, id quod divine gessit magis potentiae saeculari quam virtuti divinitatis fuisset attributum. Unde efficacissimum argumentum suae divinitatis fuit quod absque adminiculo potentiae saecularis totum mundum in melius commutavit. In like manner, it was not expedient that God incarnate should lead a life replete with wealth and the highest honor or dignity in this world, as the twelfth objection argued. In the first place, because man’s mind was given to earthly things, he came to withdraw it from them and to raise it to heavenly things. Hence he had to draw men to the contempt of riches (and of other things on which worldly men set their heart) by his example, and that he should lead a poor and hidden life in this world. Second, if he had abounded in riches, and occupied a high position, the works he did as God would have been put down to his worldly power rather than to his Godly might. Hence it was a very strong proof of his divinity that, without the help of the secular arm, he converted the whole world to better things. Unde patet etiam solutio ad id quod decimotertio obiiciebatur. Hence it is plain how the thirteenth objection is to be answered. Non est autem procul a vero quod filius Dei incarnatus obediens praecepto patris mortem sustinuit, secundum doctrinam apostoli. Praeceptum enim Dei est ad homines de operibus virtutum: et quanto aliquis perfectius actum virtutis exequitur, tanto magis Deo obedit. Inter alias autem virtutes praecipua caritas est, ad quam omnes aliae referuntur. Christus igitur, dum actum caritatis perfectissime implevit, Deo maxime obediens fuit. Nullus enim est actus caritatis perfectior quam quod homo pro amore alicuius etiam mortem sustineat: secundum quod ipsemet dominus dicit: maiorem caritatem nemo habet quam quod animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis. Sic igitur invenitur Christus, mortem sustinens pro salute hominum et ad gloriam Dei patris, Deo maxime obediens fuisse, actum caritatis perfectum exequendo. Nec hoc repugnat divinitati ipsius, ut quartadecima ratio procedebat. Sic enim facta est unio in persona ut proprietas utriusque naturae maneret, divinae scilicet et humanae, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo, patiente Christo etiam mortem et alia quae humanitatis sunt, divinitas impassibilis mansit, quamvis, propter unitatem personae, dicamus Deum passum et mortuum. Cuius exemplum aliqualiter in nobis apparet, quia, moriente carne, anima remanet immortalis. It is, indeed, far from being untrue that, according to the Apostle’s teaching, the incarnate Son of God suffered death in obedience to his Father’s command. God’s commands to men concern acts of virtue; and according as a man’s virtuous acts are more perfect, the more is he obedient to God. Now the greatest of the virtues is charity, to which all the others are referred. Hence Christ, whose act of charity was most perfect, was most obedient to God, for no act of charity is more perfect than that a man die for love of another, as our Lord himself declared: Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends (John 15:13). Therefore, Christ, by dying for the salvation of man and for the glory of God the Father, performed an act of perfect charity, and was most obedient to God. Nor was this incompatible with his divinity, as the fourteenth objection averred. For the union was so made in the person that both natures retained their respective properties (namely, divine and human, as we have stated above). Hence, though Christ suffered even death besides those things which belonged to his human nature, his divinity remained impassible, although on account of the unity of person, we say that God suffered and died. This is exemplified in ourselves, since although the body dies, the soul remains immortal. Sciendum est etiam quod, licet voluntas Dei non sit ad mortem hominum, ut quintadecima ratio proponebat, est tamen ad virtutem, per quam homo mortem fortiter sustinet, et ex caritate periculis mortis se obiicit. Et sic voluntas Dei fuit de morte Christi, inquantum Christus eam ex caritate suscepit et fortiter sustinuit. It must also be observed that although God does not will the death of man, as the fifteenth objection stated, nevertheless he wills the virtue whereby man suffers death with fortitude and braves the danger of death through charity. Thus God willed Christ’s death insofar as Christ accepted death through charity and bore it with fortitude. Unde patet quod non fuit impium et crudele quod Deus pater Christum mori voluit, ut sextadecima ratio concludebat. Non enim coegit invitum, sed complacuit ei voluntas qua ex caritate Christus mortem suscepit. Et hanc etiam caritatem in eius anima operatus est. Hence it is clear that it was not wicked and cruel for God the Father to have willed Christ’s death, as the sixteenth objection argued. For he did not compel him against his will, but it pleased him that Christ should accept death through charity. Indeed, he wrought this charity in Christ’s soul. Similiter etiam non inconvenienter dicitur quod propter humilitatem demonstrandam Christus mortem crucis voluit pati. Et revera quidem humilitas in Deum non cadit, ut decimaseptima ratio proponebat: quia virtus humilitatis in hoc consistit ut aliquis infra suos terminos se contineat, ad ea quae supra se sunt non se extendens, sed superiori se subiiciat; unde patet quod Deo humilitas convenire non potest, qui superiorem non habet, sed ipse super omnia existit. Si autem aliquis vel aequali vel inferiori se ex humilitate aliquando subiiciat, hoc est quia secundum aliquid eum qui simpliciter vel aequalis vel inferior est, superiorem se arbitratur. Quamvis igitur Christo secundum divinam naturam humilitatis virtus non competat, competit tamen sibi secundum humanam naturam, et eius humilitas ex eius divinitate laudabilior redditur: dignitas enim personae adiicit ad laudem humilitatis; puta quando, pro aliqua necessitate, expedit aliquem magnum aliqua infima pati. Nulla autem tanta dignitas esse potest hominis quam quod sit Deus. Unde hominis Dei humilitas maxime laudabilis invenitur, dum abiecta sustinuit quae pro salute hominum ipsum pati expediebat. Erant enim homines, propter superbiam, mundanae gloriae amatores. Ut igitur hominum animos ab amore mundanae gloriae in amorem divinae gloriae transmutaret, voluit mortem sustinere, non qualemcumque, sed abiectissimam. Sunt enim quidam qui, etsi mortem non timeant, abhorrent tamen mortem abiectam. Ad quam etiam contemnendam dominus homines animavit suae mortis exemplo. Likewise, there is nothing unseemly in saying that Christ was willing to suffer death on the cross, in order to give an example of humility. It is true, as the seventeenth objection asserted, that humility is not in God, since the virtue of humility consists in that a man keeps to his own place, and does not reach out to things above him, but is subject to his superior. Hence it is evident that humility is not becoming to God, who has no superior, but is above all. If, however, someone subjects himself out of humility at times either to an equal or to an inferior, this is because he looks upon one who is simply his equal or inferior as superior to himself in some respect. Accordingly, though the virtue of humility is not becoming to Christ in his divine nature, it is becoming to him in his humanity. And his humility is rendered the more praiseworthy by reason of his divine nature, because personal worth adds to the praise of humility—for instance, as when a great man has to suffer an indignity through necessity. Now no man is of greater worth than one who is God: consequently, most praiseworthy was the humility of the Man-God, who suffered the infamies which he had to suffer for man’s salvation. For pride had made men lovers of worldly glory. Therefore, that he might transform man’s mind from the love of worldly glory to the love of divine glory, he was willing to suffer death—not any kind, but the most humiliating death. There are those who, though they do not fear death, abhor an ignominious death, and it was that men might despise even this that our Lord heartened men by the example of his death. Et licet homines ad humilitatem informari potuerint divinis sermonibus instructi, ut decimaoctava ratio proponebat: tamen ad agendum magis provocant facta quam verba et tanto efficacius facta movent, quanto certior opinio bonitatis habetur de eo qui huiusmodi operatur. Unde, licet aliorum hominum multa humilitatis exempla invenirentur, tamen expedientissimum fuit ut ad hoc hominis Dei provocarentur exemplo, quem constat errare non potuisse; et cuius humilitas tanto est mirabilior quanto maiestas sublimior. Again, although men might have been taught humility by divine discourses, as the eighteenth objection urged, nevertheless deeds incite more to action than words, and all the more effectively as the goodness of the doer is known with greater certainty. Hence, however many other men might be examples of humility, it was still most expedient that we should be incited by the example of a Man-God, who certainly could not err, and whose humility is all the more wonderful as his majesty is the more sublime. Manifestum est etiam ex praedictis quod oportuit Christum mortem pati, non solum ut exemplum praeberet mortem contemnendi propter veritatis amorem, sed ut etiam aliorum peccata purgaret. Quod quidem factum est dum ipse, qui absque peccato erat, mortem peccato debitam pati voluit, ut in se poenam aliis debitam, pro aliis satisfaciendo, susciperet. Et quamvis sola Dei gratia sufficiat ad remittendum peccata, ut decimanona ratio proponebat, tamen in remissione peccati exigitur etiam aliquid ex parte eius cui peccatum remittitur: ut scilicet satisfaciat ei quem offendit. Et quia alii homines pro seipsis hoc facere non poterant, Christus hoc pro omnibus fecit, mortem voluntariam ex caritate patiendo. It is also clear from what has been said that Christ had to suffer death not only that he might give an example of the contempt of death for love of the truth, but also that he might wash away the sins of others. This was done when he who was sinless was willing to suffer the death due to sin, in order that he might take upon himself the punishment due to others by atoning for them. And, though God’s grace alone suffices for the remission of sins, as the nineteenth objection argued, nevertheless when sin is remitted something is required of him whose sin is forgiven—namely, that he offer satisfaction to the one he offended. And seeing that other men were unable to do this for themselves, Christ did so for all by suffering a voluntary death through charity. Et quamvis in puniendo peccata oportet illum puniri qui peccavit, ut vigesima ratio proponebat, tamen in satisfaciendo unus potest alterius poenam ferre. Quia dum poena pro peccato infligitur, pensatur eius qui punitur iniquitas: in satisfactione vero, dum quis, ad placandum eum quem offendit, voluntarie poenam assumit, satisfacientis caritas et benevolentia aestimatur, quae maxime apparet cum quis pro alio poenam assumit. Et ideo Deus satisfactionem unius pro alio acceptat, ut etiam in tertio libro ostensum est. And although in the punishment of sins the sinner himself should be punished, as the twentieth objection urged, nevertheless in the atonement for sin, one man can bear the punishment of another. The reason is that when a punishment is inflicted for sin, we consider the wickedness of the person to be punished; but when it is a question of atonement, if a person accepts punishment willingly in order to placate one whom he has offended, we look at the charity and goodwill of him who atones. This is especially the case when one man atones for another. Consequently, one man’s atonement for another man is acceptable to God, as we have shown. Satisfacere autem pro toto humano genere, ut supra ostensum est, nullus homo purus poterat: nec ad hoc angelus sufficiebat, ut vigesimaprima ratio procedebat. Angelus enim, licet quantum ad aliquas proprietates naturales sit homine potior, tamen quantum ad beatitudinis participationem, in quam per satisfactionem reducendus erat, est ei aequalis. Et iterum: non plene redintegraretur hominis dignitas, si angelo pro homine satisfacienti obnoxius redderetur. No mere man can make satisfaction for all mankind, as proved above; nor could an angel suffice for the purpose, as the twenty-first objection suggested. An angel, though superior to man in certain natural properties of his, is man’s equal in the participation of heavenly bliss, to which man was to be restored by means of atonement. Moreover, man’s dignity would not be fully repaired if he were beholden to an angel for his atonement. Sciendum autem est quod mors Christi virtutem satisfaciendi habuit ex caritate ipsius, qua voluntarie mortem sustinuit, non ex iniquitate occidentium, qui eum occidendo peccaverunt: quia peccatum non deletur peccato, ut vigesimasecunda ratio proponebat. It must be borne in mind, however, that Christ’s death derived its power of atonement from his charity whereby he accepted death voluntarily, and not from the wickedness of his executioners, who sinned by slaying him. As the twenty-second objection states, sin is not blotted out by sin. Et quamvis mors Christi pro peccato satisfactoria fuerit, non tamen toties eum mori oportuit quoties homines peccant, ut vigesimatertia ratio concludebat. Quia mors Christi sufficiens fuit ad omnium expianda peccata: tum propter eximiam caritatem qua mortem sustinuit; tum propter dignitatem personae satisfacientis, quae fuit Deus et homo. Manifestum est autem etiam in rebus humanis quod, quanto persona est altior, tanto poena quam sustinet pro maiori computatur, sive ad humilitatem et caritatem patientis, sive ad culpam inferentis. Although Christ’s death atoned for sin, there was no need for him to die as often as men sin, as the twenty-third objection maintained. Christ’s death sufficed to expiate the sins of all men both by reason of the sublime charity whereby he suffered death, and on account of the dignity of the person who made satisfaction, since he was both God and man. And it is clear that even in human affairs, the higher a person is placed, of so much greater account is the punishment suffered by him, whether in reference to the humility and charity of the sufferer, or to the guilt of the offender. Ad satisfaciendum autem pro peccato totius humani generis mors Christi sufficiens fuit. Quia, quamvis secundum humanam naturam solum mortuus fuerit, ut vigesimaquarta ratio proponebat, tamen ex dignitate personae patientis, quae est persona filii Dei, mors eius redditur pretiosa. Quia, ut supra dictum est, sicut maioris est criminis alicui personae inferre iniuriam quae maioris dignitatis existit, ita virtuosius est, et ex maiori caritate procedens, quod maior persona pro aliis se subiiciat voluntariae passioni. Christ’s death sufficed to atone for the sins of all mankind, because, although he died only in his human nature, as the twenty-fourth objection argued, yet his death was rendered precious by the dignity of the person who suffered, namely, the person of God the Son. For just as it is a greater crime to injure a person of greater dignity, so is it a mark of greater virtue and of greater charity that a person of higher rank suffer willingly for others. Quamvis autem Christus pro peccato originali sua morte sufficienter satisfecerit, non est tamen inconveniens quod poenalitates ex peccato originali consequentes remaneant adhuc in omnibus qui etiam redemptionis Christi participes fiunt: ut vigesimaquinta ratio procedebat. Hoc enim congruenter et utiliter factum est ut poena remaneret, etiam culpa sublata. Primo quidem, ut esset conformitas fidelium ad Christum, sicut membrorum ad caput. Unde sicut Christus prius multas passiones sustinuit, et sic ad immortalitatis gloriam pervenit; sic decuit ut fideles eius prius passionibus subiacerent, et sic ad immortalitatem pervenirent, quasi portantes in seipsis insignia passionis Christi, ut similitudinem gloriae eius consequerentur; sicut apostolus, ad Rom., dicit: heredes quidem Dei, coheredes autem Christi. Si tamen compatimur, ut et simul glorificemur. Secundo quia, si homines venientes ad Iesum statim immortalitatem et impassibilitatem consequerentur, plures homines ad Christum accederent magis propter haec corporalia beneficia quam propter spiritualia bona. Quod est contra intentionem Christi, venientis in mundum ut homines ab amore corporalium ad spiritualia transferret. Tertio quia, si accedentes ad Christum statim impassibiles et immortales redderentur, hoc quodammodo compelleret homines ad fidem Christi suscipiendam. Et sic meritum fidei minueretur. Yet, although by his death Christ made sufficient satisfaction for original sin, it is not unreasonable, as the twenty-fifth objection argued, that the penalties resulting from original sin still remain in all, even in those who have become participators in Christ’s redemption. It was fitting and profitable that the punishment should remain after the guilt had been removed. In the first place, that the faithful might be conformed to Christ, as members to their head. Therefore, just as Christ bore many sufferings before entering into everlasting glory, so was it fitting that his faithful should suffer before attaining to immortality. Thus they bear in themselves the emblems of Christ’s suffering, that they may obtain the likeness of his glory, according to the words of the Apostle: Heirs of God and fellow heirs with Christ, provided we suffer with him in order that we may also be glorified with him (Rom 8:17). Second, if man were to become immune from death and suffering as soon as he comes to Christ, many would come to him for the sake of these advantages of the body rather than for the sake of the good of the soul. This is against Christ’s purpose, since he came into the world to draw men away from the love of bodily goods to spiritual things. Third, if men became impassible and immortal as soon as they came to Christ, they would be compelled, in a sense, to believe in Christ; this would diminish the merit of faith. Quamvis autem sufficienter pro peccatis humani generis sua morte satisfecerit, ut vigesimasexta ratio proponebat, sunt tamen unicuique remedia propriae salutis quaerenda. Mors enim Christi est quasi quaedam universalis causa salutis: sicut peccatum primi hominis fuit quasi universalis causa damnationis. Oportet autem universalem causam applicari ad unumquemque specialiter, ut effectum universalis causae percipiat. Effectus igitur peccati primi parentis pervenit ad unumquemque per carnis originem: effectus autem mortis Christi pertingit ad unumquemque per spiritualem regenerationem, per quam homo Christo quodammodo coniungitur et incorporatur. Et ideo oportet quod unusquisque quaerat regenerari per Christum, et alia suscipere in quibus virtus mortis Christi operatur. Although Christ atoned sufficiently for the sins of mankind by his death, as the twenty-sixth objection argued, each one must seek the means of his own salvation. Christ’s death is by way of being a universal cause of salvation, just as the sin of the first man was like a universal cause of damnation. Now a universal cause needs to be applied to each individual, that the latter may have its share in the effect of the universal cause. Accordingly, the effect of the sin of our first parent reaches each individual through carnal origin: and the effect of Christ’s death reaches each individual through spiritual regeneration, whereby man is united to and incorporated with Christ. Therefore, each one must seek to be regenerated by Christ, and to receive the other things in which the power of Christ’s death is effective. Ex quo patet quod effluxus salutis a Christo in homines non est per naturae propaginem, sed per studium bonae voluntatis, qua homo Christo adhaeret. Et sic quod a Christo unusquisque consequitur, est personale bonum. Unde non derivatur ad posteros, sicut peccatum primi parentis, quod cum naturae propagine producitur. Et inde est quod, licet parentes sint a peccato originali mundati per Christum, non tamen est inconveniens quod eorum filii cum peccato originali nascantur, et sacramentis salutis indigeant, ut vigesimaseptima ratio concludebat. Hence it follows that the outflow of salvation from Christ to mankind is not through the channel of natural procreation, but through the endeavor of the goodwill whereby a man adheres to Christ. Consequently, that which each one receives from Christ is his own personal good, so that it is not transmitted by him to his children, as the sin of our first parent is, through having its source in natural procreation. Hence it is that although parents be cleansed of original sin by Christ, it is not unreasonable, as the twenty-seventh objection argued, that their children be born in original sin, and need the sacraments of salvation. Sic igitur ex praemissis aliquatenus patet quod ea quae circa mysterium incarnationis fides Catholica praedicat, neque impossibilia neque incongrua inveniuntur. In some measure, then, we have shown that the teaching of the Catholic faith concerning the mystery of the Incarnation is neither impossible nor unreasonable. Sacramenti The sacraments Caput 56 Chapter 56 De necessitate sacramentorum Of the necessity of the sacraments Quia vero, sicut iam dictum est, mors Christi est quasi universalis causa humanae salutis; universalem autem causam oportet applicari ad unumquemque effectum: necessarium fuit exhiberi hominibus quaedam remedia per quae eis beneficium mortis Christi quodammodo coniungeretur. Huiusmodi autem esse dicuntur Ecclesiae sacramenta. We have already observed that Christ’s death is a kind of universal cause of man’s salvation, and that a universal cause needs to be applied to each individual effect. Consequently, it was necessary for man to be supplied with certain remedies, so that thereby the benefit of Christ’s death might be brought to him. These remedies are called the sacraments of the Church.