Caput 81 Chapter 81 Solutio praemissarum obiectionum Solution of the foregoing objections Ad horum igitur solutionem, considerandum est quod Deus, sicut supra dictum est, in institutione humanae naturae, aliquid corpori humano attribuit supra id quod ei ex naturalibus principiis debebatur: scilicet incorruptibilitatem quandam, per quam convenienter suae formae coaptaretur, ut sicut animae vita perpetua est, ita corpus per animam posset perpetuo vivere. In order to solve these difficulties, we must observe that in fashioning human nature, God, as we have already stated, bestowed on the human body something in addition to that which was due to it by virtue of its natural principles. This was a kind of incorruptibility, the result of the body being so proportioned to its form that, as the soul’s life is everlasting, so was it possible for the body, through the soul, to live forever. Et talis quidem incorruptibilitas, etsi non esset naturalis quantum ad activum principium, erat tamen quodammodo naturalis ex ordine ad finem, ut scilicet materia proportionaretur suae naturali formae, quae est finis materiae. This incorruptibility, although it was not natural in relation to a natural principle, was nevertheless natural (so to speak) in relation to the end, inasmuch as the matter was proportioned to its natural form, which is the end of matter. Anima igitur, praeter ordinem suae naturae, a Deo aversa, subtracta est dispositio quae eius corpori divinitus indita erat, ut sibi proportionaliter responderet, et secuta est mors. Est igitur mors quasi per accidens superveniens homini per peccatum, considerata institutione humanae naturae. Accordingly, when the soul, against the order of its nature, turned away from God, the body was deprived of that God-given disposition which made it proportionate to the soul, and death was the result. If, then, we consider the state in which human nature was created, death is incidental to man through sin. Hoc autem accidens sublatum est per Christum, qui merito suae passionis mortem moriendo destruxit. Ex hoc igitur consequitur quod divina virtute, quae corpori incorruptionem dedit, iterato corpus de morte ad vitam reparetur. But this accident was removed by Christ, who, through the merits of his Passion, destroyed death by dying. We conclude, then, that the body is restored from death to life by the same divine power that created the body incorruptible. Secundum hoc igitur ad primum dicendum quod virtus naturae deficiens est a virtute divina, sicut virtus instrumenti a virtute principalis agentis. Quamvis igitur operatione naturae hoc fieri non possit, ut corpus corruptum reparetur ad vitam, tamen virtute divina id fieri potest. Nam quod natura hoc facere non possit, ideo est quia natura semper per formam aliquam operatur. Quod autem habet formam, iam est. Cum vero corruptum est, formam amisit, quae poterat esse actionis principium. Unde operatione naturae, quod corruptum est idem numero reparari non potest. Sed divina virtus, quae res produxit in esse, sic per naturam operatur quod absque ea effectum naturae producere potest, ut superius est ostensum. Unde, cum virtus divina maneat eadem etiam rebus corruptis, potest corrupta in integrum reparare. Accordingly, we reply to the first objection thus. The power of nature falls short of the divine power even as the power of the instrument falls short of that of the principal agent. Hence, although nature is unable to restore a dead body to life, this can be done by the power of God. The reason why nature cannot do this is that nature always works through a form, and that which has a form already exists. Therefore, a thing cannot generate itself, but it generates something else that is its like in species. And when it has been destroyed, it has lost its form, by which it could be a principle of action. Consequently, that which has been destroyed cannot be restored to its identity by the operation of nature. But the divine power, which brought things into being, so works through nature that, without it, it can produce an effect of nature, as we have proved above. Therefore, since the divine power does not change, though things themselves be destroyed, it can restore integrity to things which have been corrupted. Quod vero secundo obiicitur, impedire non potest quin homo idem numero resurgere possit. Nullum enim principiorum essentialium hominis per mortem omnino cedit in nihilum: nam anima rationalis, quae est hominis forma, manet post mortem, ut superius est ostensum; materia etiam manet, quae tali formae fuit subiecta, sub dimensionibus eisdem ex quibus habebat ut esset individualis materia. Ex coniunctione igitur eiusdem animae numero ad eandem materiam numero, homo reparabitur. The second objection does not prove that the same man cannot rise again. None of man’s essential principles is utterly annihilated by death, because the rational soul, which is man’s form, remains after death, as we have shown. The matter also, which was subject to that form, remains under the same dimensions that individualized it. Accordingly, the same man will be restored as a result of the union of the same identical matter with the same identical form. Corporeitas autem dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum quod est forma substantialis corporis, prout in genere substantiae collocatur. Et sic corporeitas cuiuscumque corporis nihil est aliud quam forma substantialis eius, secundum quam in genere et specie collocatur, ex qua debetur rei corporali quod habeat tres dimensiones. Non enim sunt diversae formae substantiales in uno et eodem, per quarum unam collocetur in genere supremo, puta substantiae; et per aliam in genere proximo, puta in genere corporis vel animalis; et per aliam in specie puta hominis aut equi. Quia si prima forma faceret esse substantiam, sequentes formae iam advenirent ei quod est hoc aliquid in actu et subsistens in natura: et sic posteriores formae non facerent hoc aliquid, sed essent in subiecto quod est hoc aliquid sicut formae accidentales. Oportet igitur, quod corporeitas, prout est forma substantialis in homine, non sit aliud quam anima rationalis, quae in sua materia hoc requirit, quod habeat tres dimensiones: est enim actus corporis alicuius. Alio modo accipitur corporeitas prout est forma accidentalis, secundum quam dicitur corpus quod est in genere quantitatis. Et sic corporeitas nihil aliud est quam tres dimensiones, quae corporis rationem constituunt. Etsi igitur haec corporeitas in nihilum cedit, corpore humano corrupto, tamen impedire non potest quin idem numero resurgat: eo quod corporeitas primo modo dicta non in nihilum cedit, sed eadem manet. As to corporeity, it can be taken in two ways. In one way it signifies the substantial form of the body, considered as a substance; thus the corporeity of any body whatever is its substantial form, whereby that thing belongs to such and such a genus and species, and owing to which a body has the three dimensions. For there are not several substantial forms in one and the same thing, by one of which it belongs to a supreme genus (substance, for example), and by another to its proximate genus (such as bodies or animals), and by yet another to its species (such as man or horse). For if the first form makes it a substance, the subsequent forms would be additions to that which is already an actual individual, subsisting in nature, so that they would not be constituents of that individual, but like accidental forms would be in the subject which is that individual. Consequently, corporeity (taken as meaning the substantial form in man), is nothing else but the rational soul, which requires the three dimensions in its matter, since it is the actuating principle of a body. In another sense, corporeity signifies an accidental form in regard to which a body is said to be in the genus of quantity, so that corporeity is identified with the three dimensions that enter into the definition of a body. Therefore, although this corporeity returns to nothingness when the body is corrupted, this cannot prevent a man from being identically the same when he rises again, since corporeity, taken in the first sense, does not return into nothing, but remains the same. Similiter etiam forma mixti dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo ut per formam mixti intelligatur forma substantialis corporis mixti. Et sic, cum in homine non sit alia forma substantialis quam anima rationalis, ut ostensum est: non poterit dici quod forma mixti, prout est forma substantialis, homine moriente cedat in nihilum. Alio modo dicitur forma mixti qualitas quaedam composita et contemperata ex mixtione simplicium qualitatum, quae ita se habet ad formam substantialem corporis mixti sicut se habet qualitas simplex ad formam substantialem corporis simplicis. Unde etsi forma mixtionis sic dicta in nihilum cedat, non praeiudicat unitati corporis resurgentis. The form of a mixture can also be taken in two ways. In one way, it signifies the substantial form of a mixed body; and thus, since in man there is no other substantial form besides the rational soul, as we have proved, neither can it be said that the form of the mixture, considered as his substantial form, is annihilated when a man dies. In another way, when a number of simple qualities are mixed and attempered so as to form a composite quality, this latter may be called the form of the mixture, and stands in the same relation to the substantial form of the mixed body as a simple quality does to the substantial form of a simple body. Therefore, if the form of the mixture, thus understood, comes to nothing, this is no proof against the identity of the body that rises again. Sic etiam dicendum est et de parte nutritiva, et sensitiva. Si enim per partem sensitivam et nutritivam intelligantur ipsae potentiae, quae sunt proprietates naturales animae, vel magis compositi, corrupto corpore corrumpuntur: nec tamen per hoc impeditur unitas resurgentis. Si vero per partes praedictas intelligatur ipsa substantia animae sensitivae et nutritivae, utraque earum est eadem cum anima rationali. Non enim sunt in homine tres animae, sed una tantum, ut in secundo libro ostensum est. This same applies to the sensitive and nutritive parts of the soul. If by these we mean the sensitive and nutritive powers, which are natural properties of the soul (or rather of the composite), they cease to be when the body ceases to be, and this does not interfere with the body’s identity in the resurrection. If, however, by these parts we mean the very substance of the sensitive and nutritive soul, each of these is identical with the rational soul: for man does not have three souls, but one only, as we have proved. De humanitate vero, non est intelligendum quod sit quaedam forma consurgens ex coniunctione formae ad materiam, quasi realiter sit alia ab utroque: quia, cum per formam materia fiat hoc aliquid actu, ut dicitur II de anima, illa tertia forma consequens non esset substantialis, sed accidentalis. Dicunt autem quidam quod forma partis eadem est et forma totius: sed dicitur forma partis secundum quod facit materiam esse in actu; forma vero totius dicitur secundum quod complet speciei rationem. Et secundum hoc, humanitas non est aliud realiter quam anima rationalis. Unde patet quod, corrupto corpore, non cedit in nihilum. Sed quia humanitas est essentia hominis; essentia autem rei est quam significat definitio; definitio autem rei naturalis non significat tantum formam, sed formam et materiam: necessarium est quod humanitas aliquid significet compositum ex materia et forma, sicut et homo. Differenter tamen. Nam humanitas significat principia essentialia speciei, tam formalia quam materialia, cum praecisione principiorum individualium, dicitur enim humanitas secundum quam aliquis est homo; homo autem non est aliquis ex hoc quod habet principia individualia, sed ex hoc solum quod habet principia essentialia speciei. Humanitas igitur significat sola principia essentialia speciei. Unde significatur per modum partis. Homo autem significat quidem principia essentialia speciei, sed non excludit principia individuantia a sui significatione: nam homo dicitur qui habet humanitatem, ex quo non excluditur quin alia habere possit. Et propter hoc homo significatur per modum totius: significat enim principia speciei essentialia in actu, individuantia vero in potentia. Socrates vero significat utraque in actu, sicut et differentiam genus habet potestate, species vero actu. Unde patet quod et homo redit idem numero in resurrectione, et humanitas eadem numero, propter animae rationalis permanentiam et materiae unitatem. As to the humanity, we must not imagine this to be a form resulting from the union of the form with the matter, and distinct from both, because, since the form makes the matter to be something actually, this additional form would not be substantial, but accidental. There are some who say that the form of the part is also the form of the whole; but that it is said to be the form of the part inasmuch as it actuates the matter, and the form of the whole inasmuch as it completes the species. Thus humanity is really nothing else but the rational soul; thus, clearly it is not annihilated when the body is destroyed. But, seeing that humanity is the essence of man, and that the essence of a thing is indicated by the definition, and that the definition of natural thing indicates not the form only, but the form and the matter, it follows that humanity signifies something composed of matter and form, just as man does, but not in the same way. ‘Humanity’ signifies the essential principles of the species, both formal and material, with abstraction of the individualizing principles: for humanity is that by which someone is a man. But it is not by the principles of individuality, but only by the essential principles of the species that someone is a man. Therefore, ‘humanity’ signifies nothing else besides the essential principles of the species, so that its signification is only partial. On the other hand, ‘man’ signifies the essential principles of the species without excluding the principles of individuality from its signification, since man signifies one having humanity, and this does not exclude his having other things. Therefore, its signification is complete, because it signifies the essential principles of the species actually, and the individualizing principles potentially. But ‘Socrates’ signifies both actually, even as the genus includes the difference potentially, whereas the species includes it actually. From this it follows that both the very same man and the very same humanity rise again, by reason of the survival of the rational soul and the unity of matter. Quod vero tertio obiicitur, quod esse non est unum quia non est continuum: falso innititur fundamento. Manifestum est enim quod materiae et formae unum est esse: non enim materia habet esse in actu nisi per formam. Differt tamen quantum ad hoc anima rationalis ab aliis formis. Nam esse aliarum formarum non est nisi in concretione ad materiam: non enim excedunt materiam neque in esse, neque in operari. Anima vero rationalis, manifestum est quod excedit materiam in operari: habet enim aliquam operationem absque participatione organi corporalis, scilicet intelligere. Unde et esse suum non est solum in concretione ad materiam. Esse igitur eius, quod erat compositi, manet in ipsa corpore dissoluto: et reparato corpore in resurrectione, in idem esse reducitur quod remansit in anima. The third objection is based on a false premise in stating that identity of being depends on continuity. For it is evident that matter and form have one being, since matter does not have actual being except through a form. In this respect, however, the rational soul differs from other forms, because the being of other forms is nothing else but their adherence to matter, for they do not transcend matter, either in being or in operation. But it is clear that the rational soul transcends matter in operation, since by its operation of understanding it is independent of any bodily organ: consequently, its being is not merely adherence to matter. Therefore, the soul’s being, which was that of the composite, remains after the dissolution of the body; and when the body is restored at the resurrection, it receives again the same being which has remained in the soul. Quod etiam quarto obiicitur, resurgentis unitatem non tollit. Quod enim non impedit unitatem secundum numerum in homine dum continue vivit, manifestum est quod non potest impedire unitatem resurgentis. In corpore autem hominis, quandiu vivit, non semper sunt eaedem partes secundum materiam, sed solum secundum speciem; secundum vero materiam partes fluunt et refluunt: nec propter hoc impeditur quin homo sit unus numero a principio vitae usque in finem. Cuius exemplum accipi potest ex igne, qui, dum continue ardet, unus numero dicitur, propter hoc quod species eius manet, licet ligna consumantur et de novo apponantur. Sic etiam est in humano corpore. Nam forma et species singularium partium eius continue manet per totam vitam: sed materia partium et resolvitur per actionem caloris naturalis, et de novo adgeneratur per alimentum. Non est igitur alius numero homo secundum diversas aetates, quamvis non quicquid materialiter est in homine secundum unum statum sit in eo secundum alium. Sic igitur non requiritur ad hoc quod resurgat homo numero idem, quod quicquid fuit materialiter in eo secundum totum tempus vitae suae resumatur: sed tantum ex eo quantum sufficit ad complementum debitae quantitatis; et praecipue illud resumendum videtur quod perfectius fuit sub forma et specie humanitatis consistens. Si quid vero defuit ad complementum debitae quantitatis, vel quia aliquis praeventus est morte antequam natura ipsum ad perfectam quantitatem deduceret, vel quia forte aliquis mutilatus est membro; aliunde hoc divina supplebit potentia. Nec tamen hoc impediet resurgentis corporis unitatem: quia etiam opere naturae super id quod puer habet, aliquid additur aliunde, ut ad perfectam perveniat quantitatem, nec talis additio facit alium numero; idem enim numero est homo et puer et adultus. The fourth objection proves nothing against the identity of those who rise again. That which is not an obstacle to man’s identity in this life is clearly no obstacle to his identity when he rises again. Now, while a man lives, the parts of his body do not always remain the same as to matter, but only as to species: in fact, as regards matter, the parts come and go. Yet this does not prevent a man from retaining his identity from the beginning of his life to the end. Take fire for an example; as long as it continues to burn, we say that it is the same fire, because its species remains: and yet the logs have been consumed, and fresh ones have been put on. It is the same with the human body, since each single part retains its form and species during the whole of a lifetime, though their matter is both dissolved by the action of natural heat and renewed by means of nourishment. Now a man remains the very same man as to his various parts and stages of life, although the matter of his body changes from one stage to another. Accordingly, for a man to rise again identically the same as before, there is no need that he should have restored to him all the matter that was in him during his whole lifetime, but only as much as would suffice for the quantity due to him (and especially such matter as is closely connected with form and species). If there be anything lacking to a man’s proper quantity, whether because he died before reaching maturity, or because he has lost a limb, the divine power will supply the deficiency. Nor will this prevent the identity of the rising body; seeing that nature too, makes additions to a child’s body from extraneous sources, so that the body attains to maturity; such an addition does not change its identity, since the child and the adult are the same man. Ex quo etiam patet quod nec resurrectionis fidem impedire potest etiam si aliqui carnibus humanis vescantur, ut quinto obiiciebatur. Non enim est necessarium, ut ostensum est, quod quicquid fuit in homine materialiter, resurgat in eo: et iterum, si aliquid deest, suppleri potest per potentiam Dei. Caro igitur comesta resurget in eo in quo primo fuit anima rationali perfecta. In secundo vero, si non solis carnibus humanis est pastus sed et aliis cibis, resurgere poterit in eo tantum de alio quod ei materialiter advenit, quod erit necessarium ad debitam quantitatem corporis restaurandam. Si vero solis humanis carnibus sit pastus, resurget in eo quod a generantibus traxit: et quod defuerit, supplebitur omnipotentia creatoris. Quod et si parentes ex solis humanis carnibus pasti fuerint, ut sic et eorum semen, quod est superfluum alimenti, ex carnibus alienis generatum sit: resurget quidem semen in eo qui est natus ex semine, loco cuius ei cuius carnes comestae sunt, supplebitur aliunde. Hoc enim in resurrectione servabitur: quod si aliquid materialiter fuit in pluribus hominibus, resurget in eo ad cuius perfectionem magis pertinebat. Unde si fuit in uno ut radicale semen ex quo est generatus, in alio vero sicut superveniens nutrimentum, resurget in eo qui est generatus ex hoc sicut ex semine. Si vero in uno fuit ut pertinens ad perfectionem individui, in alio ut deputatum ad perfectionem speciei: resurget in eo ad quem pertinebat secundum perfectionem individui. Unde semen resurget in genito, et non in generante: et costa Adae resurget in Eva, non in Adam, in quo fuit sicut in naturae principio. Si autem secundum eundem perfectionis modum fuit in utroque, resurget in eo in quo primitus fuit. Hence we gather that even if some people partake of human flesh, this is no proof against identity in the resurrection; as the fifth objection argued. In fact, as we have already proved, there is no need that whatever was in man materially should rise again in him; and that if anything be lacking, it can be supplied by God’s power. Accordingly, the flesh consumed will rise again in the man in whom it was first perfected by a rational soul; the second man—if he partook of other food besides human flesh—will rise again with only such matter as he acquired from this other food, and in such quantity as is required for the proper size of his body. But if he partakes of no other food, he will rise again with what he received from his parents, and the deficiency will be supplied by the omnipotence of his Creator. And if his parents also partook of none but human meat, so that this seed would also be engendered from it, their children will rise again with that seed, and he whose flesh was consumed will be supplied from another source. In the resurrection it will be the rule that if any matter belong to several in common, it will rise again in him to whose perfection it most intimately belonged. Thus if it were in one as the radical seed from which he was generated, and in another as the result of nourishment, it will rise again in the man who was generated from it as from seed. But if it were in one as belonging to the perfection of the individual, and in another as directed to the perfection of the species, it will rise again in him to whom it belonged as a perfection of the individual. Hence the seed will rise again in the begotten and not in the begetter, and Adam’s rib will rise again in Eve, and not in Adam, in whom it was as in the principle of nature. And if it be in both on the same count, it will rise again in the one to whom it first belonged. Ad id vero quod sexto obiectum est, ex his quae dicta sunt iam patet solutio. Resurrectio enim quantum ad finem naturalis est, inquantum naturale est animae esse corpori unitam: sed principium eius activum non est naturale, sed sola virtute divina causatur. The reply to the sixth objection is clear from what we have already said. Resurrection is natural if we look at its final cause, inasmuch as it is natural for the soul to be united to the body, but its efficient cause is not natural, since it is caused by the power of God alone. Nec etiam negandum est omnium resurrectionem esse futuram, quamvis non omnes per fidem Christo adhaereant, nec eius mysteriis sint imbuti. Filius enim Dei propter hoc naturam humanam assumpsit ut eam repararet. Id igitur quod est defectus naturae, in omnibus reparabitur, unde omnes a morte redibunt ad vitam. Sed defectus personae non reparabitur nisi in illis qui Christo adhaeserunt: vel per proprium actum, credendo in ipsum; vel saltem per fidei sacramentum. Nor should we deny that all will rise again, although all men do not believe in Christ nor are partakers in his mysteries. The Son of God took human nature that he might restore it. Accordingly, the natural defect that is shared by all will be repaired, and the dead will rise again. But this defect will not be repaired perfectly save in those who adhere to Christ, either by their own action in believing in him, or at least by the sacrament of faith. Caput 82 Chapter 82 Quod homines resurgent immortales That man will rise again immortal Ex quo etiam patet quod in futura resurrectione homines non sic resurgent ut sint iterum morituri. From this, it is clear that man will so rise as not to die again. Necessitas enim moriendi est defectus in naturam humanam ex peccato proveniens. Christus autem, merito suae passionis, naturae defectus reparavit qui in ipsam ex peccato provenerunt. Ut enim dicit apostolus Rom. 5:15: non sicut delictum, ita et donum. Si enim unius delicto multi mortui sunt, multo magis gratia Dei, in gratia unius hominis Iesu Christi in plures abundavit. Ex quo habetur quod efficacius est meritum Christi ad tollendum mortem, quam peccatum Adae ad inducendum. Illi igitur qui per meritum Christi resurgent a morte liberati, mortem ulterius non patientur. The necessity of dying is a defect that nature has contracted from sin. Now Christ, by the merits of his Passion, repaired the defects which nature contracted from sin. For as the Apostle says: The free gift is not like the trespass. For if many died through one man’s trespass, much more have the grace of God and the free gift in the grace of that one man Jesus Christ abounded for many (Rom 5:15). From this we gather that Christ’s merit is more efficacious in destroying death than Adam’s sin in causing it. Therefore, those who rise again, being delivered from death by the merits of Christ, will not die again. Praeterea. Illud quod in perpetuum duraturum est, non est destructum. Si igitur homines resurgentes adhuc iterum morientur, ut sic mors in perpetuum duret, nullo modo mors per mortem Christi destructa est. Est autem destructa: nunc quidem in causa quod dominus per Osee praedixerat dicens: ero mors tua, o mors, Oseae 13:14; ultimo autem destruetur in actu, secundum illud: novissime inimica destruetur mors, I Cor. 15:26. Est igitur secundum fidem Ecclesiae hoc tenendum, quod resurgentes non iterum morientur. Further. That which is to endure forever has not been destroyed. Therefore, if after rising from the dead men are to die again, so that death will go on forever, death was in no sense destroyed by the death of Christ. Yet it has been destroyed now indeed in its cause, as the Lord foretold by the prophet Hosea: O death, I will be your death (Hos 13:14); and at last it will be actually destroyed: The last enemy to be destroyed is death (1 Cor 15:26). It is therefore part of the Church’s faith that those who arise will not die again. Adhuc. Effectus similatur suae causae. Resurrectio autem Christi causa est futurae resurrectionis, ut dictum est. Sic autem resurrexit Christus ut non ulterius moreretur, secundum illud Rom. 6:9: Christus resurgens ex mortuis iam non moritur. Homines igitur sic resurgent ut ulterius non moriantur. Moreover. The effect is likened to its cause. Now Christ’s Resurrection is the cause of the resurrection to come, as stated above. But Christ so rose from the dead that he will not die again: Christ, being raised from the dead, will never die again (Rom 6:9). Therefore, men will so rise that they will die no more. Amplius. Si homines resurgentes iterum moriantur, aut iterum ab illa morte iterato resurgent, aut non. Si non resurgent, remanebunt perpetuo animae separatae, quod est inconveniens, ut supra dictum est, ad quod evitandum ponuntur primo resurgere: vel, si post secundam mortem non resurgant, nulla erit ratio quare post primam resurgant. Si autem post secundam mortem iterato resurgent, aut resurgent iterum morituri, aut non. Si non iterum morituri, eadem ratione hoc erit ponendum in prima resurrectione. Si vero iterum morituri, procedet in infinitum alternatio mortis et vitae in eodem subiecto. Quod videtur inconveniens. Oportet enim quod intentio Dei ad aliquid determinatum feratur: ipsa autem mortis et vitae alternatio successiva est quasi quaedam transmutatio, quae finis esse non potest; est enim contra rationem motus quod sit finis, cum omnis motus in aliud tendat. Again. If after rising from the dead men are to die again, either they will rise again from this latter death, or they will not. If not, their souls will remain forever separated from their bodies. We have proved this to be unfitting, and for this reason it is granted that they will rise again; otherwise, if they were not to rise again after dying a second time, there would be no reason for their rising after dying the first time. On the other hand, if they rise again after this second death, either this second resurrection will be followed by yet another death, or not. If not, the same argument applies, as to their first resurrection. And if they are to die again, there will be an indefinite alternation of death and life in the subject. But this is unseemly, because God must have some definite end in raising the dead to life, while alternate death and life is a kind of succession and change which cannot be an end. For movement of its very nature cannot be an end, since all movement tends towards something else. Praeterea. Intentio inferioris naturae in agendo ad perpetuitatem fertur. Omnis enim naturae inferioris actio ad generationem ordinatur, cuius quidem finis est ut conservetur esse perpetuum speciei: unde natura non intendit hoc individuum sicut ultimum finem, sed speciei conservationem in ipso. Et hoc habet natura inquantum agit in virtute Dei, quae est prima radix perpetuitatis. Unde etiam finis generationis esse ponitur a philosopho, ut generata participent esse divinum secundum perpetuitatem. Multo igitur magis actio ipsius Dei ad aliquid perpetuum tendit. Resurrectio autem non ordinatur ad perpetuitatem speciei: haec enim per generationem poterat conservari. Oportet igitur quod ordinetur ad perpetuitatem individui. Non autem secundum animam tantum: hoc enim iam anima habebat ante resurrectionem. Ergo secundum compositum. Homo igitur resurgens perpetuo vivet. Further. The purpose of nature’s action in this lower world tends to perpetuity, because that action is directed to generation, which aims at the perpetuation of the species. Hence nature does not intend this or that individual as its last end, but the preservation of the species in the individual. It is thus with nature because nature acts by the power of God, the fount of perpetuity: therefore, the Philosopher says that the purpose of generation is that the participation of the divine being may be perpetuated in the things generated. Much more, therefore, does the action of God himself tend to something perpetual. Now resurrection is not directed to the perpetuity of the species, since this might have been secured by generation. Therefore, it is directed to the perpetuation of the individual; but not in respect of the soul only, for the soul has this without the resurrection. Therefore, it is in respect of the composite; and consequently man will live forever after the resurrection. Adhuc. Anima et corpus diverso ordine comparari videntur secundum primam hominis generationem, et secundum resurrectionem eiusdem. Nam secundum generationem primam, creatio animae sequitur generationem corporis: praeparata enim materia corporali per virtutem decisi seminis, Deus animam creando infundit. In resurrectione autem corpus animae praeexistenti coaptatur. Prima autem vita, quam homo per generationem adipiscitur, sequitur conditionem corruptibilis corporis in hoc quod per mortem privatur. Vita igitur quam homo resurgendo adipiscitur, erit perpetua, secundum conditionem incorruptibilis animae. Again. If we compare the soul and body from the point of view of a man’s first generation on the one hand and of his resurrection on the other, we shall find a different order between them. In man’s first generation, the creation of the soul follows the generation of the body, for at first the matter is prepared by the power of the disconnected seed, and then God creates and infuses the soul. But in the resurrection the body will be united to the preexisting soul. Now the first life, which man obtains by generation, follows the condition of the mortal body in that death puts an end to it. Therefore, the life which he obtains by the resurrection will be everlasting, in accordance with the condition of the immortal soul. Item. Si in infinitum succedant sibi in eodem vita et mors, ipsa alternatio vitae et mortis habebit speciem circulationis cuiusdam. Omnis autem circulatio in rebus generabilibus et corruptibilibus a prima circulatione incorruptibilium corporum causatur: nam prima circulatio in motu locali invenitur, et secundum eius similitudinem ad motus alios derivatur. Causabitur igitur alternatio mortis et vitae a corpore caelesti. Quod esse non potest: quia reparatio corporis mortui ad vitam facultatem actionis naturae excedit. Non igitur est ponenda huiusmodi alternatio vitae et mortis: nec per consequens, quod resurgentia corpora moriantur. Again. If there be an indefinite succession of life and death in the same man, this alternating life and death will form a kind of circle. Now, in things subject to generation and corruption, every circle originates from the first circle of incorruptible bodies, for the first circle is composed of local movement, and this is communicated from it by way of imitation to other kinds of movement. Consequently, the alternation of death and life would be caused by a heavenly body; but this is impossible, since the restoration of life to a dead body is beyond the scope of nature’s action. Hence we cannot admit this alternation of death and life, nor consequently that bodies will die after rising from the dead. Amplius. Quaecumque succedunt sibi in eodem subiecto, habent determinatam mensuram suae durationis secundum tempus. Omnia autem huiusmodi subiecta sunt motui caeli, quem tempus consequitur. Anima autem separata non est subiecta motui caeli: quia excedit totam naturam corporalem. Alternatio igitur separationis eius et unionis ad corpus non subiacet motui caeli. Non igitur est talis circulatio in alternatione mortis et vitae, qualis sequitur si resurgentes iterum moriantur. Resurgent igitur de cetero non morituri. Further. Whatever things succeed one another in the same subject last for a certain time, and all such things are subject to the heavens’ movement, of which time is a result. But the separated soul is not subject to the movement of the heavens, because it is above all corporeal nature. Consequently, its alternate separation from and union with the body is not subject to the heavens’ movement. Therefore, there is no such rotation of alternate death and life as would result if those who rise from death were to die again. Therefore, they will rise to die no more. Hinc est quod dicitur Isaiae 25:8: praecipitabit dominus mortem in sempiternum, et Apoc. 21:4: mors ultra non erit. Hence it is said: The Lord will swallow up death forever (Isa 25:8); and: Death shall be no more (Rev 21:4). Per hoc autem excluditur error quorundam antiquorum gentilium, qui credebant eadem temporum temporaliumque rerum volumina repeti, verbi gratia: sicut in isto saeculo Plato philosophus in urbe Atheniensi, et in eadem schola, quae Academica dicta est, discipulos docuit, ita per innumerabilia retro saecula, multis quidem prolixis intervallis, sed tamen certis, et idem Plato, et eadem civitas, et eadem schola, iidemque discipuli repetiti, et per innumerabilia demum saecula repetendi sunt, ut Augustinus introducit in XII de Civ. Dei. Ad quod, ut ipse ibidem dicit, quidam referre volunt illud quod dicitur Eccle. 1:9 quid est quod fuit? Ipsum quod futurum est. Quid est quod factum est? Ipsum quod faciendum est. Nihil sub sole novum, nec valet quisquam dicere, ecce hoc recens est: iam enim praecessit in saeculis quae fuerunt ante nos. Quod quidem non sic intelligendum est quod eadem numero per generationes varias repetantur, sed similia specie: ut Augustinus ibidem solvit. Et Aristoteles, in fine de generatione, hoc ipsum docuit, contra praedictam sectam loquens. Hereby we reject the error of certain heathens of old, who held that the history of times and temporal things repeats itself. For instance, just as once upon a time the philosopher Plato taught at Athens in the school known as the Academy, so during a space of countless previous centuries, at long but certain intervals, we shall find again and again the same Plato, and the same city, and the same disciples, and we shall go on finding them during ages without number, as Augustine relates. To this, as he says in the same place, some would refer the words of Ecclesiastes: What has been is what will be, and what has been done is what will be done; and there is nothing new under the sun. Is there a thing of which it is said: ‘See, this is new’? It has been already, in the ages before us (Eccl 1:9–10). This, however, does not mean that the same identical things occur over again, but the same kind of thing, as Augustine explains. Aristotle also taught this in opposition to the foregoing view. Caput 83 Chapter 83 Quod in resurgentibus non erit usus ciborum neque venereorum That after the resurrection there will be no use of food or sex Ex praemissis autem ostenditur quod apud homines resurgentes non erit venereorum et ciborum usus. From what has been said it follows that men will have no use of sex or food after rising again. Remota enim vita corruptibili, necesse est removeri ea quae corruptibili vitae deserviunt. Manifestum est autem quod ciborum usus corruptibili vitae deservit: ad hoc enim cibos assumimus ut corruptio quae posset accidere ex consumptione naturalis humidi, evitetur. Est etiam in praesenti ciborum usus necessarius ad augmentum: quod post resurrectionem in hominibus non erit, quia omnes in debita quantitate resurgent, ut ex dictis patet. Similiter commixtio maris et feminae corruptibili vitae deservit, ordinatur enim ad generationem per quam quod perpetuo conservari non potest secundum individuum, in specie conservatur. Ostensum est autem quod resurgentium vita incorruptibilis erit. Non igitur in resurgentibus erit ciborum neque venereorum usus. When corruptible life is no more, there will be an end of those things that minister to it. Now it is evident that the use of food ministers to the corruptible life, since the reason why we partake of food is to avoid the corruption that might result from the consumption of the natural humidity. Moreover, in the present life food is necessary for growth; but after the resurrection men will not grow, since they will rise again of the size that is due to them, as we have already stated. Likewise, the alliance of male with female administers to the corruptible life, for its purpose is generation, by which that which cannot last forever in the individual may be preserved in the species. Now we have shown that the life of those who rise again will be everlasting. Therefore, after the resurrection there will be no use for food or sex. Adhuc. Vita resurgentium non minus ordinata erit quam praesens vita, sed magis: quia ad illam homo perveniet solo Deo agente: hanc autem consequitur cooperante natura. Sed in hac vita ciborum usus ordinatur ad aliquem finem: ad hoc enim cibus assumitur ut per digestionem convertatur in corpus. Si igitur tunc erit ciborum usus, oportebit quod ad hoc sit quod convertatur in corpus. Cum ergo a corpore nihil resolvatur, eo quod corpus erit incorruptibile; oportebit dicere quod totum quod convertitur ex alimento, transeat in augmentum. Resurget autem homo in debita quantitate, ut supra dictum est. Ergo perveniet ad immoderatam quantitatem: immoderata est enim quantitas quae debitam quantitatem excedit. Again. The life of those who will have risen again will not be less orderly than the present life: in fact, it will be more so, since they will obtain that life through the agency of God alone, whereas the present life is acquired through the cooperation of nature. Now in this life food is consumed for a certain purpose, namely, that it may be transformed into the body by the process of digestion. Therefore, if then there will be a use for food, it will be that it may be transformed into the body. Since, then, the body will suffer no dissolution, because it will be incorruptible, we shall have to admit that whatever a man will derive from nourishment will add to his size. And seeing that, as we have shown above, he will rise again in the size due to him, it follows that he will become of immoderate size, for that which is more than due is immoderate. Amplius. Homo resurgens in perpetuum vivet. Aut igitur semper cibo utetur: aut non semper, sed per aliquod determinatum tempus. Si autem semper cibo utetur, cum cibus in corpus conversus a quo nihil resolvitur necesse sit quod augmentum faciat secundum aliquam dimensionem, oportebit dicere quod corpus hominis resurgentis in infinitum augeatur. Quod non potest esse: quia augmentum est motus naturalis; intentio autem virtutis naturalis moventis nunquam est ad infinitum, sed semper est ad aliquid certum; quia, ut dicitur in II de anima, omnium natura constantium terminus est et magnitudinis et augmenti. Si autem non semper cibo utetur homo resurgens, semper autem vivet, erit aliquod tempus dare in quo cibo non utetur. Quare hoc a principio faciendum est. Non igitur homo resurgens cibo utetur. Further. Man will live forever after rising again. Either, then, he will continue always to take food, or only for a certain time. If he continue always to take food, his growth will be according to a certain measure, since his food will have been transformed into his body, in which nothing will be dissolved: consequently, his body will grow indefinitely. But this is impossible, because growth is a natural movement, and a natural motive force never aims at the indefinite, but always at something definite. The reason is that, as Aristotle says, there is a limit to the size and increase of all things in nature. On the other hand, if man who is to live forever is not always to partake of food after the resurrection, there will be a time during which he will not partake of it, and so should he have done from the beginning. Therefore, there will be no use for food after the resurrection.