Caput 93 Chapter 93 Quod animae malorum post mortem habent voluntatem immutabilem in malo That the souls of the wicked after death have their will fixed unchangeably on evil Similiter etiam et animae quae statim post mortem efficiuntur in poenis miserae, redduntur immutabiles secundum voluntatem. In like manner, the souls which are punished by being deprived of happiness immediately after death become unchangeable in their will. Ostensum est enim in tertio quod peccato mortali debetur poena perpetua. Non autem esset poena perpetua animarum quae damnantur, si possent voluntatem mutare in melius: quia iniquum esset quod ex quo bonam voluntatem haberent, perpetuo punirentur. Voluntas igitur animae damnatae non potest mutari in bonum. It has been proved that, for mortal sin, the soul is condemned to eternal punishment. But this punishment of the soul would not be everlasting if its will could be changed for the better, since it would be unjust if its punishment continued after its will is good. Therefore, the will of a lost soul cannot turn towards the good. Praeterea. Ipsa inordinatio voluntatis quaedam poena est, et maxime afflictiva: quia, in quantum habet inordinatam voluntatem aliquis, displicent ei quae recte fiunt, et damnatis displicebit quod voluntas Dei impletur in omnibus, cui peccando restiterunt. Igitur inordinata voluntas nunquam ab eis tolletur. Further. The very disorder of the will is a punishment, and is most painful, since when a man has a disordered will, good deeds are displeasing to him. The damned will be distressed to see in all things the fulfilment of God’s will, which by sinning they had resisted. Therefore, they will never lose their disordered will. Adhuc. Voluntatem a peccato mutari in bonum non contingit nisi per gratiam Dei, ut patet ex his quae in tertio dicta sunt. Sicut autem bonorum animae admittuntur ad perfectam participationem divinae bonitatis, ita damnatorum animae a gratia totaliter excluduntur. Non igitur poterunt mutare in melius voluntatem. Again. The will does not turn from sin to goodness except by God’s grace, as we have proved. Now, whereas the souls of the just are admitted to perfect participation in the divine goodness, the souls of the damned are utterly excluded from grace. Therefore, the lost souls are unable to change their will for the better. Praeterea. Sicut boni in carne viventes omnium suorum operum et desideriorum finem constituunt in Deo, ita mali in aliquo indebito fine avertente eos a Deo. Sed animae separatae bonorum immobiliter inhaerebunt fini quem in hac vita sibi praestituerunt, scilicet Deo. Ergo et animae malorum immobiliter inhaerebunt fini quem sibi elegerunt. Sicut igitur bonorum voluntas non poterit fieri mala, ita nec malorum poterit fieri bona. Again. Whereas the just look to God as the end of all their deeds and desires while in the flesh, the wicked look to an unlawful end which turns them away from God. Now the separated souls of the just will adhere unchangeably to God as the end to which they looked in this life. Therefore, the souls of the wicked will adhere unchangeably to the end which they have chosen for themselves. Hence, as the will of the just will be unchangeable to evil, so the will of the wicked will be unchangeable to the good. Caput 94 Chapter 94 De immutabilitate voluntatis in animabus in Purgatorio detentis The unchangeableness of will of the souls in purgatory Sed quia quaedam animae sunt quae statim post separationem ad beatitudinem non perveniunt, nec tamen sunt damnatae, sicut illae quae secum aliquid purgabile deferunt, ut dictum est; ostendendum est quod nec etiam huiusmodi animae separatae possunt secundum voluntatem mutari. Beatorum enim et damnatorum animae habent immobilem voluntatem ex fine cui adhaeserunt, ut ex dictis patet: sed animae quae secum aliquid purgabile deferunt, in fine non discrepant ab animabus beatis: decedunt enim cum caritate, per quam inhaeremus Deo ut fini. Ergo etiam ipsaemet immobilem voluntatem habebunt. However, some souls do not attain beatitude as soon as they depart, and yet are not damned. Such are those who depart with something that needs to be cleansed, as stated above. We must prove, then, that neither do these souls admit of a change in their will after they have been separated from the body. We have shown that both blessed and damned have an unchangeable will, as regards the end to which they adhered. Now the souls that finally depart with something that needs to be cleansed do not differ from the souls of the blessed in that they depart in charity, whereby we adhere to God as our end. Therefore, they also have an unchangeable will. Caput 95 Chapter 95 De immutabilitate voluntatis communiter in omnibus animabus post separationem a corpore The common cause of this unchangeableness in all souls after their departure from the body Quod autem ex fine in omnibus animabus separatis sequatur immobilitas voluntatis, sic manifestum esse potest. This unchangeableness of the will in all souls after their departure from the body is to be traced to the end as its cause. Finis enim, ut dictum est, se habet in appetitivis sicut prima principia demonstrationis in speculativis. Huiusmodi autem principia naturaliter cognoscuntur; et error qui circa huiusmodi principia accideret, ex corruptione naturae proveniret. Unde non posset homo mutari de vera acceptione principiorum in falsam, aut e converso, nisi per mutationem naturae: non enim qui errat circa principia, revocari potest per aliqua certiora, sicut revocatur homo ab errore qui est circa conclusiones. Et similiter nec posset aliquis a vera acceptione principiorum per aliqua magis apparentia seduci. Sic igitur et se habet circa finem. Quia unusquisque naturaliter habet desiderium ultimi finis. This may be proved as follows. As already stated, the end in matters of appetite is what the first principles of demonstration are in speculative matters. These principles are known naturally, and any error that may occur about such principles must be traced to some corruption in nature. Hence a man who understands these principles aright cannot come to understand them wrongly, or vice versa, unless his nature be changed. For one who errs about those principles cannot be set right by more certain principles as would be possible if he erred about some conclusion. Nor is it possible for one who grasps these principles aright to be led astray by anything more certain. The same applies to the end, since everyone naturally desires the ultimate end. Et hoc quidem sequitur in universali naturam rationalem, ut beatitudinem appetat: sed quod hoc vel illud sub ratione beatitudinis et ultimi finis desideret, ex aliqua speciali dispositione naturae contingit; unde philosophus dicit quod qualis unusquisque est talis et finis videtur ei. Si igitur dispositio illa per quam aliquid desideratur ab aliquo ut ultimus finis, ab eo removeri non possit, non poterit immutari voluntas eius quantum ad desiderium finis illius. And in consequence the rational nature desires happiness in general. But that it desire this or that thing as happiness and its last end depends on some special condition of nature. Hence the Philosopher says that such as a man is, such does he deem his end to be. Accordingly, if this disposition which makes a man desire a certain thing as his last end cannot be removed from him, his will cannot be changed from its desire for that end. Huiusmodi autem dispositiones removeri possunt a nobis quandiu est anima corpori coniuncta. Quod enim aliquid appetatur a nobis ut ultimus finis, contingit quandoque ex eo quod sic disponimur aliqua passione, quae cito transit: unde et desiderium finis de facili removetur, ut in continentibus apparet. Quandoque autem disponimur ad desiderium alicuius finis boni vel mali per aliquem habitum: et ista dispositio non de facili tollitur, unde et tale desiderium finis fortius manet, ut in temperatis apparet; et tamen dispositio habitus in hac vita auferri potest. Now these dispositions can be removed from us so long as the soul is united to the body. The desire for something as our last end is occasioned sometimes through our being disposed to it by a passion, which is of short duration; therefore, our desire for that end is easily removed. And this is especially evident in contingent matters. And sometimes we are disposed to desire something as an end, good or evil, by a habit. But this disposition is not easily removed, and consequently such a desire for an end has a firmer hold on us (and we have an example of this in the temperate). Nevertheless, an habitual disposition can be removed in this life. Sic ergo manifestum est quod, dispositione manente qua aliquid desideratur ut ultimus finis, non potest illius finis desiderium moveri: quia ultimus finis maxime desideratur; unde non potest aliquis a desiderio ultimi finis revocari per aliquid desiderabile magis. Anima autem est in statu mutabili quandiu corpori unitur: non autem postquam fuerit a corpore separata. Dispositio enim animae movetur per accidens secundum aliquem motum corporis: cum enim corpus deserviat animae ad proprias operationes, ad hoc ei naturaliter datum est ut in ipso existens perficiatur, quasi ad perfectionem mota. Quando igitur erit a corpore separata, non erit in statu ut moveatur ad finem, sed ut in fine adepto quiescat. Immobilis igitur erit voluntas eius quantum ad desiderium ultimi finis. It is evident, then, that as long as the disposition remains that causes the desire for a certain thing as the ultimate end, the desire for that end cannot be removed, because the ultimate end is desired above all, so that one cannot be turned back from the desire for the ultimate end by something more desirable. Now, so long as the soul is united to the body, it is in a changeable state; but not after its separation from the body. For a disposition of the soul is accidentally subject to change in accordance with some change in the body, because, since the body serves the soul in the soul’s proper operations, it is natural that while the soul is in the body it should be perfected by being moved to perfection. Hence, when it departs from the body, it will no longer be in a state of mobility towards the end, but of resting in the end. Consequently, the will, as regards the desire for the ultimate end, will be immovable. Ex ultimo autem fine dependet tota bonitas vel malitia voluntatis: quia bona quaecumque aliquis vult in ordine ad bonum finem, bene vult: mala autem quaecumque in ordine ad malum finem, male vult. Non est igitur voluntas animae separatae mutabilis de bono in malum: licet sit mutabilis de uno volito in aliud, servato tamen ordine ad eundem ultimum finem. Now the goodness or badness of the will depends entirely on the ultimate end, since whatever goods a man desires in relation to a good end, he desires well, and whatever he desires in relation to a bad end, he desires ill. Therefore, the will of the separated soul is not changeable from good to evil, although it is changeable from the desire for one thing to the desire for another, provided the order to the ultimate end be observed. Ex quo apparet quod talis immobilitas voluntatis libero arbitrio non repugnat, cuius actus est eligere: electio enim est eorum quae sunt ad finem, non autem ultimi finis. Sicut igitur non repugnat nunc libero arbitrio quod immobili voluntate desideramus beatitudinem et miseriam fugimus in communi, ita non erit contrarium libero arbitrio quod voluntas immobiliter fertur in aliquid determinatum sicut in ultimum finem: quia sicut nunc immobiliter nobis inhaeret natura communis, per quam beatitudinem appetimus in communi; ita tunc immobiliter manebit illa specialis dispositio per quam hoc vel illud desideratur ut ultimus finis. Hence it is evident that this immobility of the will is not inconsistent with free-will, the act of which is to choose, since we choose things that are directed to the end, but not the ultimate end itself. Therefore, just as it is not inconsistent with free-will that we desire happiness and shun unhappiness, in general, with an unchangeable will, so will it not be incompatible with free-will that the will be fixed immovably on a particular object as its last end. For just as now our common nature, whereby we desire happiness in general, adheres to us unchangeably, so too that special disposition whereby we desire this or that as our last end will remain in us unchangeably. Substantiae autem separatae, scilicet angeli, propinquiores sunt, secundum naturam in qua creantur, ultimae perfectioni quam animae: quia non indigent acquirere scientiam ex sensibus, neque pervenire ratiocinando de principiis ad conclusiones, sicut animae; sed per species inditas statim possunt in contemplationem veritatis pervenire. Et ideo statim quod debito fini, vel indebito adhaeserunt, immobiliter in eo permanserunt. Now the separate substances (that is, the angels), are nearer to ultimate perfection than souls as regards the nature in which they were created, because they do not need to gain knowledge through senses nor to reach conclusions by arguing from principles as souls do. They reach the contemplation of truth at once through the ideas implanted in them. Consequently, as soon as they adhere to an end, due or undue, they abide in it immovably. Non est tamen aestimandum quod animae, postquam resument corpora in resurrectione, immobilitatem voluntatis amittant, sed in ea perseverant: quia, ut supra dictum est, corpora in resurrectione disponentur secundum exigentiam animae, non autem animae immutabuntur per corpora. It must not be imagined that the soul ceases to have an immovable will after being reunited to the body. On the contrary, it will remain thus, because at the resurrection, as we have already said, the body will be disposed according to the exigencies of the soul, and the soul will not be influenced by the body, but will remain unchangeable. Caput 96 Chapter 96 De finali iudicio On the last judgment Ex praemissis igitur apparet quod duplex est retributio pro his quae homo in vita gerit: una secundum animam, quam aliquis percipit statim cum anima fuerit a corpore separata; alia vero retributio erit in resumptione corporum, secundum quod quidam impassibilia et gloriosa corpora, quidam vero passibilia resument et ignobilia. Et prima quidem retributio singillatim fit singulis, secundum quod divisim singuli moriuntur. Secunda autem retributio simul omnibus fiet, secundum quod omnes simul resurgent. Omnis autem retributio qua diversa redduntur secundum diversitatem meritorum, iudicium requirit. Necesse est ergo duplex esse iudicium: unum, quo divisim singulis quantum ad animam redditur poena vel praemium; aliud autem commune, secundum quod, quantum ad animam et corpus, reddetur omnibus simul quod meruerunt. We gather from what has been said that a twofold award is assigned to men’s deeds in this life: one, with respect to the soul, is received as soon as the soul departs from the body; the other will be when the soul returns to the body, and some will return to an impassible and glorious body, some to a passible and base body. The first award is made to each one separately, inasmuch as each one dies separately; but the second award will be made to all at the same time, inasmuch as all will rise together. Now there must be a judgment whenever different awards are made according to difference of merits. Consequently, there must be a twofold judgment: the first is in which each soul receives separately its reward or punishment; the other is a general judgment, when all at the same time will receive the award due to their merits as to soul and body. Et quia Christus sua humanitate, secundum quam passus est et resurrexit, nobis et resurrectionem et vitam aeternam promeruit; sibi competit illud commune iudicium, quo resurgentes vel praemiantur vel puniuntur. Propterea de eo dicitur Ioan. 5:27: potestatem dedit ei iudicium facere, quia filius hominis est. And since Christ, in his human nature, by his Passion and Resurrection, merited for us resurrection and eternal life, it is fitting that he should preside at this general judgment, in which those who have risen from the dead will be rewarded or punished. Hence it is said of him: He has given him authority to execute judgment, because he is the Son of Man (John 5:27). Oportet autem iudicium proportionale esse his de quibus iudicatur. Et quia finale iudicium erit de praemio vel poena visibilium corporum, conveniens est ut illud iudicium visibiliter agatur. Unde etiam Christus in forma humanitatis iudicabit, quam omnes possint videre, tam boni quam mali. Visio autem divinitatis eius beatos facit, ut in tertio est ostensum: unde a solis bonis poterit videri. Iudicium autem animarum, quia de invisibilibus est, invisibiliter agitur. Now the judgment should be in keeping with the things that are judged. And, seeing that the last judgment will refer to the rewards and punishments due to visible bodies, it is fitting for that judgment to be carried out visibly. Therefore, Christ will judge in his human form, which all will be able to see, both good and wicked. But the sight of his divinity is beatific, as we have proved, so that he can be seen thus by the good alone. On the other hand, the judgment of souls, since it is about things invisible, will be enacted invisibly. Licet autem Christus in illo finali iudicio auctoritatem habeat iudicandi, iudicabunt tamen simul cum illo, velut iudicis assessores, qui ei prae ceteris adhaeserunt, scilicet apostoli, quibus dictum est, Matth. 19:28: vos qui secuti estis me, sedebitis super sedes iudicantes duodecim tribus Israel; quae promissio etiam ad illos extenditur, qui apostolorum vestigia imitantur. Moreover, although Christ, at the last judgment, will exercise the authority of judge, nevertheless, others will judge with him as assessors. And these will be those who were most closely united to him:, namely, the apostles, to whom it was said: You who have followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel (Matt 19:28), which promise extends to those who follow in the footsteps of the apostles. Caput 97 Chapter 97 De statu mundi post iudicium On the state of the world after the judgment Peracto igitur finali iudicio, natura humana totaliter in suo termino constituetur. Quia vero omnia corporalia sunt quodammodo propter hominem, ut in tertio est ostensum, tunc etiam totius creaturae corporeae conveniens est ut status immutetur, ut congruat statui hominum qui tunc erunt. Et quia tunc homines incorruptibiles erunt, a tota creatura corporea tolletur generationis et corruptionis status. Et hoc est quod dicit apostolus, Rom. 8:21, quod ipsa creatura liberabitur a servitute corruptionis in libertatem gloriae filiorum Dei. After the last judgment has taken place, human nature will have reached its term. But, since all corporeal things were made for man, as we have shown, it will be fitting that the state of all corporeal creatures should be changed so as to be in conformity with the state of men as they will be then. And, seeing that men will then be incorruptible, all corporeal creatures will cease to be in the state of generation and corruption. This is indicated by the Apostle: The creation itself will be set free from its bondage to decay and obtain the glorious liberty of the children of God (Rom 8:21). Generatio autem et corruptio in inferioribus corporibus ex motu caeli causatur. Ad hoc igitur quod in inferioribus cesset generatio et corruptio, oportet etiam quod motus caeli cesset. Et propter hoc dicitur Apoc. 10:6, quod tempus amplius non erit. Now, since generation and corruption in the lower bodies is caused by the movement of the heavens, it follows that the heavens’ movement must also cease, if generation and corruption in the lower bodies is to come to an end. Thus it is said: Time shall be no longer (Rev 10:6). Non debet autem impossibile videri quod motus caeli cesset. Non enim motus caeli sic est naturalis sicut motus gravium et levium, ut ab aliquo interiori activo principio inclinetur ad motum: sed dicitur naturalis, inquantum habet in sua natura aptitudinem ad talem motum; principium autem illius motus est aliquis intellectus, ut in tertio est ostensum. Movetur igitur caelum sicut ea quae a voluntate moventur. Voluntas autem movet propter finem. Finis autem motus caeli non potest esse ipsum moveri: motus enim, cum semper in aliud tendat, non habet rationem ultimi finis. Nec potest dici quod finis caelestis motus sit, ut corpus caeleste reducatur secundum ubi de potentia in actum: quia haec potentia nunquam potest tota in actum reduci: quia dum corpus caeleste est actu in uno ubi, est in potentia ad aliud; sicut est et de potentia materiae primae respectu formarum. Sicut igitur finis naturae in generatione non est reducere materiam de potentia in actum, sed aliquid quod ad hoc consequitur, scilicet perpetuitas rerum, per quam ad divinam similitudinem accedunt; ita finis motus caelestis non est reduci de potentia in actum, sed aliquid consequens ad hanc reductionem, scilicet assimilari Deo in causando. Omnia autem generabilia et corruptibilia, quae causantur per motum caeli, ad hominem ordinantur quodammodo sicut in finem, ut in tertio est ostensum. Motus igitur caeli praecipue est propter generationem hominum: in hoc enim maxime divinam similitudinem consequitur in causando, quia forma hominis, scilicet anima rationalis, immediate creatur a Deo, ut in secundo est ostensum. Non autem potest esse finis multiplicatio animarum in infinitum: quia infinitum contrariatur rationi finis. Nihil igitur inconveniens sequitur si, certo numero hominum completo, ponamus motum caeli desistere. Nor ought it to be deemed impossible for the heavens’ movement to cease. In fact, this movement is natural not as proceeding from an interior active principle (like the movement of heavy and light bodies), but because the heavens have an aptitude for such a movement by nature, while the principle of that movement is an intellect, as we have proved. Hence the heavens are moved like things moved by the will, and the will moves for the sake of an end. Now the end of the heavens’ movement is not that they be moved, for since movement always tends to something else, it cannot be a last end. Nor can it be said that the end of the heavens’ movement is that it be moved from potency to act in point of its place, because such a potency can never wholly be reduced to act, since while a heavenly body is in one place, it is potentially in another. And the same applies to the potency of prime matter in respect of forms. Consequently, just as the end of nature in generation is not to reduce matter from potency to act, but something that results from this—namely, the perpetuation of things whereby they approach to the divine likeness—so the end of the heavens’ movement is not that the heavens may be reduced from potency to act, but something resulting from it—namely, to be like God in causality. Now all the things subject to generation and corruption that are caused by the heavens’ movement are, in a sense, directed to man as their end, as we have proved. Therefore, the movement of the heavens is chiefly for the sake of the generation of mankind: for it is especially in this that it approaches to a divine likeness in point of causality, since the form of man, namely the rational soul, is immediately created by God, as proved above. Now the indefinite increase in the number of souls cannot be an end, since the indefinite is incompatible with the nature of an end. Therefore, there is nothing unreasonable in saying that the movement of the heavens will cease when the number of men is complete. Cessante tamen motu caeli et generatione et corruptione ab elementis, eorum substantia remanebit, ex immobilitate divinae bonitatis: creavit enim res ut essent. Unde esse rerum quae aptitudinem habent ad perpetuitatem, in perpetuum remanebit. Habent autem naturam ut sint perpetua, secundum totum et partem, corpora caelestia; elementa vero secundum totum, licet non secundum partem, quia secundum partem corruptibilia sunt; homines vero secundum partem, licet non secundum totum, nam anima rationalis incorruptibilis est, compositum autem corruptibile. Haec igitur secundum substantiam remanebunt in illo ultimo statu mundi, quae quoquo modo ad perpetuitatem aptitudinem habent, Deo supplente sua virtute quod eis ex propria infirmitate deest. Nevertheless, when the heavens cease to move, and the elements cease to generate and corrupt, their substance will remain, because God’s goodness is unchangeable. For he created things that they might be: therefore, things that have an aptitude for perpetuity will remain forever. The heavenly bodies have this aptitude both in whole and in part, but the elements have it in whole but not in part, since they are corruptible in part; and men have it in part but not in whole, since the rational soul is incorruptible while the composite is corruptible. Accordingly, in that last state of the world, those things will remain in their substance which in any way whatever have an aptitude for perpetuity, for God, by his power, will supply what is lacking to them through their own infirmity. Alia vero animalia, et plantae, et corpora mixta, quae totaliter sunt corruptibilia, et secundum totum et partem, nullo modo in illo incorruptionis statu remanebunt. Sic igitur intelligendum est quod apostolus dicit, I Cor. 7:31: praeterit figura huius mundi, quia haec species mundi quae nunc est, cessabit: substantia vero remanebit. Sic etiam intelligitur quod dicitur Iob 14:12: homo, cum dormierit, non resurget donec atteratur caelum: idest, donec ista dispositio caeli cesset qua movetur et in aliis motum causat. Other things—animals, plants, and mixed bodies—which are entirely corruptible, both in whole and in part, will in no way remain in the state of incorruption. Thus, then, are we to understand the words of the Apostle: The form of this world is passing away (1 Cor 7:31), because the present outward appearance of the world will pass away, while its substance will remain. In the same sense, we are to understand the saying of Job: Man lies down and rises not again, till the heavens are no more (Job 14:12). That is until the present disposition of the heavens ceases, whereby the heavens move and cause movement in other things. Quia vero inter alia elementa maxime activum est ignis, et corruptibilium consumptivum; consumptio eorum quae in futuro statu remanere non debent, convenientissime fiet per ignem. Et ideo secundum fidem ponitur quod finaliter mundus per ignem purgabitur, non solum a corruptibilibus corporibus, sed etiam ab infectione quam locus iste incurrit ex habitatione peccatorum. Et hoc est quod dicitur II Petri 3:7: caeli qui nunc sunt et terra eodem verbo repositi sunt, igni reservati, in diem iudicii: ut per caelos non ipsum firmamentum intelligamus, in quo sunt sidera, sive fixa sive errantia, sed istos caelos aereos terrae vicinos. Moreover, since of all the elements fire is the most active, and the most destructive of corruptible things, the destruction of those things which will not remain in the future state will be fittingly brought about by fire. Therefore, it is of faith that the world will be finally cleansed by fire, not only from corruptible bodies, but even from the contamination which this world has contracted through being the abode of sinners. Thus it is said: By the same word the heavens and earth that now exist have been stored up for fire, being kept until the day of judgment (2 Pet 3:7); where by the heavens we are to understand not the firmament, in which are the stars (whether fixed or wandering), but the atmosphere contiguous to the earth. Quia igitur creatura corporalis finaliter disponetur per congruentiam ad hominis statum; homines autem non solum a corruptione liberabuntur, sed etiam gloria induentur, ut ex dictis patet: oportebit quod etiam creatura corporalis quandam claritatis gloriam suo modo consequatur. Since, then, the corporeal creature is disposed of finally in a manner that is in keeping with man’s state, and man himself will not only be delivered from corruption, but also clothed in glory, as we have stated, it follows that even the corporeal creature will acquire a certain glory of brightness befitting its capacity.