Respondeo dicendum quod iudicialia praecepta non habuerunt perpetuam obligationem, sed sunt evacuata per adventum Christi, aliter tamen quam caeremonialia. Nam caeremonialia adeo sunt evacuata ut non solum sint mortua, sed etiam mortifera observantibus post Christum, maxime post Evangelium divulgatum. Praecepta autem iudicialia sunt quidem mortua, quia non habent vim obligandi, non tamen sunt mortifera. Quia si quis princeps ordinaret in regno suo illa iudicialia observari, non peccaret, nisi forte hoc modo observarentur, vel observari mandarentur, tanquam habentia vim obligandi ex veteris legis institutione. Talis enim intentio observandi esset mortifera. I answer that, The judicial precepts did not bind for ever, but were annulled by the coming of Christ: yet not in the same way as the ceremonial precepts. For the ceremonial precepts were annulled so far as to be not only dead, but also deadly to those who observe them since the coming of Christ, especially since the promulgation of the Gospel. On the other hand, the judicial precepts are dead indeed, because they have no binding force: but they are not deadly. For if a sovereign were to order these judicial precepts to be observed in his kingdom, he would not sin: unless perchance they were observed, or ordered to be observed, as though they derived their binding force through being institutions of the Old Law: for it would be a deadly sin to intend to observe them thus. Et huius differentiae ratio potest accipi ex praemissis. Dictum est enim quod praecepta caeremonialia sunt figuralia primo et per se, tanquam instituta principaliter ad figurandum Christi mysteria ut futura. Et ideo ipsa observatio eorum praeiudicat fidei veritati, secundum quam confitemur illa mysteria iam esse completa. Praecepta autem iudicialia non sunt instituta ad figurandum, sed ad disponendum statum illius populi, qui ordinabatur ad Christum. Et ideo, mutato statu illius populi, Christo iam veniente, iudicialia praecepta obligationem amiserunt, lex enim fuit paedagogus ducens ad Christum, ut dicitur ad Gal. III. Quia tamen huiusmodi iudicialia praecepta non ordinantur ad figurandum, sed ad aliquid fiendum, ipsa eorum observatio absolute non praeiudicat fidei veritati. Sed intentio observandi tanquam ex obligatione legis, praeiudicat veritati fidei, quia per hoc haberetur quod status prioris populi adhuc duraret, et quod Christus nondum venisset. The reason for this difference may be gathered from what has been said above (A2). For it has been stated that the ceremonial precepts are figurative primarily and in themselves, as being instituted chiefly for the purpose of foreshadowing the mysteries of Christ to come. On the other hand, the judicial precepts were not instituted that they might be figures, but that they might shape the state of that people who were directed to Christ. Consequently, when the state of that people changed with the coming of Christ, the judicial precepts lost their binding force: for the Law was a pedagogue, leading men to Christ, as stated in Gal. 3:24. Since, however, these judicial precepts are instituted, not for the purpose of being figures, but for the performance of certain deeds, the observance thereof is not prejudicial to the truth of faith. But the intention of observing them, as though one were bound by the Law, is prejudicial to the truth of faith: because it would follow that the former state of the people still lasts, and that Christ has not yet come. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustitia quidem perpetuo est observanda. Sed determinatio eorum quae sunt iusta secundum institutionem humanam vel divinam, oportet quod varietur secundum diversum hominum statum. Reply Obj. 1: The obligation of observing justice is indeed perpetual. But the determination of those things that are just, according to human or Divine institution, must needs be different, according to the different states of mankind. Ad secundum dicendum quod praecepta iudicialia ab hominibus instituta habent perpetuam obligationem, manente illo statu regiminis. Sed si civitas vel gens ad aliud regimen deveniat, oportet leges mutari. Non enim eaedem leges conveniunt in democratia, quae est potestas populi, et in oligarchia, quae est potestas divitum; ut patet per philosophum, in sua politica. Et ideo etiam, mutato statu illius populi, oportuit praecepta iudicialia mutari. Reply Obj. 2: The judicial precepts established by men retain their binding force for ever, so long as the state of government remains the same. But if the state or nation pass to another form of government, the laws must needs be changed. For democracy, which is government by the people, demands different laws from those of oligarchy, which is government by the rich, as the Philosopher shows (Polit. iv, 1). Consequently when the state of that people changed, the judicial precepts had to be changed also. Ad tertium dicendum quod illa praecepta iudicialia disponebant populum ad iustitiam et aequitatem secundum quod conveniebat illi statui. Sed post Christum, statum illius populi oportuit mutari, ut iam in Christo non esset discretio gentilis et Iudaei, sicut antea erat. Et propter hoc oportuit etiam praecepta iudicialia mutari. Reply Obj. 3: Those judicial precepts directed the people to justice and equity, in keeping with the demands of that state. But after the coming of Christ, there had to be a change in the state of that people, so that in Christ there was no distinction between Gentile and Jew, as there had been before. For this reason the judicial precepts needed to be changed also. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum praecepta iudicialia possint habere aliquam certam divisionem Whether it is possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod praecepta iudicialia non possint habere aliquam certam divisionem. Praecepta enim iudicialia ordinant homines ad invicem. Sed ea quae inter homines ordinari oportet, in usum eorum venientia, non cadunt sub certa distinctione, cum sint infinita. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non possunt habere certam distinctionem. Objection 1: It would seem that it is impossible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Because the judicial precepts direct men in their relations to one another. But those things which need to be directed, as pertaining to the relationship between man and man, and which are made use of by men, are not subject to division, since they are infinite in number. Therefore it is not possible to assign a distinct division of the judicial precepts. Praeterea, praecepta iudicialia sunt determinationes moralium. Sed moralia praecepta non videntur habere aliquam distinctionem, nisi secundum quod reducuntur ad praecepta Decalogi. Ergo praecepta iudicialia non habent aliquam certam distinctionem. Obj. 2: Further, the judicial precepts are decisions on moral matters. But moral precepts do not seem to be capable of division, except insofar as they are reducible to the precepts of the decalogue. Therefore there is no distinct division of the judicial precepts. Praeterea, praecepta caeremonialia quia certam distinctionem habent, eorum distinctio in lege innuitur, dum quaedam vocantur sacrificia, quaedam observantiae. Sed nulla distinctio innuitur in lege praeceptorum iudicialium. Ergo videtur quod non habeant certam distinctionem. Obj. 3: Further, because there is a distinct division of the ceremonial precepts, the Law alludes to this division, by describing some as sacrifices, others as observances. But the Law contains no allusion to a division of the judicial precepts. Therefore it seems that they have no distinct division. Sed contra, ubi est ordo, oportet quod sit distinctio. Sed ratio ordinis maxime pertinet ad praecepta iudicialia, per quae populus ille ordinabatur. Ergo maxime debent habere distinctionem certam. On the contrary, Wherever there is order there must needs be division. But the notion of order is chiefly applicable to the judicial precepts, since thereby that people was ordained. Therefore it is most necessary that they should have a distinct division. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum lex sit quasi quaedam ars humanae vitae instituendae vel ordinandae, sicut in unaquaque arte est certa distinctio regularum artis, ita oportet in qualibet lege esse certam distinctionem praeceptorum, aliter enim ipsa confusio utilitatem legis auferret. Et ideo dicendum est quod praecepta iudicialia veteris legis, per quae homines ad invicem ordinabantur, distinctionem habent secundum distinctionem ordinationis humanae. I answer that, Since law is the art, as it were, of directing or ordering the life of man, as in every art there is a distinct division in the rules of art, so, in every law, there must be a distinct division of precepts: else the law would be rendered useless by confusion. We must therefore say that the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereby men were directed in their relations to one another, are subject to division according to the diverse ways in which man is directed. Quadruplex autem ordo in aliquo populo inveniri potest, unus quidem, principum populi ad subditos; alius autem, subditorum ad invicem; tertius autem, eorum qui sunt de populo ad extraneos; quartus autem, ad domesticos, sicut patris ad filium, uxoris ad virum, et domini ad servum. Et secundum istos quatuor ordines distingui possunt praecepta iudicialia veteris legis. Dantur enim quaedam praecepta de institutione principum et officio eorum, et de reverentia eis exhibenda, et haec est una pars iudicialium praeceptorum. Dantur etiam quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad concives ad invicem, puta circa emptiones et venditiones, et iudicia et poenas. Et haec est secunda pars iudicialium praeceptorum. Dantur etiam quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad extraneos, puta de bellis contra hostes, et de susceptione peregrinorum et advenarum. Et haec est tertia pars iudicialium praeceptorum. Dantur etiam in lege quaedam praecepta pertinentia ad domesticam conversationem, sicut de servis, et uxoribus, et filiis. Et haec est quarta pars iudicialium praeceptorum. Now in every people a fourfold order is to be found: one, of the people’s sovereign to his subjects; a second of the subjects among themselves; a third, of the citizens to foreigners; a fourth, of members of the same household, such as the order of the father to his son; of the wife to her husband; of the master to his servant: and according to these four orders we may distinguish different kinds of judicial precepts in the Old Law. For certain precepts are laid down concerning the institution of the sovereign and relating to his office, and about the respect due to him: this is one part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are given in respect of a man to his fellow citizens: for instance, about buying and selling, judgments and penalties: this is the second part of the judicial precepts. Again, certain precepts are enjoined with regard to foreigners: for instance, about wars waged against their foes, and about the way to receive travelers and strangers: this is the third part of the judicial precepts. Lastly, certain precepts are given relating to home life: for instance, about servants, wives and children: this is the fourth part of the judicial precepts. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ea quae pertinent ad ordinationem hominum ad invicem, sunt quidem numero infinita; sed tamen reduci possunt ad aliqua certa, secundum differentiam ordinationis humanae, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: Things pertaining to the ordering of relations between one man and another are indeed infinite in number: yet they are reducible to certain distinct heads, according to the different relations in which one man stands to another, as stated above. Ad secundum dicendum quod praecepta Decalogi sunt prima in genere moralium, ut supra dictum est, et ideo convenienter alia praecepta moralia secundum ea distinguuntur. Sed praecepta iudicialia et caeremonialia habent aliam rationem obligationis non quidem ex ratione naturali sed ex sola institutione. Et ideo distinctionis eorum est alia ratio. Reply Obj. 2: The precepts of the decalogue held the first place in the moral order, as stated above (Q100, A3): and consequently it is fitting that other moral precepts should be distinguished in relation to them. But the judicial and ceremonial precepts have a different binding force, derived, not from natural reason, but from their institution alone. Hence there is a distinct reason for distinguishing them. Ad tertium dicendum quod ex ipsis rebus quae per praecepta iudicialia ordinantur in lege, innuit lex distinctionem iudicialium praeceptorum. Reply Obj. 3: The Law alludes to the division of the judicial precepts in the very things themselves which are prescribed by the judicial precepts of the Law. Quaestio 105 Question 105 De ratione iudicialium praeceptorum Of the Reason for the Judicial Precepts Deinde considerandum est de ratione iudicialium praeceptorum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider the reason for the judicial precepts: under which head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, de ratione praeceptorum iudicialium quae pertinent ad principes. (1) Concerning the reason for the judicial precepts relating to the rulers; Secundo, de his quae pertinent ad convictum hominum ad invicem. (2) Concerning the fellowship of one man with another; Tertio, de his quae pertinent ad extraneos. (3) Concerning matters relating to foreigners; Quarto, de his quae pertinent ad domesticam conversationem. (4) Concerning things relating to domestic matters. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum inconvenienter lex vetus de principibus ordinaverit Whether the Old Law enjoined fitting precepts concerning rulers? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter lex vetus de principibus ordinaverit. Quia, ut philosophus dicit, in III Polit., ordinatio populi praecipue dependet ex maximo principatu. Sed in lege non invenitur qualiter debeat institui supremus princeps. Invenitur autem de inferioribus principibus, primo quidem, Exod. XVIII, provide de omni plebe viros sapientes, etc.; et Num. XI, congrega mihi septuaginta viros de senioribus Israel; et Deut. I, date ex vobis viros sapientes et gnaros, et cetera. Ergo insufficienter lex vetus principes populi ordinavit. Objection 1: It would seem that the Old Law made unfitting precepts concerning rulers. Because, as the Philosopher says (Polit. iii, 4), the ordering of the people depends mostly on the chief ruler. But the Law contains no precept relating to the institution of the chief ruler; and yet we find therein prescriptions concerning the inferior rulers: first (Exod 18:21): Provide out of all the people wise men, etc.; again (Num 11:16): Gather unto Me seventy men of the ancients of Israel; and again (Deut 1:13): Let Me have from among you wise and understanding men, etc. Therefore the Law provided insufficiently in regard to the rulers of the people. Praeterea, optimi est optima adducere, ut Plato dicit. Sed optima ordinatio civitatis vel populi cuiuscumque est ut gubernetur per regem, quia huiusmodi regimen maxime repraesentat divinum regimen, quo unus Deus mundum gubernat. A principio igitur lex debuit regem populo instituere; et non permittere hoc eorum arbitrio, sicut permittitur Deut. XVII, cum dixeris, constituam super me regem, eum constitues, et cetera. Obj. 2: Further, The best gives of the best, as Plato states (Tim. ii). Now the best ordering of a state or of any nation is to be ruled by a king: because this kind of government approaches nearest in resemblance to the Divine government, whereby God rules the world from the beginning. Therefore the Law should have set a king over the people, and they should not have been allowed a choice in the matter, as indeed they were allowed (Deut 17:14,15): When thou . . . shalt say: I will set a king over me . . . thou shalt set him, etc. Praeterea, sicut dicitur Matth. XII, omne regnum in se divisum desolabitur, quod etiam experimento patuit in populo Iudaeorum, in quo divisio regni fuit destructionis causa. Sed lex praecipue debet intendere ea quae pertinent ad communem salutem populi. Ergo debuit in lege prohiberi divisio regni in duos reges. Nec etiam debuit hoc auctoritate divina introduci; sicut legitur introductum auctoritate domini per Ahiam Silonitem prophetam, III Reg. XI. Obj. 3: Further, according to Mt. 12:25: Every kingdom divided against itself shall be made desolate: a saying which was verified in the Jewish people, whose destruction was brought about by the division of the kingdom. But the Law should aim chiefly at things pertaining to the general well-being of the people. Therefore it should have forbidden the kingdom to be divided under two kings: nor should this have been introduced even by Divine authority; as we read of its being introduced by the authority of the prophet Ahias the Silonite (3 Kgs 11:29, seqq.). Praeterea, sicut sacerdotes instituuntur ad utilitatem populi in his quae ad Deum pertinent, ut patet Heb. V; ita etiam principes instituuntur ad utilitatem populi in rebus humanis. Sed sacerdotibus et Levitis qui sunt in lege, deputantur aliqua ex quibus vivere debeant, sicut decimae et primitiae, et multa alia huiusmodi. Ergo similiter principibus populi debuerunt aliqua ordinari unde sustentarentur, et praecipue cum inhibita sit eis munerum acceptio, ut patet Exod. XXIII, non accipietis munera, quae excaecant etiam prudentes, et subvertunt verba iustorum. Obj. 4: Further, just as priests are instituted for the benefit of the people in things concerning God, as stated in Heb. 5:1; so are rulers set up for the benefit of the people in human affairs. But certain things were allotted as a means of livelihood for the priests and Levites of the Law: such as the tithes and first-fruits, and many like things. Therefore in like manner certain things should have been determined for the livelihood of the rulers of the people: the more that they were forbidden to accept presents, as is clearly stated in Ex. 23:8: You shall not take bribes, which even blind the wise, and pervert the words of the just. Praeterea, sicut regnum est optimum regimen, ita tyrannis est pessima corruptio regiminis. Sed dominus regi instituendo instituit ius tyrannicum, dicitur enim I Reg. VIII, hoc erit ius regis qui imperaturus est vobis, filios vestros tollet, et cetera. Ergo inconvenienter fuit provisum per legem circa principum ordinationem. Obj. 5: Further, as a kingdom is the best form of government, so is tyranny the most corrupt. But when the Lord appointed the king, He established a tyrannical law; for it is written (1 Kgs 8:11): This will be the right of the king, that shall reign over you: He will take your sons, etc. Therefore the Law made unfitting provision with regard to the institution of rulers. Sed contra est quod populus Israel de pulchritudine ordinationis commendatur, Num. XXIV, quam pulchra tabernacula tua, Iacob; et tentoria tua, Israel. Sed pulchritudo ordinationis populi dependet ex principibus bene institutis. Ergo per legem populus fuit circa principes bene institutus. On the contrary, The people of Israel is commended for the beauty of its order (Num 24:5): How beautiful are thy tabernacles, O Jacob, and thy tents. But the beautiful ordering of a people depends on the right establishment of its rulers. Therefore the Law made right provision for the people with regard to its rulers. Respondeo dicendum quod circa bonam ordinationem principum in aliqua civitate vel gente, duo sunt attendenda. Quorum unum est ut omnes aliquam partem habeant in principatu, per hoc enim conservatur pax populi, et omnes talem ordinationem amant et custodiunt, ut dicitur in II Polit. Aliud est quod attenditur secundum speciem regiminis, vel ordinationis principatuum. Cuius cum sint diversae species, ut philosophus tradit, in III Polit., praecipuae tamen sunt regnum, in quo unus principatur secundum virtutem; et aristocratia, idest potestas optimorum, in qua aliqui pauci principantur secundum virtutem. Unde optima ordinatio principum est in aliqua civitate vel regno, in qua unus praeficitur secundum virtutem qui omnibus praesit; et sub ipso sunt aliqui principantes secundum virtutem; et tamen talis principatus ad omnes pertinet, tum quia ex omnibus eligi possunt, tum quia etiam ab omnibus eliguntur. Talis enim est optima politia, bene commixta ex regno, inquantum unus praeest; et aristocratia, inquantum multi principantur secundum virtutem; et ex democratia, idest potestate populi, inquantum ex popularibus possunt eligi principes, et ad populum pertinet electio principum. I answer that, Two points are to be observed concerning the right ordering of rulers in a state or nation. One is that all should take some share in the government: for this form of constitution ensures peace among the people, commends itself to all, and is most enduring, as stated in Polit. ii, 6. The other point is to be observed in respect of the kinds of government, or the different ways in which the constitutions are established. For whereas these differ in kind, as the Philosopher states (Polit. iii, 5), nevertheless the first place is held by the kingdom, where the power of government is vested in one; and aristocracy, which signifies government by the best, where the power of government is vested in a few. Accordingly, the best form of government is in a state or kingdom, where one is given the power to preside over all; while under him are others having governing powers: and yet a government of this kind is shared by all, both because all are eligible to govern, and because the rules are chosen by all. For this is the best form of polity, being partly kingdom, since there is one at the head of all; partly aristocracy, insofar as a number of persons are set in authority; partly democracy, i.e., government by the people, insofar as the rulers can be chosen from the people, and the people have the right to choose their rulers. Et hoc fuit institutum secundum legem divinam. Nam Moyses et eius successores gubernabant populum quasi singulariter omnibus principantes, quod est quaedam species regni. Eligebantur autem septuaginta duo seniores secundum virtutem, dicitur enim Deut. I, tuli de vestris tribubus viros sapientes et nobiles, et constitui eos principes, et hoc erat aristocraticum. Sed democraticum erat quod isti de omni populo eligebantur; dicitur enim Exod. XVIII, provide de omni plebe viros sapientes, etc., et etiam quod populus eos eligebat; unde dicitur Deut. I, date ex vobis viros sapientes, et cetera. Unde patet quod optima fuit ordinatio principum quam lex instituit. Such was the form of government established by the Divine Law. For Moses and his successors governed the people in such a way that each of them was ruler over all; so that there was a kind of kingdom. Moreover, seventy-two men were chosen, who were elders in virtue: for it is written (Deut 1:15): I took out of your tribes wise and honorable, and appointed them rulers: so that there was an element of aristocracy. But it was a democratical government insofar as the rulers were chosen from all the people; for it is written (Exod 18:21): Provide out of all the people wise men, etc.; and, again, insofar as they were chosen by the people; wherefore it is written (Deut 1:13): Let me have from among you wise men, etc. Consequently it is evident that the ordering of the rulers was well provided for by the Law. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod populus ille sub speciali cura Dei regebatur, unde dicitur Deut. VII, te elegit dominus Deus tuus ut sis ei populus peculiaris. Et ideo institutionem summi principis dominus sibi reservavit. Et hoc est quod Moyses petivit, Num. XXVII, provideat dominus Deus spirituum omnis carnis, hominem qui sit super multitudinem hanc. Et sic ex Dei ordinatione institutus est Iosue in principatu post Moysen, et de singulis iudicibus qui post Iosue fuerunt, legitur quod Deus suscitavit populo salvatorem, et quod spiritus domini fuit in eis, ut patet Iudic. III. Et ideo etiam electionem regis non commisit dominus populo, sed sibi reservavit; ut patet Deut. XVII, eum constitues regem, quem dominus Deus tuus elegerit. Reply Obj. 1: This people was governed under the special care of God: wherefore it is written (Deut 7:6): The Lord thy God hath chosen thee to be His peculiar people: and this is why the Lord reserved to Himself the institution of the chief ruler. For this too did Moses pray (Num 27:16): May the Lord the God of the spirits of all the flesh provide a man, that may be over this multitude. Thus by God’s orders Josue was set at the head in place of Moses; and we read about each of the judges who succeeded Josue that God raised . . . up a savior for the people, and that the spirit of the Lord was in them (Judg 3:9,10,15). Hence the Lord did not leave the choice of a king to the people; but reserved this to Himself, as appears from Dt. 17:15: Thou shalt set him whom the Lord thy God shall choose. Ad secundum dicendum quod regnum est optimum regimen populi, si non corrumpatur. Sed propter magnam potestatem quae regi conceditur, de facili regnum degenerat in tyrannidem, nisi sit perfecta virtus eius cui talis potestas conceditur, quia non est nisi virtuosi bene ferre bonas fortunas, ut philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic. Perfecta autem virtus in paucis invenitur, et praecipue Iudaei crudeles erant et ad avaritiam proni, per quae vitia maxime homines in tyrannidem decidunt. Et ideo dominus a principio eis regem non instituit cum plena potestate, sed iudicem et gubernatorem in eorum custodiam. Sed postea regem ad petitionem populi, quasi indignatus, concessit, ut patet per hoc quod dixit ad Samuelem, I Reg. VIII, non te abiecerunt, sed me, ne regnem super eos. Reply Obj. 2: A kingdom is the best form of government of the people, so long as it is not corrupt. But since the power granted to a king is so great, it easily degenerates into tyranny, unless he to whom this power is given be a very virtuous man: for it is only the virtuous man that conducts himself well in the midst of prosperity, as the Philosopher observes (Ethic. iv, 3). Now perfect virtue is to be found in few: and especially were the Jews inclined to cruelty and avarice, which vices above all turn men into tyrants. Hence from the very first the Lord did not set up the kingly authority with full power, but gave them judges and governors to rule them. But afterwards when the people asked Him to do so, being indignant with them, so to speak, He granted them a king, as is clear from His words to Samuel (1 Kgs 8:7): They have not rejected thee, but Me, that I should not reign over them. Instituit tamen a principio circa regem instituendum, primo quidem, modum eligendi. In quo duo determinavit, ut scilicet in eius electione expectarent iudicium domini; et ut non facerent regem alterius gentis, quia tales reges solent parum affici ad gentem cui praeficiuntur, et per consequens non curare de eis. Secundo, ordinavit circa reges institutos qualiter deberent se habere quantum ad seipsos, ut scilicet non multiplicarent currus et equos, neque uxores, neque etiam immensas divitias; quia ex cupiditate horum principes ad tyrannidem declinant, et iustitiam derelinquunt. Instituit etiam qualiter se deberent habere ad Deum, ut scilicet semper legerent et cogitarent de lege Dei, et semper essent in Dei timore et obedientia. Instituit etiam qualiter se haberent ad subditos suos, ut scilicet non superbe eos contemnerent, aut opprimerent, neque etiam a iustitia declinarent. Nevertheless, as regards the appointment of a king, He did establish the manner of election from the very beginning (Deut 17:14, seqq.): and then He determined two points: first, that in choosing a king they should wait for the Lord’s decision; and that they should not make a man of another nation king, because such kings are wont to take little interest in the people they are set over, and consequently to have no care for their welfare: second, He prescribed how the king after his appointment should behave, in regard to himself; namely, that he should not accumulate chariots and horses, nor wives, nor immense wealth: because through craving for such things princes become tyrants and forsake justice. He also appointed the manner in which they were to conduct themselves towards God: namely, that they should continually read and ponder on God’s Law, and should ever fear and obey God. Moreover, He decided how they should behave towards their subjects: namely, that they should not proudly despise them, or ill-treat them, and that they should not depart from the paths of justice.