Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum homo possit diligere Deum super omnia ex solis naturalibus sine gratia Whether by his own natural powers and without grace man can love God above all things? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit diligere Deum super omnia ex solis naturalibus sine gratia. Diligere enim Deum super omnia est proprius et principalis caritatis actus. Sed caritatem homo non potest habere per seipsum, quia caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis, ut dicitur Rom. V. Ergo homo ex solis naturalibus non potest Deum diligere super omnia. Objection 1: It would seem that without grace man cannot love God above all things by his own natural powers. For to love God above all things is the proper and principal act of charity. Now man cannot of himself possess charity, since the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit Who is given to us, as is said Rom. 5:5. Therefore man by his natural powers alone cannot love God above all things. Praeterea, nulla natura potest supra seipsam. Sed diligere aliquid plus quam se, est tendere in aliquid supra seipsum. Ergo nulla natura creata potest Deum diligere supra seipsam sine auxilio gratiae. Obj. 2: Further, no nature can rise above itself. But to love God above all things is to tend above oneself. Therefore without the help of grace no created nature can love God above itself. Praeterea, Deo, cum sit summum bonum, debetur summus amor, qui est ut super omnia diligatur. Sed ad summum amorem Deo impendendum, qui ei a nobis debetur, homo non sufficit sine gratia, alioquin frustra gratia adderetur. Ergo homo non potest sine gratia ex solis naturalibus diligere Deum super omnia. Obj. 3: Further, to God, Who is the Highest Good, is due the best love, which is that He be loved above all things. Now without grace man is not capable of giving God the best love, which is His due; otherwise it would be useless to add grace. Hence man, without grace and with his natural powers alone, cannot love God above all things. Sed contra, primus homo in solis naturalibus constitutus fuit, ut a quibusdam ponitur. In quo statu manifestum est quod aliqualiter Deum dilexit. Sed non dilexit Deum aequaliter sibi, vel minus se, quia secundum hoc peccasset. Ergo dilexit Deum supra se. Ergo homo ex solis naturalibus potest Deum diligere plus quam se, et super omnia. On the contrary, As some maintain, man was first made with only natural endowments; and in this state it is manifest that he loved God to some extent. But he did not love God equally with himself, or less than himself, otherwise he would have sinned. Therefore he loved God above himself. Therefore man, by his natural powers alone, can love God more than himself and above all things. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est in primo, in quo etiam circa naturalem dilectionem Angelorum diversae opiniones sunt positae; homo in statu naturae integrae poterat operari virtute suae naturae bonum quod est sibi connaturale, absque superadditione gratuiti doni, licet non absque auxilio Dei moventis. Diligere autem Deum super omnia est quiddam connaturale homini; et etiam cuilibet creaturae non solum rationali, sed irrationali et etiam inanimatae, secundum modum amoris qui unicuique creaturae competere potest. Cuius ratio est quia unicuique naturale est quod appetat et amet aliquid, secundum quod aptum natum est esse, sic enim agit unumquodque, prout aptum natum est, ut dicitur in II Physic. Manifestum est autem quod bonum partis est propter bonum totius. Unde etiam naturali appetitu vel amore unaquaeque res particularis amat bonum suum proprium propter bonum commune totius universi, quod est Deus. Unde et Dionysius dicit, in libro de Div. Nom., quod Deus convertit omnia ad amorem sui ipsius. Unde homo in statu naturae integrae dilectionem sui ipsius referebat ad amorem Dei sicut ad finem, et similiter dilectionem omnium aliarum rerum. Et ita Deum diligebat plus quam seipsum, et super omnia. Sed in statu naturae corruptae homo ab hoc deficit secundum appetitum voluntatis rationalis, quae propter corruptionem naturae sequitur bonum privatum, nisi sanetur per gratiam Dei. Et ideo dicendum est quod homo in statu naturae integrae non indigebat dono gratiae superadditae naturalibus bonis ad diligendum Deum naturaliter super omnia; licet indigeret auxilio Dei ad hoc eum moventis. Sed in statu naturae corruptae indiget homo etiam ad hoc auxilio gratiae naturam sanantis. I answer that, As was said above (FP, Q60, A5), where the various opinions concerning the natural love of the angels were set forth, man in a state of perfect nature, could by his natural power, do the good natural to him without the addition of any gratuitous gift, though not without the help of God moving him. Now to love God above all things is natural to man and to every nature, not only rational but irrational, and even to inanimate nature according to the manner of love which can belong to each creature. And the reason of this is that it is natural to all to seek and love things according as they are naturally fit (to be sought and loved) since all things act according as they are naturally fit as stated in Phys. ii, 8. Now it is manifest that the good of the part is for the good of the whole; hence everything, by its natural appetite and love, loves its own proper good on account of the common good of the whole universe, which is God. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that God leads everything to love of Himself. Hence in the state of perfect nature man referred the love of himself and of all other things to the love of God as to its end; and thus he loved God more than himself and above all things. But in the state of corrupt nature man falls short of this in the appetite of his rational will, which, unless it is cured by God’s grace, follows its private good, on account of the corruption of nature. And hence we must say that in the state of perfect nature man did not need the gift of grace added to his natural endowments, in order to love God above all things naturally, although he needed God’s help to move him to it; but in the state of corrupt nature man needs, even for this, the help of grace to heal his nature. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas diligit Deum super omnia eminentius quam natura. Natura enim diligit Deum super omnia, prout est principium et finis naturalis boni, caritas autem secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis, et secundum quod homo habet quandam societatem spiritualem cum Deo. Addit etiam caritas super dilectionem naturalem Dei promptitudinem quandam et delectationem, sicut et quilibet habitus virtutis addit supra actum bonum qui fit ex sola naturali ratione hominis virtutis habitum non habentis. Reply Obj. 1: Charity loves God above all things in a higher way than nature does. For nature loves God above all things inasmuch as He is the beginning and the end of natural good; whereas charity loves Him, as He is the object of beatitude, and inasmuch as man has a spiritual fellowship with God. Moreover charity adds to natural love of God a certain quickness and joy, in the same way that every habit of virtue adds to the good act which is done merely by the natural reason of a man who has not the habit of virtue. Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum dicitur quod nulla natura potest supra seipsam, non est intelligendum quod non possit ferri in aliquod obiectum quod est supra se, manifestum est enim quod intellectus noster naturali cognitione potest aliqua cognoscere quae sunt supra seipsum, ut patet in naturali cognitione Dei. Sed intelligendum est quod natura non potest in actum excedentem proportionem suae virtutis. Talis autem actus non est diligere Deum super omnia, hoc enim est naturale cuilibet naturae creatae, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: When it is said that nature cannot rise above itself, we must not understand this as if it could not be drawn to any object above itself, for it is clear that our intellect by its natural knowledge can know things above itself, as is shown in our natural knowledge of God. But we are to understand that nature cannot rise to an act exceeding the proportion of its strength. Now to love God above all things is not such an act; for it is natural to every creature, as was said above. Ad tertium dicendum quod amor dicitur summus non solum quantum ad gradum dilectionis, sed etiam quantum ad rationem diligendi, et dilectionis modum. Et secundum hoc, supremus gradus dilectionis est quo caritas diligit Deum ut beatificantem, sicut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Love is said to be best, both with respect to degree of love, and with regard to the motive of loving, and the mode of love. And thus the highest degree of love is that whereby charity loves God as the giver of beatitude, as was said above. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum homo sine gratia per sua naturalia possit praecepta legis implere Whether man without grace and by his own natural powers can fulfill the commandments of the Law? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo sine gratia per sua naturalia possit praecepta legis implere. Dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. II, quod gentes, quae legem non habent, naturaliter ea quae legis sunt faciunt. Sed illud quod naturaliter homo facit, potest per seipsum facere absque gratia. Ergo homo potest legis praecepta facere absque gratia. Objection 1: It would seem that man without grace, and by his own natural powers, can fulfill the commandments of the Law. For the Apostle says (Rom 2:14) that the Gentiles who have not the law, do by nature those things that are of the Law. Now what a man does naturally he can do of himself without grace. Hence a man can fulfill the commandments of the Law without grace. Praeterea, Hieronymus dicit, in expositione Catholicae fidei, illos esse maledicendos qui Deum praecepisse homini aliquid impossibile dicunt. Sed impossibile est homini quod per seipsum implere non potest. Ergo homo potest implere omnia praecepta legis per seipsum. Obj. 2: Further, Jerome says (Expos. Cathol. Fide) that they are anathema who say God has laid impossibilities upon man. Now what a man cannot fulfill by himself is impossible to him. Therefore a man can fulfill all the commandments of himself. Praeterea, inter omnia praecepta legis maximum est illud, diliges dominum Deum tuum ex toto corde tuo; ut patet Matth. XXII. Sed hoc mandatum potest homo implere ex solis naturalibus, diligendo Deum super omnia, ut supra dictum est. Ergo omnia mandata legis potest homo implere sine gratia. Obj. 3: Further, of all the commandments of the Law, the greatest is this, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart (Matt 27:37). Now man with his natural endowments can fulfill this command by loving God above all things, as stated above (A3). Therefore man can fulfill all the commandments of the Law without grace. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de haeresibus, hoc pertinere ad haeresim Pelagianorum, ut credant sine gratia posse hominem facere omnia divina mandata. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Haeres. lxxxviii) that it is part of the Pelagian heresy that they believe that without grace man can fulfill all the Divine commandments. Respondeo dicendum quod implere mandata legis contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad substantiam operum, prout scilicet homo operatur iusta et fortia, et alia virtutis opera. Et hoc modo homo in statu naturae integrae potuit omnia mandata legis implere, alioquin non potuisset in statu illo non peccare, cum nihil aliud sit peccare quam transgredi divina mandata. Sed in statu naturae corruptae non potest homo implere omnia mandata divina sine gratia sanante. Alio modo possunt impleri mandata legis non solum quantum ad substantiam operis, sed etiam quantum ad modum agendi, ut scilicet ex caritate fiant. Et sic neque in statu naturae integrae, neque in statu naturae corruptae, potest homo implere absque gratia legis mandata. Unde Augustinus, in libro de Corrept. et Grat., cum dixisset quod sine gratia nullum prorsus bonum homines faciunt, subdit, non solum ut, monstrante ipsa quid faciendum sit, sciant; verum etiam ut, praestante ipsa, faciant cum dilectione quod sciunt. Indigent insuper in utroque statu auxilio Dei moventis ad mandata implenda, ut dictum est. I answer that, There are two ways of fulfilling the commandments of the Law. The first regards the substance of the works, as when a man does works of justice, fortitude, and of other virtues. And in this way man in the state of perfect nature could fulfill all the commandments of the Law; otherwise he would have been unable not to sin in that state, since to sin is nothing else than to transgress the Divine commandments. But in the state of corrupted nature man cannot fulfill all the Divine commandments without healing grace. Second, the commandments of the law can be fulfilled, not merely as regards the substance of the act, but also as regards the mode of acting, i.e., their being done out of charity. And in this way, neither in the state of perfect nature, nor in the state of corrupt nature can man fulfill the commandments of the law without grace. Hence, Augustine (De Corrupt. et Grat. ii) having stated that without grace men can do no good whatever, adds: Not only do they know by its light what to do, but by its help they do lovingly what they know. Beyond this, in both states they need the help of God’s motion in order to fulfill the commandments, as stated above (AA2,3). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Spir. et Litt., non moveat quod naturaliter eos dixit quae legis sunt facere, hoc enim agit spiritus gratiae, ut imaginem Dei, in qua naturaliter facti sumus, instauret in nobis. Reply Obj. 1: As Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xxvii), do not be disturbed at his saying that they do by nature those things that are of the Law; for the Spirit of grace works this, in order to restore in us the image of God, after which we were naturally made. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod possumus cum auxilio divino, non est nobis omnino impossibile; secundum illud philosophi, in III Ethic., quae per amicos possumus, aliqualiter per nos possumus. Unde et Hieronymus ibidem confitetur sic nostrum liberum esse arbitrium, ut dicamus nos semper indigere Dei auxilio. Reply Obj. 2: What we can do with the Divine assistance is not altogether impossible to us; according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 3): What we can do through our friends, we can do, in some sense, by ourselves. Hence Jerome concedes that our will is in such a way free that we must confess we still require God’s help. Ad tertium dicendum quod praeceptum de dilectione Dei non potest homo implere ex puris naturalibus secundum quod ex caritate impletur, ut ex supradictis patet. Reply Obj. 3: Man cannot, with his purely natural endowments, fulfill the precept of the love of God according as it is fulfilled by charity, as stated above (A3). Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum homo possit mereri vitam aeternam sine gratia Whether man can merit everlasting life without grace? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit mereri vitam aeternam sine gratia. Dicit enim dominus, Matth. XIX, si vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata, ex quo videtur quod ingredi in vitam aeternam sit constitutum in hominis voluntate. Sed id quod in nostra voluntate constitutum est, per nos ipsos possumus. Ergo videtur quod homo per seipsum possit vitam aeternam mereri. Objection 1: It would seem that man can merit everlasting life without grace. For Our Lord says (Matt 19:17): If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments; from which it would seem that to enter into everlasting life rests with man’s will. But what rests with our will, we can do of ourselves. Hence it seems that man can merit everlasting life of himself. Praeterea, vita aeterna est praemium vel merces quae hominibus redditur a Deo; secundum illud Matth. V, merces vestra multa est in caelis. Sed merces vel praemium redditur a Deo homini secundum opera eius; secundum illud Psalmi LXI, tu reddes unicuique secundum opera eius. Cum igitur homo sit dominus suorum operum, videtur quod in eius potestate constitutum sit ad vitam aeternam pervenire. Obj. 2: Further, eternal life is the wage of reward bestowed by God on men, according to Mt. 5:12: Your reward is very great in heaven. But wage or reward is meted by God to everyone according to his works, according to Ps. 61:12: Thou wilt render to every man according to his works. Hence, since man is master of his works, it seems that it is within his power to reach everlasting life. Praeterea, vita aeterna est ultimus finis humanae vitae. Sed quaelibet res naturalis per sua naturalia potest consequi finem suum. Ergo multo magis homo, qui est altioris naturae, per sua naturalia potest pervenire ad vitam aeternam absque aliqua gratia. Obj. 3: Further, everlasting life is the last end of human life. Now every natural thing by its natural endowments can attain its end. Much more, therefore, may man, who is of a higher nature, attain to life everlasting by his natural endowments, without grace. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Rom. VI, gratia Dei vita aeterna. Quod ideo dicitur, sicut Glossa ibidem dicit, ut intelligeremus Deum ad aeternam vitam pro sua miseratione nos perducere. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Rom 6:23): The grace of God is life everlasting. And as a gloss says, this is said that we may understand that God, of His own mercy, leads us to everlasting life. Respondeo dicendum quod actus perducentes ad finem oportet esse fini proportionatos. Nullus autem actus excedit proportionem principii activi. Et ideo videmus in rebus naturalibus quod nulla res potest perficere effectum per suam operationem qui excedat virtutem activam, sed solum potest producere per operationem suam effectum suae virtuti proportionatum. Vita autem aeterna est finis excedens proportionem naturae humanae, ut ex supradictis patet. Et ideo homo per sua naturalia non potest producere opera meritoria proportionata vitae aeternae, sed ad hoc exigitur altior virtus, quae est virtus gratiae. Et ideo sine gratia homo non potest mereri vitam aeternam. Potest tamen facere opera perducentia ad aliquod bonum homini connaturale, sicut laborare in agro, bibere, manducare, et habere amicum, et alia huiusmodi; ut Augustinus dicit, in tertia responsione contra Pelagianos. I answer that, Acts conducing to an end must be proportioned to the end. But no act exceeds the proportion of its active principle; and hence we see in natural things, that nothing can by its operation bring about an effect which exceeds its active force, but only such as is proportionate to its power. Now everlasting life is an end exceeding the proportion of human nature, as is clear from what we have said above (Q5, A5). Hence man, by his natural endowments, cannot produce meritorious works proportionate to everlasting life; and for this a higher force is needed, viz., the force of grace. And thus without grace man cannot merit everlasting life; yet he can perform works conducing to a good which is natural to man, as to toil in the fields, to drink, to eat, or to have friends, and the like, as Augustine says in his third Reply to the Pelagians. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo sua voluntate facit opera meritoria vitae aeternae, sed, sicut Augustinus in eodem libro dicit, ad hoc exigitur quod voluntas hominis praeparetur a Deo per gratiam. Reply Obj. 1: Man, by his will, does works meritorious of everlasting life; but as Augustine says, in the same book, for this it is necessary that the will of man should be prepared with grace by God. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut Glossa dicit Rom. VI, super illud, gratia Dei vita aeterna, certum est vitam aeternam bonis operibus reddi, sed ipsa opera quibus redditur, ad Dei gratiam pertinent, cum etiam supra dictum sit quod ad implendum mandata legis secundum debitum modum, per quem eorum impletio est meritoria, requiritur gratia. Reply Obj. 2: As the gloss upon Rm. 6:23, The grace of God is life everlasting, says, It is certain that everlasting life is dispensed to good works; but the works to which it is dispensed belong to God’s grace. And it has been said (A4), that to fulfill the commandments of the Law, in their due way, whereby their fulfilment may be meritorious, requires grace. Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de fine homini connaturali. Natura autem humana, ex hoc ipso quod nobilior est, potest ad altiorem finem perduci, saltem auxilio gratiae, ad quem inferiores naturae nullo modo pertingere possunt. Sicut homo est melius dispositus ad sanitatem qui aliquibus auxiliis medicinae potest sanitatem consequi, quam ille qui nullo modo; ut philosophus introducit in II de caelo. Reply Obj. 3: This objection has to do with the natural end of man. Now human nature, since it is nobler, can be raised by the help of grace to a higher end, which lower natures can nowise reach; even as a man who can recover his health by the help of medicines is better disposed to health than one who can nowise recover it, as the Philosopher observes (De Coelo ii, 12). Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum homo possit seipsum ad gratiam praeparare per seipsum, absque exteriori auxilio gratiae Whether a man, by himself and without the external aid of grace, can prepare himself for grace? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo possit seipsum ad gratiam praeparare per seipsum, absque exteriori auxilio gratiae. Nihil enim imponitur homini quod sit ei impossibile, ut supra dictum est. Sed Zach. I dicitur, convertimini ad me, et ego convertar ad vos, nihil autem est aliud se ad gratiam praeparare quam ad Deum converti. Ergo videtur quod homo per seipsum possit se ad gratiam praeparare absque auxilio gratiae. Objection 1: It would seem that man, by himself and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. For nothing impossible is laid upon man, as stated above (A4, ad 1). But it is written (Zech 1:3): Turn ye to Me . . . and I will turn to you. Now to prepare for grace is nothing more than to turn to God. Therefore it seems that man of himself, and without the external help of grace, can prepare himself for grace. Praeterea, homo se ad gratiam praeparat faciendo quod in se est, quia si homo facit quod in se est, Deus ei non denegat gratiam; dicitur enim Matth. VII, quod Deus dat spiritum bonum petentibus se. Sed illud in nobis esse dicitur quod est in nostra potestate. Ergo videtur quod in nostra potestate sit constitutum ut nos ad gratiam praeparemus. Obj. 2: Further, man prepares himself for grace by doing what is in him to do, since if man does what is in him to do, God will not deny him grace, for it is written (Matt 7:11) that God gives His good Spirit to them that ask Him. But what is in our power is in us to do. Therefore it seems to be in our power to prepare ourselves for grace. Praeterea, si homo indiget gratia ad hoc quod praeparet se ad gratiam, pari ratione indigebit gratia ad hoc quod praeparet se ad illam gratiam, et sic procederetur in infinitum, quod est inconveniens. Ergo videtur standum in primo, ut scilicet homo sine gratia possit se ad gratiam praeparare. Obj. 3: Further, if a man needs grace in order to prepare for grace, with equal reason will he need grace to prepare himself for the first grace; and thus to infinity, which is impossible. Hence it seems that we must not go beyond what was said first, viz., that man, of himself and without grace, can prepare himself for grace. Praeterea, Prov. XVI dicitur, hominis est praeparare animum. Sed illud dicitur esse hominis quod per seipsum potest. Ergo videtur quod homo per seipsum se possit ad gratiam praeparare. Obj. 4: Further, it is written (Prov 16:1) that it is the part of man to prepare the soul. Now an action is said to be part of a man, when he can do it by himself. Hence it seems that man by himself can prepare himself for grace.