Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum gratia sit qualitas animae Whether grace is a quality of the soul? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia non sit qualitas animae. Nulla enim qualitas agit in suum subiectum, quia actio qualitatis non est absque actione subiecti, et sic oporteret quod subiectum ageret in seipsum. Sed gratia agit in animam, iustificando ipsam. Ergo gratia non est qualitas. Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not a quality of the soul. For no quality acts on its subject, since the action of a quality is not without the action of its subject, and thus the subject would necessarily act upon itself. But grace acts upon the soul, by justifying it. Therefore grace is not a quality. Praeterea, substantia est nobilior qualitate. Sed gratia est nobilior quam natura animae, multa enim possumus per gratiam ad quae natura non sufficit, ut supra dictum est. Ergo gratia non est qualitas. Obj. 2: Furthermore, substance is nobler than quality. But grace is nobler than the nature of the soul, since we can do many things by grace, to which nature is not equal, as stated above (Q109, AA1,2,3). Therefore grace is not a quality. Praeterea, nulla qualitas remanet postquam desinit esse in subiecto. Sed gratia remanet. Non enim corrumpitur, quia sic in nihilum redigeretur, sicut ex nihilo creatur, unde et dicitur nova creatura, ad Gal. ult. Ergo gratia non est qualitas. Obj. 3: Furthermore, no quality remains after it has ceased to be in its subject. But grace remains; since it is not corrupted, for thus it would be reduced to nothing, since it was created from nothing; hence it is called a new creature (Gal 6:15). Sed contra est quod, super illud Psalmi CIII, ut exhilaret faciem in oleo, dicit Glossa quod gratia est nitor animae, sanctum concilians amorem. Sed nitor animae est quaedam qualitas, sicut et pulchritudo corporis. Ergo gratia est quaedam qualitas. On the contrary, on Ps. 103:15: That he may make the face cheerful with oil; the gloss says: Grace is a certain beauty of soul, which wins the Divine love. But beauty of soul is a quality, even as beauty of body. Therefore grace is a quality. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, in eo qui dicitur gratiam Dei habere, significatur esse quidam effectus gratuitae Dei voluntatis. Dictum est autem supra quod dupliciter ex gratuita Dei voluntate homo adiuvatur. Uno modo, inquantum anima hominis movetur a Deo ad aliquid cognoscendum vel volendum vel agendum. Et hoc modo ipse gratuitus effectus in homine non est qualitas, sed motus quidam animae, actus enim moventis in moto est motus, ut dicitur in III Physic. Alio modo adiuvatur homo ex gratuita Dei voluntate, secundum quod aliquod habituale donum a Deo animae infunditur. Et hoc ideo, quia non est conveniens quod Deus minus provideat his quos diligit ad supernaturale bonum habendum, quam creaturis quas diligit ad bonum naturale habendum. Creaturis autem naturalibus sic providet ut non solum moveat eas ad actus naturales, sed etiam largiatur eis formas et virtutes quasdam, quae sunt principia actuum, ut secundum seipsas inclinentur ad huiusmodi motus. Et sic motus quibus a Deo moventur, fiunt creaturis connaturales et faciles; secundum illud Sap. VIII, et disponit omnia suaviter. Multo igitur magis illis quos movet ad consequendum bonum supernaturale aeternum, infundit aliquas formas seu qualitates supernaturales, secundum quas suaviter et prompte ab ipso moveantur ad bonum aeternum consequendum. Et sic donum gratiae qualitas quaedam est. I answer that, As stated above (A1), there is understood to be an effect of God’s gratuitous will in whoever is said to have God’s grace. Now it was stated (Q109, A1) that man is aided by God’s gratuitous will in two ways: first, inasmuch as man’s soul is moved by God to know or will or do something, and in this way the gratuitous effect in man is not a quality, but a movement of the soul; for motion is the act of the mover in the moved. Second, man is helped by God’s gratuitous will, inasmuch as a habitual gift is infused by God into the soul; and for this reason, that it is not fitting that God should provide less for those He loves, that they may acquire supernatural good, than for creatures, whom He loves that they may acquire natural good. Now He so provides for natural creatures, that not merely does He move them to their natural acts, but He bestows upon them certain forms and powers, which are the principles of acts, in order that they may of themselves be inclined to these movements, and thus the movements whereby they are moved by God become natural and easy to creatures, according to Wis. 8:1: she . . . ordereth all things sweetly. Much more therefore does He infuse into such as He moves towards the acquisition of supernatural good, certain forms or supernatural qualities, whereby they may be moved by Him sweetly and promptly to acquire eternal good; and thus the gift of grace is a quality. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gratia, secundum quod est qualitas, dicitur agere in animam non per modum causae efficientis, sed per modum causae formalis, sicut albedo facit album, et iustitia iustum. Reply Obj. 1: Grace, as a quality, is said to act upon the soul, not after the manner of an efficient cause, but after the manner of a formal cause, as whiteness makes a thing white, and justice, just. Ad secundum dicendum quod omnis substantia vel est ipsa natura rei cuius est substantia, vel est pars naturae, secundum quem modum materia vel forma substantia dicitur. Et quia gratia est supra naturam humanam, non potest esse quod sit substantia aut forma substantialis, sed est forma accidentalis ipsius animae. Id enim quod substantialiter est in Deo, accidentaliter fit in anima participante divinam bonitatem, ut de scientia patet. Secundum hoc ergo, quia anima imperfecte participat divinam bonitatem, ipsa participatio divinae bonitatis quae est gratia, imperfectiori modo habet esse in anima quam anima in seipsa subsistat. Est tamen nobilior quam natura animae, inquantum est expressio vel participatio divinae bonitatis, non autem quantum ad modum essendi. Reply Obj. 2: Every substance is either the nature of the thing whereof it is the substance or is a part of the nature, even as matter and form are called substance. And because grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but is an accidental form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God, becomes accidental in the soul participating the Divine goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. And thus because the soul participates in the Divine goodness imperfectly, the participation of the Divine goodness, which is grace, has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it is the expression or participation of the Divine goodness, it is nobler than the nature of the soul, though not in its mode of being. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicit Boetius, accidentis esse est inesse. Unde omne accidens non dicitur ens quasi ipsum esse habeat, sed quia eo aliquid est, unde et magis dicitur esse entis quam ens, ut dicitur in VII Metaphys. Et quia eius est fieri vel corrumpi cuius est esse, ideo, proprie loquendo, nullum accidens neque fit neque corrumpitur, sed dicitur fieri vel corrumpi, secundum quod subiectum incipit vel desinit esse in actu secundum illud accidens. Et secundum hoc etiam gratia dicitur creari, ex eo quod homines secundum ipsam creantur, idest in novo esse constituuntur, ex nihilo, idest non ex meritis; secundum illud ad Ephes. II, creati in Christo Iesu in operibus bonis. Reply Obj. 3: As Boethius says, the being of an accident is to inhere. Hence no accident is called being as if it had being, but because by it something is; hence it is said to belong to a being rather to be a being (Metaph. vii, text. 2). And because to become and to be corrupted belong to what is, properly speaking, no accident comes into being or is corrupted, but is said to come into being and to be corrupted inasmuch as its subject begins or ceases to be in act with this accident. And thus grace is said to be created inasmuch as men are created with reference to it, i.e., are given a new being out of nothing, i.e., not from merits, according to Eph. 2:10, created in Jesus Christ in good works. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum gratia sit idem quod virtus Whether grace is the same as virtue? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia sit idem quod virtus. Dicit enim Augustinus quod gratia operans est fides quae per dilectionem operatur; ut habetur in libro de spiritu et littera. Sed fides quae per dilectionem operatur, est virtus. Ergo gratia est virtus. Objection 1: It would seem that grace is the same as virtue. For Augustine says (De Spir. et Lit. xiv) that operating grace is faith that worketh by charity. But faith that worketh by charity is a virtue. Therefore grace is a virtue. Praeterea, cuicumque convenit definitio, et definitum. Sed definitiones de virtute datae sive a sanctis sive a philosophis, conveniunt gratiae, ipsa enim bonum facit habentem et opus eius bonum reddit; ipsa etiam est bona qualitas mentis qua recte vivitur, et cetera. Ergo gratia est virtus. Obj. 2: Further, what fits the definition, fits the defined. But the definitions of virtue given by saints and philosophers fit grace, since it makes its subject good, and his work good, and it is a good quality of the mind, whereby we live righteously, etc. Therefore grace is virtue. Praeterea, gratia est qualitas quaedam. Sed manifestum est quod non est in quarta specie qualitatis, quae est forma et circa aliquid constans figura, quia non pertinet ad corpus. Neque etiam in tertia est, quia non est passio vel passibilis qualitas, quae est in parte animae sensitiva, ut probatur in VII Physic.; ipsa autem gratia principaliter est in mente. Neque iterum est in secunda specie, quae est potentia vel impotentia naturalis, quia gratia est supra naturam; et non se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut potentia naturalis. Ergo relinquitur quod sit in prima specie, quae est habitus vel dispositio. Habitus autem mentis sunt virtutes, quia etiam ipsa scientia quodammodo est virtus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo gratia est idem quod virtus. Obj. 3: Further, grace is a quality. Now it is clearly not in the fourth species of quality; viz., form which is the abiding figure of things, since it does not belong to bodies. Nor is it in the third, since it is not a passion nor a passion-like quality, which is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physic. viii; and grace is principally in the mind. Nor is it in the second species, which is natural power or impotence; since grace is above nature and does not regard good and evil, as does natural power. Therefore it must be in the first species which is habit or disposition. Now habits of the mind are virtues; since even knowledge itself is a virtue after a manner, as stated above (Q57, AA1,2). Therefore grace is the same as virtue. Sed contra, si gratia est virtus, maxime videtur quod sit aliqua trium theologicarum virtutum. Sed gratia non est fides vel spes, quia haec possunt esse sine gratia gratum faciente. Neque etiam caritas, quia gratia praevenit caritatem, ut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Praedest. sanctorum. Ergo gratia non est virtus. On the contrary, If grace is a virtue, it would seem before all to be one of the three theological virtues. But grace is neither faith nor hope, for these can be without sanctifying grace. Nor is it charity, since grace foreruns charity, as Augustine says in his book on the Predestination of the Saints (De Dono Persev. xvi). Therefore grace is not virtue. Respondeo dicendum quod quidam posuerunt idem esse gratiam et virtutem secundum essentiam, sed differre solum secundum rationem, ut gratia dicatur secundum quod facit hominem Deo gratum, vel secundum quod gratis datur; virtus autem, secundum quod perficit ad bene operandum. Et hoc videtur sensisse Magister, in II Sent. I answer that, Some held that grace and virtue were identical in essence, and differed only logically—in the sense that we speak of grace inasmuch as it makes man pleasing to God, or is given gratuitously—and of virtue inasmuch as it empowers us to act rightly. And the Master seems to have thought this (Sent. ii, D 27). Sed si quis recte consideret rationem virtutis, hoc stare non potest. Quia ut philosophus dicit, in VII Physic., virtus est quaedam dispositio perfecti, dico autem perfectum, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Ex quo patet quod virtus uniuscuiusque rei dicitur in ordine ad aliquam naturam praeexistentem, quando scilicet unumquodque sic est dispositum, secundum quod congruit suae naturae. Manifestum est autem quod virtutes acquisitae per actus humanos, de quibus supra dictum est, sunt dispositiones quibus homo convenienter disponitur in ordine ad naturam qua homo est. Virtutes autem infusae disponunt hominem altiori modo, et ad altiorem finem, unde etiam oportet quod in ordine ad aliquam altiorem naturam. Hoc autem est in ordine ad naturam divinam participatam; secundum quod dicitur II Petr. I, maxima et pretiosa nobis promissa donavit, ut per haec efficiamini divinae consortes naturae. Et secundum acceptionem huius naturae, dicimur regenerari in filios Dei. But if anyone rightly considers the nature of virtue, this cannot hold, since, as the Philosopher says (Physic. vii, text. 17), virtue is disposition of what is perfect—and I call perfect what is disposed according to its nature. Now from this it is clear that the virtue of a thing has reference to some pre-existing nature, from the fact that everything is disposed with reference to what befits its nature. But it is manifest that the virtues acquired by human acts of which we spoke above (Q55, seqq.) are dispositions, whereby a man is fittingly disposed with reference to the nature whereby he is a man; whereas infused virtues dispose man in a higher manner and towards a higher end, and consequently in relation to some higher nature, i.e., in relation to a participation of the Divine Nature, according to 2 Pt. 1:4: He hath given us most great and most precious promises; that by these you may be made partakers of the Divine Nature. And it is in respect of receiving this nature that we are said to be born again sons of God. Sicut igitur lumen naturale rationis est aliquid praeter virtutes acquisitas, quae dicuntur in ordine ad ipsum lumen naturale; ita etiam ipsum lumen gratiae, quod est participatio divinae naturae, est aliquid praeter virtutes infusas, quae a lumine illo derivantur, et ad illud lumen ordinantur. Unde et apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, eratis aliquando tenebrae, nunc autem lux in domino, ut filii lucis ambulate. Sicut enim virtutes acquisitae perficiunt hominem ad ambulandum congruenter lumini naturali rationis; ita virtutes infusae perficiunt hominem ad ambulandum congruenter lumini gratiae. And thus, even as the natural light of reason is something besides the acquired virtues, which are ordained to this natural light, so also the light of grace which is a participation of the Divine Nature is something besides the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to this light, hence the Apostle says (Eph 5:8): For you were heretofore darkness, but now light in the Lord. Walk then as children of the light. For as the acquired virtues enable a man to walk, in accordance with the natural light of reason, so do the infused virtues enable a man to walk as befits the light of grace. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus nominat fidem per dilectionem operantem gratiam, quia actus fidei per dilectionem operantis est primus actus in quo gratia gratum faciens manifestatur. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine calls faith that worketh by charity grace, since the act of faith of him that worketh by charity is the first act by which sanctifying grace is manifested. Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum positum in definitione virtutis, dicitur secundum convenientiam ad aliquam naturam praeexistentem, vel essentialem vel participatam. Sic autem bonum non attribuitur gratiae, sed sicut radici bonitatis in homine, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: Good is placed in the definition of virtue with reference to its fitness with some pre-existing nature essential or participated. Now good is not attributed to grace in this manner, but as to the root of goodness in man, as stated above. Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia reducitur ad primam speciem qualitatis. Nec tamen est idem quod virtus, sed habitudo quaedam quae praesupponitur virtutibus infusis, sicut earum principium et radix. Reply Obj. 3: Grace is reduced to the first species of quality; and yet it is not the same as virtue, but is a certain disposition which is presupposed to the infused virtues, as their principle and root. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum gratia sit in essentia animae sicut in subiecto, sed in aliqua potentiarum Whether grace is in the essence of the soul as in a subject, or in one of the powers? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod gratia non sit in essentia animae sicut in subiecto, sed in aliqua potentiarum. Dicit enim Augustinus, in Hypognost., quod gratia comparatur ad voluntatem, sive ad liberum arbitrium, sicut sessor ad equum. Sed voluntas, sive liberum arbitrium, est potentia quaedam, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo gratia est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Objection 1: It would seem that grace is not in the essence of the soul, as in a subject, but in one of the powers. For Augustine says (Hypognosticon iii) that grace is related to the will or to the free will as a rider to his horse. Now the will or the free will is a power, as stated above (FP, Q83, A2). Hence grace is in a power of the soul, as in a subject. Praeterea, ex gratia incipiunt merita hominis, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed meritum consistit in actu, qui ex aliqua potentia procedit. Ergo videtur quod gratia sit perfectio alicuius potentiae animae. Obj. 2: Further, Man’s merit springs from grace as Augustine says (De Gratia et Lib. Arbit. vi). Now merit consists in acts, which proceed from a power. Hence it seems that grace is a perfection of a power of the soul. Praeterea, si essentia animae sit proprium subiectum gratiae, oportet quod anima inquantum habet essentiam, sit capax gratiae. Sed hoc est falsum, quia sic sequeretur quod omnis anima esset gratiae capax. Non ergo essentia animae est proprium subiectum gratiae. Obj. 3: Further, if the essence of the soul is the proper subject of grace, the soul, inasmuch as it has an essence, must be capable of grace. But this is false; since it would follow that every soul would be capable of grace. Therefore the essence of the soul is not the proper subject of grace. Praeterea, essentia animae est prior potentiis eius. Prius autem potest intelligi sine posteriori. Ergo sequetur quod gratia possit intelligi in anima, nulla parte vel potentia animae intellecta, scilicet neque voluntate neque intellectu neque aliquo huiusmodi. Quod est inconveniens. Obj. 4: Further, the essence of the soul is prior to its powers. Now what is prior may be understood without what is posterior. Hence it follows that grace may be taken to be in the soul, although we suppose no part or power of the soul—viz., neither the will, nor the intellect, nor anything else; which is impossible. Sed contra est quod per gratiam regeneramur in filios Dei. Sed generatio per prius terminatur ad essentiam quam ad potentias. Ergo gratia per prius est in essentia animae quam in potentiis. On the contrary, By grace we are born again sons of God. But generation terminates at the essence prior to the powers. Therefore grace is in the soul’s essence prior to being in the powers. Respondeo dicendum quod ista quaestio ex praecedenti dependet. Si enim gratia sit idem quod virtus, necesse est quod sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto, nam potentia animae est proprium subiectum virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Si autem gratia differt a virtute, non potest dici quod potentia animae sit gratiae subiectum, quia omnis perfectio potentiae animae habet rationem virtutis, ut supra dictum est. Unde relinquitur quod gratia, sicut est prius virtute, ita habeat subiectum prius potentiis animae, ita scilicet quod sit in essentia animae. Sicut enim per potentiam intellectivam homo participat cognitionem divinam per virtutem fidei; et secundum potentiam voluntatis amorem divinum, per virtutem caritatis; ita etiam per naturam animae participat, secundum quandam similitudinem, naturam divinam, per quandam regenerationem sive recreationem. I answer that, This question depends on the preceding. For if grace is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul as in a subject; since the soul’s powers are the proper subject of virtue, as stated above (Q56, A1). But if grace differs from virtue, it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace, since every perfection of the soul’s powers has the nature of virtue, as stated above (Q55, A1; Q56, A1). Hence it remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul. For as man in his intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in the Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut ab essentia animae effluunt eius potentiae, quae sunt operum principia; ita etiam ab ipsa gratia effluunt virtutes in potentias animae, per quas potentiae moventur ad actus. Et secundum hoc gratia comparatur ad voluntatem ut movens ad motum, quae est comparatio sessoris ad equum, non autem sicut accidens ad subiectum. Reply Obj. 1: As from the essence of the soul flows its powers, which are the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues, whereby the powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace. And thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse—but not as an accident to a subject. Et per hoc etiam patet solutio ad secundum. Est enim gratia principium meritorii operis mediantibus virtutibus, sicut essentia animae est principium operum vitae mediantibus potentiis. And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection. For grace is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of virtues, as the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds through the medium of the powers. Ad tertium dicendum quod anima est subiectum gratiae secundum quod est in specie intellectualis vel rationalis naturae. Non autem constituitur anima in specie per aliquam potentiam, cum potentiae sint proprietates naturales animae speciem consequentes. Et ideo anima secundum suam essentiam differt specie ab aliis animabus, scilicet brutorum animalium et plantarum. Et propter hoc, non sequitur, si essentia animae humanae sit subiectum gratiae, quod quaelibet anima possit esse gratiae subiectum, hoc enim convenit essentiae animae inquantum est talis speciei. Reply Obj. 3: The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the species of intellectual or rational nature. But the soul is not classed in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are natural properties of the soul following upon the species. Hence the soul differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz., of dumb animals, and of plants. Consequently it does not follow that, if the essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may be the subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul, inasmuch as it is of such a species. Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum potentiae animae sint naturales proprietates speciem consequentes, anima non potest sine his esse. Dato autem quod sine his esset, adhuc tamen anima diceretur secundum speciem suam intellectualis vel rationalis, non quia actu haberet has potentias; sed propter speciem talis essentiae ex qua natae sunt huiusmodi potentiae effluere. Reply Obj. 4: Since the powers of the soul are natural properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them. Yet, granted that it was without them, the soul would still be called intellectual or rational in its species, not that it would actually have these powers, but on account of the essence of such a species, from which these powers naturally flow. Quaestio 111 Question 111 De divisione gratiae Of the Division of Grace