Articulus 10 Article 10 Utrum iustificatio impii sit opus miraculosum Whether the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustificatio impii sit opus miraculosum. Opera enim miraculosa sunt maiora non miraculosis. Sed iustificatio impii est maius opus quam alia opera miraculosa; ut patet per Augustinum in auctoritate inducta. Ergo iustificatio impii est opus miraculosum. Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous. Now the justification of the ungodly is greater than the other miraculous works, as is clear from the quotation from Augustine (A9). Hence the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work. Praeterea, motus voluntatis ita est in anima, sicut inclinatio naturalis in rebus naturalibus. Sed quando Deus aliquid operatur in rebus naturalibus contra inclinationem naturae, est opus miraculosum, sicut cum illuminat caecum, vel suscitat mortuum. Voluntas autem impii tendit in malum. Cum igitur Deus, iustificando hominem, moveat eum in bonum, videtur quod iustificatio impii sit miraculosa. Obj. 2: Further, the movement of the will in the soul is like the natural inclination in natural things. But when God works in natural things against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous work, as when He gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the will of the ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in justifying a man moves him to good, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly is miraculous. Praeterea, sicut sapientia est donum Dei, ita et iustitia. Sed miraculosum est quod aliquis subito sine studio sapientiam assequatur a Deo. Ergo miraculosum est quod aliquis impius iustificetur a Deo. Obj. 3: Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice. Now it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God without study. Therefore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be justified by God. Sed contra, opera miraculosa sunt supra potentiam naturalem. Sed iustificatio impii non est supra potentiam naturalem, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., quod posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere caritatem, naturae est hominum, habere autem gratiae est fidelium. Ergo iustificatio impii non est miraculosa. On the contrary, Miraculous works are beyond natural power. Now the justification of the ungodly is not beyond natural power; for Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. v) that to be capable of having faith and to be capable of having charity belongs to man’s nature; but to have faith and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful. Therefore the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous. Respondeo dicendum quod in operibus miraculosis tria consueverunt inveniri. Quorum unum est ex parte potentiae agentis, quia sola divina virtute fieri possunt. Et ideo sunt simpliciter mira, quasi habentia causam occultam, ut in primo dictum est. Et secundum hoc, tam iustificatio impii quam creatio mundi, et universaliter omne opus quod a solo Deo fieri potest, miraculosum dici potest. I answer that, In miraculous works it is usual to find three things: the first is on the part of the active power, because they can only be performed by Divine power; and they are simply wondrous, since their cause is hidden, as stated above (I, Q105, A7). And thus both the justification of the ungodly and the creation of the world, and, generally speaking, every work that can be done by God alone, is miraculous. Secundo, in quibusdam miraculosis operibus invenitur quod forma inducta est supra naturalem potentiam talis materiae, sicut in suscitatione mortui vita est supra naturalem potentiam talis corporis. Et quantum ad hoc, iustificatio impii non est miraculosa, quia naturaliter anima est gratiae capax; eo enim ipso quod facta est ad imaginem Dei, capax est Dei per gratiam, ut Augustinus dicit. Second, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form introduced is beyond the natural power of such matter, as in the resurrection of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a body. And thus the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous, because the soul is naturally capable of grace; since from its having been made to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace, as Augustine says, in the above quotation. Tertio modo, in operibus miraculosis invenitur aliquid praeter solitum et consuetum ordinem causandi effectum, sicut cum aliquis infirmus sanitatem perfectam assequitur subito, praeter solitum cursum sanationis quae fit a natura vel arte. Et quantum ad hoc, iustificatio impii quandoque est miraculosa, et quandoque non. Est enim iste consuetus et communis cursus iustificationis, ut, Deo movente interius animam, homo convertatur ad Deum, primo quidem conversione imperfecta, et postmodum ad perfectam deveniat, quia caritas inchoata meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur perfici, sicut Augustinus dicit. Quandoque vero tam vehementer Deus animam movet ut statim quandam perfectionem iustitiae assequatur, sicut fuit in conversione Pauli, adhibita etiam exterius miraculosa prostratione. Et ideo conversio Pauli, tanquam miraculosa, in Ecclesia commemoratur celebriter. Third, in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and customary order of causing an effect, as when a sick man suddenly and beyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art, receives perfect health; and thus the justification of the ungodly is sometimes miraculous and sometimes not. For the common and wonted course of justification is that God moves the soul interiorly and that man is converted to God, first by an imperfect conversion, that it may afterwards become perfect; because charity begun merits increase, and when increased merits perfection, as Augustine says (In Epist. Joan. Tract. v). Yet God sometimes moves the soul so vehemently that it reaches the perfection of justice at once, as took place in the conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same time by a miraculous external prostration. Hence the conversion of Paul is commemorated in the Church as miraculous. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quaedam miraculosa opera, etsi sint minora quam iustificatio impii quantum ad bonum quod fit, sunt tamen praeter consuetum ordinem talium effectuum. Et ideo plus habent de ratione miraculi. Reply Obj. 1: Certain miraculous works, although they are less than the justification of the ungodly, as regards the good caused, are beyond the wonted order of such effects, and thus have more of the nature of a miracle. Ad secundum dicendum quod non quandocumque res naturalis movetur contra suam inclinationem, est opus miraculosum, alioquin miraculosum esset quod aqua calefieret, vel quod lapis sursum proiiceretur, sed quando hoc fit praeter ordinem propriae causae, quae nata est hoc facere. Iustificare autem impium nulla alia causa potest nisi Deus, sicut nec aquam calefacere nisi ignis. Et ideo iustificatio impii a Deo, quantum ad hoc, non est miraculosa. Reply Obj. 2: It is not a miraculous work, whenever a natural thing is moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise it would be miraculous for water to be heated, or for a stone to be thrown upwards; but only whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save God can justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can heat water. Hence the justification of the ungodly by God is not miraculous in this respect. Ad tertium dicendum quod sapientiam et scientiam homo natus est acquirere a Deo per proprium ingenium et studium, et ideo quando praeter hunc modum homo sapiens vel sciens efficitur, est miraculosum. Sed gratiam iustificantem non est homo natus acquirere per suam operationem, sed Deo operante. Unde non est simile. Reply Obj. 3: A man naturally acquires wisdom and knowledge from God by his own talent and study. Hence it is miraculous when a man is made wise or learned outside this order. But a man does not naturally acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God’s. Hence there is no parity. Quaestio 114 Question 114 De merito Of Merit Deinde considerandum est de merito, quod est effectus gratiae cooperantis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. We must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: Primo, utrum homo possit aliquid mereri a Deo. (1) Whether a man can merit anything from God? Secundo, utrum aliquis sine gratia possit mereri vitam aeternam. (2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life? Tertio, utrum aliquis per gratiam possit mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno. (3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly? Quarto, utrum gratia sit principium merendi mediante caritate principaliter. (4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that grace is the principle of merit? Quinto, utrum homo possit sibi mereri primam gratiam. (5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself? Sexto, utrum homo possit eam mereri alii. (6) Whether he may merit it for someone else? Septimo, utrum possit sibi aliquis mereri reparationem post lapsum. (7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin? Octavo, utrum possit sibi mereri augmentum gratiae vel caritatis. (8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity? Nono, utrum possit sibi mereri finalem perseverantiam. (9) Whether he can merit final perseverance? Decimo, utrum bona temporalia cadant sub merito. (10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum homo possit aliquid mereri a Deo Whether a man may merit anything from God? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit aliquid mereri a Deo. Nullus enim videtur mercedem mereri ex hoc quod reddit alteri quod debet. Sed per omnia bona quae facimus, non possumus sufficienter recompensare Deo quod debemus, quin semper amplius debeamus; ut etiam philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Unde et Luc. XVII, dicitur, cum omnia quae praecepta sunt, feceritis, dicite, servi inutiles sumus, quod debuimus facere, fecimus. Ergo homo non potest aliquid mereri a Deo. Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For no one, it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by all the good we do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet more is His due, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14). Hence it is written (Luke 17:10): When you have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do. Therefore a man can merit nothing from God. Praeterea, ex eo quod aliquis sibi proficit, nihil videtur mereri apud eum cui nihil proficit. Sed homo bene operando sibi proficit, vel alteri homini, non autem Deo, dicitur enim Iob XXXV, si iuste egeris, quid donabis ei, aut quid de manu tua accipiet? Ergo homo non potest aliquid a Deo mereri. Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God, by what profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by acting well, a man profits himself or another man, but not God, for it is written (Job 35:7): If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or what shall He receive of thy hand. Hence a man can merit nothing from God. Praeterea, quicumque apud aliquem aliquid meretur, constituit eum sibi debitorem, debitum enim est ut aliquis merendi mercedem rependat. Sed Deus nulli est debitor, unde dicitur Rom. XI, quis prior dedit ei, et retribuetur ei? Ergo nullus a Deo potest aliquid mereri. Obj. 3: Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him his debtor; for a man’s wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one’s debtor; hence it is written (Rom 11:35): Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him? Hence no one can merit anything from God. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XXXI, est merces operi tuo. Sed merces dicitur quod pro merito redditur. Ergo videtur quod homo possit a Deo mereri. On the contrary, It is written (Jer 31:16): There is a reward for thy work. Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit. Hence it would seem that a man may merit from God. Respondeo dicendum quod meritum et merces ad idem referuntur, id enim merces dicitur quod alicui recompensatur pro retributione operis vel laboris, quasi quoddam pretium ipsius. Unde sicut reddere iustum pretium pro re accepta ab aliquo, est actus iustitiae; ita etiam recompensare mercedem operis vel laboris, est actus iustitiae. Iustitia autem aequalitas quaedam est; ut patet per philosophum, in V Ethic. Et ideo simpliciter est iustitia inter eos quorum est simpliciter aequalitas, eorum vero quorum non est simpliciter aequalitas, non est simpliciter iustitia, sed quidam iustitiae modus potest esse, sicut dicitur quoddam ius paternum vel dominativum, ut in eodem libro philosophus dicit. Et propter hoc, in his in quibus est simpliciter iustum, est etiam simpliciter ratio meriti et mercedis. In quibus autem est secundum quid iustum, et non simpliciter, in his etiam non simpliciter est ratio meriti, sed secundum quid, inquantum salvatur ibi iustitiae ratio, sic enim et filius meretur aliquid a patre, et servus a domino. I answer that, Merit and reward refer to the same, for a reward means something given anyone in return for work or toil, as a price for it. Hence, as it is an act of justice to give a just price for anything received from another, so also is it an act of justice to make a return for work or toil. Now justice is a kind of equality, as is clear from the Philosopher (Ethic. v, 3), and hence justice is simply between those that are simply equal; but where there is no absolute equality between them, neither is there absolute justice, but there may be a certain manner of justice, as when we speak of a father’s or a master’s right (Ethic. v, 6), as the Philosopher says. And hence where there is justice simply, there is the character of merit and reward simply. But where there is no simple right, but only relative, there is no character of merit simply, but only relatively, insofar as the character of justice is found there, since the child merits something from his father and the slave from his lord. Manifestum est autem quod inter Deum et hominem est maxima inaequalitas, in infinitum enim distant, et totum quod est hominis bonum, est a Deo. Unde non potest hominis ad Deum esse iustitia secundum absolutam aequalitatem, sed secundum proportionem quandam, inquantum scilicet uterque operatur secundum modum suum. Modus autem et mensura humanae virtutis homini est a Deo. Et ideo meritum hominis apud Deum esse non potest nisi secundum praesuppositionem divinae ordinationis, ita scilicet ut id homo consequatur a Deo per suam operationem quasi mercedem, ad quod Deus ei virtutem operandi deputavit. Sicut etiam res naturales hoc consequuntur per proprios motus et operationes, ad quod a Deo sunt ordinatae. Differenter tamen, quia creatura rationalis seipsam movet ad agendum per liberum arbitrium, unde sua actio habet rationem meriti; quod non est in aliis creaturis. Now it is clear that between God and man there is the greatest inequality: for they are infinitely apart, and all man’s good is from God. Hence there can be no justice of absolute equality between man and God, but only of a certain proportion, inasmuch as both operate after their own manner. Now the manner and measure of human virtue is in man from God. Hence man’s merit with God only exists on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, so that man obtains from God, as a reward of his operation, what God gave him the power of operation for, even as natural things by their proper movements and operations obtain that to which they were ordained by God; differently, indeed, since the rational creature moves itself to act by its free-will, hence its action has the character of merit, which is not so in other creatures. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod homo inquantum propria voluntate facit illud quod debet, meretur. Alioquin actus iustitiae quo quis reddit debitum, non esset meritorius. Reply Obj. 1: Man merits, inasmuch as he does what he ought, by his free-will; otherwise the act of justice whereby anyone discharges a debt would not be meritorious. Ad secundum dicendum quod Deus ex bonis nostris non quaerit utilitatem, sed gloriam, idest manifestationem suae bonitatis, quod etiam ex suis operibus quaerit. Ex hoc autem quod eum colimus, nihil ei accrescit, sed nobis. Et ideo meremur aliquid a Deo, non quasi ex nostris operibus aliquid ei accrescat, sed inquantum propter eius gloriam operamur. Reply Obj. 2: God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory, i.e., the manifestation of His goodness; even as He seeks it also in His own works. Now nothing accrues to Him, but only to ourselves, by our worship of Him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works anything accrues to Him, but inasmuch as we work for His glory. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia actio nostra non habet rationem meriti nisi ex praesuppositione divinae ordinationis, non sequitur quod Deus efficiatur simpliciter debitor nobis, sed sibi ipsi, inquantum debitum est ut sua ordinatio impleatur. Reply Obj. 3: Since our action has the character of merit, only on the presupposition of the Divine ordination, it does not follow that God is made our debtor simply, but His own, inasmuch as it is right that His will should be carried out.