Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum ad remissionem culpae, quae est iustificatio impii, requiratur gratiae infusio Whether the infusion of grace is required for the remission of guilt, which is the justification of the ungodly? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad remissionem culpae, quae est iustificatio impii, non requiratur gratiae infusio. Potest enim aliquis removeri ab uno contrario sine hoc quod perducatur ad alterum, si contraria sint mediata. Sed status culpae et status gratiae sunt contraria mediata, est enim medius status innocentiae, in quo homo nec gratiam habet nec culpam. Ergo potest alicui remitti culpa sine hoc quod perducatur ad gratiam. Objection 1: It would seem that for the remission of guilt, which is the justification of the ungodly, no infusion of grace is required. For anyone may be moved from one contrary without being led to the other, if the contraries are not immediate. Now the state of guilt and the state of grace are not immediate contraries; for there is the middle state of innocence wherein a man has neither grace nor guilt. Hence a man may be pardoned his guilt without his being brought to a state of grace. Praeterea, remissio culpae consistit in reputatione divina; secundum illud Psalmi XXXI, beatus vir cui non imputavit dominus peccatum. Sed infusio gratiae ponit etiam aliquid in nobis, ut supra habitum est. Ergo infusio gratiae non requiritur ad remissionem culpae. Obj. 2: Further, the remission of guilt consists in the Divine imputation, according to Ps. 31:2: Blessed is the man to whom the Lord hath not imputed sin. Now the infusion of grace puts something into our soul, as stated above (Q110, A1). Hence the infusion of grace is not required for the remission of guilt. Praeterea, nullus subiicitur simul duobus contrariis. Sed quaedam peccata sunt contraria, sicut prodigalitas et illiberalitas. Ergo qui subiicitur peccato prodigalitatis, non simul subiicitur peccato illiberalitatis. Potest tamen contingere quod prius ei subiiciebatur. Ergo peccando vitio prodigalitatis, liberatur a peccato illiberalitatis. Et sic remittitur aliquod peccatum sine gratia. Obj. 3: Further, no one can be subject to two contraries at once. Now some sins are contraries, as wastefulness and miserliness. Hence whoever is subject to the sin of wastefulness is not simultaneously subject to the sin of miserliness, yet it may happen that he has been subject to it hitherto. Hence by sinning with the vice of wastefulness he is freed from the sin of miserliness. And thus a sin is remitted without grace. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. III, iustificati gratis per gratiam ipsius. On the contrary, It is written (Rom 3:24): Justified freely by His grace. Respondeo dicendum quod homo peccando Deum offendit, sicut ex supradictis patet. Offensa autem non remittitur alicui nisi per hoc quod animus offensi pacatur offendenti. Et ideo secundum hoc peccatum nobis remitti dicitur, quod Deus nobis pacatur. Quae quidem pax consistit in dilectione qua Deus nos diligit. Dilectio autem Dei, quantum est ex parte actus divini, est aeterna et immutabilis, sed quantum ad effectum quem nobis imprimit, quandoque interrumpitur, prout scilicet ab ipso quandoque deficimus et quandoque iterum recuperamus. Effectus autem divinae dilectionis in nobis qui per peccatum tollitur, est gratia, qua homo fit dignus vita aeterna, a qua peccatum mortale excludit. Et ideo non posset intelligi remissio culpae, nisi adesset infusio gratiae. I answer that, by sinning a man offends God as stated above (Q71, A6). Now an offense is remitted to anyone, only when the soul of the offender is at peace with the offended. Hence sin is remitted to us, when God is at peace with us, and this peace consists in the love whereby God loves us. Now God’s love, considered on the part of the Divine act, is eternal and unchangeable; whereas, as regards the effect it imprints on us, it is sometimes interrupted, inasmuch as we sometimes fall short of it and once more require it. Now the effect of the Divine love in us, which is taken away by sin, is grace, whereby a man is made worthy of eternal life, from which sin shuts him out. Hence we could not conceive the remission of guilt, without the infusion of grace. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod plus requiritur ad hoc quod offendenti remittatur offensa, quam ad hoc quod simpliciter aliquis non offendens non habeatur odio. Potest enim apud homines contingere quod unus homo aliquem alium nec diligat nec odiat; sed si eum offendat, quod ei dimittat offensam, hoc non potest contingere absque speciali benevolentia. Benevolentia autem Dei ad hominem reparari dicitur per donum gratiae. Et ideo licet, antequam homo peccet, potuerit esse sine gratia et sine culpa; tamen post peccatum, non potest esse sine culpa nisi gratiam habeat. Reply Obj. 1: More is required for an offender to pardon an offense, than for one who has committed no offense, not to be hated. For it may happen amongst men that one man neither hates nor loves another. But if the other offends him, then the forgiveness of the offense can only spring from a special goodwill. Now God’s goodwill is said to be restored to man by the gift of grace; and hence although a man before sinning may be without grace and without guilt, yet that he is without guilt after sinning can only be because he has grace. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dilectio Dei non solum consistit in actu voluntatis divinae, sed etiam importat quendam gratiae effectum, ut supra dictum est; ita etiam et hoc quod est Deum non imputare peccatum homini, importat quendam effectum in ipso cuius peccatum non imputatur. Quod enim alicui non imputetur peccatum a Deo, ex divina dilectione procedit. Reply Obj. 2: As God’s love consists not merely in the act of the Divine will but also implies a certain effect of grace, as stated above (Q110, A1), so likewise, when God does not impute sin to a man, there is implied a certain effect in him to whom the sin is not imputed; for it proceeds from the Divine love, that sin is not imputed to a man by God. Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de nuptiis et Concup., si a peccato desistere, hoc esset non habere peccatum, sufficeret ut hoc moneret Scriptura, fili, peccasti, non adiicias iterum. Non autem sufficit, sed additur, et de pristinis deprecare, ut tibi remittantur. Transit enim peccatum actu, et remanet reatu, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo cum aliquis a peccato unius vitii transit in peccatum contrarii vitii, desinit quidem habere actum praeteriti, sed non desinit habere reatum, unde simul habet reatum utriusque peccati. Non enim peccata sunt sibi contraria ex parte aversionis a Deo, ex qua parte peccatum reatum habet. Reply Obj. 3: As Augustine says (De Nup. et Concup. i, 26), if to leave off sinning was the same as to have no sin, it would be enough if Scripture warned us thus: ‘My son, hast thou sinned? do so no more?’ Now this is not enough, but it is added: ‘But for thy former sins also pray that they may be forgiven thee.’ For the act of sin passes, but the guilt remains, as stated above (Q87, A6). Hence when anyone passes from the sin of one vice to the sin of a contrary vice, he ceases to have the act of the former sin, but he does not cease to have the guilt, hence he may have the guilt of both sins at once. For sins are not contrary to each other on the part of their turning from God, wherein sin has its guilt. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum ad iustificationem impii requiratur motus liberi arbitrii Whether a movement of the free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad iustificationem impii non requiratur motus liberi arbitrii. Videmus enim quod per sacramentum Baptismi iustificantur pueri absque motu liberi arbitrii, et etiam interdum adulti, dicit enim Augustinus, in IV Confess., quod cum quidam suus amicus laboraret febribus, iacuit diu sine sensu in sudore letali; et dum desperaretur, baptizatus est nesciens, et recreatus est; quod fit per gratiam iustificantem. Sed Deus potentiam suam non alligavit sacramentis. Ergo etiam potest iustificare hominem sine sacramentis absque omni motu liberi arbitrii. Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly. For we see that by the sacrament of Baptism, infants and sometimes adults are justified without a movement of their free-will: hence Augustine says (Confess. iv) that when one of his friends was taken with a fever, he lay for a long time senseless and in a deadly sweat, and when he was despaired of, he was baptized without his knowing, and was regenerated; which is effected by sanctifying grace. Now God does not confine His power to the sacraments. Hence He can justify a man without the sacraments, and without any movement of the free-will. Praeterea, in dormiendo homo non habet usum rationis, sine quo non potest esse motus liberi arbitrii. Sed Salomon in dormiendo consecutus est a Deo donum sapientiae; ut habetur III Reg. III, et II Paral. I. Ergo etiam, pari ratione, donum gratiae iustificantis quandoque datur homini a Deo absque motu liberi arbitrii. Obj. 2: Further, a man has not the use of reason when asleep, and without it there can be no movement of the free-will. But Solomon received from God the gift of wisdom when asleep, as related in 3 Kgs. 3 and 2 Paral 1. Hence with equal reason the gift of sanctifying grace is sometimes bestowed by God on man without the movement of his free-will. Praeterea, per eandem causam gratia producitur in esse et conservatur, dicit enim Augustinus, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod ita se debet homo ad Deum convertere, ut ab illo semper fiat iustus. Sed absque motu liberi arbitrii gratia in homine conservatur. Ergo absque motu liberi arbitrii potest a principio infundi. Obj. 3: Further, grace is preserved by the same cause as brings it into being, for Augustine says (Gen ad lit. viii, 12) that so ought man to turn to God as he is ever made just by Him. Now grace is preserved in man without a movement of his free-will. Hence it can be infused in the beginning without a movement of the free-will. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. VI, omnis qui audit a patre et didicit, venit ad me. Sed discere non est sine motu liberi arbitrii, addiscens enim consentit docenti. Ergo nullus venit ad Deum per gratiam iustificantem absque motu liberi arbitrii. On the contrary, It is written (John 6:45): Every one that hath heard of the Father, and hath learned, cometh to Me. Now to learn cannot be without a movement of the free-will, since the learner assents to the teacher. Hence, no one comes to the Father by justifying grace without a movement of the free-will. Respondeo dicendum quod iustificatio impii fit Deo movente hominem ad iustitiam, ipse enim est qui iustificat impium, ut dicitur Rom. IV. Deus autem movet omnia secundum modum uniuscuiusque, sicut in naturalibus videmus quod aliter moventur ab ipso gravia et aliter levia, propter diversam naturam utriusque. Unde et homines ad iustitiam movet secundum conditionem naturae humanae. Homo autem secundum propriam naturam habet quod sit liberi arbitrii. Et ideo in eo qui habet usum liberi arbitrii, non fit motio a Deo ad iustitiam absque motu liberi arbitrii; sed ita infundit donum gratiae iustificantis, quod etiam simul cum hoc movet liberum arbitrium ad donum gratiae acceptandum, in his qui sunt huius motionis capaces. I answer that, The justification of the ungodly is brought about by God moving man to justice. For He it is that justifieth the ungodly according to Rm. 4:5. Now God moves everything in its own manner, just as we see that in natural things, what is heavy and what is light are moved differently, on account of their diverse natures. Hence He moves man to justice according to the condition of his human nature. But it is man’s proper nature to have free-will. Hence in him who has the use of reason, God’s motion to justice does not take place without a movement of the free-will; but He so infuses the gift of justifying grace that at the same time He moves the free-will to accept the gift of grace, in such as are capable of being moved thus. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod pueri non sunt capaces motus liberi arbitrii, et ideo moventur a Deo ad iustitiam per solam informationem animae ipsorum. Non autem hoc fit sine sacramento, quia sicut peccatum originale, a quo iustificantur, non propria voluntate ad eos pervenit, sed per carnalem originem; ita etiam per spiritualem regenerationem a Christo in eos gratia derivatur. Et eadem ratio est de furiosis et amentibus qui nunquam usum liberi arbitrii habuerunt. Sed si quis aliquando habuerit usum liberi arbitrii, et postmodum eo careat vel per infirmitatem vel per somnum; non consequitur gratiam iustificantem per Baptismum exterius adhibitum, aut per aliquod aliud sacramentum, nisi prius habuerit sacramentum in proposito; quod sine usu liberi arbitrii non contingit. Et hoc modo ille de quo loquitur Augustinus, recreatus fuit, quia et prius et postea Baptismum acceptavit. Reply Obj. 1: Infants are not capable of the movement of their free-will; hence it is by the mere infusion of their souls that God moves them to justice. Now this cannot be brought about without a sacrament; because as original sin, from which they are justified, does not come to them from their own will, but by carnal generation, so also is grace given them by Christ through spiritual regeneration. And the same reason holds good with madmen and idiots that have never had the use of their free-will. But in the case of one who has had the use of his free-will and afterwards has lost it either through sickness or sleep, he does not obtain justifying grace by the exterior rite of Baptism, or of any other sacrament, unless he intended to make use of this sacrament, and this can only be by the use of his free-will. And it was in this way that he of whom Augustine speaks was regenerated, because both previously and afterwards he assented to the Baptism. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam Salomon dormiendo non meruit sapientiam, nec accepit. Sed in somno declaratum est ei quod, propter praecedens desiderium, ei a Deo sapientia infunderetur, unde ex eius persona dicitur, Sap. VII, optavi, et datus est mihi sensus. Reply Obj. 2: Solomon neither merited nor received wisdom whilst asleep; but it was declared to him in his sleep that on account of his previous desire wisdom would be infused into him by God. Hence it is said in his person (Wis 7:7): I wished, and understanding was given unto me. Vel potest dici quod ille somnus non fuit naturalis, sed somnus prophetiae; secundum quod dicitur Num. XII, si quis fuerit inter vos propheta domini, per somnium aut in visione loquar ad eum. In quo casu aliquis usum liberi arbitrii habet. Or it may be said that his sleep was not natural, but was the sleep of prophecy, according to Num. 12:6: If there be among you a prophet of the Lord, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream. In such cases the use of free-will remains. Et tamen sciendum est quod non est eadem ratio de dono sapientiae et de dono gratiae iustificantis. Nam donum gratiae iustificantis praecipue ordinat hominem ad bonum, quod est obiectum voluntatis, et ideo ad ipsum movetur homo per motum voluntatis, qui est motus liberi arbitrii. Sed sapientia perficit intellectum, qui praecedit voluntatem, unde absque completo motu liberi arbitrii, potest intellectus dono sapientiae illuminari. Sicut etiam videmus quod in dormiendo aliqua hominibus revelantur, sicut dicitur Iob XXXIII, quando irruit sopor super homines et dormiunt in lectulo, tunc aperit aures virorum, et erudiens eos instruit disciplina. And yet it must be observed that the comparison between the gift of wisdom and the gift of justifying grace does not hold. For the gift of justifying grace especially ordains a man to good, which is the object of the will; and hence a man is moved to it by a movement of the will which is a movement of free-will. But wisdom perfects the intellect which precedes the will; hence without any complete movement of the free-will, the intellect can be enlightened with the gift of wisdom, even as we see that things are revealed to men in sleep, according to Job 33:15,16: When deep sleep falleth upon men and they are sleeping in their beds, then He openeth the ears of men, and teaching, instructeth them in what they are to learn. Ad tertium dicendum quod in infusione gratiae iustificantis est quaedam transmutatio animae, et ideo requiritur motus proprius animae humanae, ut anima moveatur secundum modum suum. Sed conservatio gratiae est absque transmutatione, unde non requiritur aliquis motus ex parte animae, sed sola continuatio influxus divini. Reply Obj. 3: In the infusion of justifying grace there is a certain transmutation of the human soul, and hence a proper movement of the human soul is required in order that the soul may be moved in its own manner. But the conservation of grace is without transmutation: no movement on the part of the soul is required but only a continuation of the Divine influx. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum ad iustificationem impii requiratur motus fidei Whether a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad iustificationem impii non requiratur motus fidei. Sicut enim per fidem iustificatur homo, ita etiam et per quaedam alia. Scilicet per timorem; de quo dicitur Eccli. I, timor domini expellit peccatum, nam qui sine timore est, non poterit iustificari. Et iterum per caritatem; secundum illud Luc. VII, dimissa sunt ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit multum. Et iterum per humilitatem; secundum illud Iac. IV, Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam. Et iterum per misericordiam; secundum illud Prov. XV, per misericordiam et fidem purgantur peccata. Non ergo magis motus fidei requiritur ad iustificationem quam motus praedictarum virtutum. Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. For as a man is justified by faith, so also by other things, viz., by fear, of which it is written (Sir 1:27): The fear of the Lord driveth out sin, for he that is without fear cannot be justified; and again by charity, according to Lk. 7:47: Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much; and again by humility, according to James 4:6: God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble; and again by mercy, according to Prov. 15:27: By mercy and faith sins are purged away. Hence the movement of faith is no more required for the justification of the ungodly, than the movements of the aforesaid virtues. Praeterea, actus fidei non requiritur ad iustificationem nisi inquantum per fidem homo cognoscit Deum. Sed etiam aliis modis potest homo Deum cognoscere, scilicet per cognitionem naturalem, et per donum sapientiae. Ergo non requiritur actus fidei ad iustificationem impii. Obj. 2: Further, the act of faith is required for justification only inasmuch as a man knows God by faith. But a man may know God in other ways, viz., by natural knowledge, and by the gift of wisdom. Hence no act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. Praeterea, diversi sunt articuli fidei. Si igitur actus fidei requiratur ad iustificationem impii, videtur quod oporteret hominem, quando primo iustificatur, de omnibus articulis fidei cogitare. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens, cum talis cogitatio longam temporis moram requirat. Ergo videtur quod actus fidei non requiratur ad iustificationem. Obj. 3: Further, there are several articles of faith. Therefore if the act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would seem that a man ought to think on every article of faith when he is first justified. But this seems inconvenient, since such thought would require a long delay of time. Hence it seems that an act of faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. V, iustificati igitur ex fide, pacem habeamus ad Deum. On the contrary, It is written (Rom 5:1): Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, motus liberi arbitrii requiritur ad iustificationem impii, secundum quod mens hominis movetur a Deo. Deus autem movet animam hominis convertendo eam ad seipsum; ut dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIV, secundum aliam litteram, Deus, tu convertens vivificabis nos. Et ideo ad iustificationem impii requiritur motus mentis quo convertitur in Deum. Prima autem conversio in Deum fit per fidem; secundum illud ad Heb. XI, accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est. Et ideo motus fidei requiritur ad iustificationem impii. I answer that, As stated above (A3) a movement of free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly, inasmuch as man’s mind is moved by God. Now God moves man’s soul by turning it to Himself according to Ps. 84:7 (Septuagint): Thou wilt turn us, O God, and bring us to life. Hence for the justification of the ungodly a movement of the mind is required, by which it is turned to God. Now the first turning to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: He that cometh to God must believe that He is. Hence a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus fidei non est perfectus nisi sit caritate informatus, unde simul in iustificatione impii cum motu fidei, est etiam motus caritatis. Movetur autem liberum arbitrium in Deum ad hoc quod ei se subiiciat, unde etiam concurrit actus timoris filialis, et actus humilitatis. Contingit enim unum et eundem actum liberi arbitrii diversarum virtutum esse, secundum quod una imperat et alia imperatur, prout scilicet actus est ordinabilis ad diversos fines. Actus autem misericordiae operatur contra peccatum per modum satisfactionis, et sic sequitur iustificationem, vel per modum praeparationis, inquantum misericordes misericordiam consequuntur, et sic etiam potest praecedere iustificationem; vel etiam ad iustificationem concurrere simul cum praedictis virtutibus, secundum quod misericordia includitur in dilectione proximi. Reply Obj. 1: The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is quickened by charity; hence in the justification of the ungodly, a movement of charity is infused together with the movement of faith. Now free-will is moved to God by being subject to Him; hence an act of filial fear and an act of humility also concur. For it may happen that one and the same act of free-will springs from different virtues, when one commands and another is commanded, inasmuch as the act may be ordained to various ends. But the act of mercy counteracts sin either by way of satisfying for it, and thus it follows justification; or by way of preparation, inasmuch as the merciful obtain mercy; and thus it can either precede justification, or concur with the other virtues towards justification, inasmuch as mercy is included in the love of our neighbor. Ad secundum dicendum quod per cognitionem naturalem homo non convertitur in Deum inquantum est obiectum beatitudinis et iustificationis causa, unde talis cognitio non sufficit ad iustificationem. Donum autem sapientiae praesupponit cognitionem fidei, ut ex supradictis patet. Reply Obj. 2: By natural knowledge a man is not turned to God, according as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of justification. Hence such knowledge does not suffice for justification. But the gift of wisdom presupposes the knowledge of faith, as stated above (Q68, A4, ad 3). Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. IV, credenti in eum qui iustificat impium, reputabitur fides eius ad iustitiam, secundum propositum gratiae Dei. Ex quo patet quod in iustificatione impii requiritur actus fidei quantum ad hoc, quod homo credat Deum esse iustificatorem hominum per mysterium Christi. Reply Obj. 3: As the Apostle says (Rom 4:5), to him that . . . believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God. Hence it is clear that in the justification of the ungodly an act of faith is required in order that a man may believe that God justifies man through the mystery of Christ. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum ad iustificationem impii requiratur motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum Whether for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will regarding sin? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad iustificationem impii non requiratur motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum. Sola enim caritas sufficit ad deletionem peccati, secundum illud Prov. X, universa delicta operit caritas. Sed caritatis obiectum non est peccatum. Ergo non requiritur ad iustificationem impii motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum. Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will regarding sin is required for the justification of the ungodly. For charity alone suffices to take away sin, according to Prov. 10:12: Charity covereth all sins. Now the object of charity is not sin. Therefore for this justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will regarding sin is required. Praeterea, qui in anteriora tendit, ad posteriora respicere non debet; secundum illud apostoli, ad Philipp. III, quae quidem retro sunt obliviscens, ad ea vero quae sunt priora extendens meipsum, ad destinatum persequor bravium supernae vocationis. Sed tendenti in iustitiam retrorsum sunt peccata praeterita. Ergo eorum debet oblivisci, nec in ea se debet extendere per motum liberi arbitrii. Obj. 2: Further, whoever is tending onward, ought not to look back, according to Phil. 3:13, 14: Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forth myself to those that are before, I press towards the mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation. But whoever is stretching forth to righteousness has his sins behind him. Hence he ought to forget them, and not stretch forth to them by a movement of his free-will.