Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum ad iustificationem impii requiratur motus fidei Whether a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad iustificationem impii non requiratur motus fidei. Sicut enim per fidem iustificatur homo, ita etiam et per quaedam alia. Scilicet per timorem; de quo dicitur Eccli. I, timor domini expellit peccatum, nam qui sine timore est, non poterit iustificari. Et iterum per caritatem; secundum illud Luc. VII, dimissa sunt ei peccata multa, quoniam dilexit multum. Et iterum per humilitatem; secundum illud Iac. IV, Deus superbis resistit, humilibus autem dat gratiam. Et iterum per misericordiam; secundum illud Prov. XV, per misericordiam et fidem purgantur peccata. Non ergo magis motus fidei requiritur ad iustificationem quam motus praedictarum virtutum. Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. For as a man is justified by faith, so also by other things, viz., by fear, of which it is written (Sir 1:27): The fear of the Lord driveth out sin, for he that is without fear cannot be justified; and again by charity, according to Lk. 7:47: Many sins are forgiven her because she hath loved much; and again by humility, according to James 4:6: God resisteth the proud and giveth grace to the humble; and again by mercy, according to Prov. 15:27: By mercy and faith sins are purged away. Hence the movement of faith is no more required for the justification of the ungodly, than the movements of the aforesaid virtues. Praeterea, actus fidei non requiritur ad iustificationem nisi inquantum per fidem homo cognoscit Deum. Sed etiam aliis modis potest homo Deum cognoscere, scilicet per cognitionem naturalem, et per donum sapientiae. Ergo non requiritur actus fidei ad iustificationem impii. Obj. 2: Further, the act of faith is required for justification only inasmuch as a man knows God by faith. But a man may know God in other ways, viz., by natural knowledge, and by the gift of wisdom. Hence no act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. Praeterea, diversi sunt articuli fidei. Si igitur actus fidei requiratur ad iustificationem impii, videtur quod oporteret hominem, quando primo iustificatur, de omnibus articulis fidei cogitare. Sed hoc videtur inconveniens, cum talis cogitatio longam temporis moram requirat. Ergo videtur quod actus fidei non requiratur ad iustificationem. Obj. 3: Further, there are several articles of faith. Therefore if the act of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would seem that a man ought to think on every article of faith when he is first justified. But this seems inconvenient, since such thought would require a long delay of time. Hence it seems that an act of faith is not required for the justification of the ungodly. Sed contra est quod dicitur Rom. V, iustificati igitur ex fide, pacem habeamus ad Deum. On the contrary, It is written (Rom 5:1): Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, motus liberi arbitrii requiritur ad iustificationem impii, secundum quod mens hominis movetur a Deo. Deus autem movet animam hominis convertendo eam ad seipsum; ut dicitur in Psalmo LXXXIV, secundum aliam litteram, Deus, tu convertens vivificabis nos. Et ideo ad iustificationem impii requiritur motus mentis quo convertitur in Deum. Prima autem conversio in Deum fit per fidem; secundum illud ad Heb. XI, accedentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est. Et ideo motus fidei requiritur ad iustificationem impii. I answer that, As stated above (A3) a movement of free-will is required for the justification of the ungodly, inasmuch as man’s mind is moved by God. Now God moves man’s soul by turning it to Himself according to Ps. 84:7 (Septuagint): Thou wilt turn us, O God, and bring us to life. Hence for the justification of the ungodly a movement of the mind is required, by which it is turned to God. Now the first turning to God is by faith, according to Heb. 11:6: He that cometh to God must believe that He is. Hence a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod motus fidei non est perfectus nisi sit caritate informatus, unde simul in iustificatione impii cum motu fidei, est etiam motus caritatis. Movetur autem liberum arbitrium in Deum ad hoc quod ei se subiiciat, unde etiam concurrit actus timoris filialis, et actus humilitatis. Contingit enim unum et eundem actum liberi arbitrii diversarum virtutum esse, secundum quod una imperat et alia imperatur, prout scilicet actus est ordinabilis ad diversos fines. Actus autem misericordiae operatur contra peccatum per modum satisfactionis, et sic sequitur iustificationem, vel per modum praeparationis, inquantum misericordes misericordiam consequuntur, et sic etiam potest praecedere iustificationem; vel etiam ad iustificationem concurrere simul cum praedictis virtutibus, secundum quod misericordia includitur in dilectione proximi. Reply Obj. 1: The movement of faith is not perfect unless it is quickened by charity; hence in the justification of the ungodly, a movement of charity is infused together with the movement of faith. Now free-will is moved to God by being subject to Him; hence an act of filial fear and an act of humility also concur. For it may happen that one and the same act of free-will springs from different virtues, when one commands and another is commanded, inasmuch as the act may be ordained to various ends. But the act of mercy counteracts sin either by way of satisfying for it, and thus it follows justification; or by way of preparation, inasmuch as the merciful obtain mercy; and thus it can either precede justification, or concur with the other virtues towards justification, inasmuch as mercy is included in the love of our neighbor. Ad secundum dicendum quod per cognitionem naturalem homo non convertitur in Deum inquantum est obiectum beatitudinis et iustificationis causa, unde talis cognitio non sufficit ad iustificationem. Donum autem sapientiae praesupponit cognitionem fidei, ut ex supradictis patet. Reply Obj. 2: By natural knowledge a man is not turned to God, according as He is the object of beatitude and the cause of justification. Hence such knowledge does not suffice for justification. But the gift of wisdom presupposes the knowledge of faith, as stated above (Q68, A4, ad 3). Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut apostolus dicit, ad Rom. IV, credenti in eum qui iustificat impium, reputabitur fides eius ad iustitiam, secundum propositum gratiae Dei. Ex quo patet quod in iustificatione impii requiritur actus fidei quantum ad hoc, quod homo credat Deum esse iustificatorem hominum per mysterium Christi. Reply Obj. 3: As the Apostle says (Rom 4:5), to him that . . . believeth in Him that justifieth the ungodly his faith is reputed to justice, according to the purpose of the grace of God. Hence it is clear that in the justification of the ungodly an act of faith is required in order that a man may believe that God justifies man through the mystery of Christ. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum ad iustificationem impii requiratur motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum Whether for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will regarding sin? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad iustificationem impii non requiratur motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum. Sola enim caritas sufficit ad deletionem peccati, secundum illud Prov. X, universa delicta operit caritas. Sed caritatis obiectum non est peccatum. Ergo non requiritur ad iustificationem impii motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum. Objection 1: It would seem that no movement of the free-will regarding sin is required for the justification of the ungodly. For charity alone suffices to take away sin, according to Prov. 10:12: Charity covereth all sins. Now the object of charity is not sin. Therefore for this justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will regarding sin is required. Praeterea, qui in anteriora tendit, ad posteriora respicere non debet; secundum illud apostoli, ad Philipp. III, quae quidem retro sunt obliviscens, ad ea vero quae sunt priora extendens meipsum, ad destinatum persequor bravium supernae vocationis. Sed tendenti in iustitiam retrorsum sunt peccata praeterita. Ergo eorum debet oblivisci, nec in ea se debet extendere per motum liberi arbitrii. Obj. 2: Further, whoever is tending onward, ought not to look back, according to Phil. 3:13, 14: Forgetting the things that are behind, and stretching forth myself to those that are before, I press towards the mark, to the prize of the supernal vocation. But whoever is stretching forth to righteousness has his sins behind him. Hence he ought to forget them, and not stretch forth to them by a movement of his free-will. Praeterea, in iustificatione impii non remittitur unum peccatum sine alio, impium enim est a Deo dimidiam sperare veniam. Si igitur in iustificatione impii oporteat liberum arbitrium moveri contra peccatum, oporteret quod de omnibus peccatis suis cogitaret. Quod videtur inconveniens, tum quia requireretur magnum tempus ad huiusmodi cogitationem; tum etiam quia peccatorum quorum est homo oblitus, veniam habere non posset. Ergo motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum non requiritur ad iustificationem impii. Obj. 3: Further, in the justification of the ungodly one sin is not remitted without another, for it is irreverent to expect half a pardon from God. Hence, in the justification of the ungodly, if man’s free-will must move against sin, he ought to think of all his sins. But this is unseemly, both because a great space of time would be required for such thought, and because a man could not obtain the forgiveness of such sins as he had forgotten. Hence for the justification of the ungodly no movement of the free-will is required. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XXXI, dixi, confitebor adversum me iniustitiam meam domino, et tu remisisti impietatem peccati mei. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 31:5): I will confess against myself my injustice to the Lord; and Thou hast forgiven the wickedness of my sin. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, iustificatio impii est quidam motus quo humana mens movetur a Deo a statu peccati in statum iustitiae. Oportet igitur quod humana mens se habeat ad utrumque extremorum secundum motum liberi arbitrii, sicut se habet corpus localiter motum ab aliquo movente ad duos terminos motus. Manifestum est autem in motu locali corporum quod corpus motum recedit a termino a quo, et accedit ad terminum ad quem. Unde oportet quod mens humana, dum iustificatur, per motum liberi arbitrii recedat a peccato, et accedat ad iustitiam. I answer that, As stated above (A1), the justification of the ungodly is a certain movement whereby the human mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state of justice. Hence it is necessary for the human mind to regard both extremes by an act of free-will, as a body in local movement is related to both terms of the movement. Now it is clear that in local movement the moving body leaves the term whence and nears the term whereto. Hence the human mind whilst it is being justified, must, by a movement of its free-will withdraw from sin and draw near to justice. Recessus autem et accessus in motu liberi arbitrii accipitur secundum detestationem et desiderium, dicit enim Augustinus, super Ioan. exponens illud, mercenarius autem fugit, affectiones nostrae motus animorum sunt, laetitia animi diffusio, timor animi fuga est; progrederis animo cum appetis, fugis animo cum metuis. Oportet igitur quod in iustificatione impii sit motus liberi arbitrii duplex, unus quo per desiderium tendat in Dei iustitiam; et alius quo detestetur peccatum. Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice, in an act of free-will, means detestation and desire. For Augustine says on the words the hireling fleeth, etc. (John 10:12): Our emotions are the movements of our soul; joy is the soul’s outpouring; fear is the soul’s flight; your soul goes forward when you seek; your soul flees, when you are afraid. Hence in the justification of the ungodly there must be two acts of the free-will—one, whereby it tends to God’s justice; the other whereby it hates sin. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ad eandem virtutem pertinet prosequi unum oppositorum, et refugere aliud. Et ideo sicut ad caritatem pertinet diligere Deum, ita etiam detestari peccata, per quae anima separatur a Deo. Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to the same virtue to seek one contrary and to avoid the other; and hence, as it belongs to charity to love God, so likewise, to detest sin whereby the soul is separated from God. Ad secundum dicendum quod ad posteriora non debet homo regredi per amorem; sed quantum ad hoc debet ea oblivisci, ut ad ea non afficiatur. Debet tamen eorum recordari per considerationem ut ea detestetur, sic enim ab eis recedit. Reply Obj. 2: A man ought not to return to those things that are behind, by loving them; but, for that matter, he ought to forget them, lest he be drawn to them. Yet he ought to recall them to mind, in order to detest them; for this is to fly from them. Ad tertium dicendum quod in tempore praecedente iustificationem, oportet quod homo singula peccata quae commisit detestetur, quorum memoriam habet. Et ex tali consideratione praecedenti subsequitur in anima quidam motus detestantis universaliter omnia peccata commissa, inter quae etiam includuntur peccata oblivioni tradita, quia homo in statu illo est sic dispositus ut etiam de his quae non meminit, contereretur, si memoriae adessent. Et iste motus concurrit ad iustificationem. Reply Obj. 3: Previous to justification a man must detest each sin he remembers to have committed, and from this remembrance the soul goes on to have a general movement of detestation with regard to all sins committed, in which are included such sins as have been forgotten. For a man is then in such a frame of mind that he would be sorry even for those he does not remember, if they were present to his memory; and this movement cooperates in his justification. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum remissio peccatorum debeat numerari inter ea quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii Whether the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod remissio peccatorum non debeat numerari inter ea quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii. Substantia enim rei non connumeratur his quae ad rem requiruntur, sicut homo non debet connumerari animae et corpori. Sed ipsa iustificatio impii est remissio peccatorum, ut dictum est. Ergo remissio peccatorum non debet computari inter ea quae ad iustificationem impii requiruntur. Objection 1: It would seem that the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification. For the substance of a thing is not reckoned together with those that are required for a thing; thus a man is not reckoned together with his body and soul. But the justification of the ungodly is itself the remission of sins, as stated above (A1). Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned among the things required for the justification of the ungodly. Praeterea, idem est gratiae infusio et culpae remissio, sicut idem est illuminatio et tenebrarum expulsio. Sed idem non debet connumerari sibi ipsi, unum enim multitudini opponitur. Ergo non debet culpae remissio connumerari infusioni gratiae. Obj. 2: Further, infusion of grace and remission of sins are the same; as illumination and expulsion of darkness are the same. But a thing ought not to be reckoned together with itself; for unity is opposed to multitude. Therefore the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the infusion of grace. Praeterea, remissio peccatorum consequitur ad motum liberi arbitrii in Deum et in peccatum, sicut effectus ad causam, per fidem enim et contritionem remittuntur peccata. Sed effectus non debet connumerari suae causae, quia ea quae connumerantur quasi ad invicem condivisa, sunt simul natura. Ergo remissio culpae non debet connumerari aliis quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii. Obj. 3: Further, the remission of sin follows as effect from cause, from the free-will’s movement towards God and sin; since it is by faith and contrition that sin is forgiven. But an effect ought not to be reckoned with its cause; since things thus enumerated together, and, as it were, condivided, are by nature simultaneous. Hence the remission of sins ought not to be reckoned with the things required for the justification of the ungodly. Sed contra est quod in enumeratione eorum quae requiruntur ad rem, non debet praetermitti finis, qui est potissimum in unoquoque. Sed remissio peccatorum est finis in iustificatione impii, dicitur enim Isaiae XXVII, iste est omnis fructus, ut auferatur peccatum eius. Ergo remissio peccatorum debet connumerari inter ea quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii. On the contrary, In reckoning what is required for a thing we ought not to pass over the end, which is the chief part of everything. Now the remission of sins is the end of the justification of the ungodly; for it is written (Isa 27:9): This is all the fruit, that the sin thereof should be taken away. Hence the remission of sins ought to be reckoned amongst the things required for justification. Respondeo dicendum quod quatuor enumerantur quae requiruntur ad iustificationem impii, scilicet gratiae infusio; motus liberi arbitrii in Deum per fidem; et motus liberi arbitrii in peccatum; et remissio culpae. Cuius ratio est quia, sicut dictum est, iustificatio est quidam motus quo anima movetur a Deo a statu culpae in statum iustitiae. In quolibet autem motu quo aliquid ab altero movetur, tria requiruntur, primo quidem, motio ipsius moventis; secundo, motus mobilis; et tertio, consummatio motus, sive perventio ad finem. Ex parte igitur motionis divinae, accipitur gratiae infusio; ex parte vero liberi arbitrii moti, accipiuntur duo motus ipsius, secundum recessum a termino a quo, et accessum ad terminum ad quem; consummatio autem, sive perventio ad terminum huius motus, importatur per remissionem culpae, in hoc enim iustificatio consummatur. I answer that, There are four things which are accounted to be necessary for the justification of the ungodly, viz., the infusion of grace, the movement of the free-will towards God by faith, the movement of the free-will towards sin, and the remission of sins. The reason for this is that, as stated above (A1), the justification of the ungodly is a movement whereby the soul is moved by God from a state of sin to a state of justice. Now in the movement whereby one thing is moved by another, three things are required: first, the motion of the mover; second, the movement of the moved; third, the consummation of the movement, or the attainment of the end. On the part of the Divine motion, there is the infusion of grace; on the part of the free-will which is moved, there are two movements—of departure from the term whence, and of approach to the term whereto; but the consummation of the movement or the attainment of the end of the movement is implied in the remission of sins; for in this is the justification of the ungodly completed. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod iustificatio impii dicitur esse ipsa remissio peccatorum, secundum quod omnis motus accipit speciem a termino. Et tamen ad terminum consequendum multa alia requiruntur, ut ex supradictis patet. Reply Obj. 1: The justification of the ungodly is called the remission of sins, even as every movement has its species from its term. Nevertheless, many other things are required in order to reach the term, as stated above (A5). Ad secundum dicendum quod gratiae infusio et remissio culpae dupliciter considerari possunt. Uno modo, secundum ipsam substantiam actus. Et sic idem sunt, eodem enim actu Deus et largitur gratiam et remittit culpam. Alio modo possunt considerari ex parte obiectorum. Et sic differunt, secundum differentiam culpae quae tollitur, et gratiae quae infunditur. Sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus generatio et corruptio differunt, quamvis generatio unius sit corruptio alterius. Reply Obj. 2: The infusion of grace and the remission of sin may be considered in two ways: first, with respect to the substance of the act, and thus they are the same; for by the same act God bestows grace and remits sin. Second, they may be considered on the part of the objects; and thus they differ by the difference between guilt, which is taken away, and grace, which is infused; just as in natural things generation and corruption differ, although the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. Ad tertium dicendum quod ista non est connumeratio secundum divisionem generis in species, in qua oportet quod connumerata sint simul, sed secundum differentiam eorum quae requiruntur ad completionem alicuius. In qua quidem enumeratione aliquid potest esse prius, et aliquid posterius, quia principiorum et partium rei compositae potest esse aliquid alio prius. Reply Obj. 3: This enumeration is not the division of a genus into its species, in which the things enumerated must be simultaneous; but it is division of the things required for the completion of anything; and in this enumeration we may have what precedes and what follows, since some of the principles and parts of a composite thing may precede and some follow. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum iustificatio impii fiat in instanti, sed successive Whether the justification of the ungodly takes place in an instant or successively? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustificatio impii non fiat in instanti, sed successive. Quia ut dictum est, ad iustificationem impii requiritur motus liberi arbitrii. Actus autem liberi arbitrii est eligere, qui praeexigit deliberationem consilii, ut supra habitum est. Cum igitur deliberatio discursum quendam importet, qui successionem quandam habet, videtur quod iustificatio impii sit successiva. Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly does not take place in an instant, but successively, since, as already stated (A3), for the justification of the ungodly, there is required a movement of free-will. Now the act of the free-will is choice, which requires the deliberation of counsel, as stated above (Q13, A1). Hence, since deliberation implies a certain reasoning process, and this implies succession, the justification of the ungodly would seem to be successive. Praeterea, motus liberi arbitrii non est absque actuali consideratione. Sed impossibile est simul multa intelligere in actu, ut in primo dictum est. Cum igitur ad iustificationem impii requiratur motus liberi arbitrii in diversa, scilicet in Deum et in peccatum, videtur quod iustificatio impii non possit esse in instanti. Obj. 2: Further, the free-will’s movement is not without actual consideration. But it is impossible to understand many things actually and at once, as stated above (I, Q85, A4). Hence, since for the justification of the ungodly there is required a movement of the free-will towards several things, viz., towards God and towards sin, it would seem impossible for the justification of the ungodly to be in an instant. Praeterea, forma quae suscipit magis et minus, successive recipitur in subiecto, sicut patet de albedine et nigredine. Sed gratia suscipit magis et minus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non recipitur subito in subiecto. Cum igitur ad iustificationem impii requiratur gratiae infusio, videtur quod iustificatio impii non possit esse in instanti. Obj. 3: Further, a form that may be greater or less, e.g., blackness or whiteness, is received successively by its subject. Now grace may be greater or less, as stated above (Q112, A4). Hence it is not received suddenly by its subject. Therefore, seeing that the infusion of grace is required for the justification of the ungodly, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly cannot be in an instant.