Respondeo dicendum quod opus aliquod potest dici magnum dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte modi agendi. Et sic maximum est opus creationis, in quo ex nihilo fit aliquid. Alio modo potest dici opus magnum propter magnitudinem eius quod fit. Et secundum hoc, maius opus est iustificatio impii, quae terminatur ad bonum aeternum divinae participationis, quam creatio caeli et terrae, quae terminatur ad bonum naturae mutabilis. Et ideo Augustinus, cum dixisset quod maius est quod ex impio fiat iustus, quam creare caelum et terram, subiungit, caelum enim et terra transibit, praedestinatorum autem salus et iustificatio permanebit. I answer that, A work may be called great in two ways: first, on the part of the mode of action, and thus the work of creation is the greatest work, wherein something is made from nothing; second, a work may be called great on account of what is made, and thus the justification of the ungodly, which terminates at the eternal good of a share in the Godhead, is greater than the creation of heaven and earth, which terminates at the good of mutable nature. Hence, Augustine, after saying that for a just man to be made from a sinner is greater than to create heaven and earth, adds, for heaven and earth shall pass away, but the justification of the ungodly shall endure. Sed sciendum est quod aliquid magnum dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum quantitatem absolutam. Et hoc modo donum gloriae est maius quam donum gratiae iustificantis impium. Et secundum hoc, glorificatio iustorum est maius opus quam iustificatio impii. Alio modo dicitur aliquid magnum quantitate proportionis, sicut dicitur mons parvus, et milium magnum. Et hoc modo donum gratiae impium iustificantis est maius quam donum gloriae beatificantis iustum, quia plus excedit donum gratiae dignitatem impii, qui erat dignus poena, quam donum gloriae dignitatem iusti, qui ex hoc ipso quod est iustificatus, est dignus gloria. Et ideo Augustinus dicit ibidem, iudicet qui potest, utrum maius sit iustos Angelos creare quam impios iustificare. Certe, si aequalis est utrumque potentiae, hoc maioris est misericordiae. Again, we must bear in mind that a thing is called great in two ways: first, in an absolute quantity, and thus the gift of glory is greater than the gift of grace that sanctifies the ungodly; and in this respect the glorification of the just is greater than the justification of the ungodly. Second, a thing may be said to be great in proportionate quantity, and thus the gift of grace that justifies the ungodly is greater than the gift of glory that beatifies the just, for the gift of grace exceeds the worthiness of the ungodly, who are worthy of punishment, more than the gift of glory exceeds the worthiness of the just, who by the fact of their justification are worthy of glory. Hence Augustine says: Let him that can, judge whether it is greater to create the angels just, than to justify the ungodly. Certainly, if they both betoken equal power, one betokens greater mercy. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. And thus the reply to the first is clear. Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum universi est maius quam bonum particulare unius, si accipiatur utrumque in eodem genere. Sed bonum gratiae unius maius est quam bonum naturae totius universi. Reply Obj. 2: The good of the universe is greater than the particular good of one, if we consider both in the same genus. But the good of grace in one is greater than the good of nature in the whole universe. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procedit ex parte modi agendi, secundum quem creatio est maximum opus Dei. Reply Obj. 3: This objection rests on the manner of acting, in which way creation is God’s greatest work. Articulus 10 Article 10 Utrum iustificatio impii sit opus miraculosum Whether the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work? Ad decimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iustificatio impii sit opus miraculosum. Opera enim miraculosa sunt maiora non miraculosis. Sed iustificatio impii est maius opus quam alia opera miraculosa; ut patet per Augustinum in auctoritate inducta. Ergo iustificatio impii est opus miraculosum. Objection 1: It would seem that the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work. For miraculous works are greater than non-miraculous. Now the justification of the ungodly is greater than the other miraculous works, as is clear from the quotation from Augustine (A9). Hence the justification of the ungodly is a miraculous work. Praeterea, motus voluntatis ita est in anima, sicut inclinatio naturalis in rebus naturalibus. Sed quando Deus aliquid operatur in rebus naturalibus contra inclinationem naturae, est opus miraculosum, sicut cum illuminat caecum, vel suscitat mortuum. Voluntas autem impii tendit in malum. Cum igitur Deus, iustificando hominem, moveat eum in bonum, videtur quod iustificatio impii sit miraculosa. Obj. 2: Further, the movement of the will in the soul is like the natural inclination in natural things. But when God works in natural things against their inclination of their nature, it is a miraculous work, as when He gave sight to the blind or raised the dead. Now the will of the ungodly is bent on evil. Hence, since God in justifying a man moves him to good, it would seem that the justification of the ungodly is miraculous. Praeterea, sicut sapientia est donum Dei, ita et iustitia. Sed miraculosum est quod aliquis subito sine studio sapientiam assequatur a Deo. Ergo miraculosum est quod aliquis impius iustificetur a Deo. Obj. 3: Further, as wisdom is a gift of God, so also is justice. Now it is miraculous that anyone should suddenly obtain wisdom from God without study. Therefore it is miraculous that the ungodly should be justified by God. Sed contra, opera miraculosa sunt supra potentiam naturalem. Sed iustificatio impii non est supra potentiam naturalem, dicit enim Augustinus, in libro de Praedest. Sanct., quod posse habere fidem, sicut posse habere caritatem, naturae est hominum, habere autem gratiae est fidelium. Ergo iustificatio impii non est miraculosa. On the contrary, Miraculous works are beyond natural power. Now the justification of the ungodly is not beyond natural power; for Augustine says (De Praed. Sanct. v) that to be capable of having faith and to be capable of having charity belongs to man’s nature; but to have faith and charity belongs to the grace of the faithful. Therefore the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous. Respondeo dicendum quod in operibus miraculosis tria consueverunt inveniri. Quorum unum est ex parte potentiae agentis, quia sola divina virtute fieri possunt. Et ideo sunt simpliciter mira, quasi habentia causam occultam, ut in primo dictum est. Et secundum hoc, tam iustificatio impii quam creatio mundi, et universaliter omne opus quod a solo Deo fieri potest, miraculosum dici potest. I answer that, In miraculous works it is usual to find three things: the first is on the part of the active power, because they can only be performed by Divine power; and they are simply wondrous, since their cause is hidden, as stated above (I, Q105, A7). And thus both the justification of the ungodly and the creation of the world, and, generally speaking, every work that can be done by God alone, is miraculous. Secundo, in quibusdam miraculosis operibus invenitur quod forma inducta est supra naturalem potentiam talis materiae, sicut in suscitatione mortui vita est supra naturalem potentiam talis corporis. Et quantum ad hoc, iustificatio impii non est miraculosa, quia naturaliter anima est gratiae capax; eo enim ipso quod facta est ad imaginem Dei, capax est Dei per gratiam, ut Augustinus dicit. Second, in certain miraculous works it is found that the form introduced is beyond the natural power of such matter, as in the resurrection of the dead, life is above the natural power of such a body. And thus the justification of the ungodly is not miraculous, because the soul is naturally capable of grace; since from its having been made to the likeness of God, it is fit to receive God by grace, as Augustine says, in the above quotation. Tertio modo, in operibus miraculosis invenitur aliquid praeter solitum et consuetum ordinem causandi effectum, sicut cum aliquis infirmus sanitatem perfectam assequitur subito, praeter solitum cursum sanationis quae fit a natura vel arte. Et quantum ad hoc, iustificatio impii quandoque est miraculosa, et quandoque non. Est enim iste consuetus et communis cursus iustificationis, ut, Deo movente interius animam, homo convertatur ad Deum, primo quidem conversione imperfecta, et postmodum ad perfectam deveniat, quia caritas inchoata meretur augeri, ut aucta mereatur perfici, sicut Augustinus dicit. Quandoque vero tam vehementer Deus animam movet ut statim quandam perfectionem iustitiae assequatur, sicut fuit in conversione Pauli, adhibita etiam exterius miraculosa prostratione. Et ideo conversio Pauli, tanquam miraculosa, in Ecclesia commemoratur celebriter. Third, in miraculous works something is found besides the usual and customary order of causing an effect, as when a sick man suddenly and beyond the wonted course of healing by nature or art, receives perfect health; and thus the justification of the ungodly is sometimes miraculous and sometimes not. For the common and wonted course of justification is that God moves the soul interiorly and that man is converted to God, first by an imperfect conversion, that it may afterwards become perfect; because charity begun merits increase, and when increased merits perfection, as Augustine says (In Epist. Joan. Tract. v). Yet God sometimes moves the soul so vehemently that it reaches the perfection of justice at once, as took place in the conversion of Paul, which was accompanied at the same time by a miraculous external prostration. Hence the conversion of Paul is commemorated in the Church as miraculous. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod quaedam miraculosa opera, etsi sint minora quam iustificatio impii quantum ad bonum quod fit, sunt tamen praeter consuetum ordinem talium effectuum. Et ideo plus habent de ratione miraculi. Reply Obj. 1: Certain miraculous works, although they are less than the justification of the ungodly, as regards the good caused, are beyond the wonted order of such effects, and thus have more of the nature of a miracle. Ad secundum dicendum quod non quandocumque res naturalis movetur contra suam inclinationem, est opus miraculosum, alioquin miraculosum esset quod aqua calefieret, vel quod lapis sursum proiiceretur, sed quando hoc fit praeter ordinem propriae causae, quae nata est hoc facere. Iustificare autem impium nulla alia causa potest nisi Deus, sicut nec aquam calefacere nisi ignis. Et ideo iustificatio impii a Deo, quantum ad hoc, non est miraculosa. Reply Obj. 2: It is not a miraculous work, whenever a natural thing is moved contrary to its inclination, otherwise it would be miraculous for water to be heated, or for a stone to be thrown upwards; but only whenever this takes place beyond the order of the proper cause, which naturally does this. Now no other cause save God can justify the ungodly, even as nothing save fire can heat water. Hence the justification of the ungodly by God is not miraculous in this respect. Ad tertium dicendum quod sapientiam et scientiam homo natus est acquirere a Deo per proprium ingenium et studium, et ideo quando praeter hunc modum homo sapiens vel sciens efficitur, est miraculosum. Sed gratiam iustificantem non est homo natus acquirere per suam operationem, sed Deo operante. Unde non est simile. Reply Obj. 3: A man naturally acquires wisdom and knowledge from God by his own talent and study. Hence it is miraculous when a man is made wise or learned outside this order. But a man does not naturally acquire justifying grace by his own action, but by God’s. Hence there is no parity. Quaestio 114 Question 114 De merito Of Merit Deinde considerandum est de merito, quod est effectus gratiae cooperantis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur decem. We must now consider merit, which is the effect of cooperating grace; and under this head there are ten points of inquiry: Primo, utrum homo possit aliquid mereri a Deo. (1) Whether a man can merit anything from God? Secundo, utrum aliquis sine gratia possit mereri vitam aeternam. (2) Whether without grace anyone can merit eternal life? Tertio, utrum aliquis per gratiam possit mereri vitam aeternam ex condigno. (3) Whether anyone with grace may merit eternal life condignly? Quarto, utrum gratia sit principium merendi mediante caritate principaliter. (4) Whether it is chiefly through the instrumentality of charity that grace is the principle of merit? Quinto, utrum homo possit sibi mereri primam gratiam. (5) Whether a man may merit the first grace for himself? Sexto, utrum homo possit eam mereri alii. (6) Whether he may merit it for someone else? Septimo, utrum possit sibi aliquis mereri reparationem post lapsum. (7) Whether anyone can merit restoration after sin? Octavo, utrum possit sibi mereri augmentum gratiae vel caritatis. (8) Whether he can merit for himself an increase of grace or charity? Nono, utrum possit sibi mereri finalem perseverantiam. (9) Whether he can merit final perseverance? Decimo, utrum bona temporalia cadant sub merito. (10) Whether temporal goods fall under merit? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum homo possit aliquid mereri a Deo Whether a man may merit anything from God? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo non possit aliquid mereri a Deo. Nullus enim videtur mercedem mereri ex hoc quod reddit alteri quod debet. Sed per omnia bona quae facimus, non possumus sufficienter recompensare Deo quod debemus, quin semper amplius debeamus; ut etiam philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Unde et Luc. XVII, dicitur, cum omnia quae praecepta sunt, feceritis, dicite, servi inutiles sumus, quod debuimus facere, fecimus. Ergo homo non potest aliquid mereri a Deo. Objection 1: It would seem that a man can merit nothing from God. For no one, it would seem, merits by giving another his due. But by all the good we do, we cannot make sufficient return to God, since yet more is His due, as also the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 14). Hence it is written (Luke 17:10): When you have done all these things that are commanded you, say: We are unprofitable servants; we have done that which we ought to do. Therefore a man can merit nothing from God. Praeterea, ex eo quod aliquis sibi proficit, nihil videtur mereri apud eum cui nihil proficit. Sed homo bene operando sibi proficit, vel alteri homini, non autem Deo, dicitur enim Iob XXXV, si iuste egeris, quid donabis ei, aut quid de manu tua accipiet? Ergo homo non potest aliquid a Deo mereri. Obj. 2: Further, it would seem that a man merits nothing from God, by what profits himself only, and profits God nothing. Now by acting well, a man profits himself or another man, but not God, for it is written (Job 35:7): If thou do justly, what shalt thou give Him, or what shall He receive of thy hand. Hence a man can merit nothing from God. Praeterea, quicumque apud aliquem aliquid meretur, constituit eum sibi debitorem, debitum enim est ut aliquis merendi mercedem rependat. Sed Deus nulli est debitor, unde dicitur Rom. XI, quis prior dedit ei, et retribuetur ei? Ergo nullus a Deo potest aliquid mereri. Obj. 3: Further, whoever merits anything from another makes him his debtor; for a man’s wage is a debt due to him. Now God is no one’s debtor; hence it is written (Rom 11:35): Who hath first given to Him, and recompense shall be made to him? Hence no one can merit anything from God. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. XXXI, est merces operi tuo. Sed merces dicitur quod pro merito redditur. Ergo videtur quod homo possit a Deo mereri. On the contrary, It is written (Jer 31:16): There is a reward for thy work. Now a reward means something bestowed by reason of merit. Hence it would seem that a man may merit from God.