Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in fama seu gloria humana consistere. Nam gloria nihil aliud est quam clara notitia cum laude, ut Ambrosius dicit. Res autem cognita aliter comparatur ad cognitionem humanam, et aliter ad cognitionem divinam, humana enim cognitio a rebus cognitis causatur, sed divina cognitio est causa rerum cognitarum. Unde perfectio humani boni, quae beatitudo dicitur, non potest causari a notitia humana, sed magis notitia humana de beatitudine alicuius procedit et quodammodo causatur ab ipsa humana beatitudine, vel inchoata vel perfecta. Et ideo in fama vel in gloria non potest consistere hominis beatitudo. Sed bonum hominis dependet, sicut ex causa, ex cognitione Dei. Et ideo ex gloria quae est apud Deum, dependet beatitudo hominis sicut ex causa sua, secundum illud Psalmi XC, eripiam eum, et glorificabo eum, longitudine dierum replebo eum, et ostendam illi salutare meum. I answer that, Man’s happiness cannot consist in human fame or glory. For glory consists in being well known and praised, as Ambrose says. Now the thing known is related to human knowledge otherwise than to God’s knowledge: for human knowledge is caused by the things known, whereas God’s knowledge is the cause of the things known. Wherefore the perfection of human good, which is called happiness, cannot be caused by human knowledge: but rather human knowledge of another’s happiness proceeds from, and, in a fashion, is caused by, human happiness itself, inchoate or perfect. Consequently man’s happiness cannot consist in fame or glory. On the other hand, man’s good depends on God’s knowledge as its cause. And therefore man’s beatitude depends, as on its cause, on the glory which man has with God; according to Psalm 90: I will deliver him, and I will glorify him; I will fill him with length of days, and I will show him my salvation (15–16). Est etiam aliud considerandum, quod humana notitia saepe fallitur, et praecipue in singularibus contingentibus, cuiusmodi sunt actus humani. Et ideo frequenter humana gloria fallax est. Sed quia Deus falli non potest, eius gloria semper vera est. Propter quod dicitur, II ad Cor. X, ille probatus est, quem Deus commendat. Furthermore, we must observe that human knowledge often fails, especially in contingent singulars, such as are human acts. For this reason human glory is frequently deceptive. But since God cannot be deceived, His glory is always true; hence it is written (2 Cor 10:18): He . . . is approved . . . whom God commendeth. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus non loquitur ibi de gloria quae est ab hominibus, sed de gloria quae est a Deo coram Angelis eius. Unde dicitur Marc. VIII, filius hominis confitebitur eum in gloria patris sui, coram Angelis eius. Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from God, with His Angels. Hence it is written (Mark 8:38): The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels. Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum alicuius hominis quod per famam vel gloriam est in cognitione multorum, si cognitio quidem vera sit, oportet quod derivetur a bono existente in ipso homine, et sic praesupponit beatitudinem perfectam vel inchoatam. Si autem cognitio falsa sit, non concordat rei, et sic bonum non invenitur in eo cuius fama celebris habetur. Unde patet quod fama nullo modo potest facere hominem beatum. Reply Obj. 2: A man’s good which, through fame or glory, is in the knowledge of many, if this knowledge be true, must needs be derived from good existing in the man himself: and hence it presupposes perfect or inchoate happiness. But if the knowledge be false, it does not harmonize with the thing: and thus good does not exist in him who is looked upon as famous. Hence it follows that fame can nowise make man happy. Ad tertium dicendum quod fama non habet stabilitatem, immo falso rumore de facili perditur. Et si stabilis aliquando perseveret, hoc est per accidens. Sed beatitudo habet per se stabilitatem, et semper. Reply Obj. 3: Fame has no stability; in fact, it is easily ruined by false report. And if sometimes it endures, this is by accident. But happiness endures of itself, and for ever. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum beatitudo consistat in potestate Whether man’s happiness consists in power? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in potestate. Omnia enim appetunt assimilari Deo, tanquam ultimo fini et primo principio. Sed homines qui in potestatibus sunt, propter similitudinem potestatis, maxime videntur esse Deo conformes, unde et in Scriptura dii vocantur, ut patet Exod. XXII, diis non detrahes. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit. Objection 1: It would seem that happiness consists in power. For all things desire to become like to God, as to their last end and first beginning. But men who are in power, seem, on account of the similarity of power, to be most like to God: hence also in Scripture they are called gods (Exod 22:28), Thou shalt not speak ill of the gods. Therefore happiness consists in power. Praeterea, beatitudo est bonum perfectum. Sed perfectissimum est quod homo etiam alios regere possit, quod convenit his qui in potestatibus sunt constituti. Ergo beatitudo consistit in potestate. Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the perfect good. But the highest perfection for man is to be able to rule others; which belongs to those who are in power. Therefore happiness consists in power. Praeterea, beatitudo, cum sit maxime appetibilis, opponitur ei quod maxime est fugiendum. Sed homines maxime fugiunt servitutem, cui contraponitur potestas. Ergo in potestate beatitudo consistit. Obj. 3: Further, since happiness is supremely desirable, it is contrary to that which is before all to be shunned. But, more than aught else, men shun servitude, which is contrary to power. Therefore happiness consists in power. Sed contra, beatitudo est perfectum bonum. Sed potestas est maxime imperfecta. Ut enim dicit Boetius, III de Consol., potestas humana sollicitudinum morsus expellere, formidinum aculeos vitare nequit. Et postea, potentem censes cui satellites latus ambiunt qui quos terret, ipse plus metuit? Non igitur beatitudo consistit in potestate. On the contrary, Happiness is the perfect good. But power is most imperfect. For as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), the power of man cannot relieve the gnawings of care, nor can it avoid the thorny path of anxiety: and further on: Think you a man is powerful who is surrounded by attendants, whom he inspires with fear indeed, but whom he fears still more? Therefore happiness does not consist in power. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem in potestate consistere, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia potestas habet rationem principii, ut patet in V Metaphys. Beatitudo autem habet rationem ultimi finis. Secundo, quia potestas se habet ad bonum et ad malum. Beatitudo autem est proprium et perfectum hominis bonum. Unde magis posset consistere beatitudo aliqua in bono usu potestatis, qui est per virtutem, quam in ipsa potestate. I answer that, It is impossible for happiness to consist in power; and this for two reasons. First because power has the nature of principle, as is stated in Metaph. v, 12, whereas happiness has the nature of last end. Second, because power has relation to good and evil: whereas happiness is man’s proper and perfect good. Wherefore some happiness might consist in the good use of power, which is by virtue, rather than in power itself. Possunt autem quatuor generales rationes induci ad ostendendum quod in nullo praemissorum exteriorum bonorum beatitudo consistat. Quarum prima est quia, cum beatitudo sit summum hominis bonum, non compatitur secum aliquod malum. Omnia autem praedicta possunt inveniri et in bonis et in malis. Secunda ratio est quia, cum de ratione beatitudinis sit quod sit per se sufficiens, ut patet in I Ethic., necesse est quod, beatitudine adepta, nullum bonum homini necessarium desit. Adeptis autem singulis praemissorum, possunt adhuc multa bona homini necessaria deesse, puta sapientia, sanitas corporis, et huiusmodi. Tertia, quia, cum beatitudo sit bonum perfectum, ex beatitudine non potest aliquod malum alicui provenire. Quod non convenit praemissis, dicitur enim Eccle. V, quod divitiae interdum conservantur in malum domini sui; et simile patet in aliis tribus. Quarta ratio est quia ad beatitudinem homo ordinatur per principia interiora, cum ad ipsam naturaliter ordinetur. Praemissa autem quatuor bona magis sunt a causis exterioribus, et ut plurimum a fortuna, unde et bona fortunae dicuntur. Unde patet quod in praemissis nullo modo beatitudo consistit. Now four general reasons may be given to prove that happiness consists in none of the foregoing external goods. First, because, since happiness is man’s supreme good, it is incompatible with any evil. Now all the foregoing can be found both in good and in evil men. Second, because, since it is the nature of happiness to satisfy of itself, as stated in Ethic. i, 7, having gained happiness, man cannot lack any needful good. But after acquiring any one of the foregoing, man may still lack many goods that are necessary to him; for instance, wisdom, bodily health, and such like. Third, because, since happiness is the perfect good, no evil can accrue to anyone therefrom. This cannot be said of the foregoing: for it is written (Eccl 5:12) that riches are sometimes kept to the hurt of the owner; and the same may be said of the other three. Fourth, because man is ordained to happiness through principles that are in him; since he is ordained thereto naturally. Now the four goods mentioned above are due rather to external causes, and in most cases to fortune; for which reason they are called goods of fortune. Therefore it is evident that happiness nowise consists in the foregoing. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod divina potestas est sua bonitas, unde uti sua potestate non potest nisi bene. Sed hoc in hominibus non invenitur. Unde non sufficit ad beatitudinem hominis quod assimiletur Deo quantum ad potestatem, nisi etiam assimiletur ei quantum ad bonitatem. Reply Obj. 1: God’s power is His goodness: hence He cannot use His power otherwise than well. But it is not so with men. Consequently it is not enough for man’s happiness, that he become like God in power, unless he become like Him in goodness also. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut optimum est quod aliquis utatur bene potestate in regimine multorum, ita pessimum est si male utatur. Et ita potestas se habet et ad bonum et ad malum. Reply Obj. 2: Just as it is a very good thing for a man to make good use of power in ruling many, so is it a very bad thing if he makes a bad use of it. And so it is that power is towards good and evil. Ad tertium dicendum quod servitus est impedimentum boni usus potestatis, et ideo naturaliter homines eam fugiunt, et non quasi in potestate hominis sit summum bonum. Reply Obj. 3: Servitude is a hindrance to the good use of power: therefore is it that men naturally shun it; not because man’s supreme good consists in power. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in bonis corporis Whether man’s happiness consists in bodily goods? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in bonis corporis. Dicitur enim Eccli. XXX, non est census supra censum salutis corporis. Sed in eo quod est optimum, consistit beatitudo. Ergo consistit in corporis salute. Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness consists in bodily goods. For it is written (Sir 30:16): There are no riches above the riches of the health of the body. But happiness consists in that which is best. Therefore it consists in the health of the body. Praeterea, Dionysius dicit, V cap. de Div. Nom., quod esse est melius quam vivere, et vivere melius quam alia quae consequuntur. Sed ad esse et vivere hominis requiritur salus corporis. Cum ergo beatitudo sit summum bonum hominis, videtur quod salus corporis maxime pertineat ad beatitudinem. Obj. 2: Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v), that to be is better than to live, and to live is better than all that follows. But for man’s being and living, the health of the body is necessary. Since, therefore, happiness is man’s supreme good, it seems that health of the body belongs more than anything else to happiness. Praeterea, quanto aliquid est communius, tanto ab altiori principio dependet quia quanto causa est superior, tanto eius virtus ad plura se extendit. Sed sicut causalitas causae efficientis consideratur secundum influentiam, ita causalitas finis attenditur secundum appetitum. Ergo sicut prima causa efficiens est quae in omnia influit, ita ultimus finis est quod ab omnibus desideratur. Sed ipsum esse est quod maxime desideratur ab omnibus. Ergo in his quae pertinent ad esse hominis, sicut est salus corporis, maxime consistit eius beatitudo. Obj. 3: Further, the more universal a thing is, the higher the principle from which it depends; because the higher a cause is, the greater the scope of its power. Now just as the causality of the efficient cause consists in its flowing into something, so the causality of the end consists in its drawing the appetite. Therefore, just as the First Cause is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that which attracts the desire of all. But being itself is that which is most desired by all. Therefore man’s happiness consists most of all in things pertaining to his being, such as the health of the body. Sed contra, secundum beatitudinem homo excellit omnia alia animalia. Sed secundum bona corporis, a multis animalibus superatur, sicut ab elephante in diuturnitate vitae, a leone in fortitudine, a cervo in cursu. Ergo beatitudo hominis non consistit in bonis corporis. On the contrary, Man surpasses all other animals in regard to happiness. But in bodily goods he is surpassed by many animals; for instance, by the elephant in longevity, by the lion in strength, by the stag in fleetness. Therefore man’s happiness does not consist in goods of the body. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis in bonis corporis consistere, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia impossibile est quod illius rei quae ordinatur ad aliud sicut ad finem, ultimus finis sit eiusdem conservatio in esse. Unde gubernator non intendit, sicut ultimum finem, conservationem navis sibi commissae; eo quod navis ad aliud ordinatur sicut ad finem, scilicet ad navigandum. Sicut autem navis committitur gubernatori ad dirigendum, ita homo est suae voluntati et rationi commissus; secundum illud quod dicitur Eccli. XV, Deus ab initio constituit hominem, et reliquit eum in manu consilii sui. Manifestum est autem quod homo ordinatur ad aliquid sicut ad finem, non enim homo est summum bonum. Unde impossibile est quod ultimus finis rationis et voluntatis humanae sit conservatio humani esse. I answer that, It is impossible for man’s happiness to consist in the goods of the body; and this for two reasons. First, because, if a thing be ordained to another as to its end, its last end cannot consist in the preservation of its being. Hence a captain does not intend as a last end, the preservation of the ship entrusted to him, since a ship is ordained to something else as its end, viz., to navigation. Now just as the ship is entrusted to the captain that he may steer its course, so man is given over to his will and reason; according to Ecclus. 15:14: God made man from the beginning and left him in the hand of his own counsel. Now it is evident that man is ordained to something as his end: since man is not the supreme good. Therefore the last end of man’s reason and will cannot be the preservation of man’s being. Secundo quia, dato quod finis rationis et voluntatis humanae esset conservatio humani esse, non tamen posset dici quod finis hominis esset aliquod corporis bonum. Esse enim hominis consistit in anima et corpore, et quamvis esse corporis dependeat ab anima, esse tamen humanae animae non dependet a corpore, ut supra ostensum est; ipsumque corpus est propter animam, sicut materia propter formam, et instrumenta propter motorem, ut per ea suas actiones exerceat. Unde omnia bona corporis ordinantur ad bona animae, sicut ad finem. Unde impossibile est quod in bonis corporis beatitudo consistat, quae est ultimus hominis finis. Second, because, granted that the end of man’s will and reason be the preservation of man’s being, it could not be said that the end of man is some good of the body. For man’s being consists in soul and body; and though the being of the body depends on the soul, yet the being of the human soul depends not on the body, as shown above (I, Q75, A2); and the very body is for the soul, as matter for its form, and the instruments for the man that puts them into motion, that by their means he may do his work. Wherefore all goods of the body are ordained to the goods of the soul, as to their end. Consequently happiness, which is man’s last end, cannot consist in goods of the body. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut corpus ordinatur ad animam sicut ad finem, ita bona exteriora ad ipsum corpus. Et ideo rationabiliter bonum corporis praefertur bonis exterioribus, quae per censum significantur, sicut et bonum animae praefertur omnibus bonis corporis. Reply Obj. 1: Just as the body is ordained to the soul, as its end, so are external goods ordained to the body itself. And therefore it is with reason that the good of the body is preferred to external goods, which are signified by riches, just as the good of the soul is preferred to all bodily goods. Ad secundum dicendum quod esse simpliciter acceptum, secundum quod includit in se omnem perfectionem essendi, praeeminet vitae et omnibus subsequentibus, sic enim ipsum esse praehabet in se omnia subsequentia. Et hoc modo Dionysius loquitur. Sed si consideretur ipsum esse prout participatur in hac re vel in illa, quae non capiunt totam perfectionem essendi, sed habent esse imperfectum, sicut est esse cuiuslibet creaturae; sic manifestum est quod ipsum esse cum perfectione superaddita est eminentius. Unde et Dionysius ibidem dicit quod viventia sunt meliora existentibus, et intelligentia viventibus. Reply Obj. 2: Being taken simply, as including all perfection of being, surpasses life and all that follows it; for thus being itself includes all these. And in this sense Dionysius speaks. But if we consider being itself as participated in this or that thing, which does not possess the whole perfection of being, but has imperfect being, such as the being of any creature; then it is evident that being itself together with an additional perfection is more excellent. Hence in the same passage Dionysius says that things that live are better than things that exist, and intelligent better than living things. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia finis respondet principio, ex illa ratione probatur quod ultimus finis est primum principium essendi, in quo est omnis essendi perfectio, cuius similitudinem appetunt, secundum suam proportionem, quaedam quidem secundum esse tantum, quaedam secundum esse vivens, quaedam secundum esse vivens et intelligens et beatum. Et hoc paucorum est. Reply Obj. 3: Since the end corresponds to the beginning; this argument proves that the last end is the first beginning of being, in Whom every perfection of being is: Whose likeness, according to their proportion, some desire as to being only, some as to living being, some as to being which is living, intelligent and happy. And this belongs to few. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum beatitudo hominis in voluptate consistat Whether man’s happiness consists in pleasure? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis in voluptate consistat. Beatitudo enim, cum sit ultimus finis, non appetitur propter aliud, sed alia propter ipsam. Sed hoc maxime convenit delectationi, ridiculum est enim ab aliquo quaerere propter quid velit delectari, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Ergo beatitudo maxime in voluptate et delectatione consistit. Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be pleased (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight. Praeterea, causa prima vehementius imprimit quam secunda, ut dicitur in libro de causis. Influentia autem finis attenditur secundum eius appetitum. Illud ergo videtur habere rationem finis ultimi, quod maxime movet appetitum. Hoc autem est voluptas, cuius signum est quod delectatio intantum absorbet hominis voluntatem et rationem, quod alia bona contemnere facit. Ergo videtur quod ultimus finis hominis, qui est beatitudo, maxime in voluptate consistat. Obj. 2: Further, the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man’s will and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man’s last end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure. Praeterea, cum appetitus sit boni, illud quod omnia appetunt, videtur esse optimum. Sed delectationem omnia appetunt, et sapientes et insipientes, et etiam ratione carentia. Ergo delectatio est optimum. Consistit ergo in voluptate beatitudo, quae est summum bonum. Obj. 3: Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure. Sed contra est quod Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., tristes exitus esse voluptatum, quisquis reminisci libidinum suarum volet, intelliget. Quae si beatos efficere possent, nihil causae est quin pecudes quoque beatae esse dicantur. On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures have a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too. Respondeo dicendum quod, quia delectationes corporales pluribus notae sunt, assumpserunt sibi nomen voluptatum, ut dicitur VII Ethic., cum tamen sint aliae delectationes potiores. In quibus tamen beatitudo principaliter non consistit. Quia in unaquaque re aliud est quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, aliud est proprium accidens ipsius, sicut in homine aliud est quod est animal rationale mortale, aliud quod est risibile. Est igitur considerandum quod omnis delectatio est quoddam proprium accidens quod consequitur beatitudinem, vel aliquam beatitudinis partem, ex hoc enim aliquis delectatur quod habet bonum aliquod sibi conveniens, vel in re, vel in spe, vel saltem in memoria. Bonum autem conveniens, si quidem sit perfectum, est ipsa hominis beatitudo si autem sit imperfectum est quaedam beatitudinis participatio, vel propinqua, vel remota, vel saltem apparens. Unde manifestum est quod nec ipsa delectatio quae consequitur bonum perfectum, est ipsa essentia beatitudinis; sed quoddam consequens ad ipsam sicut per se accidens. I answer that, Because bodily delights are more generally known, the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man’s happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident. Voluptas autem corporalis non potest etiam modo praedicto sequi bonum perfectum. Nam sequitur bonum quod apprehendit sensus, qui est virtus animae corpore utens. Bonum autem quod pertinet ad corpus, quod apprehenditur secundum sensum, non potest esse perfectum hominis bonum. Cum enim anima rationalis excedat proportionem materiae corporalis, pars animae quae est ab organo corporeo absoluta, quandam habet infinitatem respectu ipsius corporis et partium animae corpori concretarum, sicut immaterialia sunt quodammodo infinita respectu materialium, eo quod forma per materiam quodammodo contrahitur et finitur, unde forma a materia absoluta est quodammodo infinita. Et ideo sensus, qui est vis corporalis, cognoscit singulare, quod est determinatum per materiam, intellectus vero, qui est vis a materia absoluta, cognoscit universale, quod est abstractum a materia, et continet sub se infinita singularia. Unde patet quod bonum conveniens corpori, quod per apprehensionem sensus delectationem corporalem causat, non est perfectum bonum hominis, sed est minimum quiddam in comparatione ad bonum animae. Unde Sap. VII, dicitur quod omne aurum, in comparatione sapientiae, arena est exigua. Sic igitur neque voluptas corporalis est ipsa beatitudo, nec est per se accidens beatitudinis. But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man’s perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not man’s perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is written (Wis 7:9) that all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand. And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod eiusdem rationis est quod appetatur bonum, et quod appetatur delectatio, quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio appetitus in bono, sicut ex eadem virtute naturae est quod grave feratur deorsum, et quod ibi quiescat. Unde sicut bonum propter seipsum appetitur, ita et delectatio propter se, et non propter aliud appetitur, si ly propter dicat causam finalem. Si vero dicat causam formalem, vel potius motivam, sic delectatio est appetibilis propter aliud, idest propter bonum, quod est delectationis obiectum, et per consequens est principium eius, et dat ei formam, ex hoc enim delectatio habet quod appetatur, quia est quies in bono desiderato. Reply Obj. 1: It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite’s rest in good: thus it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition for denote the final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for something else, i.e., for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.