Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum beatitudo consistat in aliquo bono animae Whether some good of the soul constitutes man’s happiness? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo consistat in aliquo bono animae. Beatitudo enim est quoddam hominis bonum. Hoc autem per tria dividitur, quae sunt bona exteriora, bona corporis, et bona animae. Sed beatitudo non consistit in bonis exterioribus, neque in bonis corporis, sicut supra ostensum est. Ergo consistit in bonis animae. Objection 1: It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man’s happiness. For happiness is man’s good. Now this is threefold, external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above (A. 4–5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul. Praeterea, illud cui appetimus aliquod bonum, magis amamus quam bonum quod ei appetimus, sicut magis amamus amicum cui appetimus pecuniam, quam pecuniam. Sed unusquisque quodcumque bonum sibi appetit. Ergo seipsum amat magis quam omnia alia bona. Sed beatitudo est quod maxime amatur, quod patet ex hoc quod propter ipsam omnia alia amantur et desiderantur. Ergo beatitudo consistit in aliquo bono ipsius hominis. Sed non in bonis corporis. Ergo in bonis animae. Obj. 2: Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul. Praeterea, perfectio est aliquid eius quod perficitur. Sed beatitudo est quaedam perfectio hominis. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid hominis. Sed non est aliquid corporis, ut ostensum est. Ergo beatitudo est aliquid animae. Et ita consistit in bonis animae. Obj. 3: Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above (A5). Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul. Sed contra, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de Doctr. Christ., id in quo constituitur beata vita, propter se diligendum est. Sed homo non est propter seipsum diligendus, sed quidquid est in homine, est diligendum propter Deum. Ergo in nullo bono animae beatitudo consistit. On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake. But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God’s sake. Therefore happiness consists in no good of the soul. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa res quam adipisci desideramus; et usus, seu adeptio aut possessio illius rei. Si ergo loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam rem quam appetimus sicut ultimum finem, impossibile est quod ultimus finis hominis sit ipsa anima, vel aliquid eius. Ipsa enim anima, in se considerata, est ut in potentia existens, fit enim de potentia sciente actu sciens, et de potentia virtuosa actu virtuosa. Cum autem potentia sit propter actum, sicut propter complementum, impossibile est quod id quod est secundum se in potentia existens, habeat rationem ultimi finis. Unde impossibile est quod ipsa anima sit ultimus finis sui ipsius. I answer that, As stated above (Q1, A8), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man’s last end, as to the thing itself which we desire as last end, it is impossible for man’s last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end. Similiter etiam neque aliquid eius, sive sit potentia, sive habitus, sive actus. Bonum enim quod est ultimus finis, est bonum perfectum complens appetitum. Appetitus autem humanus, qui est voluntas, est boni universalis. Quodlibet bonum autem inhaerens ipsi animae, est bonum participatum, et per consequens particulatum. Unde impossibile est quod aliquod eorum sit ultimus finis hominis. In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man’s appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man’s last end. Sed si loquamur de ultimo fine hominis quantum ad ipsam adeptionem vel possessionem, seu quemcumque usum ipsius rei quae appetitur ut finis, sic ad ultimum finem pertinet aliquid hominis ex parte animae, quia homo per animam beatitudinem consequitur. Res ergo ipsa quae appetitur ut finis, est id in quo beatitudo consistit, et quod beatum facit, sed huius rei adeptio vocatur beatitudo. Unde dicendum est quod beatitudo est aliquid animae; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra animam. But if we speak of man’s last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, secundum quod sub illa divisione comprehenduntur omnia bona quae homini sunt appetibilia, sic bonum animae dicitur non solum potentia aut habitus aut actus, sed etiam obiectum, quod est extrinsecum. Et hoc modo nihil prohibet dicere id in quo beatitudo consistit, esse quoddam bonum animae. Reply Obj. 1: Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness is a good of the soul. Ad secundum dicendum, quantum ad propositum pertinet, quod beatitudo maxime amatur tanquam bonum concupitum, amicus autem amatur tanquam id cui concupiscitur bonum; et sic etiam homo amat seipsum. Unde non est eadem ratio amoris utrobique. Utrum autem amore amicitiae aliquid homo supra se amet, erit locus considerandi cum de caritate agetur. Reply Obj. 2: As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity. Ad tertium dicendum quod beatitudo ipsa, cum sit perfectio animae, est quoddam animae bonum inhaerens, sed id in quo beatitudo consistit, quod scilicet beatum facit, est aliquid extra animam, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness, viz., which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in aliquo bono creato Whether any created good constitutes man’s happiness? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in aliquo bono creato. Dicit enim Dionysius, VII cap. de Div. Nom., quod divina sapientia coniungit fines primorum principiis secundorum, ex quo potest accipi quod summum inferioris naturae sit attingere infimum naturae superioris. Sed summum hominis bonum est beatitudo. Cum ergo Angelus naturae ordine sit supra hominem, ut in primo habitum est; videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in hoc quod aliquo modo attingit ad Angelum. Objection 1: It would seem that some created good constitutes man’s happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things, from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher nature. But man’s highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated in the First Part, (Q111, A1), it seems that man’s happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel. Praeterea, ultimus finis cuiuslibet rei est in suo perfecto, unde pars est propter totum, sicut propter finem. Sed tota universitas creaturarum, quae dicitur maior mundus, comparatur ad hominem, qui in VIII Physic. dicitur minor mundus, sicut perfectum ad imperfectum. Ergo beatitudo hominis consistit in tota universitate creaturarum. Obj. 2: Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man’s happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures. Praeterea, per hoc homo efficitur beatus, quod eius naturale desiderium quietat. Sed naturale desiderium hominis non extenditur ad maius bonum quam quod ipse capere potest. Cum ergo homo non sit capax boni quod excedit limites totius creaturae, videtur quod per aliquod bonum creatum homo beatus fieri possit. Et ita beatitudo hominis in aliquo bono creato consistit. Obj. 3: Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man’s natural desire does not reach out to a good surpassing his capacity. Since then man’s capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man’s happiness. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, XIX de Civ. Dei, ut vita carnis anima est, ita beata vita hominis Deus est; de quo dicitur, beatus populus cuius dominus Deus eius. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man’s life of happiness: of Whom it is written: ‘Happy is that people whose God is the Lord’ (Ps 143:15). Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo bono creato. Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum, alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc restaret aliquid appetendum. Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectus est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale. Quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo, quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem participatam. Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere potest; secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo CII, qui replet in bonis desiderium tuum. In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis consistit. I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e., of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Psalm 102: Who satisfieth thy desire with good things (5). Therefore God alone constitutes man’s happiness. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod superius hominis attingit quidem infimum angelicae naturae per quandam similitudinem; non tamen ibi sistit sicut in ultimo fine, sed procedit usque ad ipsum universalem fontem boni, qui est universale obiectum beatitudinis omnium beatorum, tanquam infinitum et perfectum bonum existens. Reply Obj. 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good. Ad secundum dicendum quod, si totum aliquod non sit ultimus finis, sed ordinetur ad finem ulteriorem, ultimus finis partis non est ipsum totum, sed aliquid aliud. Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem. Unde bonum universi non est ultimus finis hominis, sed ipse Deus. Reply Obj. 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself. Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum creatum non est minus quam bonum cuius homo est capax ut rei intrinsecae et inhaerentis, est tamen minus quam bonum cuius est capax ut obiecti, quod est infinitum. Bonum autem quod participatur ab Angelo, et a toto universo, est bonum finitum et contractum. Reply Obj. 3: Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good. Quaestio 3 Question 3 Quid sit beatitudo What is Happiness Deinde considerandum est quid sit beatitudo; et quae requirantur ad ipsam. We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. (1) Whether happiness is something uncreated? Secundo, si est aliquid creatum, utrum sit operatio. (2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation? Tertio, utrum sit operatio sensitivae partis, an intellectivae tantum. (3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part? Quarto, si est operatio intellectivae partis, utrum sit operatio intellectus, an voluntatis. (4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will? Quinto, si est operatio intellectus, utrum sit operatio intellectus speculativi, aut practici. (5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect? Sexto, si est operatio intellectus speculativi, utrum consistat in speculatione scientiarum speculativarum. (6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences? Septimo, utrum consistat in speculatione substantiarum separatarum, scilicet Angelorum. (7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances, viz., angels? Octavo, utrum in sola speculatione Dei qua per essentiam videtur. (8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum Whether happiness is something uncreated?