Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est beatitudinem hominis esse in aliquo bono creato. Beatitudo enim est bonum perfectum, quod totaliter quietat appetitum, alioquin non esset ultimus finis, si adhuc restaret aliquid appetendum. Obiectum autem voluntatis, quae est appetitus humanus, est universale bonum; sicut obiectum intellectus est universale verum. Ex quo patet quod nihil potest quietare voluntatem hominis, nisi bonum universale. Quod non invenitur in aliquo creato, sed solum in Deo, quia omnis creatura habet bonitatem participatam. Unde solus Deus voluntatem hominis implere potest; secundum quod dicitur in Psalmo CII, qui replet in bonis desiderium tuum. In solo igitur Deo beatitudo hominis consistit. I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute man’s happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e., of man’s appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man’s will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Psalm 102: Who satisfieth thy desire with good things (5). Therefore God alone constitutes man’s happiness. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod superius hominis attingit quidem infimum angelicae naturae per quandam similitudinem; non tamen ibi sistit sicut in ultimo fine, sed procedit usque ad ipsum universalem fontem boni, qui est universale obiectum beatitudinis omnium beatorum, tanquam infinitum et perfectum bonum existens. Reply Obj. 1: The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good. Ad secundum dicendum quod, si totum aliquod non sit ultimus finis, sed ordinetur ad finem ulteriorem, ultimus finis partis non est ipsum totum, sed aliquid aliud. Universitas autem creaturarum, ad quam comparatur homo ut pars ad totum, non est ultimus finis, sed ordinatur in Deum sicut in ultimum finem. Unde bonum universi non est ultimus finis hominis, sed ipse Deus. Reply Obj. 2: If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself. Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum creatum non est minus quam bonum cuius homo est capax ut rei intrinsecae et inhaerentis, est tamen minus quam bonum cuius est capax ut obiecti, quod est infinitum. Bonum autem quod participatur ab Angelo, et a toto universo, est bonum finitum et contractum. Reply Obj. 3: Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good. Quaestio 3 Question 3 Quid sit beatitudo What is Happiness Deinde considerandum est quid sit beatitudo; et quae requirantur ad ipsam. We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. (1) Whether happiness is something uncreated? Secundo, si est aliquid creatum, utrum sit operatio. (2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation? Tertio, utrum sit operatio sensitivae partis, an intellectivae tantum. (3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part? Quarto, si est operatio intellectivae partis, utrum sit operatio intellectus, an voluntatis. (4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will? Quinto, si est operatio intellectus, utrum sit operatio intellectus speculativi, aut practici. (5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect? Sexto, si est operatio intellectus speculativi, utrum consistat in speculatione scientiarum speculativarum. (6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences? Septimo, utrum consistat in speculatione substantiarum separatarum, scilicet Angelorum. (7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances, viz., angels? Octavo, utrum in sola speculatione Dei qua per essentiam videtur. (8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum Whether happiness is something uncreated? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Dicit enim Boetius, in III de Consol., Deum esse ipsam beatitudinem necesse est confiteri. Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): We must needs confess that God is happiness itself. Praeterea, beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed esse summum bonum convenit Deo. Cum ergo non sint plura summa bona, videtur quod beatitudo sit idem quod Deus. Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God. Praeterea, beatitudo est ultimus finis, in quem naturaliter humana voluntas tendit. Sed in nullum aliud voluntas tanquam in finem tendere debet nisi in Deum; quo solo fruendum est, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo beatitudo est idem quod Deus. Obj. 3: Further, happiness is the last end, to which man’s will tends naturally. But man’s will should tend to nothing else as an end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same as God. Sed contra, nullum factum est increatum. Sed beatitudo hominis est aliquid factum, quia secundum Augustinum, I de Doctr. Christ., illis rebus fruendum est, quae nos beatos faciunt. Ergo beatitudo non est aliquid increatum. On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But man’s happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy. Therefore happiness is not something uncreated. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, ipsa res quam cupimus adipisci, sicut avaro est finis pecunia. Alio modo, ipsa adeptio vel possessio, seu usus aut fruitio eius rei quae desideratur, sicut si dicatur quod possessio pecuniae est finis avari, et frui re voluptuosa est finis intemperati. Primo ergo modo, ultimus hominis finis est bonum increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest voluntatem hominis perfecte implere. Secundo autem modo, ultimus finis hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens, quod nihil est aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi. Ultimus autem finis vocatur beatitudo. Si ergo beatitudo hominis consideretur quantum ad causam vel obiectum, sic est aliquid increatum, si autem consideretur quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, sic est aliquid creatum. I answer that, As stated above (Q1, A8; Q2, A7), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Second there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense, then, man’s last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man’s will. But in the second way, man’s last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man’s happiness in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something created. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam, non enim per adeptionem aut participationem alicuius alterius beatus est, sed per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati, sicut ibidem dicit Boetius, per participationem; sicut et dii per participationem dicuntur. Ipsa autem participatio beatitudinis secundum quam homo dicitur beatus, aliquid creatum est. Reply Obj. 1: God is happiness by his Essence: for he is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by his Essence. On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called gods, by participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created. Ad secundum dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum hominis bonum, quia est adeptio vel fruitio summi boni. Reply Obj. 2: Happiness is called man’s supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good. Ad tertium dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur ultimus finis, per modum quo adeptio finis dicitur finis. Reply Obj. 3: Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum beatitudo sit operatio Whether happiness is an operation? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo non sit operatio. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VI, habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificationem, finem vero vitam aeternam. Sed vita non est operatio, sed ipsum esse viventium. Ergo ultimus finis, qui est beatitudo, non est operatio. Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says (Rom 6:22): You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting. But life is not an operation, but the very being of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation. Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Sed status non nominat operationem. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio. Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things. But state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation. Praeterea, beatitudo significat aliquid in beato existens, cum sit ultima perfectio hominis. Sed operatio non significat ut aliquid existens in operante, sed magis ut ab ipso procedens. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio. Obj. 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: since it is man’s final perfection. But the meaning of operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an operation. Praeterea, beatitudo permanet in beato. Operatio autem non permanet, sed transit. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio. Obj. 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation. Praeterea, unius hominis est una beatitudo. Operationes autem sunt multae. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio. Obj. 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation. Praeterea, beatitudo inest beato absque interruptione. Sed operatio humana frequenter interrumpitur puta somno, vel aliqua alia occupatione, vel quiete. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio. Obj. 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod felicitas est operatio secundum virtutem perfectam. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum quod beatitudo hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens necesse est dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit operatio. Est enim beatitudo ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque autem intantum perfectum est, inquantum est actu, nam potentia sine actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus actus operantis; unde et actus secundus a philosopho nominatur, in II de anima, nam habens formam potest esse in potentia operans, sicut sciens est in potentia considerans. Et inde est quod in aliis quoque rebus res unaquaeque dicitur esse propter suam operationem, ut dicitur in II de caelo. Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis operationem esse. I answer that, insofar as man’s happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness is man’s supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect insofar as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently happiness must consist in man’s last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the Philosopher calls it second act (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said to be for its operation (De Coelo ii, 3). Therefore man’s happiness must of necessity consist in an operation.