Respondeo dicendum quod passiones differunt secundum activa, quae sunt obiecta passionum animae. Differentia autem activorum potest attendi dupliciter, uno modo, secundum speciem vel naturam ipsorum activorum, sicut ignis differt ab aqua; alio modo, secundum diversam virtutem activam. Diversitas autem activi vel motivi quantum ad virtutem movendi, potest accipi in passionibus animae secundum similitudinem agentium naturalium. Omne enim movens trahit quodammodo ad se patiens, vel a se repellit. Trahendo quidem ad se, tria facit in ipso. Nam primo quidem, dat ei inclinationem vel aptitudinem ut in ipsum tendat, sicut cum corpus leve, quod est sursum, dat levitatem corpori generato, per quam habet inclinationem vel aptitudinem ad hoc quod sit sursum. Secundo, si corpus generatum est extra locum proprium, dat ei moveri ad locum. Tertio, dat ei quiescere, in locum cum pervenerit, quia ex eadem causa aliquid quiescit in loco, per quam movebatur ad locum. Et similiter intelligendum est de causa repulsionis. I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from water; second, from the point of view of the difference in their active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Second, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover gives it movement towards that place. Third, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion. In motibus autem appetitivae partis, bonum habet quasi virtutem attractivam, malum autem virtutem repulsivam. Bonum ergo primo quidem in potentia appetitiva causat quandam inclinationem, seu aptitudinem, seu connaturalitatem ad bonum, quod pertinet ad passionem amoris. Cui per contrarium respondet odium, ex parte mali. Secundo, si bonum sit nondum habitum, dat ei motum ad assequendum bonum amatum, et hoc pertinet ad passionem desiderii vel concupiscentiae. Et ex opposito, ex parte mali, est fuga vel abominatio. Tertio, cum adeptum fuerit bonum, dat appetitus quietationem quandam in ipso bono adepto, et hoc pertinet ad delectationem vel gaudium. Cui opponitur ex parte mali dolor vel tristitia. Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of love: the corresponding contrary of which is hatred in respect of evil. Second, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of desire or concupiscence: and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of aversion or dislike. Third, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of delight or joy; the contrary of which, in respect of evil, is sorrow or sadness. In passionibus autem irascibilis, praesupponitur quidem aptitudo vel inclinatio ad prosequendum bonum vel fugiendum malum, ex concupiscibili, quae absolute respicit bonum vel malum. Et respectu boni nondum adepti, est spes et desperatio. Respectu autem mali nondum iniacentis, est timor et audacia. Respectu autem boni adepti, non est aliqua passio in irascibili, quia iam non habet rationem ardui, ut supra dictum est. Sed ex malo iam iniacenti, sequitur passio irae. On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have hope and despair. In respect of evil not yet present we have fear and daring. But in respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above (A3). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of anger. Sic igitur patet quod in concupiscibili sunt tres coniugationes passionum, scilicet amor et odium, desiderium et fuga gaudium et tristitia. Similiter in irascibili sunt tres, scilicet spes et desperatio, timor et audacia, et ira, cui nulla passio opponitur. Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz., love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz., hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion. Sunt ergo omnes passiones specie differentes undecim, sex quidem in concupiscibili, et quinque in irascibili; sub quibus omnes animae passiones continentur. Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. From this the replies to the objections are evident. Quaestio 24 Question 24 De bono et malo circa passiones animae Of Good and Evil in the Passions of the Soul Deinde considerandum est de bono et malo circa passiones animae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider good and evil in the passions of the soul: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum bonum et malum morale possit in passionibus animae inveniri. (1) Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul? Secundo, utrum omnis passio animae sit mala moraliter. (2) Whether every passion of the soul is morally evil? Tertio, utrum omnis passio addat, vel diminuat, ad bonitatem vel malitiam actus. (3) Whether every passion increases or decreases the goodness of malice of an act? Quarto, utrum aliqua passio sit bona vel mala ex sua specie. (4) Whether any passion is good or evil specifically? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum aliqua passio animae sit bona vel mala moraliter Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod nulla passio animae sit bona vel mala moraliter. Bonum enim et malum morale est proprium hominis, mores enim proprie dicuntur humani, ut Ambrosius dicit, super Lucam. Sed passiones non sunt propriae hominum, sed sunt etiam aliis animalibus communes. Ergo nulla passio animae est bona vel mala moraliter. Objection 1: It would seem that no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. For moral good and evil are proper to man: since morals are properly predicated of man, as Ambrose says (Super Luc. Prolog.). But passions are not proper to man, for he has them in common with other animals. Therefore no passion of the soul is morally good or evil. Praeterea, bonum vel malum hominis est secundum rationem esse, vel praeter rationem esse, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Sed passiones animae non sunt in ratione, sed in appetitu sensitivo, ut supra dictum est. Ergo non pertinent ad bonum vel malum hominis, quod est bonum morale. Obj. 2: Further, the good or evil of man consists in being in accord, or in disaccord with reason, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now the passions of the soul are not in the reason, but in the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Q22, A3). Therefore they have no connection with human, i.e., moral, good or evil. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., quod passionibus neque laudamur neque vituperamur. Sed secundum bona et mala moralia, laudamur et vituperamur. Ergo passiones non sunt bonae vel malae moraliter. Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions. But we are praised and blamed for moral good and evil. Therefore the passions are not morally good or evil. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, de passionibus animae loquens mala sunt ista, si malus est amor; bona, si bonus. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) while speaking of the passions of the soul: They are evil if our love is evil; good if our love is good. Respondeo dicendum quod passiones animae dupliciter possunt considerari, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis. Si igitur secundum se considerentur, prout scilicet sunt motus quidam irrationalis appetitus, sic non est in eis bonum vel malum morale, quod dependet a ratione, ut supra dictum est. Si autem considerentur secundum quod subiacent imperio rationis et voluntatis, sic est in eis bonum et malum morale. Propinquior enim est appetitus sensitivus ipsi rationi et voluntati, quam membra exteriora; quorum tamen motus et actus sunt boni vel mali moraliter, secundum quod sunt voluntarii. Unde multo magis et ipsae passiones, secundum quod sunt voluntariae, possunt dici bonae vel malae moraliter. Dicuntur autem voluntariae vel ex eo quod a voluntate imperantur, vel ex eo quod a voluntate non prohibentur. I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; second, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (Q18, A5). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, insofar as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod istae passiones secundum se consideratae, sunt communes hominibus et aliis animalibus, sed secundum quod a ratione imperantur, sunt propriae hominum. Reply Obj. 1: These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals: but, as commanded by the reason, they are proper to man. Ad secundum dicendum quod etiam inferiores vires appetitivae dicuntur rationales, secundum quod participant aliqualiter rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Reply Obj. 2: Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, insofar as they partake of reason in some sort (Ethic. i, 13). Ad tertium dicendum quod philosophus dicit quod non laudamur aut vituperamur secundum passiones absolute consideratas, sed non removet quin possint fieri laudabiles vel vituperabiles secundum quod a ratione ordinantur. Unde subdit, non enim laudatur aut vituperatur qui timet aut irascitur, sed qui aliqualiter, idest secundum rationem vel praeter rationem. Reply Obj. 3: The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, insofar as they are subordinate to reason. Hence he continues: For the man who fears or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e., according to, or against reason. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum omnes passiones animae sint malae moraliter Whether all the passions of the soul are morally evil? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod omnes passiones animae sint malae moraliter. Dicit enim Augustinus, IX de Civ. Dei, quod passiones animae quidam vocant morbos vel perturbationes animae. Sed omnis morbus vel perturbatio animae est aliquid malum moraliter. Ergo omnis passio animae moraliter mala est. Objection 1: It would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 4) that some call the soul’s passions diseases or disturbances of the soul. But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil. Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally. Praeterea, Damascenus dicit quod operatio quidem qui secundum naturam motus est, passio vero qui praeter naturam. Sed quod est praeter naturam in motibus animae, habet rationem peccati et mali moralis, unde ipse alibi dicit quod Diabolus versus est ex eo quod est secundum naturam, in id quod est praeter naturam. Ergo huiusmodi passiones sunt malae moraliter. Obj. 2: Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to nature is passion. But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil: hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is against nature. Therefore these passions are morally evil. Praeterea, omne quod inducit ad peccatum, habet rationem mali. Sed huiusmodi passiones inducunt ad peccatum, unde Rom. VII dicuntur passiones peccatorum. Ergo videtur quod sint malae moraliter. Obj. 3: Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil. But these passions lead to sin: wherefore they are called the passions of sins (Rom 7:5). Therefore it seems that they are morally evil. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in XIV de Civ. Dei, quod rectus amor omnes istas affectiones rectas habet. Metuunt enim peccare, cupiunt perseverare, dolent in peccatis, gaudent in operibus bonis. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 9) that all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . . For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works. Respondeo dicendum quod circa hanc quaestionem diversa fuit sententia Stoicorum et Peripateticorum, nam Stoici dixerunt omnes passiones esse malas; Peripatetici vero dixerunt passiones moderatas esse bonas. Quae quidem differentia, licet magna videatur secundum vocem, tamen secundum rem vel nulla est, vel parva, si quis utrorumque intentiones consideret. Stoici enim non discernebant inter sensum et intellectum; et per consequens nec inter intellectivum appetitum et sensitivum. Unde non discernebant passiones animae a motibus voluntatis secundum hoc quod passiones animae sunt in appetitu sensitivo, simplices autem motus voluntatis sunt in intellectivo; sed omnem rationabilem motum appetitivae partis vocabant voluntatem, passionem autem dicebant motum progredientem extra limites rationis. Et ideo, eorum sententiam sequens, Tullius, in III libro de Tusculanis quaestionibus, omnes passiones vocat animae morbos. Ex quo argumentatur quod qui morbosi sunt, sani non sunt; et qui sani non sunt, insipientes sunt. Unde et insipientes insanos dicimus. I answer that, On this question the opinion of the Stoics differed from that of the Peripatetics: for the Stoics held that all passions are evil, while the Peripatetics maintained that moderate passions are good. This difference, although it appears great in words, is nevertheless, in reality, none at all, or but little, if we consider the intent of either school. For the Stoics did not discern between sense and intellect; and consequently neither between the intellectual and sensitive appetite. Hence they did not discriminate the passions of the soul from the movements of the will, insofar as the passions of the soul are in the sensitive appetite, while the simple movements of the will are in the intellectual appetite: but every rational movement of the appetitive part they call will, while they called passion, a movement that exceeds the limits of reason. Wherefore Cicero, following their opinion (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) calls all passions diseases of the soul: whence he argues that those who are diseased are unsound; and those who are unsound are wanting in sense. Hence we speak of those who are wanting in sense of being unsound. Peripatetici vero omnes motus appetitus sensitivi passiones vocant. Unde eas bonas aestimant, cum sunt a ratione moderatae; malas autem, cum sunt praeter moderationem rationis. Ex quo patet quod Tullius, in eodem libro, Peripateticorum sententiam, qui approbabant mediocritatem passionum, inconvenienter improbat, dicens quod omne malum, etiam mediocre, vitandum est, nam sicut corpus, etiamsi mediocriter aegrum est, sanum non est; sic ista mediocritas morborum vel passionum animae, sana non est. Non enim passiones dicuntur morbi vel perturbationes animae, nisi cum carent moderatione rationis. On the other hand, the Peripatetics give the name of passions to all the movements of the sensitive appetite. Wherefore they esteem them good, when they are controlled by reason; and evil when they are not controlled by reason. Hence it is evident that Cicero was wrong in disapproving (De Tusc. Quaest. iii, 4) of the Peripatetic theory of a mean in the passions, when he says that every evil, though moderate, should be shunned; for, just as a body, though it be moderately ailing, is not sound; so, this mean in the diseases or passions of the soul, is not sound. For passions are not called diseases or disturbances of the soul, save when they are not controlled by reason. Unde patet responsio ad primum. Hence the reply to the First Objection is evident. Ad secundum dicendum quod in omni passione animae additur aliquid, vel diminuitur a naturali motu cordis, inquantum cor intensius vel remissius movetur, secundum systolen aut diastolen, et secundum hoc habet passionis rationem. Non tamen oportet quod passio semper declinet ab ordine naturalis rationis. Reply Obj. 2: In every passion there is an increase or decrease in the natural movement of the heart, according as the heart is moved more or less intensely by contraction and dilatation; and hence it derives the character of passion. But there is no need for passion to deviate always from the order of natural reason. Ad tertium dicendum quod passiones animae, inquantum sunt praeter ordinem rationis, inclinant ad peccatum, inquantum autem sunt ordinatae a ratione, pertinent ad virtutem. Reply Obj. 3: The passions of the soul, insofar as they are contrary to the order of reason, incline us to sin: but insofar as they are controlled by reason, they pertain to virtue. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum passio quaecumque semper diminuat de bonitate actus moralis Whether passion increases or decreases the goodness or malice of an act?