Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum amor sit causa odii Whether love is a cause of hatred? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit causa odii. Ea enim quae ex opposito dividuntur, naturaliter sunt simul, ut dicitur in praedicamentis. Sed amor et odium, cum sint contraria, ex opposito dividuntur. Ergo naturaliter sunt simul. Non ergo amor est causa odii. Objection 1: It would seem that love is not a cause of hatred. For the opposite members of a division are naturally simultaneous (Praedic. x). But love and hatred are opposite members of a division, since they are contrary to one another. Therefore they are naturally simultaneous. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. Praeterea, unum contrariorum non est causa alterius. Sed amor et odium sunt contraria. Ergo amor non est causa odii. Obj. 2: Further, of two contraries, one is not the cause of the other. But love and hatred are contraries. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. Praeterea, posterius non est causa prioris. Sed odium est prius amore, ut videtur, nam odium importat recessum a malo, amor vero accessum ad bonum. Ergo amor non est causa odii. Obj. 3: Further, that which follows is not the cause of that which precedes. But hatred precedes love, seemingly: since hatred implies a turning away from evil, whereas love implies a turning towards good. Therefore love is not the cause of hatred. Sed contra est quod dicit Augustinus, XIV de Civ. Dei, quod omnes affectiones causantur ex amore. Ergo et odium, cum sit quaedam affectio animae, causatur ex amore. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all emotions are caused by love. Therefore hatred also, since it is an emotion of the soul, is caused by love. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, amor consistit in quadam convenientia amantis ad amatum, odium vero consistit in quadam repugnantia vel dissonantia. Oportet autem in quolibet prius considerare quid ei conveniat, quam quid ei repugnet, per hoc enim aliquid est repugnans alteri, quia est corruptivum vel impeditivum eius quod est conveniens. Unde necesse est quod amor sit prior odio; et quod nihil odio habeatur, nisi per hoc quod contrariatur convenienti quod amatur. Et secundum hoc, omne odium ex amore causatur. I answer that, As stated above (A1), love consists in a certain agreement of the lover with the object loved, while hatred consists in a certain disagreement or dissonance. Now we should consider in each thing, what agrees with it, before that which disagrees: since a thing disagrees with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred; and nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a suitable thing which is loved. And hence it is that every hatred is caused by love. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in his quae ex opposito dividuntur, quaedam inveniuntur quae sunt naturaliter simul et secundum rem, et secundum rationem, sicut duae species animalis, vel duae species coloris. Quaedam vero sunt simul secundum rationem, sed unum realiter est prius altero et causa eius, sicut patet in speciebus numerorum, figurarum et motuum. Quaedam vero non sunt simul nec secundum rem, nec secundum rationem, sicut substantia et accidens, nam substantia realiter est causa accidentis; et ens secundum rationem prius attribuitur substantiae quam accidenti, quia accidenti non attribuitur nisi inquantum est in substantia. Amor autem et odium naturaliter quidem sunt simul secundum rationem, sed non realiter. Unde nihil prohibet amorem esse causam odii. Reply Obj. 1: The opposite members of a division are sometimes naturally simultaneous, both really and logically; e.g., two species of animal, or two species of color. Sometimes they are simultaneous logically, while, in reality, one precedes, and causes the other; e.g., the species of numbers, figures and movements. Sometimes they are not simultaneous either really or logically; e.g., substance and accident; for substance is in reality the cause of accident; and being is predicated of substance before it is predicated of accident, by a priority of reason, because it is not predicated of accident except inasmuch as the latter is in substance. Now love and hatred are naturally simultaneous, logically but not really. Wherefore nothing hinders love from being the cause of hatred. Ad secundum dicendum quod amor et odium sunt contraria, quando accipiuntur circa idem. Sed quando sunt de contrariis, non sunt contraria, sed se invicem consequentia, eiusdem enim rationis est quod ametur aliquid, et odiatur eius contrarium. Et sic amor unius rei est causa quod eius contrarium odiatur. Reply Obj. 2: Love and hatred are contraries if considered in respect of the same thing. But if taken in respect of contraries, they are not themselves contrary, but consequent to one another: for it amounts to the same that one love a certain thing, or that one hate its contrary. Thus love of one thing is the cause of one’s hating its contrary. Ad tertium dicendum quod in executione prius est recedere ab uno termino, quam accedere ad alterum terminum. Sed in intentione est e converso, propter hoc enim receditur ab uno termino, ut accedatur ad alterum. Motus autem appetitivus magis pertinet ad intentionem quam ad executionem. Et ideo amor est prior odio, cum utrumque sit motus appetitivus. Reply Obj. 3: In the order of execution, the turning away from one term precedes the turning towards the other. But the reverse is the case in the order of intention: since approach to one term is the reason for turning away from the other. Now the appetitive movement belongs rather to the order of intention than to that of execution. Wherefore love precedes hatred: because each is an appetitive movement. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum odium sit fortius amore Whether hatred is stronger than love? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod odium sit fortius amore. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., nemo est qui non magis dolorem fugiat, quam appetat voluptatem. Sed fugere dolorem pertinet ad odium, appetitus autem voluptatis pertinet ad amorem. Ergo odium est fortius amore. Objection 1: It would seem that hatred is stronger than love. For Augustine says (83 Questions, Q36): There is no one who does not flee from pain, more than he desires pleasure. But flight from pain pertains to hatred; while desire for pleasure belongs to love. Therefore hatred is stronger than love. Praeterea, debilius vincitur a fortiori. Sed amor vincitur ab odio, quando scilicet amor convertitur in odium. Ergo odium est fortius amore. Obj. 2: Further, the weaker is overcome by the stronger. But love is overcome by hatred: when, that is to say, love is turned into hatred. Therefore hatred is stronger than love. Praeterea, affectio animae per effectum manifestatur. Sed fortius insistit homo ad repellendum odiosum, quam ad prosequendum amatum, sicut etiam bestiae abstinent a delectabilibus propter verbera, ut Augustinus introducit in libro octoginta trium quaest. Ergo odium est fortius amore. Obj. 3: Further, the emotions of the soul are shown by their effects. But man insists more on repelling what is hateful, than on seeking what is pleasant: thus also irrational animals refrain from pleasure for fear of the whip, as Augustine instances (83 Questions, Q36). Therefore hatred is stronger than love. Sed contra, bonum est fortius quam malum, quia malum non agit nisi virtute boni, ut Dionysius dicit, cap. IV de Div. Nom. Sed odium et amor differunt secundum differentiam boni et mali. Ergo amor est fortior odio. On the contrary, Good is stronger than evil; because evil does nothing except in virtue of good, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But hatred and love differ according to the difference of good and evil. Therefore love is stronger than hatred. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est effectum sua causa esse fortiorem. Omne autem odium procedit ex aliquo amore sicut ex causa, ut supra dictum est. I answer that, It is impossible for an effect to be stronger than its cause. Now every hatred arises from some love as its cause, as above stated (A2). Therefore it is impossible for hatred to be stronger than love absolutely. Unde impossibile est quod odium sit fortius amore simpliciter. Sed oportet ulterius quod amor, simpliciter loquendo, sit odio fortior. Fortius enim movetur aliquid in finem, quam in ea quae sunt ad finem. Recessus autem a malo ordinatur ad consecutionem boni, sicut ad finem. Unde, simpliciter loquendo, fortior est motus animae in bonum quam in malum. But furthermore, love must needs be, absolutely speaking, stronger than hatred. Because a thing is moved to the end more strongly than to the means. Now turning away from evil is directed as a means to the gaining of good. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, the soul’s movement in respect of good is stronger than its movement in respect of evil. Sed tamen aliquando videtur odium fortius amore, propter duo. Primo quidem, quia odium est magis sensibile quam amor. Cum enim sensus perceptio sit in quadam immutatione, ex quo aliquid iam immutatum est, non ita sentitur sicut quando est in ipso immutari. Unde calor febris hecticae, quamvis sit maior, non tamen ita sentitur sicut calor tertianae, quia calor hecticae iam versus est quasi in habitum et naturam. Propter hoc etiam, amor magis sentitur in absentia amati, sicut Augustinus dicit, in X de Trin., quod amor non ita sentitur, cum non prodit eum indigentia. Et propter hoc etiam, repugnantia eius quod oditur, sensibilius percipitur quam convenientia eius quod amatur. Secundo, quia non comparatur odium ad amorem sibi correspondentem. Secundum enim diversitatem bonorum, est diversitas amorum in magnitudine et parvitate, quibus proportionantur opposita odia. Unde odium quod correspondet maiori amori, magis movet quam minor amor. Nevertheless hatred sometimes seems to be stronger than love, for two reasons. First, because hatred is more keenly felt than love. For, since the sensitive perception is accompanied by a certain impression; when once the impression has been received it is not felt so keenly as in the moment of receiving it. Hence the heat of a hectic fever, though greater, is nevertheless not felt so much as the heat of tertian fever; because the heat of the hectic fever is habitual and like a second nature. For this reason, love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved; thus Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12) that love is felt more keenly when we lack what we love. And for the same reason, the unbecomingness of that which is hated is felt more keenly than the becomingness of that which is loved. Second, because comparison is made between a hatred and a love which are not mutually corresponding. Because, according to different degrees of good there are different degrees of love to which correspond different degrees of hatred. Wherefore a hatred that corresponds to a greater love, moves us more than a lesser love. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. Nam amor voluptatis est minor quam amor conservationis sui ipsius, cui respondet fuga doloris. Et ideo magis fugitur dolor, quam ametur voluptas. Hence it is clear how to reply to the First Objection. For the love of pleasure is less than the love of self-preservation, to which corresponds flight from pain. Wherefore we flee from pain more than we love pleasure. Ad secundum dicendum quod odium nunquam vinceret amorem, nisi propter maiorem amorem cui odium correspondet. Sicut homo magis diligit se quam amicum, et propter hoc quod diligit se, habet odio etiam amicum, si sibi contrarietur. Reply Obj. 2: Hatred would never overcome love, were it not for the greater love to which that hatred corresponds. Thus man loves himself, more than he loves his friend: and because he loves himself, his friend is hateful to him, if he oppose him. Ad tertium dicendum quod ideo intensius aliquid operatur ad repellendum odiosa, quia odium est magis sensibile. Reply Obj. 3: The reason why we act with greater insistence in repelling what is hateful, is because we feel hatred more keenly. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum aliquis possit seipsum odio habere Whether a man can hate himself? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis possit seipsum odio habere. Dicitur enim in Psalmo X, qui diligit iniquitatem, odit animam suam. Sed multi diligunt iniquitatem. Ergo multi odiunt seipsos. Objection 1: It would seem that a man can hate himself. For it is written (Ps 10:6): He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul. But many love iniquity. Therefore many hate themselves. Praeterea, illum odimus, cui volumus et operamur malum. Sed quandoque aliquis vult et operatur sibi ipsi malum, puta qui interimunt seipsos. Ergo aliqui seipsos habent odio. Obj. 2: Further, him we hate, to whom we wish and work evil. But sometimes a man wishes and works evil to himself, e.g., a man who kills himself. Therefore some men hate themselves. Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in II de Consol., quod avaritia facit homines odiosos, ex quo potest accipi quod omnis homo odit avarum. Sed aliqui sunt avari. Ergo illi odiunt seipsos. Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. ii) that avarice makes a man hateful; whence we may conclude that everyone hates a miser. But some men are misers. Therefore they hate themselves. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Ephes. V, quod nemo unquam carnem suam odio habuit. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Eph 5:29) that no man ever hated his own flesh. Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est quod aliquis, per se loquendo, odiat seipsum. Naturaliter enim unumquodque appetit bonum, nec potest aliquis aliquid sibi appetere nisi sub ratione boni, nam malum est praeter voluntatem, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Amare autem aliquem est velle ei bonum, ut supra dictum est. Unde necesse est quod aliquis amet seipsum; et impossibile est quod aliquis odiat seipsum, per se loquendo. I answer that, Properly speaking, it is impossible for a man to hate himself. For everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire anything for himself, save under the aspect of good: for evil is outside the scope of the will, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Now to love a man is to will good to him, as stated above (Q26, A4). Consequently, a man must, of necessity, love himself; and it is impossible for a man to hate himself, properly speaking. Per accidens tamen contingit quod aliquis seipsum odio habeat. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo, ex parte boni quod sibi aliquis vult. Accidit enim quandoque illud quod appetitur ut secundum quid bonum, esse simpliciter malum, et secundum hoc, aliquis per accidens vult sibi malum, quod est odire. Alio modo, ex parte sui ipsius, cui vult bonum. Unumquodque enim maxime est id quod est principalius in ipso, unde civitas dicitur facere quod rex facit, quasi rex sit tota civitas. Manifestum est ergo quod homo maxime est mens hominis. Contingit autem quod aliqui aestimant se esse maxime illud quod sunt secundum naturam corporalem et sensitivam. Unde amant se secundum id quod aestimant se esse, sed odiunt id quod vere sunt, dum volunt contraria rationi. Et utroque modo, ille qui diligit iniquitatem, odit non solum animam suam, sed etiam seipsum. But accidentally it happens that a man hates himself: and this in two ways. First, on the part of the good which a man wills to himself. For it happens sometimes that what is desired as good in some particular respect, is simply evil; and in this way, a man accidentally wills evil to himself; and thus hates himself. Second, in regard to himself, to whom he wills good. For each thing is that which is predominant in it; wherefore the state is said to do what the king does, as if the king were the whole state. Now it is clear that man is principally the mind of man. And it happens that some men account themselves as being principally that which they are in their material and sensitive nature. Wherefore they love themselves according to what they take themselves to be, while they hate that which they really are, by desiring what is contrary to reason. And in both these ways, he that loveth iniquity hateth not only his own soul, but also himself. Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum. Wherefore the reply to the First Objection is evident. Ad secundum dicendum quod nullus sibi vult et facit malum, nisi inquantum apprehendit illud sub ratione boni. Nam et illi qui interimunt seipsos, hoc ipsum quod est mori, apprehendunt sub ratione boni, inquantum est terminativum alicuius miseriae vel doloris. Reply Obj. 2: No man wills and works evil to himself, except he apprehend it under the aspect of good. For even they who kill themselves, apprehend death itself as a good, considered as putting an end to some unhappiness or pain. Ad tertium dicendum quod avarus odit aliquod accidens suum, non tamen propter hoc odit seipsum, sicut aeger odit suam aegritudinem, ex hoc ipso quod se amat. Vel dicendum quod avaritia odiosos facit aliis, non autem sibi ipsi. Quinimmo causatur ex inordinato sui amore, secundum quem de bonis temporalibus plus sibi aliquis vult quam debeat. Reply Obj. 3: The miser hates something accidental to himself, but not for that reason does he hate himself: thus a sick man hates his sickness for the very reason that he loves himself. Or we may say that avarice makes man hateful to others, but not to himself. In fact, it is caused by inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum aliquis possit habere odio veritatem Whether a man can hate the truth? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod aliquis non possit habere odio veritatem. Bonum enim et ens et verum convertuntur. Sed aliquis non potest habere odio bonitatem. Ergo nec veritatem. Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good, true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good. Neither, therefore, can he hate the truth.