Quaestio 3 Question 3 Quid sit beatitudo What is Happiness Deinde considerandum est quid sit beatitudo; et quae requirantur ad ipsam. We have now to consider (1) what happiness is, and (2) what things are required for it. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. (1) Whether happiness is something uncreated? Secundo, si est aliquid creatum, utrum sit operatio. (2) If it be something created, whether it is an operation? Tertio, utrum sit operatio sensitivae partis, an intellectivae tantum. (3) Whether it is an operation of the sensitive, or only of the intellectual part? Quarto, si est operatio intellectivae partis, utrum sit operatio intellectus, an voluntatis. (4) If it be an operation of the intellectual part, whether it is an operation of the intellect, or of the will? Quinto, si est operatio intellectus, utrum sit operatio intellectus speculativi, aut practici. (5) If it be an operation of the intellect, whether it is an operation of the speculative or of the practical intellect? Sexto, si est operatio intellectus speculativi, utrum consistat in speculatione scientiarum speculativarum. (6) If it be an operation of the speculative intellect, whether it consists in the consideration of speculative sciences? Septimo, utrum consistat in speculatione substantiarum separatarum, scilicet Angelorum. (7) Whether it consists in the consideration of separate substances, viz., angels? Octavo, utrum in sola speculatione Dei qua per essentiam videtur. (8) Whether it consists in the sole contemplation of God seen in His Essence? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum beatitudo sit aliquid increatum Whether happiness is something uncreated? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo sit aliquid increatum. Dicit enim Boetius, in III de Consol., Deum esse ipsam beatitudinem necesse est confiteri. Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is something uncreated. For Boethius says (De Consol. iii): We must needs confess that God is happiness itself. Praeterea, beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed esse summum bonum convenit Deo. Cum ergo non sint plura summa bona, videtur quod beatitudo sit idem quod Deus. Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But it belongs to God to be the supreme good. Since, then, there are not several supreme goods, it seems that happiness is the same as God. Praeterea, beatitudo est ultimus finis, in quem naturaliter humana voluntas tendit. Sed in nullum aliud voluntas tanquam in finem tendere debet nisi in Deum; quo solo fruendum est, ut Augustinus dicit. Ergo beatitudo est idem quod Deus. Obj. 3: Further, happiness is the last end, to which man’s will tends naturally. But man’s will should tend to nothing else as an end, but to God, Who alone is to be enjoyed, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 5,22). Therefore happiness is the same as God. Sed contra, nullum factum est increatum. Sed beatitudo hominis est aliquid factum, quia secundum Augustinum, I de Doctr. Christ., illis rebus fruendum est, quae nos beatos faciunt. Ergo beatitudo non est aliquid increatum. On the contrary, Nothing made is uncreated. But man’s happiness is something made; because according to Augustine (De Doctr. Christ. i, 3): Those things are to be enjoyed which make us happy. Therefore happiness is not something uncreated. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, ipsa res quam cupimus adipisci, sicut avaro est finis pecunia. Alio modo, ipsa adeptio vel possessio, seu usus aut fruitio eius rei quae desideratur, sicut si dicatur quod possessio pecuniae est finis avari, et frui re voluptuosa est finis intemperati. Primo ergo modo, ultimus hominis finis est bonum increatum, scilicet Deus, qui solus sua infinita bonitate potest voluntatem hominis perfecte implere. Secundo autem modo, ultimus finis hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens, quod nihil est aliud quam adeptio vel fruitio finis ultimi. Ultimus autem finis vocatur beatitudo. Si ergo beatitudo hominis consideretur quantum ad causam vel obiectum, sic est aliquid increatum, si autem consideretur quantum ad ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, sic est aliquid creatum. I answer that, As stated above (Q1, A8; Q2, A7), our end is twofold. First, there is the thing itself which we desire to attain: thus for the miser, the end is money. Second there is the attainment or possession, the use or enjoyment of the thing desired; thus we may say that the end of the miser is the possession of money; and the end of the intemperate man is to enjoy something pleasurable. In the first sense, then, man’s last end is the uncreated good, namely, God, Who alone by His infinite goodness can perfectly satisfy man’s will. But in the second way, man’s last end is something created, existing in him, and this is nothing else than the attainment or enjoyment of the last end. Now the last end is called happiness. If, therefore, we consider man’s happiness in its cause or object, then it is something uncreated; but if we consider it as to the very essence of happiness, then it is something created. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus est beatitudo per essentiam suam, non enim per adeptionem aut participationem alicuius alterius beatus est, sed per essentiam suam. Homines autem sunt beati, sicut ibidem dicit Boetius, per participationem; sicut et dii per participationem dicuntur. Ipsa autem participatio beatitudinis secundum quam homo dicitur beatus, aliquid creatum est. Reply Obj. 1: God is happiness by his Essence: for he is happy not by acquisition or participation of something else, but by his Essence. On the other hand, men are happy, as Boethius says (De Consol. iii), by participation; just as they are called gods, by participation. And this participation of happiness, in respect of which man is said to be happy, is something created. Ad secundum dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum hominis bonum, quia est adeptio vel fruitio summi boni. Reply Obj. 2: Happiness is called man’s supreme good, because it is the attainment or enjoyment of the supreme good. Ad tertium dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur ultimus finis, per modum quo adeptio finis dicitur finis. Reply Obj. 3: Happiness is said to be the last end, in the same way as the attainment of the end is called the end. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum beatitudo sit operatio Whether happiness is an operation? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo non sit operatio. Dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VI, habetis fructum vestrum in sanctificationem, finem vero vitam aeternam. Sed vita non est operatio, sed ipsum esse viventium. Ergo ultimus finis, qui est beatitudo, non est operatio. Objection 1: It would seem that happiness is not an operation. For the Apostle says (Rom 6:22): You have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end, life everlasting. But life is not an operation, but the very being of living things. Therefore the last end, which is happiness, is not an operation. Praeterea, Boetius dicit, in III de Consol., quod beatitudo est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus. Sed status non nominat operationem. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio. Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says (De Consol. iii) that happiness is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things. But state does not indicate operation. Therefore happiness is not an operation. Praeterea, beatitudo significat aliquid in beato existens, cum sit ultima perfectio hominis. Sed operatio non significat ut aliquid existens in operante, sed magis ut ab ipso procedens. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio. Obj. 3: Further, happiness signifies something existing in the happy one: since it is man’s final perfection. But the meaning of operation does not imply anything existing in the operator, but rather something proceeding therefrom. Therefore happiness is not an operation. Praeterea, beatitudo permanet in beato. Operatio autem non permanet, sed transit. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio. Obj. 4: Further, happiness remains in the happy one. Now operation does not remain, but passes. Therefore happiness is not an operation. Praeterea, unius hominis est una beatitudo. Operationes autem sunt multae. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio. Obj. 5: Further, to one man there is one happiness. But operations are many. Therefore happiness is not an operation. Praeterea, beatitudo inest beato absque interruptione. Sed operatio humana frequenter interrumpitur puta somno, vel aliqua alia occupatione, vel quiete. Ergo beatitudo non est operatio. Obj. 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I Ethic., quod felicitas est operatio secundum virtutem perfectam. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum quod beatitudo hominis est aliquid creatum in ipso existens necesse est dicere quod beatitudo hominis sit operatio. Est enim beatitudo ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque autem intantum perfectum est, inquantum est actu, nam potentia sine actu imperfecta est. Oportet ergo beatitudinem in ultimo actu hominis consistere. Manifestum est autem quod operatio est ultimus actus operantis; unde et actus secundus a philosopho nominatur, in II de anima, nam habens formam potest esse in potentia operans, sicut sciens est in potentia considerans. Et inde est quod in aliis quoque rebus res unaquaeque dicitur esse propter suam operationem, ut dicitur in II de caelo. Necesse est ergo beatitudinem hominis operationem esse. I answer that, insofar as man’s happiness is something created, existing in him, we must needs say that it is an operation. For happiness is man’s supreme perfection. Now each thing is perfect insofar as it is actual; since potentiality without act is imperfect. Consequently happiness must consist in man’s last act. But it is evident that operation is the last act of the operator, wherefore the Philosopher calls it second act (De Anima ii, 1): because that which has a form can be potentially operating, just as he who knows is potentially considering. And hence it is that in other things, too, each one is said to be for its operation (De Coelo ii, 3). Therefore man’s happiness must of necessity consist in an operation. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vita dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, ipsum esse viventis. Et sic beatitudo non est vita, ostensum est enim quod esse unius hominis, qualecumque sit, non est hominis beatitudo; solius enim Dei beatitudo est suum esse. Alio modo dicitur vita ipsa operatio viventis, secundum quam principium vitae in actum reducitur, et sic nominamus vitam activam, vel contemplativam, vel voluptuosam. Et hoc modo vita aeterna dicitur ultimus finis. Quod patet per hoc quod dicitur Ioan. XVII, haec est vita aeterna, ut cognoscant te, Deum verum unum. Reply Obj. 1: Life is taken in two senses. First for the very being of the living. And thus happiness is not life: since it has been shown (Q2, A5) that the being of a man, no matter in what it may consist, is not that man’s happiness; for of God alone is it true that His Being is His Happiness. Second, life means the operation of the living, by which operation the principle of life is made actual: thus we speak of active and contemplative life, or of a life of pleasure. And in this sense eternal life is said to be the last end, as is clear from John 17: This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God (8). Ad secundum dicendum quod Boetius, definiendo beatitudinem, consideravit ipsam communem beatitudinis rationem. Est enim communis ratio beatitudinis quod sit bonum commune perfectum; et hoc significavit cum dixit quod est status omnium bonorum aggregatione perfectus, per quod nihil aliud significatur nisi quod beatus est in statu boni perfecti. Sed Aristoteles expressit ipsam essentiam beatitudinis, ostendens per quid homo sit in huiusmodi statu, quia per operationem quandam. Et ideo in I Ethic. ipse etiam ostendit quod beatitudo est bonum perfectum. Reply Obj. 2: Boethius, in defining happiness, considered happiness in general: for considered thus it is the perfect common good; and he signified this by saying that happiness is a state made perfect by the aggregate of all good things, thus implying that the state of a happy man consists in possessing the perfect good. But Aristotle expressed the very essence of happiness, showing by what man is established in this state, and that it is by some kind of operation. And so it is that he proves happiness to be the perfect good (Ethic. i, 7). Ad tertium dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in IX Metaphys., duplex est actio. Una quae procedit ab operante in exteriorem materiam, sicut urere et secare. Et talis operatio non potest esse beatitudo, nam talis operatio non est actio et perfectio agentis, sed magis patientis, ut ibidem dicitur. Alia est actio manens in ipso agente, ut sentire, intelligere et velle, et huiusmodi actio est perfectio et actus agentis. Et talis operatio potest esse beatitudo. Reply Obj. 3: As stated in Metaph. ix, 7 action is twofold. One proceeds from the agent into outward matter, such as to burn and to cut. And such an operation cannot be happiness: for such an operation is an action and a perfection, not of the agent, but rather of the patient, as is stated in the same passage. The other is an action that remains in the agent, such as to feel, to understand, and to will: and such an action is a perfection and an act of the agent. And such an operation can be happiness. Ad quartum dicendum quod, cum beatitudo dicat quandam ultimam perfectionem, secundum quod diversae res beatitudinis capaces ad diversos gradus perfectionis pertingere possunt, secundum hoc necesse est quod diversimode beatitudo dicatur. Nam in Deo est beatitudo per essentiam, quia ipsum esse eius est operatio eius, qua non fruitur alio, sed seipso. In Angelis autem beatis est ultima perfectio secundum aliquam operationem, qua coniunguntur bono increato, et haec operatio in eis est unica et sempiterna. In hominibus autem, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est ultima perfectio secundum operationem qua homo coniungitur Deo, sed haec operatio nec continua potest esse, et per consequens nec unica est, quia operatio intercisione multiplicatur. Et propter hoc in statu praesentis vitae, perfecta beatitudo ab homine haberi non potest. Unde philosophus, in I Ethic., ponens beatitudinem hominis in hac vita, dicit eam imperfectam, post multa concludens, beatos autem dicimus ut homines. Sed promittitur nobis a Deo beatitudo perfecta, quando erimus sicut Angeli in caelo, sicut dicitur Matth. XXII. Reply Obj. 4: Since happiness signifies some final perfection; according as various things capable of happiness can attain to various degrees of perfection, so must there be various meanings applied to happiness. For in God there is happiness essentially; since His very Being is His operation, whereby He enjoys no other than Himself. In the happy angels, the final perfection is in respect of some operation, by which they are united to the Uncreated Good: and this operation of theirs is one only and everlasting. But in men, according to their present state of life, the final perfection is in respect of an operation whereby man is united to God: but this operation neither can be continual, nor, consequently, is it one only, because operation is multiplied by being discontinued. And for this reason in the present state of life, perfect happiness cannot be attained by man. Wherefore the Philosopher, in placing man’s happiness in this life (Ethic. i, 10), says that it is imperfect, and after a long discussion, concludes: We call men happy, but only as men. But God has promised us perfect happiness, when we shall be as the angels . . . in heaven (Matt 22:30).