Praeterea, beatitudo est perfectum hominis bonum. Sed intellectus practicus magis ordinatur ad bonum quam speculativus, qui ordinatur ad verum. Unde et secundum perfectionem practici intellectus, dicimur boni, non autem secundum perfectionem speculativi intellectus, sed secundum eam dicimur scientes vel intelligentes. Ergo beatitudo hominis magis consistit in actu intellectus practici quam speculativi. Obj. 2: Further, happiness is man’s perfect good. But the practical intellect is ordained to the good rather than the speculative intellect, which is ordained to the true. Hence we are said to be good, in reference to the perfection of the practical intellect, but not in reference to the perfection of the speculative intellect, according to which we are said to be knowing or understanding. Therefore man’s happiness consists in an act of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative. Praeterea, beatitudo est quoddam bonum ipsius hominis. Sed speculativus intellectus occupatur magis circa ea quae sunt extra hominem, practicus autem intellectus occupatur circa ea quae sunt ipsius hominis, scilicet circa operationes et passiones eius. Ergo beatitudo hominis magis consistit in operatione intellectus practici quam intellectus speculativi. Obj. 3: Further, happiness is a good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is more concerned with things outside man; whereas the practical intellect is concerned with things belonging to man himself, viz., his operations and passions. Therefore man’s happiness consists in an operation of the practical intellect rather than of the speculative. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I de Trin., quod contemplatio promittitur nobis, actionum omnium finis, atque aeterna perfectio gaudiorum. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that contemplation is promised us, as being the goal of all our actions, and the everlasting perfection of our joys. Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudo magis consistit in operatione speculativi intellectus quam practici. Quod patet ex tribus. Primo quidem, ex hoc quod, si beatitudo hominis est operatio, oportet quod sit optima operatio hominis. Optima autem operatio hominis est quae est optimae potentiae respectu optimi obiecti. Optima autem potentia est intellectus, cuius optimum obiectum est bonum divinum, quod quidem non est obiectum practici intellectus, sed speculativi. Unde in tali operatione, scilicet in contemplatione divinorum, maxime consistit beatitudo. Et quia unusquisque videtur esse id quod est optimum in eo, ut dicitur in IX et X Ethic., ideo talis operatio est maxime propria homini, et maxime delectabilis. I answer that, Happiness consists in an operation of the speculative rather than of the practical intellect. This is evident for three reasons. First because if man’s happiness is an operation, it must needs be man’s highest operation. Now man’s highest operation is that of his highest power in respect of its highest object: and his highest power is the intellect, whose highest object is the Divine Good, which is the object, not of the practical but of the speculative intellect. Consequently happiness consists principally in such an operation, viz., in the contemplation of Divine things. And since that seems to be each man’s self, which is best in him, according to Ethic. ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to him. Secundo apparet idem ex hoc quod contemplatio maxime quaeritur propter seipsam. Actus autem intellectus practici non quaeritur propter seipsum, sed propter actionem. Ipsae etiam actiones ordinantur ad aliquem finem. Unde manifestum est quod ultimus finis non potest consistere in vita activa, quae pertinet ad intellectum practicum. Second, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought principally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect is not sought for its own sake but for the sake of action: and these very actions are ordained to some end. Consequently it is evident that the last end cannot consist in the active life, which pertains to the practical intellect. Tertio idem apparet ex hoc quod in vita contemplativa homo communicat cum superioribus, scilicet cum Deo et Angelis, quibus per beatitudinem assimilatur. Sed in his quae pertinent ad vitam activam, etiam alia animalia cum homine aliqualiter communicant, licet imperfectae. Third, it is again evident, from the fact that in the contemplative life man has something in common with things above him, viz., with God and the angels, to whom he is made like by happiness. But in things pertaining to the active life, other animals also have something in common with man, although imperfectly. Et ideo ultima et perfecta beatitudo, quae expectatur in futura vita, tota consistit in contemplatione. Beatitudo autem imperfecta, qualis hic haberi potest, primo quidem et principaliter consistit in contemplatione, secundario vero in operatione practici intellectus ordinantis actiones et passiones humanas, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Therefore the last and perfect happiness, which we await in the life to come, consists entirely in contemplation. But imperfect happiness, such as can be had here, consists first and principally in contemplation, secundarily, however, in an operation of the practical intellect directing human actions and passions, as stated in Ethic. x, 7, 8. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod similitudo praedicta intellectus practici ad Deum, est secundum proportionalitatem; quia scilicet se habet ad suum cognitum, sicut Deus ad suum. Sed assimilatio intellectus speculativi ad Deum, est secundum unionem vel informationem; quae est multo maior assimilatio. Et tamen dici potest quod, respectu principalis cogniti, quod est sua essentia, non habet Deus practicam cognitionem, sed speculativam tantum. Reply Obj. 1: The asserted likeness of the practical intellect to God is one of proportion; that is to say, by reason of its standing in relation to what it knows, as God does to what He knows. But the likeness of the speculative intellect to God is one of union and information; which is a much greater likeness. And yet it may be answered that, in regard to the principal thing known, which is His Essence, God has not practical but merely speculative knowledge. Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus practicus ordinatur ad bonum quod est extra ipsum, sed intellectus speculativus habet bonum in seipso, scilicet contemplationem veritatis. Et si illud bonum sit perfectum, ex eo totus homo perficitur et fit bonus, quod quidem intellectus practicus non habet sed ad illud ordinat. Reply Obj. 2: The practical intellect is ordained to good which is outside of it: but the speculative intellect has good within it, viz., the contemplation of truth. And if this good be perfect, the whole man is perfected and made good thereby: such a good the practical intellect has not; but it directs man thereto. Ad tertium dicendum quod ratio illa procederet, si ipsemet homo esset ultimus finis suus, tunc enim consideratio et ordinatio actuum et passionum eius esset eius beatitudo. Sed quia ultimus hominis finis est aliquod bonum extrinsecum, scilicet Deus, ad quem per operationem intellectus speculativi attingimus; ideo magis beatitudo hominis in operatione intellectus speculativi consistit, quam in operatione intellectus practici. Reply Obj. 3: This argument would hold, if man himself were his own last end; for then the consideration and direction of his actions and passions would be his happiness. But since man’s last end is something outside of him, to wit, God, to Whom we reach out by an operation of the speculative intellect; therefore, man’s happiness consists in an operation of the speculative intellect rather than of the practical intellect. Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum Whether happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Philosophus enim dicit, in libro Ethic., quod felicitas est operatio secundum perfectam virtutem. Et distinguens virtutes, non ponit speculativas nisi tres, scientiam, sapientiam et intellectum; quae omnes pertinent ad considerationem scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo ultima hominis beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum consistit. Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 13) that happiness is an operation according to perfect virtue. And in distinguishing the virtues, he gives no more than three speculative virtues—knowledge, wisdom and understanding, which all belong to the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore man’s final happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. Praeterea, illud videtur esse ultima hominis beatitudo, quod naturaliter desideratur ab omnibus propter seipsum. Sed huiusmodi est consideratio speculativarum scientiarum, quia, ut dicitur in I Metaphys., omnes homines natura scire desiderant; et post pauca subditur quod speculativae scientiae propter seipsas quaeruntur. Ergo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum consistit beatitudo. Obj. 2: Further, that which all desire for its own sake, seems to be man’s final happiness. Now such is the consideration of speculative sciences; because, as stated in Metaph. i, 1, all men naturally desire to know; and, a little farther on (2), it is stated that speculative sciences are sought for their own sakes. Therefore happiness consists in the consideration of speculative sciences. Praeterea, beatitudo est ultima hominis perfectio. Unumquodque autem perficitur secundum quod reducitur de potentia in actum. Intellectus autem humanus reducitur in actum per considerationem scientiarum speculativarum. Ergo videtur quod in huiusmodi consideratione ultima hominis beatitudo consistat. Obj. 3: Further, happiness is man’s final perfection. Now everything is perfected, according as it is reduced from potentiality to act. But the human intellect is reduced to act by the consideration of speculative sciences. Therefore it seems that in the consideration of these sciences, man’s final happiness consists. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. IX, non glorietur sapiens in sapientia sua; et loquitur de sapientia speculativarum scientiarum. Non ergo consistit in harum consideratione ultima hominis beatitudo. On the contrary, It is written (Jer 9:23): Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom: and this is said in reference to speculative sciences. Therefore man’s final happiness does not consist in the consideration of these. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, duplex est hominis beatitudo, una perfecta, et alia imperfecta. Oportet autem intelligere perfectam beatitudinem, quae attingit ad veram beatitudinis rationem, beatitudinem autem imperfectam, quae non attingit, sed participat quandam particularem beatitudinis similitudinem. Sicut perfecta prudentia invenitur in homine, apud quem est ratio rerum agibilium, imperfecta autem prudentia est in quibusdam animalibus brutis, in quibus sunt quidam particulares instinctus ad quaedam opera similia operibus prudentiae. I answer that, As stated above (A2, ad 4), man’s happiness is twofold, one perfect, the other imperfect. And by perfect happiness we are to understand that which attains to the true notion of happiness; and by imperfect happiness that which does not attain thereto, but partakes of some particular likeness of happiness. Thus perfect prudence is in man, with whom is the idea of things to be done; while imperfect prudence is in certain irrational animals, who are possessed of certain particular instincts in respect of works similar to works of prudence. Perfecta igitur beatitudo in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum essentialiter consistere non potest. Ad cuius evidentiam, considerandum est quod consideratio speculativae scientiae non se extendit ultra virtutem principiorum illius scientiae, quia in principiis scientiae virtualiter tota scientia continetur. Prima autem principia scientiarum speculativarum sunt per sensum accepta; ut patet per philosophum in principio Metaphys., et in fine Poster. Unde tota consideratio scientiarum speculativarum non potest ultra extendi quam sensibilium cognitio ducere potest. In cognitione autem sensibilium non potest consistere ultima hominis beatitudo, quae est ultima eius perfectio. Non enim aliquid perficitur ab aliquo inferiori, nisi secundum quod in inferiori est aliqua participatio superioris. Manifestum est autem quod forma lapidis, vel cuiuslibet rei sensibilis, est inferior homine. Unde per formam lapidis non perficitur intellectus inquantum est talis forma, sed inquantum in ea participatur aliqua similitudo alicuius quod est supra intellectum humanum, scilicet lumen intelligibile, vel aliquid huiusmodi. Omne autem quod est per aliud, reducitur ad id quod est per se. Unde oportet quod ultima perfectio hominis sit per cognitionem alicuius rei quae sit supra intellectum humanum. Ostensum est autem quod per sensibilia non potest deveniri in cognitionem substantiarum separatarum, quae sunt supra intellectum humanum. Unde relinquitur quod ultima hominis beatitudo non possit esse in consideratione speculativarum scientiarum. Sed sicut in formis sensibilibus participatur aliqua similitudo superiorum substantiarum, ita consideratio scientiarum speculativarum est quaedam participatio verae et perfectae beatitudinis. Accordingly perfect happiness cannot consist essentially in the consideration of speculative sciences. To prove this, we must observe that the consideration of a speculative science does not extend beyond the scope of the principles of that science: since the entire science is virtually contained in its principles. Now the first principles of speculative sciences are received through the senses, as the Philosopher clearly states at the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 1), and at the end of the Posterior Analytics (ii, 15). Wherefore the entire consideration of speculative sciences cannot extend farther than knowledge of sensibles can lead. Now man’s final happiness, which is his final perfection, cannot consist in the knowledge of sensibles. For a thing is not perfected by something lower, except insofar as the lower partakes of something higher. Now it is evident that the form of a stone or of any sensible, is lower than man. Consequently the intellect is not perfected by the form of a stone, as such, but inasmuch as it partakes of a certain likeness to that which is above the human intellect, viz., the intelligible light, or something of the kind. Now whatever is by something else is reduced to that which is of itself. Therefore man’s final perfection must needs be through knowledge of something above the human intellect. But it has been shown (FP, Q88, A2), that man cannot acquire through sensibles, the knowledge of separate substances, which are above the human intellect. Consequently it follows that man’s happiness cannot consist in the consideration of speculative sciences. However, just as in sensible forms there is a participation of the higher substances, so the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain participation of true and perfect happiness. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod philosophus loquitur in libro Ethicorum de felicitate imperfecta, qualiter in hac vita haberi potest, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 1: In his book on Ethics the Philosopher treats of imperfect happiness, such as can be had in this life, as stated above (A2, ad 4). Ad secundum dicendum quod naturaliter desideratur non solum perfecta beatitudo, sed etiam qualiscumque similitudo vel participatio ipsius. Reply Obj. 2: Not only is perfect happiness naturally desired, but also any likeness or participation thereof. Ad tertium dicendum quod per considerationem scientiarum speculativarum reducitur intellectus noster aliquo modo in actum, non autem in ultimum et completum. Reply Obj. 3: Our intellect is reduced to act, in a fashion, by the consideration of speculative sciences, but not to its final and perfect act. Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum beatitudo hominis consistat in cognitione substantiarum separatarum, idest angelorum Whether happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, of angels? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis consistat in cognitione substantiarum separatarum, idest Angelorum. Dicit enim Gregorius, in quadam homilia, nihil prodest interesse festis hominum, si non contingat interesse festis Angelorum; per quod finalem beatitudinem designat. Sed festis Angelorum interesse possumus per eorum contemplationem. Ergo videtur quod in contemplatione Angelorum ultima hominis beatitudo consistat. Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness consists in the knowledge of separate substances, namely, angels. For Gregory says in a homily (xxvi in Evang.): It avails nothing to take part in the feasts of men, if we fail to take part in the feasts of angels; by which he means final happiness. But we can take part in the feasts of the angels by contemplating them. Therefore it seems that man’s final happiness consists in contemplating the angels. Praeterea, ultima perfectio uniuscuiusque rei est ut coniungatur suo principio, unde et circulus dicitur esse figura perfecta, quia habet idem principium et finem. Sed principium cognitionis humanae est ab ipsis Angelis, per quos homines illuminantur, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. Cael. Hier. Ergo perfectio humani intellectus est in contemplatione Angelorum. Obj. 2: Further, the final perfection of each thing is for it to be united to its principle: wherefore a circle is said to be a perfect figure, because its beginning and end coincide. But the beginning of human knowledge is from the angels, by whom men are enlightened, as Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv). Therefore the perfection of the human intellect consists in contemplating the angels. Praeterea, unaquaeque natura perfecta est, quando coniungitur superiori naturae, sicut ultima perfectio corporis est ut coniungatur naturae spirituali. Sed supra intellectum humanum, ordine naturae, sunt Angeli. Ergo ultima perfectio intellectus humani est ut coniungatur per contemplationem ipsis Angelis. Obj. 3: Further, each nature is perfect, when united to a higher nature; just as the final perfection of a body is to be united to the spiritual nature. But above the human intellect, in the natural order, are the angels. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect is to be united to the angels by contemplation. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ierem. IX, in hoc glorietur qui gloriatur, scire et nosse me. Ergo ultima hominis gloria, vel beatitudo, non consistit nisi in cognitione Dei. On the contrary, It is written (Jer 9:24): Let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth and knoweth Me. Therefore man’s final glory or happiness consists only in the knowledge of God. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, perfecta hominis beatitudo non consistit in eo quod est perfectio intellectus secundum alicuius participationem, sed in eo quod est per essentiam tale. Manifestum est autem quod unumquodque intantum est perfectio alicuius potentiae, inquantum ad ipsum pertinet ratio proprii obiecti illius potentiae. Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est verum. Quidquid ergo habet veritatem participatam, contemplatum non facit intellectum perfectum ultima perfectione. Cum autem eadem sit dispositio rerum in esse sicut in veritate, ut dicitur in II Metaphys.; quaecumque sunt entia per participationem, sunt vera per participationem. Angeli autem habent esse participatum, quia solius Dei suum esse est sua essentia, ut in primo ostensum est. Unde relinquitur quod solus Deus sit veritas per essentiam, et quod eius contemplatio faciat perfecte beatum. Aliqualem autem beatitudinem imperfectam nihil prohibet attendi in contemplatione Angelorum; et etiam altiorem quam in consideratione scientiarum speculativarum. I answer that, As stated above (A6), man’s perfect happiness consists not in that which perfects the intellect by some participation, but in that which is so by its essence. Now it is evident that whatever is the perfection of a power is so insofar as the proper formal object of that power belongs to it. Now the proper object of the intellect is the true. Therefore the contemplation of whatever has participated truth, does not perfect the intellect with its final perfection. Since, therefore, the order of things is the same in being and in truth (Metaph ii, 1); whatever are beings by participation, are true by participation. Now angels have being by participation: because in God alone is His Being His Essence, as shown in the First Part (Q44, A1). It follows that God alone is truth by His Essence, and that contemplation of Him makes man perfectly happy. However, there is no reason why we should not admit a certain imperfect happiness in the contemplation of the angels; and higher indeed than in the consideration of speculative science. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod festis Angelorum intererimus non solum contemplantes Angelos, sed simul cum ipsis, Deum. Reply Obj. 1: We shall take part in the feasts of the angels, by contemplating not only the angels, but, together with them, also God Himself. Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum illos qui ponunt animas humanas esse ab Angelis creatas, satis conveniens videtur quod beatitudo hominis sit in contemplatione Angelorum, quasi in coniunctione ad suum principium. Sed hoc est erroneum, ut in primo dictum est. Unde ultima perfectio intellectus humani est per coniunctionem ad Deum, qui est primum principium et creationis animae et illuminationis eius. Angelus autem illuminat tanquam minister, ut in primo habitum est. Unde suo ministerio adiuvat hominem ut ad beatitudinem perveniat, non autem est humanae beatitudinis obiectum. Reply Obj. 2: According to those that hold human souls to be created by the angels, it seems fitting enough, that man’s happiness should consist in the contemplation of the angels, in the union, as it were, of man with his beginning. But this is erroneous, as stated in the First Part (Q90, A3). Wherefore the final perfection of the human intellect is by union with God, Who is the first principle both of the creation of the soul and of its enlightenment. Whereas the angel enlightens as a minister, as stated in the First Part (Q111, A2, ad 2). Consequently, by his ministration he helps man to attain to happiness; but he is not the object of man’s happiness. Ad tertium dicendum quod attingi superiorem naturam ab inferiori contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, secundum gradum potentiae participantis, et sic ultima perfectio hominis erit in hoc quod homo attinget ad contemplandum sicut Angeli contemplantur. Alio modo, sicut obiectum attingitur a potentia, et hoc modo ultima perfectio cuiuslibet potentiae est ut attingat ad id in quo plene invenitur ratio sui obiecti. Reply Obj. 3: The lower nature may reach the higher in two ways. First, according to a degree of the participating power: and thus man’s final perfection will consist in his attaining to a contemplation such as that of the angels. Second, as the object is attained by the power: and thus the final perfection of each power is to attain that in which is found the fullness of its formal object. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum beatitudo hominis sit in visione ipsius divinae essentiae Whether man’s happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis non sit in visione ipsius divinae essentiae. Dicit enim Dionysius, in I cap. Myst. Theol., quod per id quod est supremum intellectus, homo Deo coniungitur sicut omnino ignoto. Sed id quod videtur per essentiam, non est omnino ignotum. Ergo ultima intellectus perfectio, seu beatitudo, non consistit in hoc quod Deus per essentiam videtur. Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His Essence. Praeterea, altioris naturae altior est perfectio. Sed haec est perfectio divini intellectus propria, ut suam essentiam videat. Ergo ultima perfectio intellectus humani ad hoc non pertingit, sed infra subsistit. Obj. 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something less. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti ipse est. On the contrary, It is written (1 John 3:2): When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and we shall see Him as He is.