Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum beatitudo hominis sit in visione ipsius divinae essentiae Whether man’s happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo hominis non sit in visione ipsius divinae essentiae. Dicit enim Dionysius, in I cap. Myst. Theol., quod per id quod est supremum intellectus, homo Deo coniungitur sicut omnino ignoto. Sed id quod videtur per essentiam, non est omnino ignotum. Ergo ultima intellectus perfectio, seu beatitudo, non consistit in hoc quod Deus per essentiam videtur. Objection 1: It would seem that man’s happiness does not consist in the vision of the Divine Essence. For Dionysius says (Myst. Theol. i) that by that which is highest in his intellect, man is united to God as to something altogether unknown. But that which is seen in its essence is not altogether unknown. Therefore the final perfection of the intellect, namely, happiness, does not consist in God being seen in His Essence. Praeterea, altioris naturae altior est perfectio. Sed haec est perfectio divini intellectus propria, ut suam essentiam videat. Ergo ultima perfectio intellectus humani ad hoc non pertingit, sed infra subsistit. Obj. 2: Further, the higher the perfection belongs to the higher nature. But to see His own Essence is the perfection proper to the Divine intellect. Therefore the final perfection of the human intellect does not reach to this, but consists in something less. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. III, cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, et videbimus eum sicuti ipse est. On the contrary, It is written (1 John 3:2): When He shall appear, we shall be like to Him; and we shall see Him as He is. Respondeo dicendum quod ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae. Ad cuius evidentiam, duo consideranda sunt. Primo quidem, quod homo non est perfecte beatus, quandiu restat sibi aliquid desiderandum et quaerendum. Secundum est, quod uniuscuiusque potentiae perfectio attenditur secundum rationem sui obiecti. Obiectum autem intellectus est quod quid est, idest essentia rei, ut dicitur in III de anima. Unde intantum procedit perfectio intellectus, inquantum cognoscit essentiam alicuius rei. Si ergo intellectus aliquis cognoscat essentiam alicuius effectus, per quam non possit cognosci essentia causae, ut scilicet sciatur de causa quid est; non dicitur intellectus attingere ad causam simpliciter, quamvis per effectum cognoscere possit de causa an sit. Et ideo remanet naturaliter homini desiderium, cum cognoscit effectum, et scit eum habere causam, ut etiam sciat de causa quid est. Et illud desiderium est admirationis, et causat inquisitionem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Puta si aliquis cognoscens eclipsim solis, considerat quod ex aliqua causa procedit, de qua, quia nescit quid sit, admiratur, et admirando inquirit. Nec ista inquisitio quiescit quousque perveniat ad cognoscendum essentiam causae. I answer that, Final and perfect happiness can consist in nothing else than the vision of the Divine Essence. To make this clear, two points must be observed. First, that man is not perfectly happy, so long as something remains for him to desire and seek: second, that the perfection of any power is determined by the nature of its object. Now the object of the intellect is what a thing is, i.e., the essence of a thing, according to De Anima iii, 6. Wherefore the intellect attains perfection, insofar as it knows the essence of a thing. If therefore an intellect knows the essence of some effect, whereby it is not possible to know the essence of the cause, i.e., to know of the cause what it is; that intellect cannot be said to reach that cause simply, although it may be able to gather from the effect the knowledge of that the cause is. Consequently, when man knows an effect, and knows that it has a cause, there naturally remains in the man the desire to know about the cause, what it is. And this desire is one of wonder, and causes inquiry, as is stated in the beginning of the Metaphysics (i, 2). For instance, if a man, knowing the eclipse of the sun, consider that it must be due to some cause, and know not what that cause is, he wonders about it, and from wondering proceeds to inquire. Nor does this inquiry cease until he arrive at a knowledge of the essence of the cause. Si igitur intellectus humanus, cognoscens essentiam alicuius effectus creati, non cognoscat de Deo nisi an est; nondum perfectio eius attingit simpliciter ad causam primam, sed remanet ei adhuc naturale desiderium inquirendi causam. Unde nondum est perfecte beatus. Ad perfectam igitur beatitudinem requiritur quod intellectus pertingat ad ipsam essentiam primae causae. Et sic perfectionem suam habebit per unionem ad Deum sicut ad obiectum, in quo solo beatitudo hominis consistit, ut supra dictum est. If therefore the human intellect, knowing the essence of some created effect, knows no more of God than that He is; the perfection of that intellect does not yet reach simply the First Cause, but there remains in it the natural desire to seek the cause. Wherefore it is not yet perfectly happy. Consequently, for perfect happiness the intellect needs to reach the very Essence of the First Cause. And thus it will have its perfection through union with God as with that object, in which alone man’s happiness consists, as stated above (A1–7; Q2, A8). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de cognitione eorum qui sunt in via, tendentes ad beatitudinem. Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius speaks of the knowledge of wayfarers journeying towards happiness. Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, finis potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad rem ipsam quae desideratur, et hoc modo idem est finis superioris et inferioris naturae, immo omnium rerum, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo, quantum ad consecutionem huius rei, et sic diversus est finis superioris et inferioris naturae, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rem talem. Sic igitur altior est beatitudo Dei suam essentiam intellectu comprehendentis, quam hominis vel Angeli videntis, et non comprehendentis. Reply Obj. 2: As stated above (Q1, A8), the end has a twofold acceptation. First, as to the thing itself which is desired: and in this way, the same thing is the end of the higher and of the lower nature, and indeed of all things, as stated above (Q1, A8). Second, as to the attainment of this thing; and thus the end of the higher nature is different from that of the lower, according to their respective habitudes to that thing. So then in the happiness of God, Who, in understanding his Essence, comprehends It, is higher than that of a man or angel who sees It indeed, but comprehends It not. Quaestio 4 Question 4 De his quae exiguntur ad beatitudinem Of Those Things That are Required for Happiness Deinde, considerandum est de his quae exiguntur ad beatitudinem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum delectatio requiratur ad beatitudinem. (1) Whether delight is required for happiness? Secundo, quid sit principalius in beatitudine, utrum delectatio vel visio. (2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision? Tertio, utrum requiratur comprehensio. (3) Whether comprehension is required? Quarto, utrum requiratur rectitudo voluntatis. (4) Whether rectitude of the will is required? Quinto, utrum ad beatitudinem hominis requiratur corpus. (5) Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness? Sexto, utrum perfectio corporis. (6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary? Septimo, utrum aliqua exteriora bona. (7) Whether any external goods are necessary? Octavo, utrum requiratur societas amicorum. (8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum delectatio requiratur ad beatitudinem Whether delight is required for happiness? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non requiratur ad beatitudinem. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Trin., quod visio est tota merces fidei. Sed id quod est praemium vel merces virtutis, est beatitudo, ut patet per philosophum in I Ethic. Ergo nihil aliud requiritur ad beatitudinem nisi sola visio. Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that vision is the entire reward of faith. But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides vision is required for happiness. Praeterea, beatitudo est per se sufficientissimum bonum, ut philosophus dicit I Ethic. Quod autem eget aliquo alio, non est per se sufficiens. Cum igitur essentia beatitudinis in visione Dei consistat, ut ostensum est; videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur delectatio. Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the most self-sufficient of all goods, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above (Q3, A8); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness. Praeterea, operationem felicitatis seu beatitudinis oportet esse non impeditam, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Sed delectatio impedit actionem intellectus corrumpit enim aestimationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo delectatio non requiritur ad beatitudinem. Obj. 3: Further, the operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod beatitudo est gaudium de veritate. On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is joy in truth. Respondeo dicendum quod quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur ad aliud. Uno modo, sicut praeambulum vel praeparatorium ad ipsum, sicut disciplina requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo, sicut perficiens aliquid, sicut anima requiritur ad vitam corporis. Tertio modo, sicut coadiuvans extrinsecum, sicut amici requiruntur ad aliquid agendum. Quarto modo, sicut aliquid concomitans, ut si dicamus quod calor requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad beatitudinem. Delectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus requiescit in bono adepto. Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione concomitante. I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary for science. Second, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Third, as helping it from without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourth, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod merces alicui redditur, voluntas merentis requiescit, quod est delectari. Unde in ipsa ratione mercedis redditae delectatio includitur. Reply Obj. 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight. Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex ipsa visione Dei causatur delectatio. Unde ille qui Deum videt, delectatione indigere non potest. Reply Obj. 2: The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight. Ad tertium dicendum quod delectatio concomitans operationem intellectus, non impedit ipsam, sed magis eam confortat, ut dicitur, in X Ethic., ea enim quae delectabiliter facimus, attentius et perseverantius operamur. Delectatio autem extranea impedit operationem, quandoque quidem ex intentionis distractione; quia, sicut dictum est, ad ea in quibus delectamur, magis intenti sumus; et dum uni vehementer intendimus, necesse est quod ab alio intentio retrahatur. Quandoque autem etiam ex contrarietate, sicut delectatio sensus contraria rationi, impedit aestimationem prudentiae magis quam aestimationem speculativi intellectus. Reply Obj. 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention; because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum delectatio sit principalius in beatitudine quam visio Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit principalius in beatitudine quam visio. Delectatio enim, ut dicitur in X Ethic., est perfectio operationis. Sed perfectio est potior perfectibili. Ergo delectatio est potior operatione intellectus, quae est visio. Objection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For delight is the perfection of operation (Ethic. x, 4). But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e., vision. Praeterea, illud propter quod aliquid est appetibile, est potius. Sed operationes appetuntur propter delectationem ipsarum, unde et natura operationibus necessariis ad conservationem individui et speciei, delectationem apposuit, ut huiusmodi operationes ab animalibus non negligantur. Ergo delectatio est potior in beatitudine quam operatio intellectus, quae est visio. Obj. 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, which is vision. Praeterea, visio respondet fidei, delectatio autem, sive fruitio, caritati. Sed caritas est maior fide, ut dicit apostolus I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo delectatio, sive fruitio, est potior visione. Obj. 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as the Apostle says (1 Cor 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision. Sed contra, causa est potior effectu. Sed visio est causa delectationis. Ergo visio est potior quam delectatio. On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight.