Ad tertium dicendum quod passio quae directe opponitur concupiscentiae, innominata est, quae ita se habet ad malum, sicut concupiscentia ad bonum. Sed quia est mali absentis sicut et timor, quandoque loco eius ponitur timor, sicut et quandoque cupiditas loco spei. Quod enim est parvum bonum vel malum, quasi non reputatur, et ideo pro omni motu appetitus in bonum vel in malum futurum, ponitur spes et timor, quae respiciunt bonum vel malum arduum. Reply Obj. 3: The passion which is directly contrary to concupiscence has no name, and stands in relation to evil, as concupiscence in regard to good. But since, like fear, it regards the absent evil; sometimes it goes by the name of fear, just as hope is sometimes called covetousness. For a small good or evil is reckoned as though it were nothing: and consequently every movement of the appetite in future good or evil is called hope or fear, which regard good and evil as arduous. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum concupiscentiarum sint quaedam naturales, et quaedam naturales Whether some concupiscences are natural, and some not natural? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentiarum non sint quaedam naturales, et quaedam non naturales. Concupiscentia enim pertinet ad appetitum animalem, ut dictum est. Sed appetitus naturalis dividitur contra animalem. Ergo nulla concupiscentia est naturalis. Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscences are not divided into those which are natural and those which are not. For concupiscence belongs to the animal appetite, as stated above (A1, ad 3). But the natural appetite is contrasted with the animal appetite. Therefore no concupiscence is natural. Praeterea, diversitas materialis non facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed solum secundum numerum, quae quidem diversitas sub arte non cadit. Sed si quae sint concupiscentiae naturales et non naturales, non differunt nisi secundum diversa concupiscibilia, quod facit materialem differentiam, et secundum numerum tantum. Non ergo dividendae sunt concupiscentiae per naturales et non naturales. Obj. 2: Further, material difference makes no difference of species, but only numerical difference; a difference which is outside the purview of science. But if some concupiscences are natural, and some not, they differ only in respect of their objects; which amounts to a material difference, which is one of number only. Therefore concupiscences should not be divided into those that are natural and those that are not. Praeterea, ratio contra naturam dividitur, ut patet in II Physic. Si igitur in homine est aliqua concupiscentia non naturalis, oportet quod sit rationalis. Sed hoc esse non potest, quia concupiscentia cum sit passio quaedam, pertinet ad appetitum sensitivum, non autem ad voluntatem, quae est appetitus rationis. Non ergo sunt concupiscentiae aliquae non naturales. Obj. 3: Further, reason is contrasted with nature, as stated in Phys. ii, 5. If therefore in man there is a concupiscence which is not natural, it must needs be rational. But this is impossible: because, since concupiscence is a passion, it belongs to the sensitive appetite, and not to the will, which is the rational appetite. Therefore there are no concupiscences which are not natural. Sed contra est quod philosophus, in III Ethic. et in I Rhetoric., ponit quasdam concupiscentias naturales, et quasdam non naturales. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11 and Rhetor. i, 11) distinguishes natural concupiscences from those that are not natural. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, concupiscentia est appetitus boni delectabilis. Dupliciter autem aliquid est delectabile. Uno modo, quia est conveniens naturae animalis, sicut cibus, potus, et alia huiusmodi. Et huiusmodi concupiscentia delectabilis dicitur naturalis. Alio modo aliquid est delectabile, quia est conveniens animali secundum apprehensionem, sicut cum aliquis apprehendit aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, et per consequens delectatur in ipso. Et huiusmodi delectabilis concupiscentia dicitur non naturalis, et solet magis dici cupiditas. I answer that, As stated above (A1), concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways. First, because it is suitable to the nature of the animal; for example, food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be natural. Second, a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends something as good and suitable, and consequently takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and is more wont to be called cupidity. Primae ergo concupiscentiae, naturales, communes sunt et hominibus et aliis animalibus, quia utrisque est aliquid conveniens et delectabile secundum naturam. Et in his etiam omnes homines conveniunt, unde et philosophus, in III Ethic., vocat eas communes et necessarias. Sed secundae concupiscentiae sunt propriae hominum, quorum proprium est excogitare aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, praeter id quod natura requirit. Unde et in I Rhetoric., philosophus dicit primas concupiscentias esse irrationales, secundas vero cum ratione. Et quia diversi diversimode ratiocinantur, ideo etiam secundae dicuntur, in III Ethic., propriae et appositae, scilicet supra naturales. Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to both is there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) calls them common and necessary. But concupiscences of the second kind are proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are irrational, but the latter, rational. And because different men reason differently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) peculiar and acquired, i.e., in addition to those that are natural. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illud idem quod appetitur appetitu naturali, potest appeti appetitu animali cum fuerit apprehensum. Et secundum hoc cibi et potus et huiusmodi, quae appetuntur naturaliter, potest esse concupiscentia naturalis. Reply Obj. 1: The same thing that is the object of the natural appetite, may be the object of the animal appetite, once it is apprehended. And in this way there may be an animal concupiscence of food, drink, and the like, which are objects of the natural appetite. Ad secundum dicendum quod diversitas concupiscentiarum naturalium a non naturalibus, non est materialis tantum; sed etiam quodammodo formalis, inquantum procedit ex diversitate obiecti activi. Obiectum autem appetitus est bonum apprehensum. Unde ad diversitatem activi pertinet diversitas apprehensionis, prout scilicet apprehenditur aliquid ut conveniens absoluta apprehensione, ex qua causantur concupiscentiae naturales, quas philosophus in Rhetoric. vocat irrationales; et prout apprehenditur aliquid cum deliberatione, ex quo causantur concupiscentiae non naturales, quae propter hoc in Rhetoric. dicuntur cum ratione. Reply Obj. 2: The difference between those concupiscences that are natural and those that are not, is not merely a material difference; it is also, in a way, formal, insofar as it arises from a difference in the active object. Now the object of the appetite is the apprehended good. Hence diversity of the active object follows from diversity of apprehension: according as a thing is apprehended as suitable, either by absolute apprehension, whence arise natural concupiscences, which the Philosopher calls irrational (Rhet. i, 11); or by apprehension together with deliberation, whence arise those concupiscences that are not natural, and which for this very reason the Philosopher calls rational (Rhet. i, 11). Ad tertium dicendum quod in homine non solum est ratio universalis, quae pertinet ad partem intellectivam; sed etiam ratio particularis, quae pertinet ad partem sensitivam, ut in primo libro dictum est. Et secundum hoc, etiam concupiscentia quae est cum ratione, potest ad appetitum sensitivum pertinere. Et praeterea appetitus sensitivus potest etiam a ratione universali moveri, mediante imaginatione particulari. Reply Obj. 3: Man has not only universal reason, pertaining to the intellectual faculty; but also particular reason pertaining to the sensitive faculty, as stated in the First Part (Q78, A4; FP, Q81, A3): so that even rational concupiscence may pertain to the sensitive appetite. Moreover the sensitive appetite can be moved by the universal reason also, through the medium of the particular imagination. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum concupiscentia sit infinita Whether concupiscence is infinite? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit infinita. Obiectum enim concupiscentiae est bonum; quod habet rationem finis. Qui autem ponit infinitum, excludit finem, ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Concupiscentia ergo non potest esse infinita. Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. But where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. Praeterea, concupiscentia est boni convenientis, cum procedat ex amore. Sed infinitum, cum sit improportionatum, non potest esse conveniens. Ergo concupiscentia non potest esse infinita. Obj. 2: Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and therefore unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. Praeterea, infinita non est transire, et sic in eis non est pervenire ad ultimum. Sed concupiscenti fit delectatio per hoc quod attingit ad ultimum. Ergo si concupiscentia esset infinita, sequeretur quod nunquam fieret delectatio. Obj. 3: Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject of concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term. Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight would ever ensue. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod, in infinitum concupiscentia existente homines infinita desiderant. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that since concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, duplex est concupiscentia, una naturalis, et alia non naturalis. Naturalis quidem igitur concupiscentia non potest esse infinita in actu. Est enim eius quod natura requirit, natura vero semper intendit in aliquid finitum et certum. Unde nunquam homo concupiscit infinitum cibum, vel infinitum potum. Sed sicut in natura contingit esse infinitum in potentia per successionem, ita huiusmodi concupiscentiam contingit infinitam esse per successionem; ut scilicet, post adeptum cibum iterum alia vice desideret cibum, vel quodcumque aliud quod natura requirit, quia huiusmodi corporalia bona, cum adveniunt, non perpetuo manent, sed deficiunt. Unde dixit dominus Samaritanae, Ioan. IV, qui biberit ex hac aqua, sitiet iterum. I answer that, As stated above (A3), concupiscence is twofold; one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence cannot be actually infinite: because it is of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires infinite meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupiscence be infinite successively; so that, for instance, after getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature requires: because these bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria (John 4:13): Whosever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again. Sed concupiscentia non naturalis omnino est infinita. Sequitur enim rationem, ut dictum est, rationi autem competit in infinitum procedere. Unde qui concupiscit divitias, potest eas concupiscere, non ad aliquem certum terminum, sed simpliciter se divitem esse, quantumcumque potest. But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as stated above (A3), it follows from the reason, and it belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible. Potest et alia ratio assignari, secundum philosophum in I Polit., quare quaedam concupiscentia sit finita, et quaedam infinita. Semper enim concupiscentia finis est infinita, finis enim per se concupiscitur, ut sanitas; unde maior sanitas magis concupiscitur, et sic in infinitum; sicut, si album per se disgregat, magis album magis disgregat. Concupiscentia vero eius quod est ad finem, non est infinita, sed secundum illam mensuram appetitur qua convenit fini. Unde qui finem ponunt in divitiis, habent concupiscentiam divitiarum in infinitum, qui autem divitias appetunt propter necessitatem vitae, concupiscunt divitias finitas, sufficientes ad necessitatem vitae, ut philosophus dicit ibidem. Et eadem est ratio de concupiscentia, quarumcumque aliarum rerum. Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another infinite. Because concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is desired for its own sake, e.g., health: and thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, that which is more white dilates yet more. On the other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because the concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of the necessities of life, desire a finite measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the concupiscence of any other things. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne quod concupiscitur, accipitur ut quoddam finitum, vel quia est finitum secundum rem, prout semel concupiscitur in actu; vel quia est finitum secundum quod cadit sub apprehensione. Non enim potest sub ratione infiniti apprehendi, quia infinitum est, cuius quantitatem accipientibus, semper est aliquid extra sumere, ut dicitur in III Physic. Reply Obj. 1: Every object of concupiscence is taken as something finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once actually desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken (Phys. iii, 6). Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio quodammodo est virtutis infinitae inquantum potest in infinitum aliquid considerare, ut apparet in additione numerorum et linearum. Unde infinitum aliquo modo sumptum, est proportionatum rationi. Nam et universale, quod ratio apprehendit, est quodammodo infinitum, inquantum in potentia continet infinita singularia. Reply Obj. 2: The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a certain sense, insofar as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears in the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact the universal which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number of singulars. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquis delectetur, non requiritur quod omnia consequatur quae concupiscit, sed in quolibet concupito quod consequitur, delectatur. Reply Obj. 3: In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the realization of each object of his concupiscence. Quaestio 31 Question 31 De ipsa delectatione secundum se Of Delight Considered in Itself Deinde considerandum est de delectatione et tristitia. Circa delectationem vero consideranda sunt quatuor, primo, de ipsa delectatione secundum se; secundo, de causis delectationis; tertio, de effectibus eius; quarto, de bonitate et malitia ipsius. We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The causes of delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum delectatio sit passio. (1) Whether delight is a passion? Secundo, utrum sit in tempore. (2) Whether delight is subject to time? Tertio, utrum differat a gaudio. (3) Whether it differs from joy? Quarto, utrum sit in appetitu intellectivo. (4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite? Quinto, de comparatione delectationum superioris appetitus, ad delectationem inferioris. (5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of the lower; Sexto, de comparatione delectationum sensitivarum ad invicem. (6) Of sensible delights compared with one another; Septimo, utrum sit aliqua delectatio non naturalis. (7) Whether any delight is non-natural? Octavo, utrum delectatio possit esse contraria delectationi. (8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another?