Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum concupiscentia sit infinita Whether concupiscence is infinite? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod concupiscentia non sit infinita. Obiectum enim concupiscentiae est bonum; quod habet rationem finis. Qui autem ponit infinitum, excludit finem, ut dicitur in II Metaphys. Concupiscentia ergo non potest esse infinita. Objection 1: It would seem that concupiscence is not infinite. For the object of concupiscence is good, which has the aspect of an end. But where there is infinity there is no end (Metaph. ii, 2). Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. Praeterea, concupiscentia est boni convenientis, cum procedat ex amore. Sed infinitum, cum sit improportionatum, non potest esse conveniens. Ergo concupiscentia non potest esse infinita. Obj. 2: Further, concupiscence is of the fitting good, since it proceeds from love. But the infinite is without proportion, and therefore unfitting. Therefore concupiscence cannot be infinite. Praeterea, infinita non est transire, et sic in eis non est pervenire ad ultimum. Sed concupiscenti fit delectatio per hoc quod attingit ad ultimum. Ergo si concupiscentia esset infinita, sequeretur quod nunquam fieret delectatio. Obj. 3: Further, there is no passing through infinite things: and thus there is no reaching an ultimate term in them. But the subject of concupiscence is not delighted until he attain the ultimate term. Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, no delight would ever ensue. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in I Polit., quod, in infinitum concupiscentia existente homines infinita desiderant. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3) that since concupiscence is infinite, men desire an infinite number of things. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, duplex est concupiscentia, una naturalis, et alia non naturalis. Naturalis quidem igitur concupiscentia non potest esse infinita in actu. Est enim eius quod natura requirit, natura vero semper intendit in aliquid finitum et certum. Unde nunquam homo concupiscit infinitum cibum, vel infinitum potum. Sed sicut in natura contingit esse infinitum in potentia per successionem, ita huiusmodi concupiscentiam contingit infinitam esse per successionem; ut scilicet, post adeptum cibum iterum alia vice desideret cibum, vel quodcumque aliud quod natura requirit, quia huiusmodi corporalia bona, cum adveniunt, non perpetuo manent, sed deficiunt. Unde dixit dominus Samaritanae, Ioan. IV, qui biberit ex hac aqua, sitiet iterum. I answer that, As stated above (A3), concupiscence is twofold; one is natural, the other is not natural. Natural concupiscence cannot be actually infinite: because it is of that which nature requires; and nature ever tends to something finite and fixed. Hence man never desires infinite meat, or infinite drink. But just as in nature there is potential successive infinity, so can this kind of concupiscence be infinite successively; so that, for instance, after getting food, a man may desire food yet again; and so of anything else that nature requires: because these bodily goods, when obtained, do not last for ever, but fail. Hence Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria (John 4:13): Whosever drinketh of this water, shall thirst again. Sed concupiscentia non naturalis omnino est infinita. Sequitur enim rationem, ut dictum est, rationi autem competit in infinitum procedere. Unde qui concupiscit divitias, potest eas concupiscere, non ad aliquem certum terminum, sed simpliciter se divitem esse, quantumcumque potest. But non-natural concupiscence is altogether infinite. Because, as stated above (A3), it follows from the reason, and it belongs to the reason to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible. Potest et alia ratio assignari, secundum philosophum in I Polit., quare quaedam concupiscentia sit finita, et quaedam infinita. Semper enim concupiscentia finis est infinita, finis enim per se concupiscitur, ut sanitas; unde maior sanitas magis concupiscitur, et sic in infinitum; sicut, si album per se disgregat, magis album magis disgregat. Concupiscentia vero eius quod est ad finem, non est infinita, sed secundum illam mensuram appetitur qua convenit fini. Unde qui finem ponunt in divitiis, habent concupiscentiam divitiarum in infinitum, qui autem divitias appetunt propter necessitatem vitae, concupiscunt divitias finitas, sufficientes ad necessitatem vitae, ut philosophus dicit ibidem. Et eadem est ratio de concupiscentia, quarumcumque aliarum rerum. Another reason may be assigned, according to the Philosopher (Polit. i, 3), why a certain concupiscence is finite, and another infinite. Because concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is desired for its own sake, e.g., health: and thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity; just as, if a white thing of itself dilates the sight, that which is more white dilates yet more. On the other hand, concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because the concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end. Consequently those who place their end in riches have an infinite concupiscence of riches; whereas those who desire riches, on account of the necessities of life, desire a finite measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life, as the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 3). The same applies to the concupiscence of any other things. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod omne quod concupiscitur, accipitur ut quoddam finitum, vel quia est finitum secundum rem, prout semel concupiscitur in actu; vel quia est finitum secundum quod cadit sub apprehensione. Non enim potest sub ratione infiniti apprehendi, quia infinitum est, cuius quantitatem accipientibus, semper est aliquid extra sumere, ut dicitur in III Physic. Reply Obj. 1: Every object of concupiscence is taken as something finite: either because it is finite in reality, as being once actually desired; or because it is finite as apprehended. For it cannot be apprehended as infinite, since the infinite is that from which, however much we may take, there always remains something to be taken (Phys. iii, 6). Ad secundum dicendum quod ratio quodammodo est virtutis infinitae inquantum potest in infinitum aliquid considerare, ut apparet in additione numerorum et linearum. Unde infinitum aliquo modo sumptum, est proportionatum rationi. Nam et universale, quod ratio apprehendit, est quodammodo infinitum, inquantum in potentia continet infinita singularia. Reply Obj. 2: The reason is possessed of infinite power, in a certain sense, insofar as it can consider a thing infinitely, as appears in the addition of numbers and lines. Consequently, the infinite, taken in a certain way, is proportionate to reason. In fact the universal which the reason apprehends, is infinite in a sense, inasmuch as it contains potentially an infinite number of singulars. Ad tertium dicendum quod ad hoc quod aliquis delectetur, non requiritur quod omnia consequatur quae concupiscit, sed in quolibet concupito quod consequitur, delectatur. Reply Obj. 3: In order that a man be delighted, there is no need for him to realize all that he desires: for he delights in the realization of each object of his concupiscence. Quaestio 31 Question 31 De ipsa delectatione secundum se Of Delight Considered in Itself Deinde considerandum est de delectatione et tristitia. Circa delectationem vero consideranda sunt quatuor, primo, de ipsa delectatione secundum se; secundo, de causis delectationis; tertio, de effectibus eius; quarto, de bonitate et malitia ipsius. We must now consider delight and sadness. Concerning delight four things must be considered: (1) Delight in itself; (2) The causes of delight; (3) Its effects; (4) Its goodness and malice. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum delectatio sit passio. (1) Whether delight is a passion? Secundo, utrum sit in tempore. (2) Whether delight is subject to time? Tertio, utrum differat a gaudio. (3) Whether it differs from joy? Quarto, utrum sit in appetitu intellectivo. (4) Whether it is in the intellectual appetite? Quinto, de comparatione delectationum superioris appetitus, ad delectationem inferioris. (5) Of the delights of the higher appetite compared with the delight of the lower; Sexto, de comparatione delectationum sensitivarum ad invicem. (6) Of sensible delights compared with one another; Septimo, utrum sit aliqua delectatio non naturalis. (7) Whether any delight is non-natural? Octavo, utrum delectatio possit esse contraria delectationi. (8) Whether one delight can be contrary to another? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum delectatio sit passio Whether delight is a passion? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non sit passio. Damascenus enim, in II libro, distinguit operationem a passione, dicens quod operatio est motus qui est secundum naturam, passio vero est motus contra naturam. Sed delectatio est operatio, ut philosophus dicit, in VII et X Ethic. Ergo delectatio non est passio. Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a passion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from passion, and says that operation is a movement in accord with nature, while passion is a movement contrary to nature. But delight is an operation, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 12; x, 5). Therefore delight is not a passion. Praeterea, pati est moveri, ut dicitur in III Physic. Sed delectatio non consistit in moveri, sed in motum esse, causatur enim delectatio ex bono iam adepto. Ergo delectatio non est passio. Obj. 2: Further, To be passive is to be moved, as stated in Phys. iii, 3. But delight does not consist in being moved, but in having been moved; for it arises from good already gained. Therefore delight is not a passion. Praeterea, delectatio consistit in quadam perfectione delectati, perficit enim operationem, ut dicitur in X Ethic. Sed perfici non est pati vel alterari, ut dicitur in VII Physic. et in II de anima. Ergo delectatio non est passio. Obj. 3: Further, delight is a kind of a perfection of the one who is delighted; since it perfects operation, as stated in Ethic. x, 4,5. But to be perfected does not consist in being passive or in being altered, as stated in Phys. vii, 3 and De Anima ii, 5. Therefore delight is not a passion. Sed contra est quod Augustinus, in IX et XIV de Civ. Dei, ponit delectationem, sive gaudium vel laetitiam, inter alias passiones animae. On the contrary, Augustine (De Civ. Dei ix, 2; xiv, 5 seqq) reckons delight, joy, or gladness among the other passions of the soul. Respondeo dicendum quod motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur, sicut supra dictum est. Affectio autem quaecumque ex apprehensione sensitiva procedens, est motus appetitus sensitivi. Hoc autem necesse est competere delectationi. Nam, sicut philosophus dicit in I Rhetoric., delectatio est quidam motus animae, et constitutio simul tota et sensibilis in naturam existentem. I answer that, The movements of the sensitive appetite, are properly called passions, as stated above (Q22, A3). Now every emotion arising from a sensitive apprehension, is a movement of the sensitive appetite: and this must needs be said of delight, since, according to the Philosopher (Rhet. i, 11) delight is a certain movement of the soul and a sensible establishing thereof all at once, in keeping with the nature of the thing. Ad cuius intellectum, considerandum est quod, sicut contingit in rebus naturalibus aliqua consequi suas perfectiones naturales, ita hoc contingit in animalibus. Et quamvis moveri ad perfectionem non sit totum simul, tamen consequi naturalem perfectionem est totum simul. Haec autem est differentia inter animalia et alias res naturales, quod aliae res naturales, quando constituuntur in id quod convenit eis secundum naturam, hoc non sentiunt, sed animalia hoc sentiunt. Et ex isto sensu causatur quidam motus animae in appetitu sensitivo, et iste motus est delectatio. Per hoc ergo quod dicitur quod delectatio est motus animae, ponitur in genere. Per hoc autem quod dicitur constitutio in existentem naturam, idest in id quod existit in natura rei, ponitur causa delectationis, scilicet praesentia connaturalis boni. Per hoc autem quod dicitur simul tota, ostendit quod constitutio non debet accipi prout est in constitui, sed prout est in constitutum esse, quasi in termino motus, non enim delectatio est generatio, ut Plato posuit, sed magis consistit in factum esse, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Per hoc autem quod dicitur sensibilis, excluduntur perfectiones rerum insensibilium, in quibus non est delectatio. Sic ergo patet quod, cum delectatio sit motus in appetitu animali consequens apprehensionem sensus, delectatio est passio animae. In order to understand this, we must observe that just as in natural things some happen to attain to their natural perfections, so does this happen in animals. And though movement towards perfection does not occur all at once, yet the attainment of natural perfection does occur all at once. Now there is this difference between animals and other natural things, that when these latter are established in the state becoming their nature, they do not perceive it, whereas animals do. And from this perception there arises a certain movement of the soul in the sensitive appetite; which movement is called delight. Accordingly by saying that delight is a movement of the soul, we designate its genus. By saying that it is an establishing in keeping with the thing’s nature, i.e., with that which exists in the thing, we assign the cause of delight, viz., the presence of a becoming good. By saying that this establishing is all at once, we mean that this establishing is to be understood not as in the process of establishment, but as in the fact of complete establishment, in the term of the movement, as it were: for delight is not a becoming as Plato maintained, but a complete fact, as stated in Ethic. vii, 12. Lastly, by saying that this establishing is sensible, we exclude the perfections of insensible things wherein there is no delight. It is therefore evident that, since delight is a movement of the animal appetite arising from an apprehension of sense, it is a passion of the soul. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod operatio connaturalis non impedita, est perfectio secunda, ut habetur in II de anima. Et ideo, quando constituitur res in propria operatione connaturali et non impedita, sequitur delectatio, quae consistit in perfectum esse, ut dictum est. Sic ergo cum dicitur quod delectatio est operatio, non est praedicatio per essentiam, sed per causam. Reply Obj. 1: Connatural operation, which is unhindered, is a second perfection, as stated in De Anima ii, 1: and therefore when a thing is established in its proper connatural and unhindered operation, delight follows, which consists in a state of completion, as observed above. Accordingly when we say that delight is an operation, we designate, not its essence, but its cause. Ad secundum dicendum quod in animali duplex motus considerari potest, unus secundum intentionem finis, qui pertinet ad appetitum, alius secundum executionem, qui pertinet ad exteriorem operationem licet ergo in eo qui iam consecutus est bonum in quo delectatur, cesset motus executionis, quo tenditur ad finem; non tamen cessat motus appetitivae partis, quae, sicut prius desiderabat non habitum, ita postea delectatur in habito. Licet enim delectatio sit quies quaedam appetitus, considerata praesentia boni delectantis, quod appetitui satisfacit; tamen adhuc remanet immutatio appetitus ab appetibili, ratione cuius delectatio motus quidam est. Reply Obj. 2: A twofold movement is to be observed in an animal: one, according to the intention of the end, and this belongs to the appetite; the other, according to the execution, and this belongs to the external operation. And so, although in him who has already gained the good in which he delights, the movement of execution ceases, by which he tends to the end; yet the movement of the appetitive faculty does not cease, since, just as before it desired that which it had not, so afterwards does it delight in that which is possesses. For though delight is a certain repose of the appetite, if we consider the presence of the pleasurable good that satisfies the appetite, nevertheless there remains the impression made on the appetite by its object, by reason of which delight is a kind of movement. Ad tertium dicendum quod, quamvis nomen passionis magis proprie conveniat passionibus corruptivis et in malum tendentibus, sicut sunt aegritudines corporales, et tristitia et timor in anima; tamen etiam in bonum ordinantur aliquae passiones, ut supra dictum est. Et secundum hoc delectatio dicitur passio. Reply Obj. 3: Although the name of passion is more appropriate to those passions which have a corruptive and evil tendency, such as bodily ailments, as also sadness and fear in the soul; yet some passions have a tendency to something good, as stated above (Q23, AA1,4): and in this sense delight is called a passion. Articulus 2 Article 2