Quaestio 4 Question 4 De his quae exiguntur ad beatitudinem Of Those Things That are Required for Happiness Deinde, considerandum est de his quae exiguntur ad beatitudinem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. We have now to consider those things that are required for happiness: and concerning this there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum delectatio requiratur ad beatitudinem. (1) Whether delight is required for happiness? Secundo, quid sit principalius in beatitudine, utrum delectatio vel visio. (2) Which is of greater account in happiness, delight or vision? Tertio, utrum requiratur comprehensio. (3) Whether comprehension is required? Quarto, utrum requiratur rectitudo voluntatis. (4) Whether rectitude of the will is required? Quinto, utrum ad beatitudinem hominis requiratur corpus. (5) Whether the body is necessary for man’s happiness? Sexto, utrum perfectio corporis. (6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary? Septimo, utrum aliqua exteriora bona. (7) Whether any external goods are necessary? Octavo, utrum requiratur societas amicorum. (8) Whether the fellowship of friends is necessary? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum delectatio requiratur ad beatitudinem Whether delight is required for happiness? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio non requiratur ad beatitudinem. Dicit enim Augustinus, in I de Trin., quod visio est tota merces fidei. Sed id quod est praemium vel merces virtutis, est beatitudo, ut patet per philosophum in I Ethic. Ergo nihil aliud requiritur ad beatitudinem nisi sola visio. Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not required for happiness. For Augustine says (De Trin. i, 8) that vision is the entire reward of faith. But the prize or reward of virtue is happiness, as the Philosopher clearly states (Ethic. i, 9). Therefore nothing besides vision is required for happiness. Praeterea, beatitudo est per se sufficientissimum bonum, ut philosophus dicit I Ethic. Quod autem eget aliquo alio, non est per se sufficiens. Cum igitur essentia beatitudinis in visione Dei consistat, ut ostensum est; videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur delectatio. Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the most self-sufficient of all goods, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. i, 7). But that which needs something else is not self-sufficient. Since then the essence of happiness consists in seeing God, as stated above (Q3, A8); it seems that delight is not necessary for happiness. Praeterea, operationem felicitatis seu beatitudinis oportet esse non impeditam, ut dicitur in VII Ethic. Sed delectatio impedit actionem intellectus corrumpit enim aestimationem prudentiae, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Ergo delectatio non requiritur ad beatitudinem. Obj. 3: Further, the operation of bliss or happiness should be unhindered (Ethic. vii, 13). But delight hinders the operation of the intellect: since it destroys the estimate of prudence (Ethic. vi, 5). Therefore delight is not necessary for happiness. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, X Confess., quod beatitudo est gaudium de veritate. On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. x, 23) that happiness is joy in truth. Respondeo dicendum quod quadrupliciter aliquid requiritur ad aliud. Uno modo, sicut praeambulum vel praeparatorium ad ipsum, sicut disciplina requiritur ad scientiam. Alio modo, sicut perficiens aliquid, sicut anima requiritur ad vitam corporis. Tertio modo, sicut coadiuvans extrinsecum, sicut amici requiruntur ad aliquid agendum. Quarto modo, sicut aliquid concomitans, ut si dicamus quod calor requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio requiritur ad beatitudinem. Delectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus requiescit in bono adepto. Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam adeptio summi boni, non potest esse beatitudo sine delectatione concomitante. I answer that, One thing may be necessary for another in four ways. First, as a preamble and preparation to it: thus instruction is necessary for science. Second, as perfecting it: thus the soul is necessary for the life of the body. Third, as helping it from without: thus friends are necessary for some undertaking. Fourth, as something attendant on it: thus we might say that heat is necessary for fire. And in this way delight is necessary for happiness. For it is caused by the appetite being at rest in the good attained. Wherefore, since happiness is nothing else but the attainment of the Sovereign Good, it cannot be without concomitant delight. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ex hoc ipso quod merces alicui redditur, voluntas merentis requiescit, quod est delectari. Unde in ipsa ratione mercedis redditae delectatio includitur. Reply Obj. 1: From the very fact that a reward is given to anyone, the will of him who deserves it is at rest, and in this consists delight. Consequently, delight is included in the very notion of reward. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex ipsa visione Dei causatur delectatio. Unde ille qui Deum videt, delectatione indigere non potest. Reply Obj. 2: The very sight of God causes delight. Consequently, he who sees God cannot need delight. Ad tertium dicendum quod delectatio concomitans operationem intellectus, non impedit ipsam, sed magis eam confortat, ut dicitur, in X Ethic., ea enim quae delectabiliter facimus, attentius et perseverantius operamur. Delectatio autem extranea impedit operationem, quandoque quidem ex intentionis distractione; quia, sicut dictum est, ad ea in quibus delectamur, magis intenti sumus; et dum uni vehementer intendimus, necesse est quod ab alio intentio retrahatur. Quandoque autem etiam ex contrarietate, sicut delectatio sensus contraria rationi, impedit aestimationem prudentiae magis quam aestimationem speculativi intellectus. Reply Obj. 3: Delight that is attendant upon the operation of the intellect does not hinder it, rather does it perfect it, as stated in Ethic. x, 4: since what we do with delight, we do with greater care and perseverance. On the other hand, delight which is extraneous to the operation is a hindrance thereto: sometimes by distracting the attention; because, as already observed, we are more attentive to those things that delight us; and when we are very attentive to one thing, we must needs be less attentive to another: sometimes on account of opposition; thus a sensual delight that is contrary to reason, hinders the estimate of prudence more than it hinders the estimate of the speculative intellect. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum delectatio sit principalius in beatitudine quam visio Whether in happiness vision ranks before delight? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit principalius in beatitudine quam visio. Delectatio enim, ut dicitur in X Ethic., est perfectio operationis. Sed perfectio est potior perfectibili. Ergo delectatio est potior operatione intellectus, quae est visio. Objection 1: It would seem that in happiness, delight ranks before vision. For delight is the perfection of operation (Ethic. x, 4). But perfection ranks before the thing perfected. Therefore delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, i.e., vision. Praeterea, illud propter quod aliquid est appetibile, est potius. Sed operationes appetuntur propter delectationem ipsarum, unde et natura operationibus necessariis ad conservationem individui et speciei, delectationem apposuit, ut huiusmodi operationes ab animalibus non negligantur. Ergo delectatio est potior in beatitudine quam operatio intellectus, quae est visio. Obj. 2: Further, that by reason of which a thing is desirable, is yet more desirable. But operations are desired on account of the delight they afford: hence, too, nature has adjusted delight to those operations which are necessary for the preservation of the individual and of the species, lest animals should disregard such operations. Therefore, in happiness, delight ranks before the operation of the intellect, which is vision. Praeterea, visio respondet fidei, delectatio autem, sive fruitio, caritati. Sed caritas est maior fide, ut dicit apostolus I ad Cor. XIII. Ergo delectatio, sive fruitio, est potior visione. Obj. 3: Further, vision corresponds to faith; while delight or enjoyment corresponds to charity. But charity ranks before faith, as the Apostle says (1 Cor 13:13). Therefore delight or enjoyment ranks before vision. Sed contra, causa est potior effectu. Sed visio est causa delectationis. Ergo visio est potior quam delectatio. On the contrary, The cause is greater than its effect. But vision is the cause of delight. Therefore vision ranks before delight. Respondeo dicendum quod istam quaestionem movet philosophus in X Ethic., et eam insolutam dimittit. Sed si quis diligenter consideret, ex necessitate oportet quod operatio intellectus, quae est visio, sit potior delectatione. Delectatio enim consistit in quadam quietatione voluntatis. Quod autem voluntas in aliquo quietetur, non est nisi propter bonitatem eius in quo quietatur. Si ergo voluntas quietatur in aliqua operatione, ex bonitate operationis procedit quietatio voluntatis. Nec voluntas quaerit bonum propter quietationem, sic enim ipse actus voluntatis esset finis, quod est contra praemissa. Sed ideo quaerit quod quietetur in operatione, quia operatio est bonum eius. Unde manifestum est quod principalius bonum est ipsa operatio in qua quietatur voluntas, quam quietatio voluntatis in ipso. I answer that, The Philosopher discusses this question (Ethic. x, 4), and leaves it unsolved. But if one consider the matter carefully, the operation of the intellect which is vision, must needs rank before delight. For delight consists in a certain repose of the will. Now that the will finds rest in anything, can only be on account of the goodness of that thing in which it reposes. If therefore the will reposes in an operation, the will’s repose is caused by the goodness of the operation. Nor does the will seek good for the sake of repose; for thus the very act of the will would be the end, which has been disproved above (Q1, A1, ad 2; Q3, A4): but it seeks to be at rest in the operation, because that operation is its good. Consequently it is evident that the operation in which the will reposes ranks before the resting of the will therein. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus ibidem dicit, delectatio perficit operationem sicut decor iuventutem, qui est ad iuventutem consequens. Unde delectatio est quaedam perfectio concomitans visionem; non sicut perfectio faciens visionem esse in sua specie perfectam. Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) delight perfects operation as vigor perfects youth, because it is a result of youth. Consequently delight is a perfection attendant upon vision; but not a perfection whereby vision is made perfect in its own species. Ad secundum dicendum quod apprehensio sensitiva non attingit ad communem rationem boni, sed ad aliquod bonum particulare quod est delectabile. Et ideo secundum appetitum sensitivum, qui est in animalibus, operationes quaeruntur propter delectationem. Sed intellectus apprehendit universalem rationem boni, ad cuius consecutionem sequitur delectatio. Unde principalius intendit bonum quam delectationem. Et inde est quod divinus intellectus, qui est institutor naturae, delectationes apposuit propter operationes. Non est autem aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus intellectivi. Reply Obj. 2: The apprehension of the senses does not attain to the universal good, but to some particular good which is delightful. And consequently, according to the sensitive appetite which is in animals, operations are sought for the sake of delight. But the intellect apprehends the universal good, the attainment of which results in delight: wherefore its purpose is directed to good rather than to delight. Hence it is that the Divine intellect, which is the Author of nature, adjusted delights to operations on account of the operations. And we should form our estimate of things not simply according to the order of the sensitive appetite, but rather according to the order of the intellectual appetite. Ad tertium dicendum quod caritas non quaerit bonum dilectum propter delectationem, sed hoc est ei consequens, ut delectetur in bono adepto quod amat. Et sic delectatio non respondet ei ut finis, sed magis visio, per quam primo finis fit ei praesens. Reply Obj. 3: Charity does not seek the beloved good for the sake of delight: it is for charity a consequence that it delights in the good gained which it loves. Thus delight does not answer to charity as its end, but vision does, whereby the end is first made present to charity. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum ad beatitudinem requiratur comprehensio Whether comprehension is necessary for happiness? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod ad beatitudinem non requiratur comprehensio. Dicit enim Augustinus, ad Paulinam de videndo Deum, attingere mente Deum magna est beatitudo, comprehendere autem est impossibile. Ergo sine comprehensione est beatitudo. Objection 1: It would seem that comprehension is not necessary for happiness. For Augustine says (Ad Paulinam de Videndo Deum): To reach God with the mind is happiness, to comprehend Him is impossible. Therefore happiness is without comprehension. Praeterea, beatitudo est perfectio hominis secundum intellectivam partem, in qua non sunt aliae potentiae quam intellectus et voluntas, ut in primo dictum est. Sed intellectus sufficienter perficitur per visionem Dei, voluntas autem per delectationem in ipso. Ergo non requiritur comprehensio tanquam aliquod tertium. Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the perfection of man as to his intellective part, wherein there are no other powers than the intellect and will, as stated in the First Part (Q79). But the intellect is sufficiently perfected by seeing God, and the will by enjoying Him. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third. Praeterea, beatitudo in operatione consistit. Operationes autem determinantur secundum obiecta. Obiecta autem generalia sunt duo, verum et bonum, verum correspondet visioni, et bonum correspondet delectationi. Ergo non requiritur comprehensio quasi aliquod tertium. Obj. 3: Further, happiness consists in an operation. But operations are determined by their objects: and there are two universal objects, the true and the good: of which the true corresponds to vision, and good to delight. Therefore there is no need for comprehension as a third.