Praeterea, Boetius dicit quod nullius boni sine consortio iucunda est possessio. Sed ad beatitudinem requiritur delectatio. Ergo etiam requiritur societas amicorum. Obj. 2: Further, Boethius says that there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us. But delight is necessary for happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary. Praeterea, caritas in beatitudine perficitur. Sed caritas se extendit ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. Ergo videtur quod ad beatitudinem requiratur societas amicorum. Obj. 3: Further, charity is perfected in happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that fellowship of friends is necessary for happiness. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. VII, venerunt mihi omnia bona pariter cum illa, scilicet cum divina sapientia, quae consistit in contemplatione Dei. Et sic ad beatitudinem nihil aliud requiritur. On the contrary, It is written (Wis 7:11): All good things came to me together with her, i.e., with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for happiness. Respondeo dicendum quod, si loquamur de felicitate praesentis vitae, sicut philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., felix indiget amicis, non quidem propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter delectationem, quia habet in seipso delectationem perfectam in operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur, et ut etiam ab eis in benefaciendo adiuvetur. Indiget enim homo ad bene operandum auxilio amicorum, tam in operibus vitae activae, quam in operibus vitae contemplativae. I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz., that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped by them in his good work. For in order that man may do well, whether in the works of the active life, or in those of the contemplative life, he needs the fellowship of friends. Sed si loquamur de perfecta beatitudine quae erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum de necessitate ad beatitudinem, quia homo habet totam plenitudinem suae perfectionis in Deo. Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit societas amicorum. Unde Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod creatura spiritualis, ad hoc quod beata sit, non nisi intrinsecus adiuvatur aeternitate, veritate, caritate creatoris. Extrinsecus vero, si adiuvari dicenda est, fortasse hoc solo adiuvatur, quod invicem vident, et de sua societate gaudent in Deo. But if we speak of perfect happiness which will be in our heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential to happiness; since man has the entire fullness of his perfection in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-being of happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen ad lit. viii, 25) that the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator. But if they can be said to be helped from without, perhaps it is only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at their fellowship. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gloria quae est essentialis beatitudini, est quam habet homo non apud hominem, sed apud Deum. Reply Obj. 1: That glory which is essential to happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God. Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud intelligitur, quando in eo bono quod habetur, non est plena sufficientia. Quod in proposito dici non potest, quia omnis boni sufficientiam habet homo in Deo. Reply Obj. 2: This saying is to be understood of the possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not apply to the question under consideration; because man possesses in God a sufficiency of every good. Ad tertium dicendum quod perfectio caritatis est essentialis beatitudini quantum ad dilectionem Dei, non autem quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Unde si esset una sola anima fruens Deo, beata esset, non habens proximum quem diligeret. Sed supposito proximo, sequitur dilectio eius ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter se habet amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam. Reply Obj. 3: Perfection of charity is essential to happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our neighbor. Wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying God, it would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But supposing one neighbor to be there, love of him results from perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were, concomitant with perfect happiness. Quaestio 5 Question 5 De ipsa adeptione beatitudinis Of the Attainment of Happiness Deinde considerandum est de ipsa adeptione beatitudinis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. We must now consider the attainment of happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum homo possit consequi beatitudinem. (1) Whether man can attain Happiness? Secundo, utrum unus homo possit esse alio beatior. (2) Whether one man can be happier than another? Tertio, utrum aliquis possit esse in hac vita beatus. (3) Whether any man can be happy in this life? Quarto, utrum beatitudo habita possit amitti. (4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost? Quinto, utrum, homo per sua naturalia possit acquirere beatitudinem. (5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers? Sexto, utrum homo consequatur beatitudinem per actionem alicuius superioris creaturae. (6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature? Septimo, utrum requirantur opera hominis aliqua ad hoc quod homo beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. (7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God? Octavo, utrum omnis homo appetat beatitudinem. (8) Whether every man desires Happiness? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum homo beatitudinem adipisci possit Whether man can attain happiness? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo beatitudinem adipisci non possit. Sicut enim natura rationalis est supra sensibilem ita natura intellectualis est supra rationalem ut patet per Dionysium in libro de Div. Nom., in multis locis. Sed bruta animalia, quae habent naturam sensibilem tantum, non possunt pervenire ad finem rationalis naturae. Ergo nec homo, qui est rationalis naturae, potest pervenire ad finem intellectualis naturae, qui est beatitudo. Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who is of rational nature, attain the end of the intellectual nature, which is happiness. Praeterea, beatitudo vera consistit in visione Dei, qui est veritas pura. Sed homini est connaturale ut veritatem intueatur in rebus materialibus, unde species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo non potest ad beatitudinem pervenire. Obj. 2: Further, true happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material things: wherefore he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain happiness. Praeterea, beatitudo consistit in adeptione summi boni. Sed aliquis non potest pervenire ad summum, nisi transcendat media. Cum igitur inter Deum et naturam humanam media sit natura angelica, quam homo transcendere non potest; videtur quod non possit beatitudinem adipisci. Obj. 3: Further, happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle. Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot attain happiness. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, beatus homo quem tu erudieris, domine. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 93:12): Blessed is the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord. Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudo nominat adeptionem perfecti boni. Quicumque ergo est capax perfecti boni, potest ad beatitudinem pervenire. Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit capax, ex hoc apparet, quia et eius intellectus apprehendere potest universale et perfectum bonum, et eius voluntas appetere illud. Et ideo homo potest beatitudinem adipisci. Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod homo est capax visionis divinae essentiae, sicut in primo habitum est; in qua quidem visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus. I answer that, Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain happiness. Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that man is capable of seeing God, as stated in the First Part (Q12, A1): in which vision, as we stated above (Q3, A8) man’s perfect happiness consists. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliter excedit natura rationalis sensitivam, et aliter intellectualis rationalem. Natura enim rationalis excedit sensitivam quantum ad cognitionis obiectum, quia sensus nullo modo potest cognoscere universale, cuius ratio est cognoscitiva. Sed intellectualis natura excedit rationalem quantum ad modum cognoscendi eandem intelligibilem veritatem, nam intellectualis natura statim apprehendit veritatem, ad quam rationalis natura per inquisitionem rationis pertingit, ut patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt. Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit, ratio per quendam motum pertingit. Unde rationalis natura consequi potest beatitudinem, quae est perfectio intellectualis naturae, tamen alio modo quam Angeli. Nam Angeli consecuti sunt eam statim post principium suae conditionis, homines autem per tempus ad ipsam perveniunt. Sed natura sensitiva ad hunc finem nullo modo pertingere potest. Reply Obj. 1: The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal, whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the First Part (Q58, A3; FP, Q79, A8). Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end. Ad secundum dicendum quod homini, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est connaturalis modus cognoscendi veritatem intelligibilem per phantasmata. Sed post huius vitae statum, habet alium modum connaturalem, ut in primo dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: To man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the First Part (Q84, A7; FP, Q89, A1). Ad tertium dicendum quod homo non potest transcendere Angelos gradu naturae, ut scilicet naturaliter sit eis superior. Potest tamen eos transcendere per operationem intellectus, dum intelligit aliquid super Angelos esse, quod homines beatificat; quod cum perfecte consequetur, perfecte beatus erit. Reply Obj. 3: Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained it, he will be perfectly happy. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum unus homo alio possit esse beatior Whether one man can be happier than another? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus homo alio non possit esse beatior. Beatitudo enim est praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Sed pro operibus virtutum omnibus aequalis merces redditur, dicitur enim Matth. XX, quod omnes qui operati sunt in vinea, acceperunt singulos denarios; quia, ut dicit Gregorius, aequalem aeternae vitae retributionem sortiti sunt. Ergo unus non erit alio beatior. Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For happiness is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written (Matt 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard received every man a penny; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), each was equally rewarded with eternal life. Therefore one man cannot be happier than another. Praeterea, beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed summo non potest esse aliquid maius. Ergo beatitudine unius hominis non potest esse alia maior beatitudo. Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man’s happiness cannot be surpassed by another’s. Praeterea, beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, desiderium hominis quietat. Sed non quietatur desiderium, si aliquod bonum deest quod suppleri possit. Si autem nihil deest quod suppleri possit, non poterit esse aliquid aliud maius bonum. Ergo vel homo non est beatus, vel, si est beatus, non potest alia maior beatitudo esse. Obj. 3: Further, since happiness is the perfect and sufficient good (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man’s desire. But his desire is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other happiness can be greater. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, in domo patris mei mansiones multae sunt; per quas, ut Augustinus dicit, diversae meritorum dignitates intelliguntur in vita aeterna. Dignitas autem vitae aeternae, quae pro merito datur, est ipsa beatitudo. Ergo sunt diversi gradus beatitudinis, et non omnium est aequalis beatitudo. On the contrary, It is written (John 14:2): In My Father’s house there are many mansions; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal life. But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of happiness, and happiness is not equally in all. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in ratione beatitudinis duo includuntur, scilicet ipse finis ultimus, qui est summum bonum; et adeptio vel fruitio ipsius boni. Quantum igitur ad ipsum bonum quod est beatitudinis obiectum et causa, non potest esse una beatitudo alia maior, quia non est nisi unum summum bonum, scilicet Deus, cuius fruitione homines sunt beati. Sed quantum ad adeptionem huiusmodi boni vel fruitionem, potest aliquis alio esse beatior, quia quanto magis hoc bono fruitur, tanto beatior est. Contingit autem aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod est melius dispositus vel ordinatus ad eius fruitionem. Et secundum hoc potest aliquis alio beatior esse. I answer that, As stated above (Q1, A8; Q2, A7), happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e., the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of happiness, one happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And in this sense one man can be happier than another.