Quaestio 40 Question 40 De passionibus irascibilis, et primo, de spe et desperatione Of the Irascible Passions, and First, of Hope and Despair Consequenter considerandum est de passionibus irascibilis, et primo, de spe et desperatione; secundo, de timore et audacia; tertio, de ira. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. We must now consider the irascible passions: (1) Hope and despair; (2) Fear and daring; (3) Anger. Under first head there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum spes sit idem quod desiderium vel cupiditas. (1) Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity? Secundo, utrum spes sit in vi apprehensiva, vel in vi appetitiva. (2) Whether hope is in the apprehensive, or in the appetitive faculty? Tertio, utrum spes sit in brutis animalibus. (3) Whether hope is in dumb animals? Quarto, utrum spei contrarietur desperatio. (4) Whether despair is contrary to hope? Quinto, utrum causa spei sit experientia. (5) Whether experience is a cause of hope? Sexto, utrum in iuvenibus et ebriosis spes abundet. (6) Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards? Septimo, de ordine spei ad amorem. (7) Concerning the order of hope to love; Octavo, utrum spes conferat ad operationem. (8) Whether love conduces to action? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum spes sit idem quod desiderium sive cupiditas Whether hope is the same as desire or cupidity? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes sit idem quod desiderium sive cupiditas. Spes enim ponitur una quatuor principalium passionum. Sed Augustinus, enumerans quatuor principales passiones, ponit cupiditatem loco spei, ut patet in XIV de Civ. Dei. Ergo spes est idem quod cupiditas sive desiderium. Objection 1: It would seem that hope is the same as desire or cupidity. Because hope is reckoned as one of the four principal passions. But Augustine in setting down the four principal passions puts cupidity in the place of hope (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,7). Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire. Praeterea, passiones differunt secundum obiecta. Sed idem est obiectum spei, et cupiditatis sive desiderii, scilicet bonum futurum. Ergo spes est idem quod cupiditas sive desiderium. Obj. 2: Further, passions differ according to their objects. But the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, viz., the future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire. Si dicatur quod spes addit supra desiderium possibilitatem adipiscendi bonum futurum, contra, id quod per accidens se habet ad obiectum, non variat speciem passionis. Sed possibile se habet per accidens ad bonum futurum, quod est obiectum cupiditatis vel desiderii, et spei. Ergo spes non est passio specie differens a desiderio vel cupiditate. Obj. 3: If it be said that hope, in addition to desire, denotes the possibility of obtaining the future good; on the contrary, whatever is accidental to the object does not make a different species of passion. But possibility of acquisition is accidental to a future good, which is the object of cupidity or desire, and of hope. Therefore hope does not differ specifically from desire or cupidity. Sed contra, diversarum potentiarum sunt diversae passiones specie differentes. Sed spes est in irascibili; desiderium autem et cupiditas in concupiscibili. Ergo spes differt specie a desiderio seu cupiditate. On the contrary, To different powers belong different species of passions. But hope is in the irascible power; whereas desire or cupidity is in the concupiscible. Therefore hope differs specifically from desire or cupidity. Respondeo dicendum quod species passionis ex obiecto consideratur circa obiectum autem spei quatuor conditiones attenduntur. Primo quidem, quod sit bonum, non enim, proprie loquendo, est spes nisi de bono. Et per hoc differt spes a timore, qui est de malo. Secundo, ut sit futurum, non enim spes est de praesenti iam habito. Et per hoc differt spes a gaudio, quod est de bono praesenti. Tertio, requiritur quod sit aliquid arduum cum difficultate adipiscibile, non enim aliquis dicitur aliquid sperare minimum, quod statim est in sua potestate ut habeat. Et per hoc differt spes a desiderio vel cupiditate, quae est de bono futuro absolute, unde pertinet ad concupiscibilem, spes autem ad irascibilem. Quarto, quod illud arduum sit possibile adipisci, non enim aliquis sperat id quod omnino adipisci non potest. Et secundum hoc differt spes a desperatione. Sic ergo patet quod spes differt a desiderio, sicut differunt passiones irascibilis a passionibus concupiscibilis. Et propter hoc, spes praesupponit desiderium, sicut et omnes passiones irascibilis praesupponunt passiones concupiscibilis, ut supra dictum est. I answer that, The species of a passion is taken from the object. Now, in the object of hope, we may note four conditions. First, that it is something good; since, properly speaking, hope regards only the good; in this respect, hope differs from fear, which regards evil. Second, that it is future; for hope does not regard that which is present and already possessed: in this respect, hope differs from joy which regards a present good. Third, that it must be something arduous and difficult to obtain, for we do not speak of any one hoping for trifles, which are in one’s power to have at any time: in this respect, hope differs from desire or cupidity, which regards the future good absolutely: wherefore it belongs to the concupiscible, while hope belongs to the irascible faculty. Fourth, that this difficult thing is something possible to obtain: for one does not hope for that which one cannot get at all: and, in this respect, hope differs from despair. It is therefore evident that hope differs from desire, as the irascible passions differ from the concupiscible. For this reason, moreover, hope presupposes desire: just as all irascible passions presuppose the passions of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Q25, A1). Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Augustinus ponit cupiditatem loco spei, propter hoc quod utrumque respicit bonum futurum, et quia bonum quod non est arduum, quasi nihil reputatur; ut sic cupiditas maxime videatur tendere in bonum arduum, in quod etiam tendit spes. Reply Obj. 1: Augustine mentions desire instead of hope, because each regards future good; and because the good which is not arduous is reckoned as nothing: thus implying that desire seems to tend chiefly to the arduous good, to which hope tends likewise. Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectum spei non est bonum futurum absolute, sed cum arduitate et difficultate adipiscendi, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: The object of hope is the future good considered, not absolutely, but as arduous and difficult of attainment, as stated above. Ad tertium dicendum quod obiectum spei non tantum addit possibilitatem super obiectum desiderii, sed etiam arduitatem, quae ad aliam potentiam facit spem pertinere, scilicet ad irascibilem, quae respicit arduum, ut in primo dictum est. Possibile autem et impossibile non omnino per accidens se habent ad obiectum appetitivae virtutis. Nam appetitus est principium motionis, nihil autem movetur ad aliquid nisi sub ratione possibilis; nullus enim movetur ad id quod existimat impossibile adipisci. Et propter hoc, spes differt a desperatione secundum differentiam possibilis et impossibilis. Reply Obj. 3: The object of hope adds not only possibility to the object of desire, but also difficulty: and this makes hope belong to another power, viz., the irascible, which regards something difficult, as stated in the FP, Q81, A2. Moreover, possibility and impossibility are not altogether accidental to the object of the appetitive power: because the appetite is a principle of movement; and nothing is moved to anything except under the aspect of being possible; for no one is moved to that which he reckons impossible to get. Consequently hope differs from despair according to the difference of possible and impossible. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum spes pertineat ad vim cognitivam aut ad appetitivam virtutem Whether hope is in the apprehensive or in the appetitive power? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes pertineat ad vim cognitivam. Spes enim videtur esse expectatio quaedam, dicit enim apostolus, Rom. VIII, si autem quod non videmus speramus, per patientiam expectamus. Sed expectatio videtur ad vim cognitivam pertinere, cuius est exspectare. Ergo spes ad cognitivam pertinet. Objection 1: It would seem that hope belongs to the cognitive power. Because hope, seemingly, is a kind of awaiting; for the Apostle says (Rom 8:25): If we hope for that which we see not; we wait for it with patience. But awaiting seems to belong to the cognitive power, which we exercise by looking out. Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power. Praeterea, idem est, ut videtur, spes quod fiducia, unde et sperantes confidentes vocamus, quasi pro eodem utentes eo quod est confidere et sperare. Sed fiducia, sicut et fides, videtur ad vim cognitivam pertinere. Ergo et spes. Obj. 2: Further, apparently hope is the same as confidence; hence when a man hopes he is said to be confident, as though to hope and to be confident were the same thing. But confidence, like faith, seems to belong to the cognitive power. Therefore hope does too. Praeterea, certitudo est proprietas cognitivae virtutis. Sed certitudo attribuitur spei. Ergo spes ad vim cognitivam pertinet. Obj. 3: Further, certainty is a property of the cognitive power. But certainty is ascribed to hope. Therefore hope belongs to the cognitive power. Sed contra, spes est de bono, sicut dictum est. Bonum autem, inquantum huiusmodi, non est obiectum cognitivae, sed appetitivae virtutis. Ergo spes non pertinet ad cognitivam, sed ad appetitivam virtutem. On the contrary, Hope regards good, as stated above (A1). Now good, as such, is not the object of the cognitive, but of the appetitive power. Therefore hope belongs, not to the cognitive, but to the appetitive power. Respondeo dicendum quod, cum spes importet extensionem quandam appetitus in bonum, manifeste pertinet ad appetitivam virtutem, motus enim ad res pertinet proprie ad appetitum. Actio vero virtutis cognitivae perficitur non secundum motum cognoscentis ad res, sed potius secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente. Sed quia vis cognitiva movet appetitivam, repraesentando ei suum obiectum; secundum diversas rationes obiecti apprehensi, subsequuntur diversi motus in vi appetitiva. Alius enim motus sequitur in appetitu ex apprehensione boni, et alius ex apprehensione mali, et similiter alius motus ex apprehensione praesentis et futuri, absoluti et ardui, possibilis et impossibilis. Et secundum hoc, spes est motus appetitivae virtutis consequens apprehensionem boni futuri ardui possibilis adipisci, scilicet extensio appetitus in huiusmodi obiectum. I answer that, Since hope denotes a certain stretching out of the appetite towards good, it evidently belongs to the appetitive power; since movement towards things belongs properly to the appetite: whereas the action of the cognitive power is accomplished not by the movement of the knower towards things, but rather according as the things known are in the knower. But since the cognitive power moves the appetite, by presenting its object to it; there arise in the appetite various movements according to various aspects of the apprehended object. For the apprehension of good gives rise to one kind of movement in the appetite, while the apprehension of evil gives rise to another: in like manner various movements arise from the apprehension of something present and future; of absolute and difficult; of possible and impossible. And accordingly hope is a movement of the appetitive power ensuing from the apprehension of a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; namely, a stretching forth of the appetite to such an object. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia spes respicit ad bonum possibile, insurgit dupliciter homini motus spei, sicut dupliciter est ei aliquid possibile, scilicet secundum propriam virtutem, et secundum virtutem alterius. Quod ergo aliquis sperat per propriam virtutem adipisci, non dicitur expectare, sed sperare tantum. Sed proprie dicitur expectare quod sperat ex auxilio virtutis alienae, ut dicatur exspectare quasi ex alio spectare, inquantum scilicet vis apprehensiva praecedens non solum respicit ad bonum quod intendit adipisci, sed etiam ad illud cuius virtute adipisci sperat; secundum illud Eccli. li, respiciens eram ad adiutorium hominum. Motus ergo spei quandoque dicitur expectatio, propter inspectionem virtutis cognitivae praecedentem. Reply Obj. 1: Since hope regards a possible good, there arises in man a twofold movement of hope; for a thing may be possible to him in two ways, viz., by his own power, or by another’s. Accordingly when a man hopes to obtain something by his own power, he is not said to wait for it, but simply to hope for it. But, properly speaking, he is said to await that which he hopes to get by another’s help as though to expect implied keeping one’s eyes on another, insofar as the apprehensive power, by going ahead, not only keeps its eye on the good which man intends to get, but also on the thing by whose power he hopes to get it; according to Eccl. 51:10, I looked for the succor of men. Wherefore the movement of hope is sometimes called expectation, on account of the preceding inspection of the cognitive power. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud quod homo desiderat, et aestimat se posse adipisci, credit se adepturum, et ex tali fide in cognitiva praecedente, motus sequens in appetitu fiducia nominatur. Denominatur enim motus appetitivus a cognitione praecedente, sicut effectus ex causa magis nota, magis enim cognoscit vis apprehensiva suum actum quam actum appetitivae. Reply Obj. 2: When a man desires a thing and reckons that he can get it, he believes that he can get it, he believes that he will get it; and from this belief which precedes in the cognitive power, the ensuing movement in the appetite is called confidence. Because the movement of the appetite takes its name from the knowledge that precedes it, as an effect from a cause which is better known; for the apprehensive power knows its own act better than that of the appetite. Ad tertium dicendum quod certitudo attribuitur motui non solum appetitus sensitivi, sed etiam appetitus naturalis, sicut dicitur quod lapis certitudinaliter tendit deorsum. Et hoc propter infallibilitatem quam habet ex certitudine cognitionis quae praecedit motum appetitus sensitivi, vel etiam naturalis. Reply Obj. 3: Certainty is ascribed to the movement, not only of the sensitive, but also of the natural appetite; thus we say that a stone is certain to tend downwards. This is owing to the inerrancy which the movement of the sensitive or even natural appetite derives from the certainty of the knowledge that precedes it. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum in brutis animalibus sit spes Whether hope is in dumb animals? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod in brutis animalibus non sit spes. Spes enim est de futuro bono, ut Damascenus dicit. Sed cognoscere futurum non pertinet ad animalia bruta, quae habent solum cognitionem sensitivam, quae non est futurorum. Ergo spes non est in brutis animalibus. Objection 1: It would seem that there is no hope in dumb animals. Because hope is for some future good, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). But knowledge of the future is not in the competency of dumb animals, whose knowledge is confined to the senses and does not extend to the future. Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals. Praeterea, obiectum spei est bonum possibile adipisci. Sed possibile et impossibile sunt quaedam differentiae veri et falsi, quae solum sunt in mente, ut philosophus dicit in VI Metaphys. Ergo spes non est in brutis animalibus, in quibus non est mens. Obj. 2: Further, the object of hope is a future good, possible of attainment. But possible and impossible are differences of the true and the false, which are only in the mind, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vi, 4). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals, since they have no mind. Praeterea, Augustinus dicit, super Gen. ad Litt., quod animalia moventur visis. Sed spes non est de eo quod videtur, nam quod videt quis, quid sperat? Ut dicitur Rom. VIII. Ergo spes non est in brutis animalibus. Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (Gen ad lit. ix, 14) that animals are moved by the things that they see. But hope is of things unseen: for what a man seeth, why doth he hope for? (Rom 8:24). Therefore there is no hope in dumb animals.