Articulus 6 Article 6 Utrum iuventus et ebrietas sint causa spei Whether hope abounds in young men and drunkards? Ad sextum sic proceditur. Videtur quod iuventus et ebrietas non sint causa spei. Spes enim importat quandam certitudinem et firmitatem, unde ad Heb. VI, spes comparatur ancorae. Sed iuvenes et ebrii deficiunt a firmitate, habent enim animum de facili mutabilem. Ergo iuventus et ebrietas non est causa spei. Objection 1: It would seem that youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope. Because hope implies certainty and steadiness; so much so that it is compared to an anchor (Heb 6:19). But young men and drunkards are wanting in steadiness; since their minds are easily changed. Therefore youth and drunkenness are not causes of hope. Praeterea, ea quae augent potestatem, maxime sunt causa spei, ut supra dictum est. Sed iuventus et ebrietas quandam infirmitatem habent adiunctam. Ergo non sunt causa spei. Obj. 2: Further, as stated above (A5), the cause of hope is chiefly whatever increases one’s power. But youth and drunkenness are united to weakness. Therefore they are not causes of hope. Praeterea, experientia est causa spei, ut dictum est. Sed iuvenibus experientia deficit. Ergo iuventus non est causa spei. Obj. 3: Further, experience is a cause of hope, as stated above (A5). But youth lacks experience. Therefore it is not a cause of hope. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inebriati sunt bene sperantes. Et in II Rhetoric. dicitur quod iuvenes sunt bonae spei. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that drunken men are hopeful: and (Rhet. ii, 12) that the young are full of hope. Respondeo dicendum quod iuventus est causa spei propter tria, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric. Et haec tria possunt accipi secundum tres conditiones boni quod est obiectum spei, quod est futurum, et arduum, et possibile, ut dictum est. Iuvenes enim multum habent de futuro, et parum de praeterito. Et ideo, quia memoria est praeteriti, spes autem futuri; parum habent de memoria, sed multum vivunt in spe. Iuvenes etiam, propter caliditatem naturae, habent multos spiritus, et ita in eis cor ampliatur. Ex amplitudine autem cordis est quod aliquis ad ardua tendat. Et ideo iuvenes sunt animosi et bonae spei. Similiter etiam illi qui non sunt passi repulsam, nec experti impedimenta in suis conatibus, de facili reputant aliquid sibi possibile. Unde et iuvenes, propter inexperientiam impedimentorum et defectuum, de facili reputant aliquid sibi possibile. Et ideo sunt bonae spei. Duo etiam istorum sunt in ebriis, scilicet caliditas et multiplicatio spirituum, propter vinum; et iterum inconsideratio periculorum vel defectuum. Et propter eandem rationem etiam omnes stulti, et deliberatione non utentes, omnia tentant, et sunt bonae spei. I answer that, Youth is a cause of hope for three reasons, as the Philosopher states in Rhet. ii, 12: and these three reasons may be gathered from the three conditions of the good which is the object of hope—namely, that it is future, arduous and possible, as stated above (A1). For youth has much of the future before it, and little of the past: and therefore since memory is of the past, and hope of the future, it has little to remember and lives very much in hope. Again, youths, on account of the heat of their nature, are full of spirit; so that their heart expands: and it is owing to the heart being expanded that one tends to that which is arduous; wherefore youths are spirited and hopeful. Likewise they who have not suffered defeat, nor had experience of obstacles to their efforts, are prone to count a thing possible to them. Wherefore youths, through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing possible; and consequently are of good hope. Two of these causes are also in those who are in drink—viz., heat and high spirits, on account of wine, and heedlessness of dangers and shortcomings. For the same reason all foolish and thoughtless persons attempt everything and are full of hope. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in iuvenibus et in ebriis licet non sit firmitas secundum rei veritatem, est tamen in eis secundum eorum aestimationem, reputant enim se firmiter assecuturos illud quod sperant. Reply Obj. 1: Although youths and men in drink lack steadiness in reality, yet they are steady in their own estimation, for they think that they will steadily obtain that which they hope for. Et similiter dicendum ad secundum, quod iuvenes et ebrii habent quidem infirmitatem secundum rei veritatem, sed secundum eorum existimationem, habent potestatem; quia suos defectus non cognoscunt. In like manner, in reply to the Second Objection, we must observe that young people and men in drink are indeed unsteady in reality: but, in their own estimation, they are capable, for they know not their shortcomings. Ad tertium dicendum quod non solum experientia, sed etiam inexperientia est quodammodo causa spei, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 3: Not only experience, but also lack of experience, is, in some way, a cause of hope, as explained above (A5, ad 3). Articulus 7 Article 7 Utrum spes sit causa amoris Whether hope is a cause of love? Ad septimum sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non sit causa amoris. Quia secundum Augustinum, XIV de Civ. Dei, prima affectionum animae est amor. Sed spes est quaedam affectio animae. Amor ergo praecedit spem. Non ergo spes causat amorem. Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a cause of love. Because, according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9), love is the first of the soul’s emotions. But hope is an emotion of the soul. Therefore love precedes hope, and consequently hope does not cause love. Praeterea, desiderium praecedit spem. Sed desiderium causatur ex amore, ut dictum est. Ergo etiam spes sequitur amorem. Non ergo causat ipsum. Obj. 2: Further, desire precedes hope. But desire is caused by love, as stated above (Q25, A2). Therefore hope, too, follows love, and consequently is not its cause. Praeterea, spes causat delectationem, ut supra dictum est. Sed delectatio non est nisi de bono amato. Ergo amor praecedit spem. Obj. 3: Further, hope causes pleasure, as stated above (Q32, A3). But pleasure is only of the good that is loved. Therefore love precedes hope. Sed contra est quod Matth. I, super illud, Abraham genuit Isaac, Isaac autem genuit Iacob, dicit Glossa, idest, fides spem, spes caritatem. Caritas autem est amor. Ergo amor causatur a spe. On the contrary, The gloss commenting on Mt. 1:2, Abraham begot Isaac, and Isaac begot Jacob, says, i.e., faith begets hope, and hope begets charity. But charity is love. Therefore love is caused by hope. Respondeo dicendum quod spes duo respicere potest. Respicit enim sicut obiectum, bonum speratum. Sed quia bonum speratum est arduum possibile; aliquando autem fit aliquod arduum possibile nobis, non per nos, sed per alios; ideo spes etiam respicit illud per quod fit nobis aliquid possibile. I answer that, Hope can regard two things. For it regards as its object, the good which one hopes for. But since the good we hope for is something difficult but possible to obtain; and since it happens sometimes that what is difficult becomes possible to us, not through ourselves but through others; hence it is that hope regards also that by which something becomes possible to us. Inquantum igitur spes respicit bonum speratum, spes ex amore causatur, non enim est spes nisi de bono desiderato et amato. Inquantum vero spes respicit illum per quem fit aliquid nobis possibile, sic amor causatur ex spe, et non e converso. Ex hoc enim quod per aliquem speramus nobis posse provenire bona, movemur in ipsum sicut in bonum nostrum, et sic incipimus ipsum amare. Ex hoc autem quod amamus aliquem, non speramus de eo, nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet credimus nos redamari ab ipso. Unde amari ab aliquo facit nos sperare de eo, sed amor eius causatur ex spe quam de eo habemus. In so far, then, as hope regards the good we hope to get, it is caused by love: since we do not hope save for that which we desire and love. But insofar as hope regards one through whom something becomes possible to us, love is caused by hope, and not vice versa. Because by the very fact that we hope that good will accrue to us through someone, we are moved towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him. Whereas from the fact that we love someone we do not hope in him, except accidentally, that is, insofar as we think that he returns our love. Wherefore the fact of being loved by another makes us hope in him; but our love for him is caused by the hope we have in him. Et per haec patet responsio ad obiecta. Wherefore the Replies to the Objections are evident. Articulus 8 Article 8 Utrum spes adiuvet operationem, sed magis impediat Whether hope is a help or a hindrance to action? Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod spes non adiuvet operationem, sed magis impediat. Ad spem enim securitas pertinet. Sed securitas parit negligentiam, quae impedit operationem. Ergo spes impedit operationem. Objection 1: It would seem that hope is not a help but a hindrance to action. Because hope implies security. But security begets negligence which hinders action. Therefore hope is a hindrance to action. Praeterea, tristitia impedit operationem, ut supra dictum est. Sed spes quandoque causat tristitiam, dicitur enim Prov. XIII, spes quae differtur, affligit animam. Ergo spes impedit operationem. Obj. 2: Further, sorrow hinders action, as stated above (Q37, A3). But hope sometimes causes sorrow: for it is written (Prov 13:12): Hope that is deferred afflicteth the soul. Therefore hope hinders action. Praeterea, desperatio contrariatur spei, ut dictum est. Sed desperatio, maxime in rebus bellicis, adiuvat operationem, dicitur enim II Reg. II, quod periculosa res est desperatio. Ergo spes facit contrarium effectum, impediendo scilicet operationem. Obj. 3: Further, despair is contrary to hope, as stated above (A4). But despair, especially in matters of war, conduces to action; for it is written (2 Kgs 2:26), that it is dangerous to drive people to despair. Therefore hope has a contrary effect, namely, by hindering action. Sed contra est quod dicitur I ad Cor. IX, quod qui arat, debet arare in spe fructus percipiendi. Et eadem ratio est in omnibus aliis. On the contrary, It is written (1 Cor 9:10) that he that plougheth should plough in hope . . . to receive fruit: and the same applies to all other actions. Respondeo dicendum quod spes per se habet quod adiuvet operationem, intendendo ipsam. Et hoc ex duobus. Primo quidem, ex ratione sui obiecti, quod est bonum arduum possibile. Existimatio enim ardui excitat attentionem, existimatio vero possibilis non retardat conatum. Unde sequitur quod homo intente operetur propter spem. Secundo vero, ex ratione sui effectus. Spes enim, ut supra dictum est, causat delectationem, quae adiuvat operationem, ut supra dictum est. Unde spes operationem adiuvat. I answer that, Hope of its very nature is a help to action by making it more intense: and this for two reasons. First, by reason of its object, which is a good, difficult but possible. For the thought of its being difficult arouses our attention; while the thought that it is possible is no drag on our effort. Hence it follows that by reason of hope man is intent on his action. Second, on account of its effect. Because hope, as stated above (Q32, A3), causes pleasure; which is a help to action, as stated above (Q33, A4). Therefore hope is conducive to action. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod spes respicit bonum consequendum, securitas autem respicit malum vitandum. Unde securitas magis videtur opponi timori, quam ad spem pertinere. Et tamen securitas non causat negligentiam, nisi inquantum diminuit existimationem ardui, in quo etiam diminuitur ratio spei. Illa enim in quibus homo nullum impedimentum timet, quasi iam non reputantur ardua. Reply Obj. 1: Hope regards a good to be obtained; security regards an evil to be avoided. Wherefore security seems to be contrary to fear rather than to belong to hope. Yet security does not beget negligence, save insofar as it lessens the idea of difficulty: whereby it also lessens the character of hope: for the things in which a man fears no hindrance, are no longer looked upon as difficult. Ad secundum dicendum quod spes per se causat delectationem, sed per accidens est ut causet tristitiam, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: Hope of itself causes pleasure; it is by accident that it causes sorrow, as stated above (Q32, A3, ad 2). Ad tertium dicendum quod desperatio in bello fit periculosa, propter aliquam spem adiunctam. Illi enim qui desperant de fuga, debilitantur in fugiendo, sed sperant mortem suam vindicare. Et ideo ex hac spe acrius pugnant, unde periculosi hostibus fiunt. Reply Obj. 3: Despair threatens danger in war, on account of a certain hope that attaches to it. For they who despair of flight, strive less to fly, but hope to avenge their death: and therefore in this hope they fight the more bravely, and consequently prove dangerous to the foe. Quaestio 41 Question 41 De timore ipso Of Fear, in Itself Consequenter considerandum est, primo, de timore; et secundo, de audacia. Circa timorem consideranda sunt quatuor, primo, de ipso timore; secundo, de obiecto eius; tertio, de causa ipsius; quarto, de effectu. Circa primum quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider, in the first place, fear; and, second, daring. With regard to fear, four things must be considered: (1) Fear, in itself; (2) Its object; (3) Its cause; (4) Its effect. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum timor sit passio animae. (1) Whether fear is a passion of the soul? Secundo, utrum sit specialis passio. (2) Whether fear is a special passion? Tertio, utrum sit aliquis timor naturalis. (3) Whether there is a natural fear? Quarto, de speciebus timoris. (4) Of the species of fear.