Ad secundum dicendum quod non omnis fuga appetitus est timor, sed fuga ab aliquo speciali obiecto, ut dictum est. Et ideo, licet fuga sit quoddam generale, tamen timor est passio specialis. Reply Obj. 2: Not every avoidance in the appetite is fear, but avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance be something common, yet fear is a special passion. Ad tertium dicendum quod timor nullo modo est in concupiscibili, non enim respicit malum absolute, sed cum quadam difficultate vel arduitate, ut ei resisti vix possit. Sed quia passiones irascibilis derivantur a passionibus concupiscibilis et ad eas terminantur, ut supra dictum est; ideo timori attribuuntur ea quae sunt concupiscibilis. Dicitur enim timor esse tristitia, inquantum obiectum, timoris est contristans, si praesens fuerit, unde et philosophus dicit ibidem quod timor procedit ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel contristativi. Similiter et desiderium attribuitur a Damasceno timori, quia, sicut spes oritur a desiderio boni ita timor ex fuga mali; fuga autem mali oritur ex desiderio boni, ut ex supra dictis patet. Reply Obj. 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost unavoidable. But since the irascible passions arise from the passions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above (Q25, A1); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, insofar as the object of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises from the representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful. In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident from what has been said above (Q25, A2; Q29, A2; Q36, A2). Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum timor aliquis sit naturalis Whether there is a natural fear? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor aliquis sit naturalis. Dicit enim Damascenus, in III libro, quod est quidam timor naturalis, nolente anima dividi a corpore. Objection 1: It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that there is a natural fear, through the soul refusing to be severed from the body. Praeterea, timor ex amore oritur, ut dictum est. Sed est aliquis amor naturalis, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo etiam est aliquis timor naturalis. Obj. 2: Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A2, ad 1). But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is also a natural fear. Praeterea, timor opponitur spei, ut supra dictum est. Sed est aliqua spes naturae, ut patet per id quod dicitur Rom. IV, de Abraham, quod contra spem naturae, in spem gratiae credidit. Ergo etiam est aliquis timor naturae. Obj. 3: Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above (Q40, A4, ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from Rom. 4:18, where it is said of Abraham that against hope of nature, he believed in hope of grace. Therefore there is also a fear of nature. Sed contra, ea quae sunt naturalia, communiter inveniuntur in rebus animatis et inanimatis. Sed timor non invenitur in rebus inanimatis. Ergo timor non est naturalis. On the contrary, That which is natural is common to things animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is no natural fear. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquis motus dicitur naturalis, quia ad ipsum inclinat natura. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Uno modo, quod totum perficitur a natura, absque aliqua operatione apprehensivae virtutis, sicut moveri sursum est motus naturalis ignis, et augeri est motus naturalis animalium et plantarum. Alio modo dicitur motus naturalis, ad quem natura inclinat, licet non perficiatur nisi per apprehensionem, quia, sicut supra dictum est, motus cognitivae et appetitivae virtutis reducuntur in naturam, sicut in principium primum. Et per hunc modum, etiam ipsi actus apprehensivae virtutis, ut intelligere, sentire et memorari, et etiam motus appetitus animalis, quandoque dicuntur naturales. I answer that, A movement is said to be natural, because nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is entirely accomplished by nature, without any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to fire, and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants. Second, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines thereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as stated above (Q10, A1), the movements of the cognitive and appetitive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first principle. In this way, even the acts of the apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of the animal appetite, are sometimes said to be natural. Et per hunc modum potest dici timor naturalis. Et distinguitur a timore non naturali, secundum diversitatem obiecti. Est enim, ut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., timor de malo corruptivo, quod natura refugit propter naturale desiderium essendi, et talis timor dicitur naturalis. Est iterum de malo contristativo, quod non repugnat naturae, sed desiderio appetitus, et talis timor non est naturalis. Sicut etiam supra amor, concupiscentia et delectatio distincta sunt per naturale et non naturale. And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of corruptive evil, which nature shrinks from on account of its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural. Again, there is a fear of painful evil, which is repugnant not to nature, but to the desire of the appetite; and such fear is not natural. In this sense we have stated above (Q26, A1; Q30, A3; Q31, A7) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural. Sed secundum primam acceptionem naturalis, sciendum est quod quaedam de passionibus animae quandoque dicuntur naturales, ut amor, desiderium et spes, aliae vero naturales dici non possunt. Et hoc ideo, quia amor et odium, desiderium et fuga, important inclinationem quandam ad prosequendum bonum et fugiendum malum; quae quidem inclinatio pertinet etiam ad appetitum naturalem. Et ideo est amor quidam naturalis, et desiderium vel spes potest quodammodo dici etiam in rebus naturalibus cognitione carentibus. Sed aliae passiones animae important quosdam motus ad quos nullo modo sufficit inclinatio naturalis. Vel quia de ratione harum passionum est sensus seu cognitio, sicut dictum est quod apprehensio requiritur ad rationem delectationis et doloris, unde quae carent cognitione, non possunt dici delectari vel dolere. Aut quia huiusmodi motus sunt contra rationem inclinationis naturalis, puta quod desperatio refugit bonum propter aliquam difficultatem; et timor refugit impugnationem mali contrarii, ad quod est inclinatio naturalis. Et ideo huiusmodi passiones nullo modo attribuuntur rebus inanimatis. But in the first sense of the word natural, we must observe that certain passions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural, as love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural. The reason of this is because love and hatred, desire and avoidance, imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil; which inclination is to be found in the natural appetite also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the other passions of the soul denote certain movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or knowledge is essential to these passions (thus we have said, Q31, AA1,3; Q35, A1, that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like passions are in no way ascribed to inanimate beings. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum convenienter Damascenus assignet sex species timoris, scilicet segnitiem, erubescentiam, verecundiam, admirationem, stuporem, agoniam Whether Damascene suitably assigns six species of fear: namely, laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod inconvenienter Damascenus assignet sex species timoris, scilicet segnitiem, erubescentiam, verecundiam, admirationem, stuporem, agoniam. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., timor est de malo contristativo. Ergo species timoris debent respondere speciebus tristitiae. Sunt autem quatuor species tristitiae, ut supra dictum est. Ergo solum debent esse quatuor species timoris, eis correspondentes. Objection 1: It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably assigned by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety. Because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear regards a saddening evil. Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above (Q35, A8). Therefore there should only be four species of fear corresponding to them. Praeterea, illud quod in actu nostro consistit, nostrae potestati subiicitur. Sed timor est de malo quod excedit potestatem nostram, ut dictum est. Non ergo segnities et erubescentia et verecundia, quae respiciunt operationem nostram, debent poni species timoris. Obj. 2: Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil that surpasses our power, as stated above (A2). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear. Praeterea, timor est de futuro, ut dictum est. Sed verecundia est de turpi actu iam commisso, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit. Ergo verecundia non est species timoris. Obj. 3: Further, fear is of the future, as stated above (AA1, 2). But shame regards a disgraceful deed already done, as Gregory of Nyssa says. Therefore shame is not a species of fear. Praeterea, timor non est nisi de malo. Sed admiratio et stupor sunt de magno et insolito, sive bono sive malo. Ergo admiratio et stupor non sunt species timoris. Obj. 4: Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore amazement and stupor are not species of fear. Praeterea, philosophi ex admiratione sunt moti ad inquirendum veritatem, ut dicitur in principio Metaphys. Timor autem non movet ad inquirendum, sed magis ad fugiendum. Ergo admiratio non est species timoris. Obj. 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of Metaphysics. But fear leads to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear. Sed in contrarium sufficiat auctoritas Damasceni et Gregorii Nysseni. On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa (Cf. obj 1,3). Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, timor est de futuro malo quod excedit potestatem timentis, ut scilicet ei resisti non possit. Sicut autem bonum hominis, ita et malum, potest considerari vel in operatione ipsius, vel in exterioribus rebus. In operatione autem ipsius hominis, potest duplex malum timeri. Primo quidem, labor gravans naturam. Et sic causatur segnities, cum scilicet aliquis refugit operari, propter timorem excedentis laboris. Secundo, turpitudo laedens opinionem. Et sic, si turpitudo timeatur in actu committendo, est erubescentia, si autem sit de turpi iam facto, est verecundia. I answer that, As stated above (A2), fear regards a future evil which surpasses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man’s evil, like his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises laziness, as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil. Second, there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is shamefacedness; if, however, it be a deed already done, there is shame. Malum autem quod in exterioribus rebus consistit, triplici ratione potest excedere hominis facultatem ad resistendum. Primo quidem, ratione suae magnitudinis, cum scilicet aliquis considerat aliquod magnum malum, cuius exitum considerare non sufficit. Et sic est admiratio. Secundo, ratione dissuetudinis, quia scilicet aliquod malum inconsuetum nostrae considerationi offertur, et sic est magnum nostra reputatione. Et hoc modo est stupor, qui causatur ex insolita imaginatione. Tertio modo, ratione improvisionis, quia scilicet provideri non potest, sicut futura infortunia timentur. Et talis timor dicitur agonia. On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpass man’s faculty of resistance in three ways. First by reason of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is amazement. Second, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great in our estimation: and then there is stupor, which is caused by the representation of something unwonted. Third, by reason of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind is called anxiety. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illae species tristitiae quae supra positae sunt, non accipiuntur secundum diversitatem obiecti, sed secundum effectus, et secundum quasdam speciales rationes. Et ideo non oportet quod illae species tristitiae respondeant istis speciebus timoris, quae accipiuntur secundum divisionem propriam obiecti ipsius timoris. Reply Obj. 1: Those species of sorrow given above are not derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of fear, which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear itself. Ad secundum dicendum quod operatio secundum quod iam fit, subditur potestati operantis. Sed aliquid circa operationem considerari potest facultatem operantis excedens, propter quod aliquis refugit actionem. Et secundum hoc, segnities, erubescentia et verecundia ponuntur species timoris. Reply Obj. 2: A deed considered as being actually done, is in the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration something connected with the deed, and surpassing the faculty of the doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of fear. Ad tertium dicendum quod de actu praeterito potest timeri convitium vel opprobrium futurum. Et secundum hoc, verecundia est species timoris. Reply Obj. 3: The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear. Ad quartum dicendum quod non quaelibet admiratio et stupor sunt species timoris, sed admiratio quae est de magno malo, et stupor qui est de malo insolito. Vel potest dici quod, sicut segnities refugit laborem exterioris operationis, ita admiratio et stupor refugiunt difficultatem considerationis rei magnae et insolitae, sive sit bona sive mala, ut hoc modo se habeat admiratio et stupor ad actum intellectus, sicut segnities ad exteriorem actum. Reply Obj. 4: Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and stupor stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to external work. Ad quintum dicendum quod admirans refugit in praesenti dare iudicium de eo quod miratur, timens defectum, sed in futurum inquirit. Stupens autem timet et in praesenti iudicare, et in futuro inquirere. Unde admiratio est principium philosophandi, sed stupor est philosophicae considerationis impedimentum. Reply Obj. 5: He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the truth, but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a hindrance thereto. Quaestio 42 Question 42 De obiecto timoris Of the Object of Fear Deinde considerandum est de obiecto timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum bonum sit obiectum timoris, vel malum. (1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear? Secundo, utrum malum naturae sit obiectum timoris. (2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear? Tertio, utrum timor sit de malo culpae. (3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear? Quarto, utrum ipse timor timeri possit. (4) Whether fear itself can be feared? Quinto, utrum repentina magis timeantur. (5) Whether sudden things are especially feared? Sexto, utrum ea contra quae non est remedium, magis timeantur. (6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no remedy?