Quaestio 42 Question 42 De obiecto timoris Of the Object of Fear Deinde considerandum est de obiecto timoris. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum bonum sit obiectum timoris, vel malum. (1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear? Secundo, utrum malum naturae sit obiectum timoris. (2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear? Tertio, utrum timor sit de malo culpae. (3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear? Quarto, utrum ipse timor timeri possit. (4) Whether fear itself can be feared? Quinto, utrum repentina magis timeantur. (5) Whether sudden things are especially feared? Sexto, utrum ea contra quae non est remedium, magis timeantur. (6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no remedy? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum bonum sit obiectum timoris Whether the object of fear is good? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod bonum sit obiectum timoris. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod nihil timemus, nisi ne id quod amamus, aut adeptum amittamus, aut non adipiscamur speratum. Sed id quod amamus est bonum. Ergo timor respicit bonum sicut proprium obiectum. Objection 1: It would seem that good is the object of fear. For Augustine says (83 Questions, Q83) that we fear nothing save to lose what we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for. But that which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good as its proper object. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod potestas, et super alium ipsum esse, est terribile. Sed huiusmodi est quoddam bonum. Ergo bonum est obiectum timoris. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that power and to be above another is a thing to be feared. But this is a good thing. Therefore good is the object of fear. Praeterea, in Deo nihil malum esse potest. Sed mandatur nobis ut Deum timeamus; secundum illud Psalmi XXXIII, timete dominum, omnes sancti eius. Ergo etiam timor est de bono. Obj. 3: Further, there can be no evil in God. But we are commanded to fear God, according to Ps. 33:10: Fear the Lord, all ye saints. Therefore even the good is an object of fear. Sed contra est quod Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod timor est de malo futuro. On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil. Respondeo dicendum quod timor est quidam motus appetitivae virtutis. Ad virtutem autem appetitivam pertinet prosecutio et fuga, ut dicitur in VI Ethic. Est autem prosecutio boni. Fuga autem mali. Unde quicumque motus appetitivae virtutis importat prosecutionem, habet aliquod bonum pro obiecto, quicumque autem importat fugam, habet malum pro obiecto. Unde, cum timor fugam quandam importet, primo et per se respicit malum sicut proprium obiectum. I answer that, Fear is a movement of the appetitive power. Now it belongs to the appetitive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in Ethic. vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil. Consequently whatever movement of the appetitive power implies pursuit, has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since fear implies an avoidance, in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper object. Potest autem respicere etiam bonum, secundum quod habet habitudinem ad malum. Quod quidem potest esse dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, inquantum per malum privatur bonum. Ex hoc autem ipso est aliquid malum, quod est privativum boni. Unde, cum fugiatur malum quia malum est, sequitur ut fugiatur quia privat bonum quod quis amando prosequitur. Et secundum hoc dicit Augustinus quod nulla est causa timendi, nisi ne amittatur bonum amatum. It can, however, regard good also, insofar as referable to evil. This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good. Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love. Alio modo comparatur bonum ad malum, ut causa ipsius, inquantum scilicet aliquod bonum sua virtute potest inducere aliquod nocumentum in bono amato. Et ideo, sicut spes, ut supra dictum est, ad duo respicit, scilicet ad bonum in quod tendit, et ad id per quod sperat se bonum concupitum adipisci; ita etiam timor ad duo respicit, scilicet ad malum quod refugit, et ad illud bonum quod sua virtute potest infligere malum. Et per hunc modum Deus timetur ab homine, inquantum potest infligere poenam, vel spiritualem vel corporalem. Per hunc etiam modum timetur potestas alicuius hominis, maxime quando est laesa, vel quando est iniusta, quia sic in promptu habet nocumentum inferre. In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: insofar as some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love: and so, just as hope, as stated above (Q40, A7), regards two things, namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by its power, can inflict that evil. In this way God is feared by man, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the power of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us a harm. Ita etiam timetur super alium esse, idest inniti alii, ut scilicet in eius potestate sic constitutum nobis nocumentum inferre, sicut ille qui est conscius criminis, timetur, ne crimen revelet. In like manner one fears to be over another, i.e., to lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime lest he reveal it to others. Et per hoc patet responsio ad obiecta. This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum timor sit de malo naturae Whether evil of nature is an object of fear? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor non sit de malo naturae. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod timor consiliativos facit. Non autem consiliamur de his quae a natura eveniunt, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Ergo timor non est de malo naturae. Objection 1: It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear makes us take counsel. But we do not take counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is not an object of fear. Praeterea, defectus naturales semper homini imminent, ut mors et alia huiusmodi. Si igitur de huiusmodi malis esset timor, oporteret quod homo semper esset in timore. Obj. 2: Further, natural defects such as death and the like are always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object of fear, man would needs be always in fear. Praeterea, natura non movet ad contraria. Sed malum naturae provenit ex natura. Ergo quod timendo aliquis refugiat huiusmodi malum, non est a natura. Timor ergo naturalis non est de malo naturae; ad quem tamen hoc malum pertinere videtur. Obj. 3: Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature. Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and yet it seems that it should be. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod inter omnia terribilissimum est mors, quae est malum naturae. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that the most terrible of all things is death, which is an evil of nature. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., timor provenit ex phantasia futuri mali corruptivi vel contristativi. Sicut autem contristativum malum est quod contrariatur voluntati; ita corruptivum malum est quod contrariatur naturae. Et hoc est malum naturae. Unde de malo naturae potest esse timor. I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by the imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful. Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear. Sed considerandum est quod malum naturae quandoque est a causa naturali, et tunc dicitur malum naturae, non solum quia privat naturae bonum, sed etiam quia est effectus naturae; sicut mors naturalis, et alii huiusmodi defectus. Aliquando vero malum naturae provenit ex causa non naturali, sicut mors quae violenter infertur a persecutore. Et utroque modo malum naturae quodammodo timetur, et quodammodo non timetur. Cum enim timor proveniat ex phantasia futuri mali, ut dicit philosophus; illud quod removet futuri mali phantasiam, excludit etiam timorem. Quod autem non appareat aliquod malum ut futurum, potest ex duobus contingere. Uno quidem modo, ex hoc quod est remotum et distans, hoc enim, propter distantiam, imaginamur ut non futurum. Et ideo vel non timemus, vel parum timemus. Ut enim philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quae valde longe sunt non timentur, sciunt enim omnes, quod morientur; sed quia non prope est, nihil curant. Alio modo aestimatur aliquod malum quod est futurum, ut non futurum, propter necessitatem, quae facit ipsum aestimare ut praesens. Unde philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod illi qui iam decapitantur non timent, videntes sibi necessitatem mortis imminere; sed ad hoc quod aliquis timeat, oportet adesse aliquam spem salutis. But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and other like defects. But sometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death inflicted by an assailant. In either case evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not. For since fear arises from the imagination of future evil, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), we do not fear things that are very far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not. Second, a future evil is considered as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid, seeing that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no escape; but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for him. Sic igitur malum naturae non timetur, quia non apprehenditur ut futurum. Si vero malum naturae, quod est corruptivum, apprehendatur ut propinquum, et tamen cum aliqua spe evasionis, tunc timebitur. Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod malum naturae quandoque non provenit a natura, ut dictum est. Secundum tamen quod a natura provenit, etsi non ex toto vitari possit, potest tamen differri. Et sub hac spe, potest esse consilium de vitatione ipsius. Reply Obj. 1: The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of nature, as stated above. But insofar as it is an effect of nature, although it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about avoiding it. Ad secundum dicendum quod malum naturae, etsi semper immineat, non tamen semper imminet de propinquo. Et ideo non semper timetur. Reply Obj. 2: Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always feared. Ad tertium dicendum quod mors et alii defectus naturae proveniunt a natura universali, quibus tamen repugnat natura particularis quantum potest. Et sic ex inclinatione particularis naturae, est dolor et tristitia de huiusmodi malis, cum sunt praesentia; et timor, si immineant in futurum. Reply Obj. 3: Death and other defects of nature are the effects of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear when threatening in the future. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum timor possit esse de malo culpae Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor possit esse de malo culpae. Dicit enim Augustinus, super canonicam Ioan., quod timore casto timet homo separationem a Deo. Sed nihil separat nos a Deo nisi culpa; secundum illud Isaiae LIX. Peccata vestra diviserunt inter vos et Deum vestrum. Ergo timor potest esse de malo culpae. Objection 1: It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract. ix), that by chaste fear man fears to be severed from God. Now nothing but sin severs us from God; according to Is. 59:2: Your iniquities have divided between you and your God. Therefore the evil of sin can be an object of fear. Praeterea, Tullius dicit, in IV de Tusculanis quaest., quod de illis timemus, cum futura sunt, de quorum praesentia tristamur. Sed de malo culpae potest aliquis dolere vel tristari. Ergo etiam malum culpae aliquis potest timere. Obj. 2: Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4,6) that we fear when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when they are present. But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of sin.