Utrum timor impediat operationem Whether fear hinders action? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod timor impediat operationem. Operatio enim maxime impeditur ex perturbatione rationis, quae dirigit in opere. Sed timor perturbat rationem, ut dictum est. Ergo timor impedit operationem. Objection 1: It would seem that fear hinders action. For action is hindered chiefly by a disturbance in the reason, which directs action. But fear disturbs reason, as stated above (A2). Therefore fear hinders action. Praeterea, illi qui faciunt aliquid cum timore, facilius in operando deficiunt, sicut si aliquis incedat super trabem in alto positam, propter timorem de facili cadit; non autem caderet, si incederet super eandem trabem in imo positam, propter defectum timoris. Ergo timor impedit operationem. Obj. 2: Further, those who fear while doing anything, are more apt to fail: thus a man who walks on a plank placed aloft, easily falls through fear; whereas, if he were to walk on the same plank down below, he would not fall, through not being afraid. Therefore fear hinders action. Praeterea, pigritia, sive segnities, est quaedam species timoris. Sed pigritia impedit operationem. Ergo et timor. Obj. 3: Further, laziness or sloth is a kind of fear. But laziness hinders action. Therefore fear does too. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, ad Philipp. II, cum metu et tremore vestram salutem operamini, quod non diceret, si timor bonam operationem impediret. Timor ergo non impedit bonam operationem. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Phil 2:12): With fear and trembling work out your salvation: and he would not say this if fear were a hindrance to a good work. Therefore fear does not hinder a good action. Respondeo dicendum quod operatio hominis exterior causatur quidem ab anima sicut a primo movente, sed a membris corporeis sicut ab instrumentis. Contingit autem operationem impediri et propter defectum instrumenti, et propter defectum principalis moventis. Ex parte igitur instrumentorum corporalium, timor, quantum est de se, semper natus est impedire exteriorem operationem, propter defectum caloris qui ex timore accidit in exterioribus membris. Sed ex parte animae, si sit timor moderatus, non multum rationem perturbans; confert ad bene operandum, inquantum causat quandam sollicitudinem, et facit hominem attentius consiliari et operari. Si vero timor tantum increscat quod rationem perturbet, impedit operationem etiam ex parte animae. Sed de tali timore apostolus non loquitur. I answer that, Man’s exterior actions are caused by the soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, of their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, insofar as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak. Et per haec patet responsio ad primum. This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection. Ad secundum dicendum quod illi qui cadunt de trabe in alto posita, patiuntur perturbationem imaginationis, propter timorem casus imaginati. Reply Obj. 2: He that falls from a plank placed aloft, suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured to his imagination. Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis timens refugit id quod timet, et ideo, cum pigritia sit timor de ipsa operatione, inquantum est laboriosa, impedit operationem, quia retrahit voluntatem ab ipsa. Sed timor qui est de aliis rebus, intantum adiuvat operationem, inquantum inclinat voluntatem ad operandum ea per quae homo effugit id quod timet. Reply Obj. 3: Everyone in fear shuns that which he fears: and therefore, since laziness is a fear of work itself as being toilsome, it hinders work by withdrawing the will from it. But fear of other things conduces to action, insofar as it inclines the will to do that whereby a man escapes from what he fears. Quaestio 45 Question 45 De audacia Of Daring Deinde considerandum est de audacia. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor. We must now consider daring: under which head there are four points of inquiry: Primo, utrum audacia sit contraria timori. (1) Whether daring is contrary to fear? Secundo, quomodo audacia se habeat ad spem. (2) How is daring related to hope? Tertio, de causa audaciae. (3) Of the cause of daring; Quarto, de effectus ipsius. (4) Of its effect. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum audacia contrarietur timori Whether daring is contrary to fear? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non contrarietur timori. Dicit enim Augustinus, in libro octoginta trium quaest., quod audacia vitium est. Vitium autem virtuti contrariatur. Cum ergo timor non sit virtus, sed passio, videtur quod timori non contrarietur audacia. Objection 1: It would seem that daring is not contrary to fear. For Augustine says (83 Questions, Q31) that daring is a vice. Now vice is contrary to virtue. Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue but a passion, it seems that daring is not contrary to fear. Praeterea, uni unum est contrarium. Sed timori contrariatur spes. Non ergo contrariatur ei audacia. Obj. 2: Further, to one thing there is one contrary. But hope is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear. Praeterea, unaquaeque passio excludit passionem oppositam. Sed id quod excluditur per timorem, est securitas, dicit enim Augustinus, II Confess., quod timor securitati praecavet ergo securitas contrariatur timori. Non ergo audacia. Obj. 3: Further, every passion excludes its opposite. But fear excludes safety; for Augustine says (Confess. ii, 6) that fear takes forethought for safety. Therefore safety is contrary to fear. Therefore daring is not contrary to fear. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod audacia est timori contraria. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that daring is contrary to fear. Respondeo dicendum quod de ratione contrariorum est quod maxime a se distent, ut dicitur in X Metaphys. Illud autem quod maxime distat a timore, est audacia, timor enim refugit nocumentum futurum, propter eius victoriam super ipsum timentem; sed audacia aggreditur periculum imminens, propter victoriam sui supra ipsum periculum. Unde manifeste timori contrariatur audacia. I answer that, It is of the essence of contraries to be farthest removed from one another, as stated in Metaph. x, 4. Now that which is farthest removed from fear, is daring: since fear turns away from the future hurt, on account of its victory over him that fears it; whereas daring turns on threatened danger because of its own victory over that same danger. Consequently it is evident that daring is contrary to fear. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ira et audacia, et omnium passionum nomina, dupliciter accipi possunt. Uno modo, secundum quod important absolute motus appetitus sensitivi in aliquod obiectum bonum vel malum, et sic sunt nomina passionum. Alio modo, secundum quod simul cum huiusmodi motu important recessum ab ordine rationis, et sic sunt nomina vitiorum. Et hoc modo loquitur Augustinus de audacia, sed nos loquimur nunc de audacia secundum primum modum. Reply Obj. 1: Anger, daring and all the names of the passions can be taken in two ways. First, as denoting absolutely movements of the sensitive appetite in respect of some object, good or bad: and thus they are names of passions. Second, as denoting besides this movement, a straying from the order of reason: and thus they are names of vices. It is in this sense that Augustine speaks of daring: but we are speaking of it in the first sense. Ad secundum dicendum quod uni secundum idem, non sunt plura contraria, sed secundum diversa, nihil prohibet uni plura contrariari. Et sic dictum est supra quod passiones irascibilis habent duplicem contrarietatem, unam secundum oppositionem boni et mali, et sic timor contrariatur spei; aliam secundum oppositionem accessus et recessus, et sic timori contrariatur audacia, spei vero desperatio. Reply Obj. 2: To one thing, in the same respect, there are not several contraries; but in different respects nothing prevents one thing having several contraries. Accordingly it has been said above (Q23, A2; Q40, A4) that the irascible passions admit of a twofold contrariety: one, according to the opposition of good and evil, and thus fear is contrary to hope: the other, according to the opposition of approach and withdrawal, and thus daring is contrary to fear, and despair contrary to hope. Ad tertium dicendum quod securitas non significat aliquid contrarium timori, sed solam timoris exclusionem, ille enim dicitur esse securus, qui non timet. Unde securitas opponitur timori sicut privatio, audacia autem sicut contrarium. Et sicut contrarium includit in se privationem, ita audacia securitatem. Reply Obj. 3: Safety does not denote something contrary to fear, but merely the exclusion of fear: for he is said to be safe, who fears not. Wherefore safety is opposed to fear, as a privation: while daring is opposed thereto as a contrary. And as contrariety implies privation, so daring implies safety. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum audacia consequatur spem Whether daring ensues from hope? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod audacia non consequatur spem. Audacia enim est respectu malorum et terribilium, ut dicitur in III Ethic. Spes autem respicit bonum. Ut supra dictum est. Ergo habent diversa obiecta, et non sunt unius ordinis. Non ergo audacia consequitur spem. Objection 1: It would seem that daring does not ensue from hope. Because daring regards evil and fearful things, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But hope regards good things, as stated above (Q40, A1). Therefore they have different objects and are not in the same order. Therefore daring does not ensue from hope. Praeterea, sicut audacia contrariatur timori, ita desperatio spei. Sed timor non sequitur desperationem, quinimmo desperatio excludit timorem. Ut philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric. Ergo audacia non consequitur spem. Obj. 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5). Therefore daring does not result from hope. Praeterea, audacia intendit quoddam bonum, scilicet victoriam. Sed tendere in bonum arduum pertinet ad spem. Ergo audacia est idem spei. Non ergo consequitur ad spem. Obj. 3: Further, daring is intent on something good, viz., victory. But it belongs to hope to tend to that which is good and difficult. Therefore daring is the same as hope; and consequently does not result from it. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in III Ethic., quod illi qui sunt bonae spei, sunt audaces. Videtur ergo audacia consequi spem. On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) that those who are hopeful are full of daring. Therefore it seems that daring ensues from hope. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam pluries dictum est, omnes huiusmodi passiones animae ad appetitivam potentiam pertinent. Omnis autem motus appetitivae potentiae reducitur ad prosecutionem vel fugam. Prosecutio autem vel fuga est alicuius et per se, et per accidens, per se quidem est prosecutio boni, fuga vero mali; per accidens autem potest prosecutio esse mali, propter aliquod bonum adiunctum, et fuga boni, propter aliquod malum adiunctum. Quod autem est per accidens, sequitur ad id quod est per se. Et ideo prosecutio mali, sequitur prosecutionem boni, sicut et fuga boni sequitur fugam mali. Haec autem quatuor pertinent ad quatuor passiones, nam prosecutio boni pertinet ad spem, fuga mali ad timorem, insecutio mali terribilis pertinet ad audaciam, fuga vero boni pertinet ad desperationem. Unde sequitur quod audacia consequitur ad spem, ex hoc enim quod aliquis sperat superare terribile imminens, ex hoc audacter insequitur ipsum. Ad timorem vero sequitur desperatio, ideo enim aliquis desperat, quia timet difficultatem quae est circa bonum sperandum. I answer that, As we have often stated (Q22, A2; Q35, A1; Q41, A1), all these passions belong to the appetitive power. Now every movement of the appetitive power is reducible to one either of pursuit or of avoidance. Again, pursuit or avoidance is of something either by reason of itself or by reason of something else. By reason of itself, good is the object of pursuit, and evil, the object of avoidance: but by reason of something else, evil can be the object of pursuit, through some good attaching to it; and good can be the object of avoidance, through some evil attaching to it. Now that which is by reason of something else, follows that which is by reason of itself. Consequently pursuit of evil follows pursuit of good; and avoidance of good follows avoidance of evil. Now these four things belong to four passions, since pursuit of good belongs to hope, avoidance of evil to fear, the pursuit of the fearful evil belongs to daring, and the avoidance of good to despair. It follows, therefore, that daring results from hope; since it is in the hope of overcoming the threatening object of fear, that one attacks it boldly. But despair results from fear: since the reason why a man despairs is because he fears the difficulty attaching to the good he should hope for. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ratio sequeretur, si bonum et malum essent obiecta non habentia ordinem ad invicem. Sed quia malum habet aliquem ordinem ad bonum, est enim posterius bono, sicut privatio habitu; ideo audacia, quae insequitur malum, est post spem, quae insequitur bonum. Reply Obj. 1: This argument would hold, if good and evil were not co-ordinate objects. But because evil has a certain relation to good, since it comes after good, as privation comes after habit; consequently daring which pursues evil, comes after hope which pursues good. Ad secundum dicendum quod, etsi bonum simpliciter sit prius quam malum, tamen fuga per prius debetur malo quam bono, sicut insecutio per prius debetur bono quam malo. Et ideo sicut spes est prior quam audacia, ita timor est prior quam desperatio. Et sicut ex timore non semper sequitur desperatio, sed quando fuerit intensus; ita ex spe non semper sequitur audacia, sed quando fuerit vehemens. Reply Obj. 2: Although good, absolutely speaking, is prior to evil, yet avoidance of evil precedes avoidance of good; just as the pursuit of good precedes the pursuit of evil. Consequently just as hope precedes daring, so fear precedes despair. And just as fear does not always lead to despair, but only when it is intense; so hope does not always lead to daring, save only when it is strong. Ad tertium dicendum quod audacia, licet sit circa malum cui coniunctum est bonum victoriae secundum aestimationem audacis, tamen respicit malum, bonum vero adiunctum respicit spes. Et similiter desperatio respicit bonum directe, quod refugit, malum vero adiunctum respicit timor. Unde, proprie loquendo, audacia non est pars spei, sed eius effectus, sicut nec desperatio est pars timoris, sed eius effectus. Et propter hoc etiam audacia principalis passio esse non potest. Reply Obj. 3: Although the object of daring is an evil to which, in the estimation of the daring man, the good of victory is conjoined; yet daring regards the evil, and hope regards the conjoined good. In like manner despair regards directly the good which it turns away from, while fear regards the conjoined evil. Hence, properly speaking, daring is not a part of hope, but its effect: just as despair is an effect, not a part, of fear. For this reason, too, daring cannot be a principal passion.