Sed contra est quod philosophus, in eodem libro, dicit quod homines propter excellentiam indignantur.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 9) that excellence makes men prone to anger.
Respondeo dicendum quod causa irae in eo qui irascitur, dupliciter accipi potest. Uno modo, secundum habitudinem ad motivum irae. Et sic excellentia est causa ut aliquis de facili irascatur. Est enim motivum irae iniusta parvipensio, ut dictum est. Constat autem quod quanto aliquis est excellentior, iniustius parvipenditur in hoc in quo excellit. Et ideo illi qui sunt in aliqua excellentia, maxime irascuntur, si parvipendantur, puta si dives parvipenditur in pecunia, et rhetor in loquendo, et sic de aliis.
I answer that, The cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be taken in two ways. First in respect of the motive of anger: and thus excellence is the cause of a man being easily angered. Because the motive of anger is an unjust slight, as stated above (A2). Now it is evident that the more excellent a man is, the more unjust is a slight offered him in the matter in which he excels. Consequently those who excel in any matter, are most of all angry, if they be slighted in that matter; for instance, a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his eloquence, and so forth.
Alio modo potest considerari causa irae in eo qui irascitur, ex parte dispositionis quae in eo relinquitur ex tali motivo. Manifestum est autem quod nihil movet ad iram, nisi nocumentum quod contristat. Ea autem quae ad defectum pertinent, maxime sunt contristantia, quia homines defectibus subiacentes facilius laeduntur. Et ista est causa quare homines qui sunt infirmi, vel in aliis defectibus, facilius irascuntur, quia facilius contristantur.
Second, the cause of anger, in the man who is angry, may be considered on the part of the disposition produced in him by the motive aforesaid. Now it is evident that nothing moves a man to anger except a hurt that grieves him: while whatever savors of defect is above all a cause of grief; since men who suffer from some defect are more easily hurt. And this is why men who are weak, or subject to some other defect, are more easily angered, since they are more easily grieved.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Ad secundum dicendum quod ille qui despicitur in eo in quo manifeste multum excellit, non reputat se aliquam iacturam pati, et ideo non contristatur, et ex hac parte minus irascitur. Sed ex alia parte, inquantum indignius despicitur, habet maiorem rationem irascendi. Nisi forte reputet se non invideri vel subsannari propter despectum; sed propter ignorantiam, vel propter aliud huiusmodi.
Reply Obj. 2: If a man be despised in a matter in which he evidently excels greatly, he does not consider himself the loser thereby, and therefore is not grieved: and in this respect he is less angered. But in another respect, insofar as he is more undeservedly despised, he has more reason for being angry: unless perhaps he thinks that he is envied or insulted not through contempt but through ignorance, or some other like cause.
Ad tertium dicendum quod omnia illa impediunt iram, inquantum impediunt tristitiam. Sed ex alia parte, nata sunt provocare iram, secundum quod faciunt hominem inconvenientius despici.
Reply Obj. 3: All these things hinder anger insofar as they hinder sorrow. But in another respect they are naturally apt to provoke anger, because they make it more unseemly to insult anyone.
Articulus 4
Article 4
Utrum defectus alicuius sit causa ut contra ipsum facilius irascamur
Whether a person’s defect is a reason for being more easily angry with him?
Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod defectus alicuius non sit causa ut contra ipsum facilius irascamur. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Rhetoric., quod his qui confitentur et poenitent et humiliantur, non irascimur, sed magis ad eos mitescimus. Unde et canes non mordent eos qui resident. Sed haec pertinent ad parvitatem et defectum. Ergo parvitas alicuius est causa ut ei minus irascamur.
Objection 1: It would seem that a person’s defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that we are not angry with those who confess and repent and humble themselves; on the contrary, we are gentle with them. Wherefore dogs bite not those who sit down. But these things savor of littleness and defect. Therefore littleness of a person is a reason for being less angry with him.
Praeterea, nullus est maior defectus quam mortis. Sed ad mortuos desinit ira. Ergo defectus alicuius non est causa provocativa irae contra ipsum.
Obj. 2: Further, there is no greater defect than death. But anger ceases at the sight of death. Therefore defect of a person does not provoke anger against him.
Praeterea, nullus aestimat aliquem parvum ex hoc quod est sibi amicus. Sed ad amicos, si nos offenderint, vel si non iuverint, magis offendimur, unde dicitur in Psalmo LIV, si inimicus meus maledixisset mihi, sustinuissem utique. Ergo defectus alicuius non est causa ut contra ipsum facilius irascamur.
Obj. 3: Further, no one thinks little of a man through his being friendly towards him. But we are more angry with friends, if they offend us or refuse to help us; hence it is written (Ps 54:13): If my enemy had reviled me I would verily have borne with it. Therefore a person’s defect is not a reason for being more easily angry with him.
Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod dives irascitur contra pauperem, si eum despiciat; et principans contra subiectum.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like manner the prince is angry with his subject.
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, indigna despectio est maxime provocativa irae. Defectus igitur vel parvitas eius contra quem irascimur, facit ad augmentum irae, inquantum auget indignam despectionem. Sicut enim quanto aliquis est maior, tanto indignius despicitur; ita quanto aliquis est minor, tanto indignius despicit. Et ideo nobiles irascuntur si despiciantur a rusticis, vel sapientes ab insipientibus, vel domini a servis.
I answer that, As stated above (AA2, 3) unmerited contempt more than anything else is a provocative of anger. Consequently deficiency or littleness in the person with whom we are angry, tends to increase our anger, insofar as it adds to the unmeritedness of being despised. For just as the higher a man’s position is, the more undeservedly he is despised; so the lower it is, the less reason he has for despising. Thus a nobleman is angry if he be insulted by a peasant; a wise man, if by a fool; a master, if by a servant.
Si vero parvitas vel defectus diminuat despectionem indignam, talis parvitas non auget, sed diminuit iram. Et hoc modo illi qui poenitent de iniuriis factis, et confitentur se male fecisse, et humiliantur et veniam petunt, mitigant iram, secundum illud Prov. XV, responsio mollis frangit iram, inquantum scilicet tales videntur non despicere, sed magis magnipendere eos quibus se humiliant.
If, however, the littleness or deficiency lessens the unmerited contempt, then it does not increase but lessens anger. In this way those who repent of their ill-deeds, and confess that they have done wrong, who humble themselves and ask pardon, mitigate anger, according to Prov. 15:1: A mild answer breaketh wrath: because, to wit, they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they humble themselves.
Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.
This suffices for the Reply to the First Objection.
Ad secundum dicendum quod duplex est causa quare ad mortuos cessat ira. Una, quia non possunt dolere et sentire, quod maxime quaerunt irati in his quibus irascuntur. Alio modo, quia iam videntur ad ultimum malorum pervenisse. Unde etiam ad quoscumque graviter laesos cessat ira, inquantum eorum malum excedit mensuram iustae retributionis.
Reply Obj. 2: There are two reasons why anger ceases at the sight of death. One is because the dead are incapable of sorrow and sensation; and this is chiefly what the angry seek in those with whom they are angered. Another reason is because the dead seem to have attained to the limit of evils. Hence anger ceases in regard to all who are grievously hurt, insofar as this hurt surpasses the measure of just retaliation.
Ad tertium dicendum quod etiam despectio quae est ab amicis, videtur esse magis indigna. Et ideo ex simili causa magis irascimur contra eos, si despiciant, vel nocendo vel non iuvando, sicut et contra minores.
Reply Obj. 3: To be despised by one’s friends seems also a greater indignity. Consequently if they despise us by hurting or by failing to help, we are angry with them for the same reason for which we are angry with those who are beneath us.
Quaestio 48
Question 48
De effectibus irae
Of the Effects of Anger
Deinde considerandum est de effectibus irae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.
We must now consider the effects of anger: under which head there are four points of inquiry:
Primo, utrum ira causet delectationem.
(1) Whether anger causes pleasure?
Secundo, utrum maxime causet fervorem in corde.
(2) Whether above all it causes heat in the heart?
Tertio, utrum maxime impediat rationis usum.
(3) Whether above all it hinders the use of reason?
Quarto, utrum causet taciturnitatem.
(4) Whether it causes taciturnity?
Articulus 1
Article 1
Utrum ira causet delectationem
Whether anger causes pleasure?
Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod ira non causet delectationem. Tristitia enim delectationem excludit. Sed ira est semper cum tristitia, quia, ut dicitur in VII Ethic., omnis qui facit aliquid per iram, facit tristatus. Ergo ira non causat delectationem.
Objection 1: It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain. Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.
Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in IV Ethic., quod punitio quietat impetum irae, delectationem pro tristitia faciens, ex quo potest accipi quod delectatio irato provenit ex punitione, punitio autem excludit iram. Ergo, adveniente delectatione, ira tollitur. Non est ergo effectus delectationi coniunctus.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain: whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect united with pleasure.
Praeterea, nullus effectus impedit causam suam, cum sit suae causae conformis. Sed delectationes impediunt iram, ut dicitur in II Rhetoric. Ergo delectatio non est effectus irae.
Obj. 3: Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet. ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.
Sed contra est quod philosophus, in eodem libro, inducit proverbium, quod ira multo dulcior melle distillante in pectoribus virorum crescit.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste (Iliad, xviii, 109, trl. Pope).
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in VII Ethic., delectationes, maxime sensibiles et corporales, sunt medicinae quaedam contra tristitiam, et ideo quanto per delectationem contra maiorem tristitiam vel anxietatem remedium praestatur, tanto delectatio magis percipitur; sicut patet quod quando aliquis sitit, delectabilior fit ei potus. Manifestum est autem ex praedictis quod motus irae insurgit ex aliqua illata iniuria contristante; cui quidem tristitiae remedium adhibetur per vindictam. Et ideo ad praesentiam vindictae delectatio sequitur, et tanto maior, quanto maior fuit tristitia. Si igitur vindicta fuerit praesens realiter, fit perfecta delectatio, quae totaliter excludit tristitiam, et per hoc quietat motum irae. Sed antequam vindicta sit praesens realiter, fit irascenti praesens dupliciter. Uno modo, per spem, quia nullus irascitur nisi sperans vindictam, ut supra dictum est. Alio modo, secundum continuam cogitationem. Unicuique enim concupiscenti est delectabile immorari in cogitatione eorum quae concupiscit, propter quod etiam imaginationes somniorum sunt delectabiles. Et ideo, cum iratus multum in animo suo cogitet de vindicta, ex hoc delectatur. Tamen delectatio non est perfecta, quae tollat tristitiam, et per consequens iram.
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has been said (Q47, AA1,3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the greater according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement of anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present to the angry man in two ways: in one way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above (Q46, A1); in another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger.
Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non de eodem iratus tristatur et gaudet, sed tristatur de illata iniuria, delectatur autem de vindicta cogitata et sperata. Unde tristitia se habet ad iram sicut principium, sed delectatio sicut effectus vel terminus.
Reply Obj. 1: The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.
Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectio illa procedit de delectatione quae causatur ex reali praesentia vindictae, quae totaliter tollit iram.
Reply Obj. 2: This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether.
Ad tertium dicendum quod delectationes praecedentes impediunt ne sequatur tristitia; et per consequens impediunt iram. Sed delectatio de vindicta consequitur ipsam.
Reply Obj. 3: Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from anger.
Articulus 2
Article 2
Utrum fervor sit maxime effectus irae
Whether anger above all causes fervor?