Quaestio 5 Question 5 De ipsa adeptione beatitudinis Of the Attainment of Happiness Deinde considerandum est de ipsa adeptione beatitudinis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo. We must now consider the attainment of happiness. Under this heading there are eight points of inquiry: Primo, utrum homo possit consequi beatitudinem. (1) Whether man can attain Happiness? Secundo, utrum unus homo possit esse alio beatior. (2) Whether one man can be happier than another? Tertio, utrum aliquis possit esse in hac vita beatus. (3) Whether any man can be happy in this life? Quarto, utrum beatitudo habita possit amitti. (4) Whether Happiness once had can be lost? Quinto, utrum, homo per sua naturalia possit acquirere beatitudinem. (5) Whether man can attain Happiness by means of his natural powers? Sexto, utrum homo consequatur beatitudinem per actionem alicuius superioris creaturae. (6) Whether man attains Happiness through the action of some higher creature? Septimo, utrum requirantur opera hominis aliqua ad hoc quod homo beatitudinem consequatur a Deo. (7) Whether any actions of man are necessary in order that man may obtain Happiness of God? Octavo, utrum omnis homo appetat beatitudinem. (8) Whether every man desires Happiness? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum homo beatitudinem adipisci possit Whether man can attain happiness? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod homo beatitudinem adipisci non possit. Sicut enim natura rationalis est supra sensibilem ita natura intellectualis est supra rationalem ut patet per Dionysium in libro de Div. Nom., in multis locis. Sed bruta animalia, quae habent naturam sensibilem tantum, non possunt pervenire ad finem rationalis naturae. Ergo nec homo, qui est rationalis naturae, potest pervenire ad finem intellectualis naturae, qui est beatitudo. Objection 1: It would seem that man cannot attain happiness. For just as the rational is above the sensible nature, so the intellectual is above the rational, as Dionysius declares (Div. Nom. iv, vi, vii) in several passages. But irrational animals that have the sensitive nature only, cannot attain the end of the rational nature. Therefore neither can man, who is of rational nature, attain the end of the intellectual nature, which is happiness. Praeterea, beatitudo vera consistit in visione Dei, qui est veritas pura. Sed homini est connaturale ut veritatem intueatur in rebus materialibus, unde species intelligibiles in phantasmatibus intelligit, ut dicitur in III de anima. Ergo non potest ad beatitudinem pervenire. Obj. 2: Further, true happiness consists in seeing God, Who is pure Truth. But from his very nature, man considers truth in material things: wherefore he understands the intelligible species in the phantasm (De Anima iii, 7). Therefore he cannot attain happiness. Praeterea, beatitudo consistit in adeptione summi boni. Sed aliquis non potest pervenire ad summum, nisi transcendat media. Cum igitur inter Deum et naturam humanam media sit natura angelica, quam homo transcendere non potest; videtur quod non possit beatitudinem adipisci. Obj. 3: Further, happiness consists in attaining the Sovereign Good. But we cannot arrive at the top without surmounting the middle. Since, therefore, the angelic nature through which man cannot mount is midway between God and human nature; it seems that he cannot attain happiness. Sed contra est quod dicitur in Psalmo XCIII, beatus homo quem tu erudieris, domine. On the contrary, It is written (Ps 93:12): Blessed is the man whom Thou shalt instruct, O Lord. Respondeo dicendum quod beatitudo nominat adeptionem perfecti boni. Quicumque ergo est capax perfecti boni, potest ad beatitudinem pervenire. Quod autem homo perfecti boni sit capax, ex hoc apparet, quia et eius intellectus apprehendere potest universale et perfectum bonum, et eius voluntas appetere illud. Et ideo homo potest beatitudinem adipisci. Apparet etiam idem ex hoc quod homo est capax visionis divinae essentiae, sicut in primo habitum est; in qua quidem visione perfectam hominis beatitudinem consistere diximus. I answer that, Happiness is the attainment of the Perfect Good. Whoever, therefore, is capable of the Perfect Good can attain happiness. Now, that man is capable of the Perfect Good, is proved both because his intellect can apprehend the universal and perfect good, and because his will can desire it. And therefore man can attain happiness. This can be proved again from the fact that man is capable of seeing God, as stated in the First Part (Q12, A1): in which vision, as we stated above (Q3, A8) man’s perfect happiness consists. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aliter excedit natura rationalis sensitivam, et aliter intellectualis rationalem. Natura enim rationalis excedit sensitivam quantum ad cognitionis obiectum, quia sensus nullo modo potest cognoscere universale, cuius ratio est cognoscitiva. Sed intellectualis natura excedit rationalem quantum ad modum cognoscendi eandem intelligibilem veritatem, nam intellectualis natura statim apprehendit veritatem, ad quam rationalis natura per inquisitionem rationis pertingit, ut patet ex his quae in primo dicta sunt. Et ideo ad id quod intellectus apprehendit, ratio per quendam motum pertingit. Unde rationalis natura consequi potest beatitudinem, quae est perfectio intellectualis naturae, tamen alio modo quam Angeli. Nam Angeli consecuti sunt eam statim post principium suae conditionis, homines autem per tempus ad ipsam perveniunt. Sed natura sensitiva ad hunc finem nullo modo pertingere potest. Reply Obj. 1: The rational exceeds the sensitive nature, otherwise than the intellectual surpasses the rational. For the rational exceeds the sensitive nature in respect of the object of its knowledge: since the senses have no knowledge whatever of the universal, whereas the reason has knowledge thereof. But the intellectual surpasses the rational nature, as to the mode of knowing the same intelligible truth: for the intellectual nature grasps forthwith the truth which the rational nature reaches by the inquiry of reason, as was made clear in the First Part (Q58, A3; FP, Q79, A8). Therefore reason arrives by a kind of movement at that which the intellect grasps. Consequently the rational nature can attain happiness, which is the perfection of the intellectual nature: but otherwise than the angels. Because the angels attained it forthwith after the beginning of their creation: whereas man attains if after a time. But the sensitive nature can nowise attain this end. Ad secundum dicendum quod homini, secundum statum praesentis vitae, est connaturalis modus cognoscendi veritatem intelligibilem per phantasmata. Sed post huius vitae statum, habet alium modum connaturalem, ut in primo dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: To man in the present state of life the natural way of knowing intelligible truth is by means of phantasms. But after this state of life, he has another natural way, as was stated in the First Part (Q84, A7; FP, Q89, A1). Ad tertium dicendum quod homo non potest transcendere Angelos gradu naturae, ut scilicet naturaliter sit eis superior. Potest tamen eos transcendere per operationem intellectus, dum intelligit aliquid super Angelos esse, quod homines beatificat; quod cum perfecte consequetur, perfecte beatus erit. Reply Obj. 3: Man cannot surmount the angels in the degree of nature so as to be above them naturally. But he can surmount them by an operation of the intellect, by understanding that there is above the angels something that makes men happy; and when he has attained it, he will be perfectly happy. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum unus homo alio possit esse beatior Whether one man can be happier than another? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod unus homo alio non possit esse beatior. Beatitudo enim est praemium virtutis, ut philosophus dicit in I Ethic. Sed pro operibus virtutum omnibus aequalis merces redditur, dicitur enim Matth. XX, quod omnes qui operati sunt in vinea, acceperunt singulos denarios; quia, ut dicit Gregorius, aequalem aeternae vitae retributionem sortiti sunt. Ergo unus non erit alio beatior. Objection 1: It would seem that one man cannot be happier than another. For happiness is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 9). But equal reward is given for all the works of virtue; because it is written (Matt 20:10) that all who labor in the vineyard received every man a penny; for, as Gregory says (Hom. xix in Evang.), each was equally rewarded with eternal life. Therefore one man cannot be happier than another. Praeterea, beatitudo est summum bonum. Sed summo non potest esse aliquid maius. Ergo beatitudine unius hominis non potest esse alia maior beatitudo. Obj. 2: Further, happiness is the supreme good. But nothing can surpass the supreme. Therefore one man’s happiness cannot be surpassed by another’s. Praeterea, beatitudo, cum sit perfectum et sufficiens bonum, desiderium hominis quietat. Sed non quietatur desiderium, si aliquod bonum deest quod suppleri possit. Si autem nihil deest quod suppleri possit, non poterit esse aliquid aliud maius bonum. Ergo vel homo non est beatus, vel, si est beatus, non potest alia maior beatitudo esse. Obj. 3: Further, since happiness is the perfect and sufficient good (Ethic. i, 7) it brings rest to man’s desire. But his desire is not at rest, if he yet lacks some good that can be got. And if he lack nothing that he can get, there can be no still greater good. Therefore either man is not happy; or, if he be happy, no other happiness can be greater. Sed contra est quod dicitur Ioan. XIV, in domo patris mei mansiones multae sunt; per quas, ut Augustinus dicit, diversae meritorum dignitates intelliguntur in vita aeterna. Dignitas autem vitae aeternae, quae pro merito datur, est ipsa beatitudo. Ergo sunt diversi gradus beatitudinis, et non omnium est aequalis beatitudo. On the contrary, It is written (John 14:2): In My Father’s house there are many mansions; which, according to Augustine (Tract. lxvii in Joan.) signify the diverse dignities of merits in the one eternal life. But the dignity of eternal life which is given according to merit, is happiness itself. Therefore there are diverse degrees of happiness, and happiness is not equally in all. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in ratione beatitudinis duo includuntur, scilicet ipse finis ultimus, qui est summum bonum; et adeptio vel fruitio ipsius boni. Quantum igitur ad ipsum bonum quod est beatitudinis obiectum et causa, non potest esse una beatitudo alia maior, quia non est nisi unum summum bonum, scilicet Deus, cuius fruitione homines sunt beati. Sed quantum ad adeptionem huiusmodi boni vel fruitionem, potest aliquis alio esse beatior, quia quanto magis hoc bono fruitur, tanto beatior est. Contingit autem aliquem perfectius frui Deo quam alium, ex eo quod est melius dispositus vel ordinatus ad eius fruitionem. Et secundum hoc potest aliquis alio beatior esse. I answer that, As stated above (Q1, A8; Q2, A7), happiness implies two things, to wit, the last end itself, i.e., the Sovereign Good; and the attainment or enjoyment of that same Good. As to that Good itself, Which is the object and cause of happiness, one happiness cannot be greater than another, since there is but one Sovereign Good, namely, God, by enjoying Whom, men are made happy. But as to the attainment or enjoyment of this Good, one man can be happier than another; because the more a man enjoys this Good the happier he is. Now, that one man enjoys God more than another, happens through his being better disposed or ordered to the enjoyment of Him. And in this sense one man can be happier than another. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod unitas denarii significat unitatem beatitudinis ex parte obiecti. Sed diversitas mansionum significat diversitatem beatitudinis secundum diversum gradum fruitionis. Reply Obj. 1: The one penny signifies that happiness is one in its object. But the many mansions signify the manifold happiness in the diverse degrees of enjoyment. Ad secundum dicendum quod beatitudo dicitur esse summum bonum, inquantum est summi boni perfecta possessio sive fruitio. Reply Obj. 2: Happiness is said to be the supreme good, inasmuch as it is the perfect possession or enjoyment of the Supreme Good. Ad tertium dicendum quod nulli beato deest aliquod bonum desiderandum, cum habeat ipsum bonum infinitum, quod est bonum omnis boni, ut Augustinus dicit. Sed dicitur aliquis alio beatior, ex diversa eiusdem boni participatione. Additio autem aliorum bonorum non auget beatitudinem, unde Augustinus dicit, in V Confess., qui te et alia novit, non propter illa beatior, sed propter te solum beatus. Reply Obj. 3: None of the Blessed lacks any desirable good; since they have the Infinite Good Itself, Which is the good of all good, as Augustine says (Enarr. in Ps. 134). But one is said to be happier than another, by reason of diverse participation of the same good. And the addition of other goods does not increase happiness, since Augustine says (Confess. v, 4): He who knows Thee, and others besides, is not the happier for knowing them, but is happy for knowing Thee alone. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum beatitudo possit in hac vita haberi Whether happiness can be had in this life? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod beatitudo possit in hac vita haberi. Dicitur enim in Psalmo CXVIII, beati immaculati in via, qui ambulant in lege domini. Hoc autem in hac vita contingit. Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus. Objection 1: It would seem that happiness can be had in this life. For it is written (Ps 118:1): Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord. But this happens in this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life. Praeterea, imperfecta participatio summi boni non adimit rationem beatitudinis, alioquin unus non esset alio beatior. Sed in hac vita homines possunt participare summum bonum, cognoscendo et amando Deum, licet imperfecte. Ergo homo in hac vita potest esse beatus. Obj. 2: Further, imperfect participation in the Sovereign Good does not destroy the nature of happiness, otherwise one would not be happier than another. But men can participate in the Sovereign Good in this life, by knowing and loving God, albeit imperfectly. Therefore man can be happy in this life. Praeterea, quod a pluribus dicitur, non potest totaliter falsum esse, videtur enim esse naturale quod in pluribus est; natura autem non totaliter deficit. Sed plures ponunt beatitudinem in hac vita, ut patet per illud Psalmi CXLIII, beatum dixerunt populum cui haec sunt, scilicet praesentis vitae bona. Ergo aliquis in hac vita potest esse beatus. Obj. 3: Further, what is said by many cannot be altogether false: since what is in many, comes, apparently, from nature; and nature does not fail altogether. Now many say that happiness can be had in this life, as appears from Ps. 143:15: They have called the people happy that hath these things, to wit, the good things in this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life.