Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum sit conveniens definitio virtutis: scilicet, virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur Whether the definition of virtue is suitable: namely, that “virtue is a good quality of the mind by which we live righteously”? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit conveniens definitio virtutis quae solet assignari, scilicet, virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur, qua nullus male utitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Virtus enim est bonitas hominis, ipsa enim est quae bonum facit habentem. Sed bonitas non videtur esse bona, sicut nec albedo est alba. Igitur inconvenienter dicitur quod virtus est bona qualitas. Objection 1: It would seem that the definition, usually given, of virtue, is not suitable, to wit: Virtue is a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us. For virtue is man’s goodness, since virtue it is that makes its subject good. But goodness does not seem to be good, as neither is whiteness white. It is therefore unsuitable to describe virtue as a good quality. Praeterea, nulla differentia est communior suo genere, cum sit generis divisiva. Sed bonum est communius quam qualitas, convertitur enim cum ente. Ergo bonum non debet poni in definitione virtutis, ut differentia qualitatis. Obj. 2: Further, no difference is more common than its genus; since it is that which divides the genus. But good is more common than quality, since it is convertible with being. Therefore good should not be put in the definition of virtue, as a difference of quality. Praeterea, sicut Augustinus dicit, in XII de Trin., ubi primo occurrit aliquid quod non sit nobis pecoribusque commune, illud ad mentem pertinet. Sed quaedam virtutes sunt etiam irrationabilium partium; ut philosophus dicit, in III Ethic. Non ergo omnis virtus est bona qualitas mentis. Obj. 3: Further, as Augustine says (De Trin. xii, 3): When we come across anything that is not common to us and the beasts of the field, it is something appertaining to the mind. But there are virtues even of the irrational parts; as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 10). Every virtue, therefore, is not a good quality of the mind. Praeterea, rectitudo videtur ad iustitiam pertinere, unde idem dicuntur recti, et iusti. Sed iustitia est species virtutis. Inconvenienter ergo ponitur rectum in definitione virtutis, cum dicitur, qua recte vivitur. Obj. 4: Further, righteousness seems to belong to justice; whence the righteous are called just. But justice is a species of virtue. It is therefore unsuitable to put righteous in the definition of virtue, when we say that virtue is that by which we live righteously. Praeterea, quicumque superbit de aliquo, male utitur eo. Sed multi superbiunt de virtute, dicit enim Augustinus, in regula, quod superbia etiam bonis operibus insidiatur, ut pereant. Falsum est ergo quod nemo virtute male utatur. Obj. 5: Further, whoever is proud of a thing, makes bad use of it. But many are proud of virtue, for Augustine says in his Rule, that pride lies in wait for good works in order to slay them. It is untrue, therefore, that no one can make bad use of virtue. Praeterea, homo per virtutem iustificatur. Sed Augustinus dicit, super illud Ioan., maiora horum faciet, qui creavit te sine te, non iustificabit te sine te. Inconvenienter ergo dicitur quod virtutem Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Obj. 6: Further, man is justified by virtue. But Augustine commenting on Jn. 15:11: He shall do greater things than these, says: He who created thee without thee, will not justify thee without thee. It is therefore unsuitable to say that God works virtue in us, without us. Sed contra est auctoritas Augustini, ex cuius verbis praedicta definitio colligitur, et praecipue in II de libero arbitrio. On the contrary, We have the authority of Augustine from whose words this definition is gathered, and principally in De Libero Arbitrio ii, 19. Respondeo dicendum quod ista definitio perfecte complectitur totam rationem virtutis. Perfecta enim ratio uniuscuiusque rei colligitur ex omnibus causis eius. Comprehendit autem praedicta definitio omnes causas virtutis. Causa namque formalis virtutis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, accipitur ex eius genere et differentia, cum dicitur qualitas bona, genus enim virtutis qualitas est, differentia autem bonum. Esset tamen convenientior definitio, si loco qualitatis habitus poneretur, qui est genus propinquum. I answer that, This definition comprises perfectly the whole essential notion of virtue. For the perfect essential notion of anything is gathered from all its causes. Now the above definition comprises all the causes of virtue. For the formal cause of virtue, as of everything, is gathered from its genus and difference, when it is defined as a good quality: for quality is the genus of virtue, and the difference, good. But the definition would be more suitable if for quality we substitute habit, which is the proximate genus. Virtus autem non habet materiam ex qua, sicut nec alia accidentia, sed habet materiam circa quam; et materiam in qua, scilicet subiectum. Materia autem circa quam est obiectum virtutis; quod non potuit in praedicta definitione poni, eo quod per obiectum determinatur virtus ad speciem; hic autem assignatur definitio virtutis in communi. Unde ponitur subiectum loco causae materialis, cum dicitur quod est bona qualitas mentis. Now virtue has no matter out of which it is formed, as neither has any other accident; but it has matter about which it is concerned, and matter in which it exists, namely, the subject. The matter about which virtue is concerned is its object, and this could not be included in the above definition, because the object fixes the virtue to a certain species, and here we are giving the definition of virtue in general. And so for material cause we have the subject, which is mentioned when we say that virtue is a good quality of the mind. Finis autem virtutis, cum sit habitus operativus, est ipsa operatio. Sed notandum quod habituum operativorum aliqui sunt semper ad malum, sicut habitus vitiosi; aliqui vero quandoque ad bonum, et quandoque ad malum, sicut opinio se habet ad verum et ad falsum; virtus autem est habitus semper se habens ad bonum. Et ideo, ut discernatur virtus ab his quae semper se habent ad malum, dicitur, qua recte vivitur, ut autem discernatur ab his quae se habent quandoque ad bonum, quandoque ad malum, dicitur, qua nullus male utitur. The end of virtue, since it is an operative habit, is operation. But it must be observed that some operative habits are always referred to evil, as vicious habits: others are sometimes referred to good, sometimes to evil; for instance, opinion is referred both to the true and to the untrue: whereas virtue is a habit which is always referred to good: and so the distinction of virtue from those habits which are always referred to evil, is expressed in the words by which we live righteously: and its distinction from those habits which are sometimes directed unto good, sometimes unto evil, in the words, of which no one makes bad use. Causa autem efficiens virtutis infusae, de qua definitio datur, Deus est. Propter quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae quidem particula si auferatur, reliquum definitionis erit commune omnibus virtutibus, et acquisitis et infusis. Lastly, God is the efficient cause of infused virtue, to which this definition applies; and this is expressed in the words which God works in us without us. If we omit this phrase, the remainder of the definition will apply to all virtues in general, whether acquired or infused. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod id quod primo cadit in intellectu, est ens, unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens; et per consequens quod sit unum et bonum, quae convertuntur cum ente. Unde dicimus quod essentia est ens et una et bona; et quod unitas est ens et una et bona; et similiter de bonitate. Non autem hoc habet locum in specialibus formis, sicut est albedo et sanitas, non enim omne quod apprehendimus, sub ratione albi et sani apprehendimus. Sed tamen considerandum quod sicut accidentia et formae non subsistentes dicuntur entia, non quia ipsa habeant esse, sed quia eis aliquid est; ita etiam dicuntur bona vel una, non quidem aliqua alia bonitate vel unitate, sed quia eis est aliquid bonum vel unum. Sic igitur et virtus dicitur bona, quia ea aliquid est bonum. Reply Obj. 1: That which is first seized by the intellect is being: wherefore everything that we apprehend we consider as being, and consequently as one, and as good, which are convertible with being. Wherefore we say that essence is being and is one and is good; and that oneness is being and one and good: and in like manner goodness. But this is not the case with specific forms, as whiteness and health; for everything that we apprehend, is not apprehended with the notion of white and healthy. We must, however, observe that, as accidents and non-subsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had being, but because things are by them; so also are they called good or one, not by some distinct goodness or oneness, but because by them something is good or one. So also is virtue called good, because by it something is good. Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum quod ponitur in definitione virtutis, non est bonum commune, quod convertitur cum ente, et est in plus quam qualitas, sed est bonum rationis, secundum quod Dionysius dicit, in IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod bonum animae est secundum rationem esse. Reply Obj. 2: Good, which is put in the definition of virtue, is not good in general which is convertible with being, and which extends further than quality, but the good as fixed by reason, with regard to which Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that the good of the soul is to be in accord with reason. Ad tertium dicendum quod virtus non potest esse in irrationali parte animae, nisi inquantum participat rationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Et ideo ratio, sive mens, est proprium subiectum virtutis humanae. Reply Obj. 3: Virtue cannot be in the irrational part of the soul, except insofar as this participates in the reason (Ethic. i, 13). And therefore reason, or the mind, is the proper subject of virtue. Ad quartum dicendum quod iustitiae est propria rectitudo quae constituitur circa res exteriores quae in usum hominis veniunt, quae sunt propria materia iustitiae, ut infra patebit. Sed rectitudo quae importat ordinem ad finem debitum et ad legem divinam, quae est regula voluntatis humanae, ut supra dictum est, communis est omni virtuti. Reply Obj. 4: Justice has a righteousness of its own by which it puts those outward things right which come into human use, and are the proper matter of justice, as we shall show further on (Q60, A2; SS, Q58, A8). But the righteousness which denotes order to a due end and to the Divine law, which is the rule of the human will, as stated above (Q19, A4), is common to all virtues. Ad quintum dicendum quod virtute potest aliquis male uti tanquam obiecto, puta cum male sentit de virtute, cum odit eam, vel superbit de ea, non autem tanquam principio usus, ita scilicet quod malus sit actus virtutis. Reply Obj. 5: One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e.g., by hating it, or by being proud of it: but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil. Ad sextum dicendum quod virtus infusa causatur in nobis a Deo sine nobis agentibus, non tamen sine nobis consentientibus. Et sic est intelligendum quod dicitur, quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. Quae vero per nos aguntur, Deus in nobis causat non sine nobis agentibus, ipse enim operatur in omni voluntate et natura. Reply Obj. 6: Infused virtue is caused in us by God without any action on our part, but not without our consent. This is the sense of the words, which God works in us without us. As to those things which are done by us, God causes them in us, yet not without action on our part, for He works in every will and in every nature. Quaestio 56 Question 56 De subiecto virtutis Of the Subject of Virtue Deinde considerandum est de subiecto virtutis. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. We now have to consider the subject of virtue, about which there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum virtus sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. (1) Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul? Secundo, utrum una virtus possit esse in pluribus potentiis. (2) Whether one virtue can be in several powers? Tertio, utrum intellectus possit esse subiectum virtutis. (3) Whether the intellect can be the subject of virtue? Quarto, utrum irascibilis et concupiscibilis. (4) Whether the irascible and concupiscible faculties can be the subject of virtue? Quinto, utrum vires apprehensivae sensitivae. (5) Whether the sensitive powers of apprehension can be the subject of virtue? Sexto, utrum voluntas. (6) Whether the will can be the subject of virtue? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum virtus sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto Whether the subject of virtue is a power of the soul? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus non sit in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Dicit enim Augustinus, in II de Lib. Arbit., quod virtus est qua recte vivitur. Vivere autem non est per potentiam animae, sed per eius essentiam. Ergo virtus non est in potentia animae, sed in eius essentia. Objection 1: It would seem that the subject of virtue is not a power of the soul. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that virtue is that by which we live righteously. But we live by the essence of the soul, and not by a power of the soul. Therefore virtue is not a power, but in the essence of the soul. Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Ethic., virtus est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit. Sed sicut opus constituitur per potentiam, ita habens virtutem constituitur per essentiam animae. Ergo virtus non magis pertinet ad potentiam animae, quam ad eius essentiam. Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 6) that virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his work good likewise. But as work is set up by power, so he that has a virtue is set up by the essence of the soul. Therefore virtue does not belong to the power, any more than to the essence of the soul. Praeterea, potentia est in secunda specie qualitatis. Virtus autem est quaedam qualitas, ut supra dictum est. Qualitatis autem non est qualitas. Ergo virtus non est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. Obj. 3: Further, power is in the second species of quality. But virtue is a quality, as we have said above (Q55, A4): and quality is not the subject of quality. Therefore a power of the soul is not the subject of virtue. Sed contra, virtus est ultimum potentiae, ut dicitur in I de caelo. Sed ultimum est in eo cuius est ultimum. Ergo virtus est in potentia animae. On the contrary, Virtue is the limit of power (De Coelo ii). But the limit is in that of which it is the limit. Therefore virtue is in a power of the soul. Respondeo dicendum quod virtutem pertinere ad potentiam animae, ex tribus potest esse manifestum. Primo quidem, ex ipsa ratione virtutis, quae importat perfectionem potentiae, perfectio autem est in eo cuius est perfectio. Secundo, ex hoc quod est habitus operativus, ut supra dictum est, omnis autem operatio est ab anima per aliquam potentiam. Tertio, ex hoc quod disponit ad optimum, optimum autem est finis, qui vel est operatio rei, vel aliquid consecutum per operationem a potentia egredientem. Unde virtus humana est in potentia animae sicut in subiecto. I answer that, It can be proved in three ways that virtue belongs to a power of the soul. First, from the notion of the very essence of virtue, which implies perfection of a power; for perfection is in that which it perfects. Second, from the fact that virtue is an operative habit, as we have said above (Q55, A2): for all operation proceeds from the soul through a power. Third, from the fact that virtue disposes to that which is best: for the best is the end, which is either a thing’s operation, or something acquired by an operation proceeding from the thing’s power. Therefore a power of the soul is the subject of virtue. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod vivere dupliciter sumitur. Quandoque enim dicitur vivere ipsum esse viventis, et sic pertinet ad essentiam animae, quae est viventi essendi principium. Alio modo vivere dicitur operatio viventis, et sic virtute recte vivitur, inquantum per eam aliquis recte operatur. Reply Obj. 1: To live may be taken in two ways. Sometimes it is taken for the very existence of the living thing: in this way it belongs to the essence of the soul, which is the principle of existence in the living thing. But sometimes to live is taken for the operation of the living thing: in this sense, by virtue we live righteously, inasmuch as by virtue we perform righteous actions.