Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum virtus moralis possit esse absque passione Whether there can be moral virtue without passion? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus moralis possit esse absque passione. Quanto enim virtus moralis est perfectior, tanto magis superat passiones. Ergo in suo perfectissimo esse, est omnino absque passionibus. Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtue can be without passion. For the more perfect moral virtue is, the more does it overcome the passions. Therefore at its highest point of perfection it is altogether without passion. Praeterea, tunc unumquodque est perfectum, quando est remotum a suo contrario, et ab his quae ad contrarium inclinant. Sed passiones inclinant ad peccatum, quod virtuti contrariatur, unde Rom. VII, nominantur passiones peccatorum. Ergo perfecta virtus est omnino absque passione. Obj. 2: Further, then is a thing perfect, when it is removed from its contrary and from whatever inclines to its contrary. Now the passions incline us to sin which is contrary to virtue: hence (Rom 7:5) they are called passions of sins. Therefore perfect virtue is altogether without passion. Praeterea, secundum virtutem Deo conformamur; ut patet per Augustinum, in libro de moribus Eccles. Sed Deus omnia operatur sine passione. Ergo virtus perfectissima est absque omni passione. Obj. 3: Further, it is by virtue that we are conformed to God, as Augustine declares (De Moribus Eccl. vi, xi, xiii). But God does all things without passion at all. Therefore the most perfect virtue is without any passion. Sed contra est quod nullus iustus est qui non gaudet iusta operatione, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Sed gaudium est passio. Ergo iustitia non potest esse sine passione. Et multo minus aliae virtutes. On the contrary, No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds, as stated in Ethic. i, 8. But joy is a passion. Therefore justice cannot be without passion; and still less can the other virtues be. Respondeo dicendum quod, si passiones dicamus inordinatas affectiones, sicut Stoici posuerunt; sic manifestum est quod virtus perfecta est sine passionibus. Si vero passiones dicamus omnes motus appetitus sensitivi, sic planum est quod virtutes morales quae sunt circa passiones sicut circa propriam materiam, sine passionibus esse non possunt. Cuius ratio est, quia secundum hoc, sequeretur quod virtus moralis faceret appetitum sensitivum omnino otiosum. Non autem ad virtutem pertinet quod ea quae sunt subiecta rationi, a propriis actibus vacent, sed quod exequantur imperium rationis, proprios actus agendo. Unde sicut virtus membra corporis ordinat ad actus exteriores debitos, ita appetitum sensitivum ad motus proprios ordinatos. I answer that, If we take the passions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the passions. But if by passions we understand any movement of the sensitive appetite, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the passions as about their proper matter, cannot be without passions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appetite altogether idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts. Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appetite to its proper regulated movements. Virtutes vero morales quae non sunt circa passiones, sed circa operationes, possunt esse sine passionibus (et huiusmodi virtus est iustitia), quia per eas applicatur voluntas ad proprium actum, qui non est passio. Sed tamen ad actum iustitiae sequitur gaudium, ad minus in voluntate, quod non est passio. Et si hoc gaudium multiplicetur per iustitiae perfectionem, fiet gaudii redundantia usque ad appetitum sensitivum; secundum quod vires inferiores sequuntur motum superiorum, ut supra dictum est. Et sic per redundantiam huiusmodi, quanto virtus fuerit perfectior, tanto magis passionem causat. Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the passions, but about operations, can be without passions. Such a virtue is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a passion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a passion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; insofar as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above (Q17, A7; Q24, A3). Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod virtus passiones inordinatas superat, moderatas autem producit. Reply Obj. 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate passion; it produces ordinate passion. Ad secundum dicendum quod passiones inordinatae inducunt ad peccandum, non autem si sunt moderatae. Reply Obj. 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, passion that leads to sin. Ad tertium dicendum quod bonum in unoquoque consideratur secundum conditionem suae naturae. In Deo autem et Angelis non est appetitus sensitivus, sicut est in homine. Et ideo bona operatio Dei et Angeli est omnino sine passione, sicut et sine corpore, bona autem operatio hominis est cum passione, sicut et cum corporis ministerio. Reply Obj. 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appetite in God and the angels, as there is in man. Consequently good operation in God and the angels is altogether without passion, as it is without a body: whereas the good operation of man is with passion, even as it is produced with the body’s help. Quaestio 60 Question 60 De distinctione virtutum moralium ad invicem How the Moral Virtues Differ from One Another Deinde considerandum est de distinctione virtutum moralium ad invicem. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry: Primo, utrum sit tantum una virtus moralis. (1) Whether there is only one moral virtue? Secundo, utrum distinguantur virtutes morales quae sunt circa operationes, ab his quae sunt circa passiones. (2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about passions? Tertio, utrum circa operationes sit una tantum moralis virtus. (3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations? Quarto, utrum circa diversas passiones sint diversae morales virtutes. (4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different passions? Quinto, utrum virtutes morales distinguantur secundum diversa obiecta passionum. (5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the passions? Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum sit una tantum moralis virtus Whether there is only one moral virtue? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus. Sicut enim in actibus moralibus directio pertinet ad rationem, quae est subiectum intellectualium virtutum; ita inclinatio pertinet ad vim appetitivam, quae est subiectum moralium virtutum. Sed una est intellectualis virtus dirigens in omnibus moralibus actibus, scilicet prudentia. Ergo etiam una tantum est moralis virtus inclinans in omnibus moralibus actibus. Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue. Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appetite which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz., prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations. Praeterea, habitus non distinguuntur secundum materialia obiecta, sed secundum formales rationes obiectorum. Formalis autem ratio boni ad quod ordinatur virtus moralis, est unum, scilicet modus rationis. Ergo videtur quod sit una tantum moralis virtus. Obj. 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz., the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is but one moral virtue. Praeterea, moralia recipiunt speciem a fine, ut supra dictum est. Sed finis omnium virtutum moralium communis est unus, scilicet felicitas; proprii autem et propinqui sunt infiniti. Non sunt autem infinitae virtutes morales. Ergo videtur quod sit una tantum. Obj. 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above (Q1, A3). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz., happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one. Sed contra est quod unus habitus non potest esse in diversis potentiis, ut supra dictum est. Sed subiectum virtutum moralium est pars appetitiva animae, quae per diversas potentias distinguitur, ut in primo dictum est. Ergo non potest esse una tantum virtus moralis. On the contrary, One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q56, A2). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appetitive part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the FP, Q80, A2; FP, Q81, A2. Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, virtutes morales sunt habitus quidam appetitivae partis. Habitus autem specie differunt secundum speciales differentias obiectorum, ut supra dictum est. Species autem obiecti appetibilis, sicut et cuiuslibet rei, attenditur secundum formam specificam, quae est ab agente. Est autem considerandum quod materia patientis se habet ad agens dupliciter. Quandoque enim recipit formam agentis secundum eandem rationem, prout est in agente, sicut est in omnibus agentibus univocis. Et sic necesse est quod, si agens est unum specie, quod materia recipiat formam unius speciei, sicut ab igne non generatur univoce nisi aliquid existens in specie ignis. Aliquando vero materia recipit formam ab agente non secundum eandem rationem, prout est in agente, sicut patet in generantibus non univocis, ut animal generatur a sole. Et tunc formae receptae in materia ab eodem agente, non sunt unius speciei sed diversificantur secundum diversam proportionem materiae ad recipiendum influxum agentis, sicut videmus quod ab una actione solis generantur per putrefactionem animalia diversarum specierum secundum diversam proportionem materiae. I answer that, As stated above (Q58, AA1,2,3), the moral virtues are habits of the appetitive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (Q54, A2). Again, the species of the object of appetite, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the passive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various adaptability of matter. Manifestum est autem quod in moralibus ratio est sicut imperans et movens; vis autem appetitiva est sicut imperata et mota. Non autem appetitus recipit impressionem rationis quasi univoce, quia non fit rationale per essentiam, sed per participationem, ut dicitur in I Ethic. Unde appetibilia secundum motionem rationis constituuntur in diversis speciebus, secundum quod diversimode se habent ad rationem. Et ita sequitur quod virtutes morales sint diversae secundum speciem, et non una tantum. Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appetitive power is commanded and moved. But the appetite does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by participation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species and are not one only. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem ratio veri in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia. Unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia. Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile. Cuius est diversa ratio, secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem dirigentem. Reply Obj. 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz., prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appetitive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing power. Ad secundum dicendum quod illud formale est unum genere, propter unitatem agentis. Sed diversificatur specie, propter diversas habitudines recipientium, ut supra dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above. Ad tertium dicendum quod moralia non habent speciem a fine ultimo sed a finibus proximis, qui quidem, etsi infiniti sint numero, non tamen infiniti sunt specie. Reply Obj. 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum virtutes morales distinguantur ab invicem per hoc quod quaedam sunt circa operationes, quaedam circa passiones Whether moral virtues are divided into those about operations and those about passions? Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtutes morales non distinguantur ab invicem per hoc quod quaedam sunt circa operationes, quaedam circa passiones. Dicit enim philosophus, in II Ethic., quod virtus moralis est circa delectationes et tristitias optimorum operativa. Sed voluptates et tristitiae sunt passiones quaedam, ut supra dictum est. Ergo eadem virtus quae est circa passiones, est etiam circa operationes, utpote operativa existens. Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about passions. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or sorrow. Now pleasure and sorrow are passions, as stated above (Q31, A1; Q35, A1). Therefore the same virtue which is about passions is also about operations, since it is an operative habit. Praeterea, passiones sunt principia exteriorum operationum. Si ergo aliquae virtutes rectificant passiones, oportet quod etiam per consequens rectificent operationes. Eaedem ergo virtutes morales sunt circa passiones et operationes. Obj. 2: Further, the passions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the passions, they must, as a consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both passions and operations. Praeterea, ad omnem operationem exteriorem movetur appetitus sensitivus bene vel male. Sed motus appetitus sensitivi sunt passiones. Ergo eaedem virtutes quae sunt circa operationes, sunt circa passiones. Obj. 3: Further, the sensitive appetite is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appetite are passions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about passions. Sed contra est quod philosophus ponit iustitiam circa operationes; temperantiam autem et fortitudinem et mansuetudinem, circa passiones quasdam. On the contrary, The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fortitude and gentleness, about passions (Ethic. ii, 3,7; v, 1, seqq.).