Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ad rationem voluntarii requiritur quod principium actus sit intra, cum aliqua cognitione finis. Est autem duplex cognitio finis, perfecta scilicet, et imperfecta. Perfecta quidem finis cognitio est quando non solum apprehenditur res quae est finis sed etiam cognoscitur ratio finis, et proportio eius quod ordinatur in finem ad ipsum. Et talis cognitio finis competit soli rationali naturae. Imperfecta autem cognitio finis est quae in sola finis apprehensione consistit, sine hoc quod cognoscatur ratio finis, et proportio actus ad finem. Et talis cognitio finis invenitur in brutis animalibus, per sensum et aestimationem naturalem. I answer that, As stated above (A1), it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, together with some knowledge of the end. Now knowledge of the end is twofold; perfect and imperfect. Perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such knowledge of the end is exercised by irrational animals, through their senses and their natural estimative power. Perfectam igitur cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam, prout scilicet, apprehenso fine, aliquis potest, deliberans de fine et de his quae sunt ad finem, moveri in finem vel non moveri. Imperfectam autem cognitionem finis sequitur voluntarium secundum rationem imperfectam, prout scilicet apprehendens finem non deliberat, sed subito movetur in ipsum. Unde soli rationali naturae competit voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam, sed secundum rationem imperfectam, competit etiam brutis animalibus. Consequently perfect knowledge of the end leads to the perfect voluntary; inasmuch as, having apprehended the end, a man can, from deliberating about the end and the means thereto, be moved, or not, to gain that end. But imperfect knowledge of the end leads to the imperfect voluntary; inasmuch as the agent apprehends the end, but does not deliberate, and is moved to the end at once. Wherefore the voluntary in its perfection belongs to none but the rational nature: whereas the imperfect voluntary is within the competency of even irrational animals. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntas nominat rationalem appetitum, et ideo non potest esse in his quae ratione carent. Voluntarium autem denominative dicitur a voluntate, et potest trahi ad ea in quibus est aliqua participatio voluntatis, secundum aliquam convenientiam ad voluntatem. Et hoc modo voluntarium attribuitur animalibus brutis, inquantum scilicet per cognitionem aliquam moventur in finem. Reply Obj. 1: The will is the name of the rational appetite; and consequently it cannot be in things devoid of reason. But the word voluntary is derived from voluntas, and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will, by way of likeness thereto. It is thus that voluntary action is attributed to irrational animals, insofar as they are moved to an end, through some kind of knowledge. Ad secundum dicendum quod ex hoc contingit quod homo est dominus sui actus, quod habet deliberationem de suis actibus, ex hoc enim quod ratio deliberans se habet ad opposita, voluntas in utrumque potest. Sed secundum hoc voluntarium non est in brutis animalibus, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: The fact that man is master of his actions, is due to his being able to deliberate about them: for since the deliberating reason is indifferently disposed to opposite things, the will can be inclined to either. But it is not thus that voluntariness is in irrational animals, as stated above. Ad tertium dicendum quod laus et vituperium consequuntur actum voluntarium secundum perfectam voluntarii rationem; qualis non invenitur in brutis. Reply Obj. 3: Praise and blame are the result of the voluntary act, wherein is the perfect voluntary; such as is not to be found in irrational animals. Articulus 3 Article 3 Utrum voluntarium possit esse sine actu Whether there can be voluntariness without any act? Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntarium non possit esse sine actu. Voluntarium enim dicitur quod est a voluntate. Sed nihil potest esse a voluntate nisi per aliquem actum, ad minus ipsius voluntatis. Ergo voluntarium non potest esse sine actu. Objection 1: It would seem that voluntariness cannot be without any act. For that is voluntary which proceeds from the will. But nothing can proceed from the will, except through some act, at least an act of the will. Therefore there cannot be voluntariness without act. Praeterea, sicut per actum voluntatis dicitur aliquis velle, ita cessante actu voluntatis dicitur non velle. Sed non velle involuntarium causat, quod opponitur voluntario. Ergo voluntarium non potest esse, actu voluntatis cessante. Obj. 2: Further, just as one is said to wish by an act of the will, so when the act of the will ceases, one is said not to wish. But not to wish implies involuntariness, which is contrary to voluntariness. Therefore there can be nothing voluntary when the act of the will ceases. Praeterea, de ratione voluntarii est cognitio, ut dictum est. Sed cognitio est per aliquem actum. Ergo voluntarium non potest esse absque aliquo actu. Obj. 3: Further, knowledge is essential to the voluntary, as stated above (A1,2). But knowledge involves an act. Therefore voluntariness cannot be without some act. Sed contra, illud cuius domini sumus, dicitur esse voluntarium. Sed nos domini sumus eius quod est agere et non agere, velle et non velle. Ergo sicut agere et velle est voluntarium, ita et non agere et non velle. On the contrary, The word voluntary is applied to that of which we are masters. Now we are masters in respect of to act and not to act, to will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will are voluntary, so also are not to act and not to will. Respondeo dicendum quod voluntarium dicitur quod est a voluntate. Ab aliquo autem dicitur esse aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo, directe, quod scilicet procedit ab aliquo inquantum est agens, sicut calefactio a calore. Alio modo, indirecte, ex hoc ipso quod non agit, sicut submersio navis dicitur esse a gubernatore, inquantum desistit a gubernando. Sed sciendum quod non semper id quod sequitur ad defectum actionis, reducitur sicut in causam in agens, ex eo quod non agit, sed solum tunc cum potest et debet agere. Si enim gubernator non posset navem dirigere, vel non esset ei commissa gubernatio navis, non imputaretur ei navis submersio, quae per absentiam gubernatoris contingeret. I answer that, Voluntary is what proceeds from the will. Now one thing proceeds from another in two ways. First, directly; in which sense something proceeds from another inasmuch as this other acts; for instance, heating from heat. Second, indirectly; in which sense something proceeds from another through this other not acting; thus the sinking of a ship is set down to the helmsman, from his having ceased to steer. But we must take note that the cause of what follows from want of action is not always the agent as not acting; but only then when the agent can and ought to act. For if the helmsman were unable to steer the ship or if the ship’s helm be not entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship would not be set down to him, although it might be due to his absence from the helm. Quia igitur voluntas, volendo et agendo, potest impedire hoc quod est non velle et non agere, et aliquando debet; hoc quod est non velle et non agere, imputatur ei, quasi ab ipsa existens. Et sic voluntarium potest esse absque actu, quandoque quidem absque actu exteriori, cum actu interiori, sicut cum vult non agere; aliquando autem et absque actu interiori, sicut cum non vult. Since, then, the will by willing and acting, is able, and sometimes ought, to hinder not-willing and not-acting; this not-willing and not-acting is imputed to, as though proceeding from, the will. And thus it is that we can have the voluntary without an act; sometimes without outward act, but with an interior act; for instance, when one wills not to act; and sometimes without even an interior act, as when one does not will to act. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod voluntarium dicitur non solum quod procedit a voluntate directe, sicut ab agente; sed etiam quod est ab ea indirecte, sicut a non agente. Reply Obj. 1: We apply the word voluntary not only to that which proceeds from the will directly, as from its action; but also to that which proceeds from it indirectly as from its inaction. Ad secundum dicendum quod non velle dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo, prout sumitur in vi unius dictionis, secundum quod est infinitivum huius verbi nolo. Unde sicut cum dico nolo legere, sensus est, volo non legere; ita hoc quod est non velle legere, significat velle non legere. Et sic non velle causat involuntarium. Alio modo sumitur in vi orationis. Et tunc non affirmatur actus voluntatis. Et huiusmodi non velle non causat involuntarium. Reply Obj. 2: Not to wish is said in two senses. First, as though it were one word, and the infinitive of I-do-not-wish. Consequently just as when I say I do not wish to read, the sense is, I wish not to read; so not to wish to read is the same as to wish not to read, and in this sense not to wish implies involuntariness. Second it is taken as a sentence: and then no act of the will is affirmed. And in this sense not to wish does not imply involuntariness. Ad tertium dicendum quod eo modo requiritur ad voluntarium actus cognitionis, sicut et actus voluntatis; ut scilicet sit in potestate alicuius considerare et velle et agere. Et tunc sicut non velle et non agere, cum tempus fuerit, est voluntarium, ita etiam non considerare. Reply Obj. 3: Voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in one’s power to consider, to wish and to act. And then, just as not to wish, and not to act, when it is time to wish and to act, is voluntary, so is it voluntary not to consider. Articulus 4 Article 4 Utrum voluntati possit violentia inferri Whether violence can be done to the will? Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod voluntati possit violentia inferri. Unumquodque enim potest cogi a potentiori. Sed aliquid est humana voluntate potentius, scilicet Deus. Ergo saltem ab eo cogi potest. Objection 1: It would seem that violence can be done to the will. For everything can be compelled by that which is more powerful. But there is something, namely, God, that is more powerful than the human will. Therefore it can be compelled, at least by Him. Praeterea, omne passivum cogitur a suo activo, quando immutatur ab eo. Sed voluntas est vis passiva, est enim movens motum, ut dicitur in III de anima. Cum ergo aliquando moveatur a suo activo, videtur quod aliquando cogatur. Obj. 2: Further, every passive subject is compelled by its active principle, when it is changed by it. But the will is a passive force: for it is a mover moved (De Anima iii, 10). Therefore, since it is sometimes moved by its active principle, it seems that sometimes it is compelled. Praeterea, motus violentus est qui est contra naturam. Sed motus voluntatis aliquando est contra naturam; ut patet de motu voluntatis ad peccandum, qui est contra naturam, ut Damascenus dicit. Ergo motus voluntatis potest esse coactus. Obj. 3: Further, violent movement is that which is contrary to nature. But the movement of the will is sometimes contrary to nature; as is clear of the will’s movement to sin, which is contrary to nature, as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iv, 20). Therefore the movement of the will can be compelled. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in V de Civ. Dei, quod si aliquid fit voluntate, non fit ex necessitate. Omne autem coactum fit ex necessitate. Ergo quod fit ex voluntate, non potest esse coactum. Ergo voluntas non potest cogi ad agendum. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei v, 10) that what is done by the will is not done of necessity. Now, whatever is done under compulsion is done of necessity: consequently what is done by the will, cannot be compelled. Therefore the will cannot be compelled to act. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est actus voluntatis, unus quidem qui est eius immediate, velut ab ipsa elicitus, scilicet velle; alius autem est actus voluntatis a voluntate imperatus, et mediante alia potentia exercitus, ut ambulare et loqui, qui a voluntate imperantur mediante potentia motiva. I answer that, The act of the will is twofold: one is its immediate act, as it were, elicited by it, namely, to wish; the other is an act of the will commanded by it, and put into execution by means of some other power, such as to walk and to speak, which are commanded by the will to be executed by means of the motive power. Quantum igitur ad actus a voluntate imperatos, voluntas violentiam pati potest, inquantum per violentiam exteriora membra impediri possunt ne imperium voluntatis exequantur. Sed quantum ad ipsum proprium actum voluntatis, non potest ei violentia inferri. As regards the commanded acts of the will, then, the will can suffer violence, insofar as violence can prevent the exterior members from executing the will’s command. But as to the will’s own proper act, violence cannot be done to the will. Et huius ratio est quia actus voluntatis nihil est aliud quam inclinatio quaedam procedens ab interiori principio cognoscente, sicut appetitus naturalis est quaedam inclinatio ab interiori principio et sine cognitione. Quod autem est coactum vel violentum, est ab exteriori principio. Unde contra rationem ipsius actus voluntatis est quod sit coactus vel violentus, sicut etiam est contra rationem naturalis inclinationis vel motus. Potest enim lapis per violentiam sursum ferri, sed quod iste motus violentus sit ex eius naturali inclinatione, esse non potest. Similiter etiam potest homo per violentiam trahi, sed quod hoc sit ex eius voluntate, repugnat rationi violentiae. The reason of this is that the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge: just as the natural appetite is an inclination proceeding from an interior principle without knowledge. Now what is compelled or violent is from an exterior principle. Consequently it is contrary to the nature of the will’s own act, that it should be subject to compulsion and violence: just as it is also contrary to the nature of a natural inclination or movement. For a stone may have an upward movement from violence, but that this violent movement be from its natural inclination is impossible. In like manner a man may be dragged by force: but it is contrary to the very notion of violence, that he be dragged of his own will. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Deus, qui est potentior quam voluntas humana, potest voluntatem humanam movere; secundum illud Prov. XXI, cor regis in manu Dei est, et quocumque voluerit, vertet illud. Sed si hoc esset per violentiam, iam non esset cum actu voluntatis nec ipsa voluntas moveretur, sed aliquid contra voluntatem. Reply Obj. 1: God Who is more powerful than the human will, can move the will of man, according to Prov. 21:1: The heart of the king is in the hand of the Lord; whithersoever He will He shall turn it. But if this were by compulsion, it would no longer be by an act of the will, nor would the will itself be moved, but something else against the will. Ad secundum dicendum quod non semper est motus violentus, quando passivum immutatur a suo activo, sed quando hoc fit contra interiorem inclinationem passivi. Alioquin omnes alterationes et generationes simplicium corporum essent innaturales et violentae. Sunt autem naturales, propter naturalem aptitudinem interiorem materiae vel subiecti ad talem dispositionem. Et similiter quando voluntas movetur ab appetibili secundum propriam inclinationem, non est motus violentus, sed voluntarius. Reply Obj. 2: It is not always a violent movement, when a passive subject is moved by its active principle; but only when this is done against the interior inclination of the passive subject. Otherwise every alteration and generation of simple bodies would be unnatural and violent: whereas they are natural by reason of the natural interior aptitude of the matter or subject to such a disposition. In like manner when the will is moved, according to its own inclination, by the appetible object, this movement is not violent but voluntary. Ad tertium dicendum quod id in quod voluntas tendit peccando, etsi sit malum et contra rationalem naturam secundum rei veritatem, apprehenditur tamen ut bonum et conveniens naturae, inquantum est conveniens homini secundum aliquam passionem sensus, vel secundum aliquem habitum corruptum. Reply Obj. 3: That to which the will tends by sinning, although in reality it is evil and contrary to the rational nature, nevertheless is apprehended as something good and suitable to nature, insofar as it is suitable to man by reason of some pleasurable sensation or some vicious habit. Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum violentia causet involuntarium Whether violence causes involuntariness? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod violentia non causet involuntarium. Voluntarium enim et involuntarium secundum voluntatem dicuntur. Sed voluntati violentia inferri non potest, ut ostensum est. Ergo violentia involuntarium causare non potest. Objection 1: It would seem that violence does not cause involuntariness. For we speak of voluntariness and involuntariness in respect of the will. But violence cannot be done to the will, as shown above (A4). Therefore violence cannot cause involuntariness. Praeterea, id quod est involuntarium, est cum tristitia, ut Damascenus et philosophus dicunt. Sed aliquando patitur aliquis violentiam, nec tamen inde tristatur. Ergo violentia non causat involuntarium. Obj. 2: Further, that which is done involuntarily is done with grief, as Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) and the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 5) say. But sometimes a man suffers compulsion without being grieved thereby. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness. Praeterea, id quod est a voluntate, non potest esse involuntarium. Sed aliqua violenta sunt a voluntate, sicut cum aliquis cum corpore gravi sursum ascendit; et sicut cum aliquis inflectit membra contra naturalem eorum flexibilitatem. Ergo violentia non causat involuntarium. Obj. 3: Further, what is from the will cannot be involuntary. But some violent actions proceed from the will: for instance, when a man with a heavy body goes upwards; or when a man contorts his limbs in a way contrary to their natural flexibility. Therefore violence does not cause involuntariness. Sed contra est quod philosophus et Damascenus dicunt, quod aliquid est involuntarium per violentiam. On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) and Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 24) say that things done under compulsion are involuntary. Respondeo dicendum quod violentia directe opponitur voluntario, sicut etiam et naturali. Commune est enim voluntario et naturali quod utrumque sit a principio intrinseco, violentum autem est a principio extrinseco. Et propter hoc, sicut in rebus quae cognitione carent, violentia aliquid facit contra naturam; ita in rebus cognoscentibus facit aliquid esse contra voluntatem. Quod autem est contra naturam, dicitur esse innaturale, et similiter quod est contra voluntatem, dicitur esse involuntarium. Unde violentia involuntarium causat. I answer that, Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as likewise to the natural. For the voluntary and the natural have this in common, that both are from an intrinsic principle; whereas violence is from an extrinsic principle. And for this reason, just as in things devoid of knowledge, violence effects something against nature: so in things endowed with knowledge, it effects something against the will. Now that which is against nature is said to be unnatural; and in like manner that which is against the will is said to be involuntary. Therefore violence causes involuntariness. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod involuntarium voluntario opponitur. Dictum est autem supra quod voluntarium dicitur non solum actus qui est immediate ipsius voluntatis, sed etiam actus a voluntate imperatus. Quantum igitur ad actum qui est immediate ipsius voluntatis, ut supra dictum est, violentia voluntati inferri non potest, unde talem actum violentia involuntarium facere non potest. Sed quantum ad actum imperatum, voluntas potest pati violentiam. Et quantum ad hunc actum, violentia involuntarium facit. Reply Obj. 1: The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Now it has been said (A4) that not only the act, which proceeds immediately from the will, is called voluntary, but also the act commanded by the will. Consequently, as to the act which proceeds immediately from the will, violence cannot be done to the will, as stated above (A4): wherefore violence cannot make that act involuntary. But as to the commanded act, the will can suffer violence: and consequently in this respect violence causes involuntariness.