Articulus 5 Article 5 Utrum caritas possit esse sine fide et spe Whether charity can be without faith and hope? Ad quintum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas possit esse sine fide et spe. Caritas enim est amor Dei. Sed Deus potest a nobis amari naturaliter, etiam non praesupposita fide, vel spe futurae beatitudinis. Ergo caritas potest esse sine fide et spe. Objection 1: It would seem that charity can be without faith and hope. For charity is the love of God. But it is possible for us to love God naturally, without already having faith, or hope in future bliss. Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. Praeterea, caritas est radix omnium virtutum; secundum illud Ephes. III, in caritate radicati et fundati. Sed radix aliquando est sine ramis. Ergo caritas potest esse aliquando sine fide et spe et aliis virtutibus. Obj. 2: Further, charity is the root of all the virtues, according to Eph. 3:17: Rooted and founded in charity. Now the root is sometimes without branches. Therefore charity can sometimes be without faith and hope, and the other virtues. Praeterea, in Christo fuit perfecta caritas. Ipse tamen non habuit fidem et spem, quia fuit perfectus comprehensor, ut infra dicetur. Ergo caritas potest esse sine fide et spe. Obj. 3: Further, there was perfect charity in Christ. And yet He had neither faith nor hope: because He was a perfect comprehensor, as we shall explain further on (TP, Q7, AA3,4). Therefore charity can be without faith and hope. Sed contra est quod apostolus dicit, Heb. XI, sine fide impossibile est placere Deo; quod maxime pertinet ad caritatem, ut patet; secundum illud Proverb. VIII, ego diligentes me diligo. Spes etiam est quae introducit ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Ergo caritas non potest haberi sine fide et spe. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Heb 11:6): Without faith it is impossible to please God; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to Prov. 8:17: I love them that love me. Again, it is by hope that we are brought to charity, as stated above (Q62, A4). Therefore it is not possible to have charity without faith and hope. Respondeo dicendum quod caritas non solum significat amorem Dei, sed etiam amicitiam quandam ad ipsum; quae quidem super amorem addit mutuam redamationem cum quadam mutua communicatione, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Et quod hoc ad caritatem pertineat, patet per id quod dicitur I Ioan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Et I ad Cor. I dicitur, fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem filii eius. Haec autem societas hominis ad Deum, quae est quaedam familiaris conversatio cum ipso, inchoatur quidem hic in praesenti per gratiam, perficietur autem in futuro per gloriam, quorum utrumque fide et spe tenetur. Unde sicut aliquis non posset cum aliquo amicitiam habere, si discrederet vel desperaret se posse habere aliquam societatem vel familiarem conversationem cum ipso; ita aliquis non potest habere amicitiam ad Deum, quae est caritas, nisi fidem habeat, per quam credat huiusmodi societatem et conversationem hominis cum Deo, et speret se ad hanc societatem pertinere. Et sic caritas sine fide et spe nullo modo esse potest. I answer that, Charity signifies not only the love of God, but also a certain friendship with Him; which implies, besides love, a certain mutual return of love, together with mutual communion, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. That this belongs to charity is evident from 1 Jn. 4:16: He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him, and from 1 Cor. 1:9, where it is written: God is faithful, by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son. Now this fellowship of man with God, which consists in a certain familiar colloquy with Him, is begun here, in this life, by grace, but will be perfected in the future life, by glory; each of which things we hold by faith and hope. Wherefore just as friendship with a person would be impossible, if one disbelieved in, or despaired of, the possibility of their fellowship or familiar colloquy; so too, friendship with God, which is charity, is impossible without faith, so as to believe in this fellowship and colloquy with God, and to hope to attain to this fellowship. Therefore charity is quite impossible without faith and hope. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod caritas non est qualiscumque amor Dei, sed amor Dei quo diligitur ut beatitudinis obiectum, ad quod ordinamur per fidem et spem. Reply Obj. 1: Charity is not any kind of love of God, but that love of God, by which He is loved as the object of bliss, to which object we are directed by faith and hope. Ad secundum dicendum quod caritas est radix fidei et spei, inquantum dat eis perfectionem virtutis. Sed fides et spes, secundum rationem propriam, praesupponuntur ad caritatem, ut supra dictum est. Et sic caritas sine eis esse non potest. Reply Obj. 2: Charity is the root of faith and hope, insofar as it gives them the perfection of virtue. But faith and hope as such are the precursors of charity, as stated above (Q62, A4), and so charity is impossible without them. Ad tertium dicendum quod Christo defuit fides et spes, propter id quod est imperfectionis in eis. Sed loco fidei, habuit apertam visionem; et loco spei, plenam comprehensionem. Et sic fuit perfecta caritas in eo. Reply Obj. 3: In Christ there was neither faith nor hope, on account of their implying an imperfection. But instead of faith, He had manifest vision, and instead of hope, full comprehension: so that in Him was perfect charity. Quaestio 66 Question 66 De aequalitate virtutum Of Equality among the Virtues Deinde considerandum est de aequalitate virtutum. Et circa hoc quaeruntur sex. We must now consider equality among the virtues: under which head there are six points of inquiry: Primo, utrum virtus possit esse maior vel minor. (1) Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another? Secundo, utrum omnes virtutes simul in eodem existentes, sint aequales. (2) Whether all the virtues existing together in one subject are equal? Tertio, de comparatione virtutum moralium ad intellectuales. (3) Of moral virtue in comparison with intellectual virtue; Quarto, de comparatione virtutum moralium ad invicem. (4) Of the moral virtues as compared with one another; Quinto, de comparatione virtutum intellectualium ad invicem. (5) Of the intellectual virtues in comparison with one another; Sexto, de comparatione virtutum theologicarum ad invicem. (6) Of the theological virtues in comparison with one another. Articulus 1 Article 1 Utrum virtus possit esse maior vel minor Whether one virtue can be greater or less than another? Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod virtus non possit esse maior vel minor. Dicitur enim in Apoc. XXI, quod latera civitatis Ierusalem sunt aequalia. Per haec autem significantur virtutes, ut Glossa dicit ibidem. Ergo omnes virtutes sunt aequales. Non ergo potest esse virtus maior virtute. Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. For it is written (Rev 21:16) that the sides of the city of Jerusalem are equal; and a gloss says that the sides denote the virtues. Therefore all virtues are equal; and consequently one cannot be greater than another. Praeterea, omne illud cuius ratio consistit in maximo, non potest esse maius vel minus. Sed ratio virtutis consistit in maximo, est enim virtus ultimum potentiae, ut philosophus dicit in I de caelo; et Augustinus etiam dicit, in II de Lib. Arb., quod virtutes sunt maxima bona, quibus nullus potest male uti. Ergo videtur quod virtus non possit esse maior neque minor. Obj. 2: Further, a thing that, by its nature, consists in a maximum, cannot be more or less. Now the nature of virtue consists in a maximum, for virtue is the limit of power, as the Philosopher states (De Coelo i, text. 116); and Augustine says (De Lib. Arb. ii, 19) that virtues are very great boons, and no one can use them to evil purpose. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater or less than another. Praeterea, quantitas effectus pensatur secundum virtutem agentis. Sed virtutes perfectae, quae sunt virtutes infusae, sunt a Deo, cuius virtus est uniformis et infinita. Ergo videtur quod virtus non possit esse maior virtute. Obj. 3: Further, the quantity of an effect is measured by the power of the agent. But perfect, viz., infused virtues, are from God Whose power is uniform and infinite. Therefore it seems that one virtue cannot be greater than another. Sed contra, ubicumque potest esse augmentum et superabundantia, potest esse inaequalitas. Sed in virtutibus invenitur superabundantia et augmentum, dicitur enim Matth. V, nisi abundaverit iustitia vestra plus quam Scribarum et Pharisaeorum, non intrabitis in regnum caelorum; et Proverb. XV dicitur, in abundanti iustitia virtus maxima est. Ergo videtur quod virtus possit esse maior vel minor. On the contrary, Wherever there can be increase and greater abundance, there can be inequality. Now virtues admit of greater abundance and increase: for it is written (Matt 5:20): Unless your justice abound more than that of the Scribes and Pharisees, you shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven: and (Prov 15:5): In abundant justice there is the greatest strength. Therefore it seems that a virtue can be greater or less than another. Respondeo dicendum quod cum quaeritur utrum virtus una possit esse maior alia, dupliciter intelligi potest quaestio. Uno modo, in virtutibus specie differentibus. Et sic manifestum est quod una virtus est alia maior. Semper enim est potior causa suo effectu, et in effectibus, tanto aliquid est potius, quanto est causae propinquius. I answer that, When it is asked whether one virtue can be greater than another, the question can be taken in two senses. First, as applying to virtues of different species. In this sense it is clear that one virtue is greater than another; since a cause is always more excellent than its effect; and among effects, those nearest to the cause are the most excellent. Manifestum est autem ex dictis quod causa et radix humani boni est ratio. Et ideo prudentia, quae perficit rationem, praefertur in bonitate aliis virtutibus moralibus, perficientibus vim appetitivam inquantum participat rationem. Now it is clear from what has been said (Q18, A5; Q61, A2) that the cause and root of human good is the reason. Hence prudence which perfects the reason, surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power, insofar as it partakes of reason. Et in his etiam tanto est una altera melior, quanto magis ad rationem accedit. Unde et iustitia, quae est in voluntate, praefertur aliis virtutibus moralibus, et fortitudo, quae est in irascibili, praefertur temperantiae, quae est in concupiscibili, quae minus participat rationem, ut patet in VII Ethic. And among these, one is better than another, according as it approaches nearer to the reason. Consequently justice, which is in the will, excels the remaining moral virtues; and fortitude, which is in the irascible part, stands before temperance, which is in the concupiscible, which has a smaller share of reason, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6. Alio modo potest intelligi quaestio in virtute eiusdem speciei. Et sic, secundum ea quae dicta sunt supra, cum de intensionibus habituum ageretur, virtus potest dupliciter dici maior et minor, uno modo, secundum seipsam; alio modo, ex parte participantis subiecti. Si igitur secundum seipsam consideretur, magnitudo vel parvitas eius attenditur secundum ea ad quae se extendit. Quicumque autem habet aliquam virtutem, puta temperantiam, habet ipsam quantum ad omnia ad quae se temperantia extendit. Quod de scientia et arte non contingit, non enim quicumque est grammaticus, scit omnia quae ad grammaticam pertinent. The question can be taken in another way, as referring to virtues of the same species. In this way, according to what was said above (Q52, A1), when we were treating of the intensity of habits, virtue may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, in itself; second with regard to the subject that partakes of it. If we consider it in itself, we shall call it greater or little, according to the things to which it extends. Now whosoever has a virtue, e.g., temperance, has it in respect of whatever temperance extends to. But this does not apply to science and art: for every grammarian does not know everything relating to grammar. Et secundum hoc bene dixerunt Stoici, ut Simplicius dicit in commento praedicamentorum, quod virtus non recipit magis et minus, sicut scientia vel ars; eo quod ratio virtutis consistit in maximo. Si vero consideretur virtus ex parte subiecti participantis, sic contingit virtutem esse maiorem vel minorem, sive secundum diversa tempora, in eodem; sive in diversis hominibus. Quia ad attingendum medium virtutis, quod est secundum rationem rectam, unus est melius dispositus quam alius, vel propter maiorem assuetudinem, vel propter meliorem dispositionem naturae, vel propter perspicacius iudicium rationis, aut etiam propter maius gratiae donum, quod unicuique donatur secundum mensuram donationis Christi, ut dicitur ad Ephes. IV. And in this sense the Stoics said rightly, as Simplicius states in his Commentary on the Predicaments, that virtue cannot be more or less, as science and art can; because the nature of virtue consists in a maximum. If, however, we consider virtue on the part of the subject, it may then be greater or less, either in relation to different times, or in different men. Because one man is better disposed than another to attain to the mean of virtue which is defined by right reason; and this, on account of either greater habituation, or a better natural disposition, or a more discerning judgment of reason, or again a greater gift of grace, which is given to each one according to the measure of the giving of Christ, as stated in Eph. 4:9. Et in hoc deficiebant Stoici, aestimantes nullum esse virtuosum dicendum, nisi qui summe fuerit dispositus ad virtutem. Non enim exigitur ad rationem virtutis, quod attingat rectae rationis medium in indivisibili, sicut Stoici putabant, sed sufficit prope medium esse, ut in II Ethic. dicitur. Idem etiam indivisibile signum unus propinquius et promptius attingit quam alius, sicut etiam patet in sagittatoribus trahentibus ad certum signum. And here the Stoics erred, for they held that no man should be deemed virtuous, unless he were, in the highest degree, disposed to virtue. Because the nature of virtue does not require that man should reach the mean of right reason as though it were an indivisible point, as the Stoics thought; but it is enough that he should approach the mean, as stated in Ethic. ii, 6. Moreover, one same indivisible mark is reached more nearly and more readily by one than by another: as may be seen when several arches aim at a fixed target. Ad primum ergo dicendum quod aequalitas illa non est secundum quantitatem absolutam, sed est secundum proportionem intelligenda, quia omnes virtutes proportionaliter crescunt in homine, ut infra dicetur. Reply Obj. 1: This equality is not one of absolute quantity, but of proportion: because all virtues grow in a man proportionately, as we shall see further on (A2). Ad secundum dicendum quod illud ultimum quod pertinet ad virtutem, potest habere rationem magis vel minus boni secundum praedictos modos, cum non sit ultimum indivisibile, ut dictum est. Reply Obj. 2: This limit which belongs to virtue, can have the character of something more or less good, in the ways explained above: since, as stated, it is not an indivisible limit. Ad tertium dicendum quod Deus non operatur secundum necessitatem naturae, sed secundum ordinem suae sapientiae, secundum quam diversam mensuram virtutis hominibus largitur, secundum illud ad Ephes. IV, unicuique vestrum data est gratia secundum mensuram donationis Christi. Reply Obj. 3: God does not work by necessity of nature, but according to the order of His wisdom, whereby He bestows on men various measures of virtue, according to Eph. 4:7: To every one of you is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ. Articulus 2 Article 2 Utrum omnes virtutes in uno et eodem sint aequaliter intensae Whether all the virtues that are together in one man, are equal?